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ABSTRACT - THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MICROFINANCE: A 
NICARAGUAN CASE STUDY 
This thesis eschews an econometric approach to the analysis of microfinance 
initiatives in favour of a wider, political economy approach. It paints a picture of the 
international financial and socio-economic environment in which microfinance as a 
practice has developed since the mid-1970s, and the introduction outlines the political 
agendas that fuel the theoretical debate over development, and the manner in which 
the self-proclaimedly objective scientific rationale that underlines the dominant neo- 
liberal hegemony is in reality no such thing. 
The introduction is followed by a methodological explanation of the necessity to 
examine microfinance in such a context, and then deals with the combination of 
approaches included in the thesis, sources, and data-collection methods of the 
fieldwork in Nicaragua. The next three chapters comprise the body of theoretical and 
literary evidence in support of this methodology, from the international down to the 
sectoral level within Nicaragua. 
Having located the Nicaraguan microfinance sector within a theoretical, international 
and national context, the subsequent chapter moves to examine the local context. The 
fieldwork in Nicaragua culminates in a combined map- and questionnaire-based 
exercise set in Masaya, a city some 27 kilometres roughly south of Managua, the 
capital. The chapter examines the structure and functions of two local microfinance 
organisations, FAMA and ADIM, and conducts a close examination of the population 
amongst which these microfinance organisations operate. The survey of the socio- 
economy of households within the Masaya area concludes by casting doubts on, 
traditional methods of microfinance impact assessment, and suggests a different 
approach to studying microfinance. 
The thesis concludes by suggesting that the current vogue for envisaging 
microfinance initiatives as purely financial operations to be analysed as an accounting 
phenomenon is not only mistaken, but has potentially damaging consequences. The 
thesis argues that microfinance must be seen within local, national and international 
political contexts, and that doing so will help avoid costly errors. The thesis also 
suggests that the demand for new client-orientated initiatives will be assisted by 
taking the political economic reality into account, and by using methods such as those 
suggested by this thesis. 
KEYWORDS: Microfinance, Microcredit, Credit, Nicaragua, Political, 
Economy, Socio-economic, Neo-liberal 
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CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MICROFINANCE 
"Virtually every aspect of conventional economic theory is intellectually unsound; virtually every 
economic policy recommendation is just as likely to do harm as it is to lead to the general good. 
Far from holding the intellectual high ground, economics rests on foundations of quicksand. If 
economics were truly a science, then the dominant school of thought in economics would long 
ago have disappeared from view. 
Instead it has been preserved, not via greater knowledge, as its advocates might believe, but by 
ignorance. Many economists are simply unaware that the foundations of economics have even 
been disputed, let alone that these critiques have motivated prominent economists to profoundly 
change their views, and to consequently themselves become, to some extent, critics of economic 
theory. Names such as Irving Fisher, John Hicks, Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow, Alan Kirman 
and Joseph Stiglitz are famous within economics because they made major contributions to 
economic theory. Yet to varying degrees, these and other prominent economists have distanced 
themselves from conventional economics, after coming to believe, for a range of reasons, that the 
theory ha rboured fundamental flaws. " 
(Steve Keen, "Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor of the Social Sciences"; Pluto Press, 
Australia, 2001, p. 4) 
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"The religion of development cannot be validated or invalidated either. It doesn't matter whether 
it works or not, nor how many ordinary people's lives are damaged or destroyed, nor how much 
nature may be abused because of it. Development theory and practice cannot be validated 
because they are not scientific. They have not established reliable and recognized criteria for 
determining development has in fact occurred, except for internal economic indicators like the 
rate of return of an individual project or the growth of Gross National Product - themselves 
artificial constructions and articles of faith. " 
(Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli, `Faith And Credit', (Penguin, London) 1994, p. 6) 
"Is public support for microcredit wasted or worthwhile? No one knows. Most measures of the 
impact of microfinance organizations fail to control for what would have happened in their 
absence (Sebstad, Barnes, and Chen, 1995; Von Pischke and Adams, 1980). If users borrow 
more than once, then they must get benefits. The question, however, is not whether microfinance 
is better than nothing for its users. The question is whether microfinance is better than some 
other development project for the poor as a whole. " 
(Sergio Navajas, Mark Schreiner, Richard L. Meyer, Claudio Gonzalez-Vegas and Jorge 
Rodriguez-Meza, 2000, `Microcredit and the Poorest of the Poor: Theory and Evidence From 
Bolivia', World Development, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 333-346. ) 
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1.1 - Introduction - The Construction Of Microfinance 
This thesis is concerned with analysing a relatively new and increasingly popular tool for 
providing access to credit, known as microfmance, at every level from the global and theoretical 
down to local, cultural and practical. The analysis is intended to examine the interlinking spheres 
of knowledge and policy that comprise the environment in which theories of microfmance are 
expressed in practical terms. The thesis does this by comparing doxae (Bourdieu 1977: 167-70), 
those things that are "undiscussed, unnamed, admitted without argument or scrutiny", with 
knowledges that are hidden, and those that are forbidden. The thesis proceeds in stages from the 
macro to the micro, analysing in particular the ways in which the field of microfinance is affected 
experientially and ideologically by two closely-linked knowledge spheres, that of the political 
economy and that of gender. It is a central contention of the thesis that whilst the political 
economy and the gendered economy are the sea through which microfinance fish swim, these 
discourses are effectively ignored under the current orthodox economic hegemony, which 
sacrifices the analysis of difficult and frequently unmeasurable socio-cultural factors, for the false 
clarity of econometric analysis. 
Microfmance has increased rapidly in importance since the 1970s for a number of reasons 
intimately concerned with what has been termed the `impasse in development studies' (Booth 
1985). As a loan-based discipline in which at least the rudiments of successful practice can be 
detected in commonly high loan repayment rates, it appears to constitute a contraindication to a 
widely perceived failure of development in the South (Schuurman 2002). There is, in addition, an 
increasing movement towards the `globalization' of microfinance `best practice', that fits in well 
with the principles of universal applicability inherent in the neo-liberal discourse. Whether or not 
the reality of globalization per se is accepted (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1996), microfmance (and 
in particular microcredit, the practice of individualized lending) has developed in theory at least a 
truly globalize applicability. Crucial to the global spread of microfmance is the idea that through 
improving the economic well-being of the poor, microfmance reduces vulnerability: 
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"Building on the arguments of Rutherford (1999), the impact of financial services on 
reduced vulnerability may be described in terms of making available to clients 
`chunks' of money that enable them to protect against risk ahead of time (resist 
downward pressures and exploit opportunities to increase resources when they 
present themselves) and to cope with economic losses resulting from crises, shocks, 
and downward pressures. These services enable clients to move from a reactive 
mode to one that offers them more choices when faced with a crisis. " (Sebstad and 
Cohen 2000, p. 9) 
Set against this positivist view of microfmance, however, is the way in which it is perceived by 
some to reflect some of the more doubtful aspects of systematised economic orthodoxy, because 
it can be said to represent the way in which an `economic mindset implies a reductionist view of 
existence' (Nederveen Pieterse 2000, p. 175). These fears might at least be offset were it possible 
to provide hard evidence that microfmance initiatives have succeeded in raising the standards of 
living of substantial numbers of their clients. Whilst effective impact assessment has become the 
holy grail of microfmance practitioners, however, evidence of increased or decreased economic 
well-being amongst clients which is directly attributable to credit access has thus far proven 
difficult to separate from other socio-economic influences, although many researchers are in no 
doubt: 
"All the institutions studied made a considerable contribution to the reduction of 
poverty on all the measures of income which we considered. " (Mosley 1999, p. 3) 
The key words here however are `reduction of poverty' and `measures of income that we 
considered', with perhaps emphasis being laid on the measures chosen, and how they were 
measured. In the chapters that follow, the thesis points out that most (if not all) microfmance 
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institutions in Central America are pursuing those poor who are not amongst the very poorest, 
under pressure to achieve self-sustainability from donors; The grounds for making the above 
claim rests therefore in the main on the selection of control groups. Even were irrefutable 
evidence of beneficial effects is possible, microfmance theory and practice are still vulnerable to 
accusations that it is a post-development extension of Western power and strategy through other 
means, embodying a geopolitical viewpoint enacted and implemented through local third world 
elites (cf. Slater 1993). 
Such a severe critique, however, belies both the popularity of microfinance initiatives on a local 
scale and the drive for innovation and change within the practice; Indeed, it can be said that the 
internal debate amongst microfmance practitioners reflects the potential for change within the 
development debate itself (Brown 1996). It has been suggested that there is currently a `schism' 
(Morduch 1998) in microfmance theory and practice is between the camps of `Institutionists', for 
whom there is an emphasis on financial self-sufficiency and institutional scale, and `Welfarists' 
(Woller 1999), who underline the primacy of direct poverty alleviation among the very poor. A 
further distinction between the two is in the insistence by many Welfarists that microfinance 
should be used on a case-by-case basis as part of a holistic programme directed at poverty 
alleviation, whereas many Institutionists appear to believe that access to credit by itself is all that 
is necessary for poverty alleviation. 
In order to set both the internal debate regarding microfinance (and microfinance itself) in a 
wider context, this thesis uses heuristic analytical postulates of hidden and forbidden knowledges. 
The wide-scale corruption which permeates government and private sector alike in Nicaragua is 
one example of this, as is the party duopoly control of state structures, the closure of democracy 
and the continued internal intervention of external forces such as the US state department; 
knowledge of these issues is open, and yet they may not be taken into account when planning 
strategic poverty reduction policy. In seeking to include a discussion of such issues within the 
context of the wider development environment in Nicaragua, the thesis also undertakes a 
recognition that microfinance theory and practice, along with development, is but one way of 
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seeing the world "and one which carries certain consequences and assumptions" (Siddaway 2002, 
p. 18). Central to this recognition is the understanding that particularly under the current neo- 
liberal hegemony dominating International Financial Institutes (IFIs) and governments alike, 
there has been "created a space in which only certain things could be said or even 
imagined. "(Escobar 1995, p. 39). 
The example of the microfinance sector serves to illuminate other areas where lack of knowledge, 
both supposed and actual, acts directly on the central themes of the current development debate. 
The historicity of microfmance practice itself shows an ancient and usurped socio-cultural 
phenomenon, discuss in detail in the next chapter. The metonymic take-over of this history 
effectively coincides with the take-over of development theory through the `unchallengeable' 
hegemony of orthodox economism, and in particular the conditionality of structural adjustment, 
which is a global practical expression of that hegemony. At the end of the 1990s caution being 
urged by practitioners and researchers within the microfmance sector (Sebstad and Cohen 2000) 
concerning the palliative effects of microfmance on poverty had effectively been marginalized by 
the dominant Institutionist literature, for instance Otero and Rhyne (1994), where no such doubts 
in the efficacy of microfmance were being expressed: 
"Our specific concern is that in advocating their position, some prominent 
institutionists have gone too far - to insist that all MFIs adopt institutionist values 
and "best practices, " to attempt active suppression of the welfarist point of view, and 
to cause the expansion of "best practices" to become antithetical to the welfarist 
objective of direct poverty alleviation among the very poor. " (Woller, Op. Cit., p. 3) 
A predominance of the Institutionist school in Nicaragua (as indeed throughout Central America) 
was among the reasons for selecting it as the site for the fieldwork. In various interviews with the 
author the heads of various microcredit operations explained that it was simply not part of their 
business to target the poorest, but instead to achieve self-sufficiency as soon as possible, mainly 
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because of external donor pressure. Nicaragua is simultaneously experiencing amongst the 
highest concentrations of microfmance in the region, the highest population growth rate and the 
fastest rate of urbanization in Central America, as well as the highest per capita external debt of 
any country in the world. Apart from Haiti (with which it is rapidly closing), Nicaragua is the 
poorest country in the region and is, therefore, an ideal place to examine the contradictory nature 
of diverse aid policies and practices, those practiced by NGOs (Non-Government Organizations), 
those by state organizations, the external country donor organizations, and by the IFIs. 
Always present are the political economy and the gendered economy, in reality complex mixtures 
of process, agency and structure that are inseparable from the `real' economy. Even now, 
however, when gender as discourse is beginning to influence government and IFIs at the highest 
levels, neo-liberal economic theory and practice denies it agency by failing to take into account 
the different economic realities of men and women in discrete societies and cultures. Whilst 
gendered processes and structures constitute a body of hidden knowledge' however, the 
politicised nature of many emerging economies (such as that of Nicaragua) appears to be a 
forbidden subject - however much evidence is provided of the ineffectiveness and politicised 
prejudices of neo-liberal economic prescriptions, and however well-made the point that they 
serve the interests of rich societies which steadfastly refuse to act by inconvenient parts of the 
theory, the hegemony is sufficiently strong to deny this `other' reality a place at the table. 
The gender implications of microfmance occupy an important position in the development debate 
in the light of the andro-centric and orthodox institutions of IFI aid disbursement and policy, 
because of the specific targeting of poor women that appears to underline the repayment success 
of microfmance initiatives. The divide between Welfarists and Institutionists in microfinance 
finds echo in an increasing divergence of opinion between feminist researchers (Mayoux 2000a) 
Who define lack of empowerment for women in terms of overall socio-economic vulnerability, 
I Although with elements of the forbidden as well, such as the way in which the importance of female labour to the 
food production sector and the incorporation of the growing number of female heads of family into the wider 
economy is disavowed by the orthodox Catholic insistence on treating a mythical nuclear family headed by the 
paterfamilias as the centrepiece of social policy 
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and a perceived assumption on the part of more orthodox practitioners working on microfinance 
that empowerment can be achieved by clients through their own fmancial and economic 
endeavour: "It is supposed that high levels of demand for credit and high repayment rates indicate 
a positive gender impact and, because of this, explicit strategies for the empowerment of women 
are not needed. " (Mayoux 2000b p. 14, author's translation). 
Central to the examination of hidden/forbidden knowledge is an understanding of the signifier 
`economics' as a rigid and codified ideological construct, a `closed system' (Elson 1998, p. 156) 
that currently excludes significant bodies of knowledge. In terms of gendering economics, for 
instance, orthodox economics as taught from secondary school to graduate level in universities 
world-wide makes no attempt to measure or even allow for the existence of gender prejudice in 
the labour market, which is part of the orthodox preference for treating labour markets as 
homogenous, in terms at least of the economic logic practiced by worker and employer alike. In 
fact, male bias is overwhelming in many areas such as credit, labour, product markets and access 
to infrastructural services, about which there is an extensive literature (Agarwal 1988, Young 
1993, Kabeer 1994, Elson et al 1997) Similarly, gender-differentiated patterns of preference and 
utility (see for example Collier 1990) from the individual and household level upwards fand no 
place in the equilibrium-based models of orthodox economics, or the manner in which cultural 
and social dynamic interactions may affect and change both expressed and hidden preferences. 
The mythical `homo economicus' is indeed just that, a man; and perhaps the most serious flaw of 
orthodox description stems from that original sine. 
Despite the claims of the IFIs to be non-political and positive in their applications of a neutral 
economic logic, and despite a public face of consultation and discussion with borrowing 
governments in which adjustment programmes are alleged to be arrived at through consensus, the 
reality of structural adjustment is other (Stiglitz, 2000). As a direct consequence of the 
consecration and institutionalization of a generalized structural adjustment model and the debt 
2 Not only is this the case, but as Elson (1998) points out most people involved in macroeconomic policy formulation 
are male as well. 
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crisis, and under the perception that the same set of market-driven economic rules apply 
everywhere, conditionality-enforced adjustment programmes visited on borrowing countries 
continue to exhibit very little variation; however, "the justification of conditionality stands or 
falls on its ability to change policies for the better" (Killick 2002, p. 482). 
Thus far, even though some research indicates improvement in the area of macroeconomic 
stability3 during the latter part of the 1990s, the results have been disappointing, to say the least; 
the picture in Latin America is discussed in the next chapter, with a more generalized discussion 
of neo-liberalism and structural adjustment. As a result of a limited amount of determinable, 
sustained change for the better (Mosley et al 1995, Killick 1995, Killick et al 1998) the 
homogeneity of approach implicit in the structural adjustment model is becoming subject to 
sustained and increasing internal and external pressure, however, ranging from a growing 
acceptance of individual country difference by the IFIs themselves, a similar recognition of the 
need to develop new tools to focus on poverty alleviation, and the recently recognized 
problematics of governability, transparency, and constructing democratic participatory 
mechanisms under which adjustment must be carried out to be fully effective. 
A central tenet of structural adjustment, the reification of economics and its' cognitive 
sterilization as neutral and objective, is based on another doxa: the constitution of economic 
knowledge and who defines it. So firm is this doxa, indeed, and such the confidence in it, that 
although the IFIs and the World Bank in particular undertake a good deal of research, this is 
frequently research whose results have been pre-determined: 
"World Bank texts on privatization have been criticized on several counts. Its 
publications tend to be selective in use of evidence. The extensive body of critical 
3 Particularly control over inflation rates; however, it should be noted that there is controversy over how the causal 
mechanism for control of inflation works, and whether it is due to adjustment or general economic debilitation, and 
in addition over exactly what levels of inflation are harmful (see FLORA Community Web 1999) 
9 
literature......... is rarely acknowledged in Bank publications. Rather citations are 
dominated by Bank-sponsored studies which tend to be more supportive of 
privatization. The 1995 Report, Bureaucrats in Business, attracted substantial 
criticism for among other things, the narrow analytical framework and questionable 
causality assumptions. Bank literature on privatization seems to support a 
predetermined conclusion, applying a circular logic and developing a framework 
where all findings are evidence of benefits of privatization. For example, in the 
study of African experience, privatization can be shown to be beneficial if an 
enterprise performance improves or if it fails (as privatization means that state 
support for a failing enterprise has been withdrawn). This framework ensures that 
critical outcomes fail to emerge. " (Bayliss 2000, p. 6) 
For the IFIs, the gap in knowledge that is believed to afflict developing countries (and which 
World Bank research is supposed in part to address) is caused by lack of technology and 
institutions, rather than just appropriate policies. These are all acting however, as mere conduits 
for the transmission of a received knowledge; there appears to be no question as to whether there 
is any flaw in the knowledge itself that is being transmitted, whether it is incomplete, or whether 
it is just plain wrong. There are, fairly obviously, fundamental contradictions between 
democratic, participatory and ownership-based approaches to development, and the centralized, 
top-down and autocratic theories and policies inherent in structural adjustment. Similarly, those 
microfinance practitioners who call for innovative, adaptable and need-sensitive microfmance 
find themselves increasingly sidelined by the institutional, donor-driven surge towards massive 
coverage and the self-sustainability of microcredit organizations. This view of potential 
microfmance clients leads to some occasionally disturbing assessments of the situation in Latin 
America: 
"Once we acknowledge the increasing significance of microfinance in the region's 
economy, we should consider two main points of view regarding the direct influence 
of MFI in the reduction of poverty. The first considers that workers in the MIC 
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sector are underemployed and are working in the informal sector due to their low 
skills. The second favors the view that most workers choose this sector due to its 
flexibility and increasing opportunities. " (Herrador & Clapes 2002, p. 3) 
The poor in Latin America are therefore either those with few or no skills and work in the 
informal sector because of this, or those who choose to work in the sector out of preference 
because of the flexibility and increased opportunities. Analysis such as this fits in all too well 
with the more extreme neo-liberal view of unemployment as always voluntary, a state in which a 
choice is being made between leisure and earnings. 
In order to expand in outline these ideas of hidden/forbidden knowledge, this introductory 
chapter continues with a brief exploration of gender issues as they pertain both to the current 
regime of structural adjustment maintained by the IFIs, and to the environment in which theory 
and practice of microfmance takes place. The chapter touches on the attitude of the IFIs to gender 
(in a wider context as well as applied to the microfmance sector) as opposed to the reality 
expressed in practice. Problems arising from discussions of wider issues of empowerment are 
also outlined, such as the importance and definition of the gendered household in the 
development discourse. The third section of the chapter contains a discussion of the wider 
political economy issues that microfmance in general, and the way in which microfmance is 
practiced in Nicaragua. The section also deals briefly with issues such as corruption, as well as 
the NGO sector, which are explored in more detail in the next four chapters. The fourth section of 
the chapter goes into the wider issues involved in the hegemony of economic orthodoxy as a 
vehicle for a universal, neutral truth, using some of the more contentious issues such as 
inappropriate privatization to critique the vaunted objectivity of the economic discourse on which 
adjustment is based. 
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1.2.1 - Hidden Knowledge - Microfinance and the Gendered Economy 
"Most of us, when asked, have a great deal of difficulty defining empowerment. The word does 
not even translate literally into many languages. Yet, most of us know empowerment when we 
see it. " 
(Suzy Cheston and Lisa Kuhn, `Empowering Women Through Microfinance', Draft Document 
3/14/02, Microcredit Summit Website. ) 
There has been an increasing prominence given to an understanding of gender dynamics over the 
last ten to fifteen years, in all areas of development and at all levels from the personal to the 
global by practitioners and theoreticians alike. This is an overdue and partial attempt to research 
and give an effective voice to a fundamental source of hidden/forbidden knowledge in the 
development discourse. That this attempt is overdue is due to the predominantly white, male, 
middle-class and euro-centric (or perhaps occido-centric) hand (Teivainen 1994), not just of the 
IFIs themselves, but of institutional research and policy implementation in general. This 
increasing prominence has been reluctantly given and frequently bitterly contested, despite 
research indicating the vital nature of gendered development policy stretching back more than 
thirty years. 
In the US, for instance, whilst aid policy becomes increasing hostage to pressure such as that 
from the Christian right to halt aid to programmes having access to birth control or abortion as 
components, the long-forgotten Percy Amendment of 1973 is still in force. This amendment for 
the first time explicitly addressed women's roles in the development process, and still requires 
U. S. assistance programs to enhance the integration of women into the national economies of 
developing countries (Sharma 2001). It also instructs the State Department to consider progress 
on women's issues when making decisions about funding international organizations. Despite 
this attempt to enhance the appropriateness of US aid policy, and in an environment increasingly 
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hostile to gender issues, in 1993 the Government Accounting Office evaluated USAID's progress 
in meeting the requirements of the Percy Amendment, and found that USA. ID had only recently 
started to consider the role of women in development strategies despite 20 years having passed 
since Congress stated that AID programs should focus on women (US Government Accounting 
Office 1993). 
The US is by no means isolated, however, in its' approach to the contribution of women to the 
economy; its failure to take seriously a gendered approach to appropriate policy reflects an 
undervaluing of women's roles that extends from the global to the local, in most rich as well as 
poor countries. This systematic under-valuation and misunderstanding of the role of women in 
rich as well as poor communities, where this role underpins important distributive principles, 
simply reinforces gender-related deprivation, or what Sen (1990) terms "perceived contribution 
response". Domestic policy in the USA, the UK or any other CME (Complex Market Economy) 
continues to be underpinned by an elect orally acceptable model construct of a family defined by 
marital status that is acceptable to the Judaeo-Christian cognitive model, when in both countries 
more children are born out of wedlock than inside it, and this is largely reflected in official aid 
policy. 
1.2.2 - Gender And The International Financial Institutions 
From the famous ten points that became known as the Washington consensus, outlined by 
Williamson (1990), which describe the basis for conditionality-based structural adjustment, and 
from which the prescriptions of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are derived, the core of 
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`appropriate' policy advice from the IFIs, based on the neo-liberal interpretation of orthodox 
economics, is notable for an absence of gendered knowledge. This is despite the fact that 
organisations such as the World Bank are beginning to produce research such as that indicating 
that gender prejudice in education and health is suppressing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
Africa by 0.8% annually (Blackden and Bhanu 1998). The 1990s have seen the setting up of 
instruments such as the Living Standards Measurement Surveys to monitor the effects of 
adjustment at the lowest levels (Brydon 2002), and short-term targeted poverty alleviation 
packages such as Ghana's PAMSCAD (Brydon and Legge 1996) which contain elements of 
gendered policy, but these are effectively short-term measures covering what are perceived as 
temporary aberrations, not recognitions of fundamental flaws in theory and practice. 
Nevertheless, the World Bank continues to claim that: "Investing in women is a major theme in 
the World Bank's two pronged strategy for poverty reduction (World Bank 1994a, p. 8). 
Whilst the political importance and place of gender in development continues to be contested, 
microfinance derives major importance from being a socio-economic instrument promoted by the 
IFIs aimed primarily at women, with a central stated purpose of financial empowerment. As well 
as providing a stark contrast to the reluctance to give practical recognition to the political 
importance of gender within the power structures of international development, a central support 
of the success of microfmance institutions has been the greater dependability of women as users 
and repayers of credit. This strikes at orthodox economic suppositions of homogeneity between 
men and women in markets, giving a clear illustration of how orthodox economic theory shapes 
gendered prejudice as exact science (Elson 1995a). This `discovery' of women as a vital 
component in at least one facet of development by orthodox economists must raise wry smiles 
amongst those feminists who have long argued that it is not women that must be problematised, 
but gender relations (Pearson and Jackson 1998), and that gender relations are central to the 
development of effective policies at all levels (Elson, 1995a, Op. Cit. ). 
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1.2.3 - Wider Issues Of Empowerment 
In examining microfmance in Nicaragua, the thesis briefly discusses wider issues of 
empowerment and oppression, following Kabeer (1998) where empowerment is conceived of as a 
multidimensional process of change varying across class, time and space. In this respect the 
studies that detect negative impacts through access to micro-loans on the empowerment of 
women are problematic, not least because as Kabeer (Op. Cit. ) points out, the definitions of 
empowerment used, and subsequent analyses of the impact of loans, tend to be derived from 
particular theoretical frameworks. As an example of this, the UNDP Human Development Report 
of 1995 included two new indexes, a Gender Disparity Index and a Gender Empowerment 
Measure, of which the latter attempted to establish a universal index attempting to measure 
female empowerment. As Baden and Goetz (1998) point out, however, the index used top-down 
indices such as measures of income, participation in managerial and professional jobs, as well as 
formal political participation to measure what is usually understood to be a collective, bottom- 
upwards form of development 
Beside the disempowering bias in the development discourse due to gender, proponents of 
participatory development point out that so-called normal development is full of other biases 
such as eurocentrism and positivism (Chambers 1997). The thesis adds to the body of knowledge 
in this area, paying particular attention to ideas put forward from other studies (Zaman 1999) 
suggesting that empowerment for women should be seen in the context of the household as a 
whole, and relevant changes in their overall status within the extended network in which they 
operate. Attitudes within the microfmance sector (and especially the Institutionist faction) plainly 
see empowerment almost entirely in terms of income and earnings opportunities, with the rest to 
follow, in contrast to the work of writers from the South such as Batliwala (1994, p. 130), who see 
4 As well as its' increasing symbolic importance, discussed in the next chapter 
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empowerment as: `the process of challenging existing power relations, and of gaining greater 
control over the sources of power'. 
If it is accepted that empowerment is a personal, relational and collective process (Rowlands 
1997) in which "empowerment is more than participation in decision-making; it must also 
include the processes that lead people to perceive themselves as able and entitled to make 
decisions" (Rowlands, ibid. p.. 14), there is a growing body of evidence to support the contention 
that access to credit can form an important part of aid projects with a gender focus aimed at 
empowerment. In countries such as Bangladesh research has indicated that participation by 
women in aid projects having a credit component encourages participation in local politics 
(Mayoux 2000a) and other forms of social activity traditionally denied them (Cheston & Kuhn 
2002). Other research in countries such as Uganda (Sebstad and Cohen Op. Cit. ) seems to indicate 
that the support networks constructed as part of microfinance initiatives themselves constitute a 
positive impetus towards empowerment, irrespective of how successful the actual financial 
component, the loan, might be. Group meetings may well provide fora for self-help and mutual 
support, and the very act of getting together to learn about saving, planning and development of 
rotating savings and loan groups can have effects beyond the purely financial in societies where 
this kind of female gathering (or female participation in this type of activity) is either a rarity or 
impinges on cultural taboos. 
Wittingly or unwittingly, such groups can be constructive at the local level by encouraging less 
measurable processes such as ability in public speaking, the development of trust and friendship 
amongst members, the patronising of each other's businesses and help with each other's funerals 
and weddings. These processes frequently act in promoting social well-being and stability in 
ways outside the financial vision of the founders of the groups, and are the type of phenomena 
which have increasingly become incorporated under the heading of social capital (see Becker 
1996 and Tommasi and Iurelli 1995). 
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The latter concept, having increased in importance to the point of becoming one of the key terms 
in the current development lexicon (Harriss and de Renzio, 1997), has increasingly been used to 
elicit crude statistical causal relationships from complex, delicate and chaotic aspects of 
communal and individual behaviour: 
"Such studies have the explicit aim of leaping from the individual to the social by 
the use of macro-structural indicators and statistics to avoid both conceptual issues 
and the causal mechanisms and processes by which the social is reproduced. " (Fine 
1999, p. 6) 
Such positive processes are rarely static or stable, and unless the processes by which they may be 
developed through development initiatives and incorporated into organizational processes are 
better understood then they run the danger of becoming `indiscriminate applications of social and 
`other' capitals (Woolcock 1998, p. 155) - the same factors which lead to the development of what 
might loosely be referred to as social capital can lead to its destruction. Neither is an `abstract 
theory of social capital which focuses on the logistics of networks' (Fine, ibid. p. 7) sufficient or 
per se indicative of social benefit; `perverse' social capital (Rubio 1997) forms the clientelistic 
links that comprise much of the corruption in Latin America, and which are themselves a form of 
social capital. In such situations it is therefore by no means inevitable that the development of 
social capital (however that term is understood) will be empowering. The processes and actions 
involved in accumulating social capital in a corrupt, clientelistic society must each involve a 
degree of abandonment of personal liberty and increased vulnerability to the arbitrariness of 
autocratic control. 
Widening the discussion on the cultural norms that handicap empowerment, processes of 
empowerment are a mirror image of the processes leading to risk and vulnerability, and as 
Kabeer (1994) says, women experience different risks than men. In the Nicaraguan context, 
whilst women are not forced to subject themselves to the kind of cultural norms that may operate 
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in Islamic cultures for example, the cultural environment embodied in latino discourses of 
marianismo and machismo (which are explained later in the thesis) create a pervasive atmosphere 
of insistent male dominance, underlined by an unfocused yet persistent menace of violence. In 
the Nicaraguan context machismo and marianismo are examined as current cognitive models of 
pervasive strength whose manifestations, whilst changed over time, continue to have a strong 
affect on all aspects of social development, and perhaps nowhere more so than in the economic 
context. Despite the socio-economic change that took place in Nicaragua during the revolutionary 
period of 1979-90 and the different attitudes to gender embodied in the revolutionary project, the 
range of potential choices available to women in terms of employment remains limited, although 
in two key economic sectors, white-collar/ professional work and small-scale commerce, there 
has been rapid change and expansion of participation. 
The public service sector since 1990 in Nicaragua has been associated with more highly skilled 
and waged jobs for women, and certainly the two sectors that employ women predominantly are 
small-scale ambulant commerce and the public sector. Gendered analysis of privatisation, 
furthermore, whether under the aegis of adjustment-derived privatisation or under GATS 
(General Agreement on Trade in Services) initiatives from the WTO, shows that the worst 
affected are mostly women (White 2001). In 1991 in Nicaragua, after the first Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) agreed by the Chamorro government with the IMF, the worst 
affected were government workers in the health and education sectors where more than 70% of 
those laid off were women. Adverse affects of privatisation for women are not restricted to 
employment, however; for-profit provision of healthcare, education and water impact far more 
heavily on women in terms of access and payment, because of the gendered reality that places 
these activities in their realm of responsibility. 
Throughout Central America vulnerability and risk for women are defined by symptoms of the 
machismo/marianismo duality in ways which are familiar to researchers in other countries, in 
particular with domestic and societal phenomena such as violence within and outside the home, 
lack of co-operation by and with husbands, and abandonment by and of husbands. The extended 
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(frequently multiple) female-headed household at the centre of a family network is a common 
occurrence as the economic situation in Nicaragua is quickly destroying the reality (as opposed to 
the symbolism) of the family with the male as primary breadwinner and paterfamilias. As the 
growth in importance of migrant labour within and outside Nicaragua increasingly affects both 
male and female labour forces, relationships in any case amongst the poor are taking on fluid and 
temporary shapes. A man may have more than one family either inside or outside Nicaragua and 
yet describe himself as single; a woman may have a 'permanent' partner who is a migrant labourer 
in Costa Rica, and occasional other partners in the community (none of the relationships based on 
formal marriage) and yet describe herself as married. 
1.2.4 - The Gendered Household 
Similar caution needs to be taken in approaching the household as a unit for analysis of 
empowerment, even if the fact that a woman may not personally have full control over loan 
money disbursed to her in her name is not necessarily an indication of disenfranchisement or 
disempowerment within a household unit. The household is a fluid, dynamic organisation that 
may exhibit overlapping spheres of co-operation as well as non-co-operation (Agarwal 1997). 
Members of households additionally have agendas which may co-operate but can as frequently be 
contradictory, and may be hidden or revealed. The traditional, orthodox method of treating the 
household as a unit of production and consumption striving for Pareto optimality fails completely 
to take into account the unstable and counterproductive dynamics that may drive them: 
"In contrast, the "noncooperative" models relax many of these assumptions, 
including those of Pareto efficiency, income pooling, and enforceable and binding 
contracts. In addition to allowing differing preferences between individuals, they 
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allow for individual production decisions and asymmetry between the parties with 
respect to information and the rules of the game (see Wooley 1988, and Kanbur and 
Haddad 1994, among others). " (Agarwal, Op. Cit, p. 10. ) 
To this might be added that individual actors bring to the household varying assets and 
bargaining powers, depending on gender, culture and the socio-economic constraints within 
which individual men and women and households operate, and that the dynamics of power within 
households undergo change over time. Following Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000), a more 
realistic model for households would appear to be one where analysis of bargaining power was 
affected by four sets of determinants - (1) control over household resources; (2) influences that 
can be used to influence household bargaining processes; (3) mobilization of interpersonal 
networks and (4) basic attitudinal attributes. 
Clearly the structures through which microfmance is filtered such as gender and household 
composition, and which model the household occupies out of a range of possible co-operative 
and non-co-operative sets (McElroy 1992) are complex issues that are not addressed in orthodox 
economic theory. With this in mind, the diverse methods employed in this thesis to illuminate the 
subject similarly recall feminist methodologies: 
"A feminist investigation is defined more by its focus than by the methodology used. 
The use of diverse methods gives validity and rigour to an investigation 
(triangulation). " (Bradshaw, 1999 P. 6, author's translation) 
The methodology used to examine the guiding principles established above consist, therefore, of 
a mixture of documentary research, personal interviews with microfmance practitioners, actors 
within the sector and outside it who influence it, as well as with individual loan clients. The 
fieldwork also involves a mapping exercise and questionnaire interviews, plus the use of diverse 
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media sources with a view not only to drawing a more out a realistic picture of the environment 
in which the Nicaraguan microfmance sector operates, but also to revealing those parts of the 
gendered and political economy which remain out of view in the official development discourse 
of the IFIs and external donors. 
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1.3.1 - Forbidden Knowledge - Microfinance And Political Economy 
"To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its flat is law upon the 
subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or 
good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor 
because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the 
United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with 
its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any 
or all other powers. " 
(Richard Olney, The Olney Memorandum, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States...... 1895 Part I, US Department of State, quoted in Holden, R. H. & Zolov, E. Ed. s. 2000, 
`Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History' (OUP, Oxford), p. 66) 
Central America concentrates many microfmance practitioners and organizations in a relatively 
small geographical area, and the unique post-World War II political economy of the region serves 
to illustrate clearly the political economy of aid policy itself. The rapid urbanization of the region 
(with amongst the highest rates of population growth and urbanization in the world) conflicts 
with a continued heavy dependence on the agro-fishery sector and the export of primary products 
throughout the region. Microfinance practice in Central America, therefore, takes place in a 
region in which the debate concerning sustainable rural livelihoods is most put to the test. Given 
the generally poor economic state of the region and the intractability of poverty everywhere 
except Costa Rica, enthusiasm for a particularly Institutionist vision of microfmance within 
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USAID and US government circles is entirely understandable, especially in view of the 
traditional US enthusiasm for self-reliant capitalism, and `do-it-yourself poverty alleviation5. 
In terms of actual democratic participation, whilst it is true that during the 1980s and 1990s the 
Central American region experienced an unprecedented wave of democratic development, it is 
questionable how effective democracy can be in a situation where many vital state functions are 
dictated by adjustment programmes. As a direct corollary of this, whilst macroeconomic and 
microeconomic processes alike are being controlled by the requirement to adjust, it must be 
questioned how effective microfinance can be in absorbing the unemployment that is an 
inevitable result of adjustment programmes. The thesis describes how with the unpopular nature 
of many adjustment processes, for instance the cessation of food subsidies, cutbacks in state 
expenditure on vital educational and health programmes, and the increasing of taxes to fund state 
activities where much state income goes towards debt servicing, adjustment frequently relies on a 
rich elite to carry through reforms in the face of popular opposition. Even where the dictatorially 
optimal conditions have been present for the pursuit of neo-liberal economic policies, such as 
in 
Malawi under Hastings Banda (Kydd 1988) or Chile after the overthrow of Allende (Munoz 
1986, Ffrench-Davis 1988, Petras and Leiva 1994), the destructive effects of the policies 
themselves have frequently been such as to cause the cessation of the programme and the 
adoption of more pragmatic measures. 
S One piece of research makes the suggestion that the push towards individual loan practices in Nicaragua, to the 
virtual exclusion of solidarity groups, may be an effort to avoid co-operative, group-based activities associated with 
Socialism; a fierce indication of the politicised nature of the economy if true (Findley A. L. & Salgdo M. M. 2001). 
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1.3.2 - Nicaragua And The USA 
In Nicaragua a combination of `appropriate' policy recommendations from the IMF and heavy 
pressure from the US State department have conspired to force damaging options on the 
government towards the agricultural sector on which Nicaragua is so heavily dependent - policies 
to settle the land tenure problems occasioned by the agrarian reform of 1980-90. The agrarian 
reform (discussed in detail in chapter 4) that took place during the revolutionary period placed in 
the hands of small producers and co-operatives some 3.5 -4 million manzanas of Ian d6, giving 
Nicaraguan potentially the most egalitarian distribution in Central America. The reform is further 
being undermined by different factors such as the credit restrictions placed on the Nicaraguan 
banking system by IFI-decreed conditionality, and at the same time the forced disappearance of 
the state banks that provided the vast bulk of credit to small producers. Additionally, as the price 
of export crops such as coffee decline, pressure from the US to give back land and properties to 
pre-revolutionary owners who are now US citizens combine to produce an environment of 
extreme uncertainty. 
The socio-economic consequence of US hostility to the legacy of the agrarian reform, plus credit 
restrictions placed on the formal banking system as a consequence of IMF insistence on 
inflationary control and the need to attract foreign investors, act increasingly to destabilize an 
already weak economy. At the same time Nicaragua is being encouraged to alleviate its' debt and 
poverty problems by increasing exports, predominantly coffee, which depends on a stable and 
flexible agricultural supply and credit system; the price of coffee is in long-term decline, and in 
addition the US (Nicaragua's single most important trading partner) is restricting its' markets for 
Nicaraguan produce, whilst insisting that all barriers to US investment and ownership are 
removed. In this situation, models of comparative advantage and trade- and export-based growth 
are relatively meaningless, and yet these are the prescriptions of the IMF. In this case, then, the 
international political economy is a case of `forbidden' knowledge, since the situation is clear and 
6 The exact quantity redistributed varies greatly according to source - see chapter 4 
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yet the IMF apparently may not take it into account the consequences of its own policy 
prescriptions. 
1.3.3 - Microfinance And The Political Economy Of Banking In Nicaragua 
The formal banking system in Nicaragua7, closely linked to the political system to which it has 
privileged access, maintains restriction on access to the banking system and credit, whilst at the 
same time participating in the more economically destabilizing financial services. The provision 
of short-term high-interest foreign currency accounts and the provision of services to facilitate 
capital flight, in common with many Central American countries, is an important source of profit 
for the private banks, and is both a cause of and a consequence of the weakness of the financial 
system and financial regulation. The internal administration of the banks and the state regulatory 
mechanisms that exist in Nicaragua mean that far from stabilizing the system and acting as 
guarantors to in-country and external investors and savers, they themselves are a debilitating 
influence. 
Chapter 5 of the thesis contends that, from a political point-of-view, microfmance initiatives in 
the Nicaraguan case are viewed with suspicion by the private banks as a potential rival, by the 
government as a diversion of and usurpation of authority, and by the largest opposition faction, 
the FSLN, as practitioners of usury profiting from the country's poverty. Chapters 4 and 5 of the 
thesis also explain the politicized manner in which regulation is enacted in Nicaragua, as well as 
the ways in which obstruction, blackmail and bribery are visited on profitable business from even 
those institutional bodies purportedly responsible for the even-handed enactment of regulatory 
7 Discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 5 
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legislation. The result of this is that it is frequently the regulatory mechanism itself that stagnates 
legitimate business and scares away venture capital. This, however, is for reasons that are entirely 
different from the state=bad/private sector=good discourse of the IFIs; corruption in Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries is both an inevitability and an essential component of structural 
adjustment. 
1.3.4 - The Economy Of Corruption 
As the thesis also discusses, externally imposed socio-economic constraints on the Central 
American political economy are therefore nuanced and exacerbated by internal corruption. This 
process is usually examined as an illness of a temporary nature, rather than as a mixture of 
formative components of a cultural infrastructure (the caudillismo (petty tyranny) and clientelism 
of criollo politics, for instance), and externally induced opportunism (the forced sale of state 
telecoms companies where there are no interested buyers, for instance). Frequently, sales of state 
assets (ostensibly promoted to increase illusory private sector efficiency in those assets) result in 
transfers for minimal or no gains to the state. These sales into private hands tend to operate 
through corrupt and fraudulent auction processes, among other reasons because often there are no 
or very few interested other buyers (Bayliss 2000). Another component of the hostility that 
microfmance operations in Nicaragua attract is caused by the fact that they represent massive 
flows of money into and out of the country that are to a large degree outside the control of the 
traditional political elites, and are thus far less prone to misuse. 
The thesis examines how in Nicaragua corruption constitutes one of the bodies of hidden 
knowledge in the political economy, impinging both directly and indirectly on microfmance 
organizations and thus contradicting a central tenet of adjustment, that the private sector must, by 
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its' very nature, be more efficient than state control. Thus, we read in the government of 
Nicaragua's letter of intent to the IMF of August 30th 2000: 
"In the structural area, the National Assembly passed legislation to help improve 
transparency and efficiency in government procurement. Laws relating to the central 
bank, commercial banks and the Superintendency of banks approved in the fourth 
quarter of 1999 strengthened the autonomy of the central bank and improved the 
legal basis for prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions. " 
If this is accepted at face value, as the IMF/IDA (International Development Association) joint 
staff response to the Nicaraguan Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IMF/IDA 2000) makes 
plain that they do, it would appear that the Nicaraguan government is making efforts to regulate 
government and combat corruption. Widening the view of the enquiry, however, all legislation 
passed by the National Assembly was at the time of writing subject to the pact between the two 
parties (FSLN and PLC) that effectively divides up government between them. As a direct 
consequence of this laws to promote the autonomy of the Central Bank and the Superintendency 
are effectively meaningless since both bodies are subject to political appointment, and regulation 
and supervision of financial institutions is effectively what the political party executives, many of 
them board members of those same financial institutions, decide it is. 
Following this theme chapters two and four discusses the ideas brought forward in the `Interim 
Poverty Reduction Strategy' written by the Nicaraguan Government to the IMF in 2000, which 
contain a blend of `traditional' adjustment prescriptions (economic growth, decentralization of 
government) with newer ideas that fall under the `broadened goals' (Stiglitz 1998) of the so- 
called `post -Washington Consensus' (investment in human capital, strengthening of institutions 
and good governance). The four pillars and three themes identified in the joint staff assessment 
by the IMF and the IDA are i) broad-based economic growth focused on employment and the 
rural sector, ii) better investment in human capital of the poor, iii) better protection of vulnerable 
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populations and iv) the strengthening of institutions and good governance. The three themes are 
i) reducing the environmental and ecological degradation of the country, ii) bringing about 
greater social equity, and iii) a further decentralization of the government. 
Whilst the principles of `post-Washington' as applied to the Nicaraguan IPRS sound reasonable 
and should certainly be at the centre of any broad-based, participatory and equitable development 
strategy, the new consensus is not built on an acceptance of the fundamental theoretical flaws of 
the old Consensus. The new emphasis on the `dominant keys' (Jayasuriya 1999) of governance, 
civil society and social safety nets are certainly a welcome change, but the strictly neo-liberal 
model of structural adjustment had in any case been already evolving in some countries such as 
Chile and Brazil into a more socially democratic interpretation (Gwynne and Kay 1999). The 
reality in Nicaragua is that all of the themes and pillars of the IPRS require policies and practices 
that run contrary not only to the current global trade and financial systems environment 
encouraged by the IMF, they also run contrary to the corrupt and autocratic political and social 
environment of Nicaragua itself. In addition, the IMF and the World Bank can themselves afford 
to be less gung-ho about such issues as subsidies and economic liberalisation when they now 
have the regulatory framework of the WTO to take care of these areas for them 
1.3.5 - The Political Economy Of The NGO sector 
Finally, a consideration of the role of the NGO sector is essential to an analysis of the political 
economy in Nicaragua because of the high and increasing levels of employment it represents, not 
to mention its' effective usurpation of some state functions. Microfmance disbursement operates 
through the offices of NGOs in Nicaragua, and as the thesis details in Chapter 4a large part of 
the yearly business of the National Assembly of Nicaragua is spent in constituting new NGOs. 
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The rapidly changing role of NGOs themselves is the subject of increasing analysis (Bendana 
2000), as is the relationship between NGOs, host-country governments, and IFIs. Increasingly 
NGOs are being co-opted into closer relationships with government, to the extent that in some 
countries (Bolivia for instance) they have effectively evolved into agencies of government. Even 
were this not the case, the exact role of NGOs, the appropriateness of their advice and exactly 
who they represent are questions that are under keen examination, frequently by nobody more 
keenly than the NGOs themselves. The clash of agendas and interests between NGO, national 
and local actors may be fierce, and co-operation either lacking or temporary: 
"Many NGOs will respond to local and global dynamics in a way that is distinct 
from local social actors and community-based organizations, employing different 
strategies--often the product of different understandings. The relationship between 
NGOs, be they international or national, is less one of "solidarity" than 
"cooperation" on the basis of a temporary intersection of distinct agendas. " 
(Alejandro Bendana, Op. Cit. ) 
Questioning the nature and role of NGOs, however, leads to the increasingly popular theme of 
governability, since the governments of many (Lesser Industrialised Economies) LIEs can safely 
be said to represent minority interest groups. The thesis therefore discusses the way in which civil 
society groups in Nicaragua frequently represent or at least are run by similar but oppositional 
elites; many disenchanted members of the FSLN now work in NGOs of various sorts, thus 
increasing the hostility and suspicion of the current Liberal government. The ruling PLC (Partido 
Liberal Constitucional) has begun the process of setting up its' own NGOs, frequently religious 
in character and with agendas complementary to the beliefs of the Catholic Church, a staunch 
supporter of the PLC politically. 
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1.4.1 - Hegemonic Knowledge - The Deification Of The 'Economic' 
"The IMF likes to go about its business without outsiders asking too many questions. In theory, 
the fund supports democratic institutions in the nations it assists. In practice, it undermines the 
democratic process by imposing policies. Officially, of course, the IMF doesn't "impose" 
anything. It "negotiates" the conditions for receiving aid. But all the power in the negotiations is 
on one side--the IMF's--and the fund rarely allows sufficient time for broad consensus-building 
or even widespread consultations with either parliaments or civil society. Sometimes the IMF 
dispenses with the pretense of openness altogether and negotiates secret covenants. " 
"What I learned at the world economic crisis: The Insider" by Joseph Stiglitz, Chief Economist of 
the World Bank, The New Republic, April 17-24 2000. 
The failure of orthodoxy to encapsulate essential socio-economic and cultural processes, actors 
and agencies, stems from a deterministic tendency over the last century to depict economics as a 
positive, neutral, and above all nomothetic science. It will be a theme throughout the thesis that 
orthodox economics, far from being a science in the sense of knowledge ascertained by 
observation and experiment, critically tested and systematized under general principles, is in fact 
a sciosophy, a system that claims to be knowledge but is actually without basis in ascertained 
scientific fact; nowhere is this clearer than in the praxis of the implementation of structural 
adjustment by the IFIs. 
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Structural adjustment is the practical expression of orthodox theory taken to a neo-liberal 
extreme, if certain underlying principles of orthodox theory concerning equilibria and the nature 
and composition of supply and demand curves are accepted. As Keen (Op. Cit. ) points out, 
however, these suppositions are filled with internal flaws; basing international development 
policy and strategy on such suppositions is unable to guarantee any particular result. In the light 
of the neo-liberal hegemony, however, the rapid advance of the Institutionist position in 
microfmance where the poor are increasingly perceived as microentrepreneurs who merely lack 
access to credit before being able to fulfill their true potential, is entirely understandable: 
"Microfinance demand can be met on a global scale only through the provision of 
financial services by self-sufficient institutions. " (Robinson 2001, p. 11) 
Ignoring the historicity of microfinance8 and also the fact that social lending on soft-terms and at 
subsidized interest rates constitutes the majority of funding currently available for microfmance 
The Institutionist position is attempting to enforce the notion that the global coverage necessary 
for microfmance to fulfill its' true potential can only be achieved by self-sustaining organizations 
that have access to private sector funds at market interest rates. Despite microfinance being a 
still-emerging sector, and despite a continuing reluctance to invest on the part of the private 
sector, as Robinson herself indicates (Op. Cit., p. xxxii), a hegemony is busily being established 
which requires access only to private sector funding at market rates. This one-size-fits-all 
approach keys in well with neo-liberal promotion of the private sector - social lenders who 
provide subsidized funds for the majority of microfmance are presumably doing the new sector 
an active disservice, by this version, irrespective of the paucity of provision from other sources. 
Evidence to back up the fetishistic economic theory that liberalization of a LIE public sector will 
release the private sector to act as a motor for growth is scant, evidence of the state protection 
demanded by the private sector in CME countries is ample. As Chomsky (1997) points out, even 
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the Reagan administration of the US during the 1980s, perhaps the most aggressively free-market 
presidency to date (in rhetoric at least) in reality granted more import relief to U. S. industry than 
any of his predecessors and presided over what has been claimed to be the greatest swing toward 
protectionism since the 1930s. Similarly, the competitive advantage that allows U. S. agri- 
business to flood developing country markets with low-priced imports which destroy the home 
market owes more than a little to the continuing receipt of huge public subsidies, increased by the 
Reagan administration to the point where they provided 40% of growers' gross incomes by 1987. 
Meanwhile, in the case of Nicaragua, US controls on exports such as meat, rice and sugar mean 
that an already weakened agro-dependent economy is further handicapped by the protectionist 
instincts guarding its most important market. The damage done by US controls to the Nicaraguan 
economy is shortly to get much worse, however. The recent votes in the US Congress and the 
Senate (May 2002) under the Bush administration that a further $180 billion (Cassel 2002) in 
farm subsidies be allocated to an agriculture sector that is already the most heavily subsidised in 
the world indicates plainly the fate of neo-liberal rhetoric in the real world. Add to this the fact 
that by last year (2001) nearly three-quarters of the already existing subsidy money in the US 
went to the richest 10 percent of American farmers, and it is difficult to understand how the 
allegedly free market beliefs of the US administration in any given economic or social sector can 
stand the cruel glare of such hypocrisy. Neo-liberal consciences were doubtless soothed 
somewhat to understand that the recipients of such a generous corporate welfare programme 
included such desperate and needy cases as John Hancock Life Insurance Co., Chevron, banker 
David Rockefeller, and basketball star Scottie Pippen, as well as former Enron chairman Kenneth 
Lay (Cassel, Op. Cit. ). 
8 Discussed in more detail in the following chapter 
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1.4.2 - Microfinance And Adjustment 
Since the debt crisis of 1980-82, and the subsequent design and development of structural 
adjustment programmes by the IMF and the World Bank, capital transfers to and from LIEs have 
been dominated by four processes: 1) the massive outflows of capital from LIEs as service on 
capital and interest of debt, 2) the effects of currency speculation destabilizing the vulnerable 
financial services sectors of LIEs through financial sector liberalization strictures invoked by the 
IFIs, 3) the sale of large quantities of state-owned goods and services under IMF-induced 
privatization and liberalization programmes, and 4) rapid foreign currency movement into and 
out of LIEs through currency flight and re-entry caused by, and exacerbating, the economic 
instability resulting from the first three processes. Despite the assertions of the IFIs that progress 
towards conditionality objectives by itself constitutes macro-economic improvement, in the case 
of the first two of the above processes at least the damage must obviously outweigh any benefit, 
and despite the beneficial claims made on behalf of the second two processes by the IFIs, 
supportive evidence is scant. 
The centrality of liberalization in the dominant global economic hegemony finds more than an 
echo in current analysis of the place of microfmance in the development discourse: 
"The basic conceptual framework for analysing the financial environment in which 
microfinance projects are implemented in developing countries today can be found in 
the works on financial liberalization done more than two decades ago by Goldsmith, 
McKinnon and Shad. According to these studies, a positive correlation exists 
9 The relevant works are Raymond W. Goldsmith., Financial Structure and Development (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969), Robert McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development 
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between the extent of financial development and economic growth. Developing 
economies enhance their growth potential by liberalizing and strengthening their 
financial sector. Such strengthening allows a more rational, intertemporal allocation 
of resources, which is the first requirement for economic growth. " (Herrador & 
Clapes, Op. Cit., p. 4) 
The studies do not, of course, give evidence of which way the positive correlation works nor, 
bearing in mind that correlation does not constitute causation, is it at all evident exactly how the 
causation came about, particularly because of a complete absence of historical and political 
context. The inference that developing economies must therefore liberalise (by which we must 
also accept that liberalisation = financial development) to develop is therefore not part of this 
equation, and the further inference that microfmance equates to a holistic tendency towards a 
`rational, intertemporal allocation of resources' is more tenuous still. 
There are also similarities of vision between the dominant, institutionist theory of microfmance 
development and the linear take-off model presented by Rostow (1960). As Helms (2002, p. 1) 
points out: 
"The model focuses on enterprise expansion and development as the engine of 
growth. It assumes that credit will facilitate the growth of the enterprise from micro 
to small and medium. The enterprise will capitalize itself, generate employment and 
eventually contribute to economic growth. This linear growth path will allow 
microfinance clients to lift themselves out of poverty by crossing over the poverty line 
for good. Donor bureaucrats and development professionals find this vision of 
productive enterprise growth resulting from ever-increasing amounts of credit very 
appealing and concrete in terms of measuring outputs and impact. " 
(Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), and Edward S. Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic 
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
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Helms goes on to warn against such a rose-tinted view of the powers of microfmance, stating that 
the enterprise growth model is only going to be relevant for a small number of informal sector 
business, and that the real business of microfmance is in developing new and innovative financial 
tools to reduce the vulnerability of the poor. The enterprise take-off model, however, provides a 
powerful ally for the dominant neo-liberal hegemony, and it must reasonably be assumed that 
those practitioners and experts for whom it is a valid model will continue to press it into the 
service of neo-liberal orthodoxy. Trends in drop-out rates from microfinance organisations, 
sometimes as high as 62.8% (Machado, Valazza, Cheston & Salib 2001), should provide ample 
reason for caution, however - this is to say that in one year in some organizations a total of clients 
equivalent to 62.8% of the whole client base left the project and declined to take out any more 
loans. 
1.4.3 - Global And Local Adjustment Theory 
The thesis uses the example of Nicaragua to illustrate how a key component of the imbalance in 
adjustment thinking, that the private sector should take over from the state as a first option, is 
often extremely inappropriate in countries where the state is the largest employer, where the 
private sector is minimal, under-capitalized and frequently dependent on the state for much of its 
income, or where the regulatory, judicial and contractual mechanisms that are a necessary 
component of a CME private sector are either very weak or simply not there1°. Additionally 
10 The microfinance sector is undergoing a similar push towards a form of privatisation, as the example of Bolivia 
and the formation of PFFs (Private Finance Foundations) shows. The campaign for formalisation in Nicaragua by 
ASOMIF (discussed later in the thesis) is a reflection of this, and has led to inappropriate and aggressive sales 
tactics, as well as more clients being denied access in Bolivia, where the market anyway appears to have reached 
saturation levels (Wiedmaier-Pfister, M., Pastor, F., & Salinas L. 2001). 
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where, as is the case with Nicaragua and Bangladesh, the NGO sector is the most important 
employer besides the state, employment per se may become an increasingly politicized activity 
that exacerbates tribal or clientelistic tendencies already present in local cultures. 
Overemphasis on privatisation is not alone in being harmful to weaker HIPC (Highly 
Impoverished Poor Country) economies; other current IFI macroeconomic policies such as the 
drive for capital account liberalization, operating as they do in a global financial landscape of 
increasing flux and instability activities have frequently had destructive effects. An example of is 
the 1997 East Asian financial system crisis, at least in part exacerbated by IFI-encouraged 
financial systems vulnerability to rapid currency movements and speculation. Not only is the lack 
of supportive evidence in favour of capital liberalization ignored, however, indications of the 
harm it causes are similarly ignored in the same manner as the mass of evidence indicating the 
harmful nature of SAPs: 
"There are actually no strong arguments in favour of moving towards capital account 
convertibility. There is no evidence that capital mobility leads to an efficient 
smoothing of expenditures in developing countries through the business cycle and, on 
the contrary, strong evidence that in these countries the volatility of capital flows is 
an additional source of instability. There is also no evidence of an association 
between capital account liberalization and economic growth, and there are some 
indications that point in the opposite direction. " (Ocampo 2000, p. 33) 
The strength of the cognitive model is so strong, however, that the representation of factual data 
is ignored by appeals to a mirage of long-term benefits. The hard reality is that whilst the current 
global financial architecture is strongly supportive of private banking profitability in the CMEs, 
there is absolutely no reason to expect them to change or accept regulation whilst their 
governments and the IFIs are on hand to protect them from the strategic mistakes that they 
frequently make. Increasingly, in addition, the creation of ever more complicated financial 
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derivatives and trades are introducing elements of instability that equilibrium-based theory is 
simply unable to cope with. 
In addition to a systemic and theoretical inability to cope with global financial flows the thesis 
looks at how conceptual and cognitive visualisations of knowledge by the IFIs cause a lack of 
sufficient research in strategic/tactical areas that are to do with policy implementation. One such 
area, as the UNDP points out, is the nexus of rural/urban linkages, as opposed to a continued 
focus on the purely rural and sustainable rural livelihoods. The UNDP states that researchers 
engaged in poverty analysis mostly ignore rural-urban linkages, despite their importance to 
understanding poverty: 
"Furthermore, there appears to be no overall consensus emerging on how to address 
poverty problems associated with escalating urbanization and growing rural-urban 
disparities. " (UNDP 2000a, p. 2) 
The promotion of a one-size-fits-all-model of microfmance, of course, avoids the necessity for 
research into chaotic socio-economic processes. If the essential link between high rates of 
repayment and increased economic well-being can be enthroned (if not actually proven) in 
microfmance, then tackling poverty in either a rural or urban setting becomes simply the problem 
of accountancy that neo-liberals were always convinced it was, requiring only the massive 
provision of credit globally that the institutionist model insists on. 
A key signifier of the complexity of urban rural networks is rural non-agricultural income 
(RNAI); some estimates give the percentage of rural income that is derived from non-agricultural 
sources as high as 40% of total rural income throughout Latin America (Berdegue, Reardon, 
Escobar and Echeverri 2000). RNAI may derive from numerous sources, depending on the size 
of the extended family network, and may encompass different countries, depending on whether 
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the family is receiving remittances from migrant members abroad. Agricultural activities in 
countries such as Nicaragua may subsidise urban activities of the network, and vice-versa, and 
migration of supporting members may be temporary, semi-permanent, cyclical or permanent. 
The thesis therefore describes some aspects of the extended household and its' attendant family 
network within the context of fluid urban/rural linkages in Nicaragua, with the intention of 
demonstrating that current policies with a focus purely on the parlous state of agriculture in 
Nicaragua, along with stratagems devised to tackle rural problems in isolation, are missing vital 
components of the complex urban/rural socio-economy. Linking in to the theme of gender in 
rural livelihoods, figures produced by ECLAC (CEPAL by its initials in Spanish) indicate that by 
the late 1990s RNAI was the dominant source of income for women by a considerable margin; in 
9 of the 11 countries included in the ECLAC study, between 65% and 93% of rural women 
participating in the labour market did so in non-agricultural activities (ECLAC 2000). 
1.4.4 - Inappropriate Privatization 
In the poorest Highly-Indebted countries, not only may there be very little demand for the type of 
state-sector businesses that are for sale, but the deals struck with the state by external buyers are 
frequently hedged with conditions that render any profit to the state minimal (Bayliss 2000 p. 8). 
Overall in Nicaragua as in much of Central America, there is very little if any competition 
involved in the privatization process, even at the bidding stage. It will be the suggestion of the 
thesis that privatization deals in the case of Nicaragua are predominantly arrived at through a 
mixture of clientelism, family contacts, political favour and outright bribery, and that commercial 
competition that challenges the dominance of the local elite is virtually excluded. In the situations 
where external corporations take over state operations, moreover, the bargaining power of a 
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financially weakened government to enforce contractual obligations in a country with weak or 
non-existent regulatory mechanisms, even were it so minded, may be slight or non-existent. 
From the earliest adjustment programmes, there has been research to suggest that forced 
privatization frequently has the effect of pushing state assets into the hands of foreign investors at 
a discount (Commander and Killick 1988), who then frequently impose profit-maximizing 
regimes on vital services that are directly contrary to poverty alleviation aims. An insistence on 
rolling back the state, deregulating existing markets and diverting capital flows and state assets to 
private-sector ownership irrespective of the weakness of regulatory mechanisms and individual 
country circumstances is an invitation to disaster, as the example of post-Soviet Russia shows 
clearly. According to Stiglitz (2000): 
"The rapid privatization urged upon Moscow by the IMF and the (United States) 
Treasury Department had allowed a small group of oligarchs to gain control of 
state assets..... While the government lacked the money to pay pensioners, the 
oligarchs were sending money obtained by stripping assets and selling the 
country's precious national resources into Cypriot and Swiss bank accounts. " 
Additionally, where such corruption is identified by international aid/finance organizations as a 
problem, the analysis is rarely objective. The UNDP report 'Choices for the poor' (2000a p. 3) 
asserts that the two main obstacles encountered by the PSI (Poverty Strategy Initiative) analysis 
of LIEs are firstly, the refusal of local elites to surrender control of political and financial power 
to localized authority, and secondly the weakness of civil society/representative groups to force 
this devolution of control. What it does not mention is the role of the IFIs in centralizing that 
control, for instance through their autocratic operation through central government in prioritizing 
macroeconomic stability, and through the policy choices that follow on automatically from that 
dictated emphasis, in terms of health, education etc. Neither, unsurprisingly, are external factors 
such as donor-country tied aid, political influence and the corrupting activities of external 
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corporations considered in this section of the report - the focus is purely on the internal 
dimensions of these factors, giving a distinctly one-sided picture. 
As a direct corollary to internal and external corruption in Nicaragua, Chapter 3 of the thesis 
examines the body of `forbidden' knowledge constituted by corporate domination of national and 
regional economies, not just in terms of the market environment in which LIEs in general are 
expected to trade and use for their expansion, but of the political agenda of CME country 
countries in the globalization process, and in particular in the development of the WTO. The 
domination of global trading processes by corporate interests constitutes a de facto competitive 
advantage of such a technological and legal sophistication that it can never be overcome by 
orthodox economic prescriptions. The IFIs and the WTO are effectively forbidden by their 
cognitive model to recognize the true situation of many LIEs, which is a condition of severe 
disadvantage in which virtually all their markets are unconditional price-takers, especially the 
labour market. 
This corporate control of not only the trade agenda, but also to a greater or lesser degree internal 
country political agendas, not only reinforces the CME control of what is `acceptable' 
development debate within the IFIs, but contributes to weakening the democratic process within 
LIEs themselves, and of course any ownership of aid and development policy and processes. At 
the same time as the democratization of states within Central American countries took place over 
the 1980s, those states themselves were surrendering control of essential parts of their economies 
and political and executive structures, making any devolution of power to the mass of citizenry 
through the acquisition of the vote a weak and cosmetic process. 
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1.5 - Conclusion 
"The battle of economic ideas is, as McCloskey (1998) has argued, fought to a significant extent 
in terms of rhetoric. This means that the dual use of a term with strong ideological overtones can 
pose serious dangers, not only of misunderstanding, but also of inadvertently prejudicing policy 
stances. Specifically, there is a real danger that many of the economic reforms that the Bank 
tends to favour - notably macroeconomic discipline, trade openness, and market friendly 
microeconomic policies - will be discredited in the eyes of many, simply because the Bank is 
inevitably implicated in views that command a consensus in Washington and the term 
"Washington Consensus" has come to be used to describe an extreme and dogmatic commitment 
to the belief that the markets can handle everything. " 
Williamson, J., 1999, `What Should The Bank Think About The Washington Consensus', 
Occasional paper prepared as background to the World Bank's WDR 2000, 
httn: //www. iiecom/TESTIMONY/Bankwc. htm, 17/6/2000, p. 1. 
Whilst Joseph Stiglitz was still working for the World Bank as chief economist, he was involved 
with the President, James Wolfensohn, in the ongoing process of defining and codifying the 
official discourse of the Bank on aid and development. Effectively the discourse expands the 
remit of the given development doxa to encompass a rapidly expanding set of flows and 
processes normally assigned under the heading of Globalization. Stiglitz outlined in particular 
four guiding principles that he believed should be guiding institutional policy: firstly that aid 
should continue to serve an assumedly traditional role as a transfer of capital, paying particular 
attention to areas where the private sector is less likely to go, secondly that policy advice cannot 
be imposed from above, and that developing countries must take ownership of it to ensure 
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sustainability, thirdly that aid can be complementary to private investment, and fourthly that 
closing the knowledge gap is as important as closing the "object" gap (Stiglitz 2000). 
Ironically in view of the nature of his departure from the World Bank, Stiglitz makes a distinction 
between `the knowledge gap' and `the object gap', plainly missing the point that since the IFIs 
continue to construct their knowledge by building it and bounding it according to rigid codes of 
orthodox economic belief, knowledge itself is objectified, and thus practically speaking part of 
the object gap. Stiglitz left the Bank complaining of the anti-democratic processes and practices 
of the Bank, and yet seemed unable or unwilling to see the reality of the political economy in 
which orthodox theory and practices operate. Under such a rigid definition of acceptable 
knowledge, shackled by orthodox economic theory, transfers of knowledge are limited both in 
their content and in what they may or may not contain. This objectification of the knowledge gap 
is nowhere more evident than in the championing of intellectual property rights which the CME 
countries have also been keen to extend and reinforce through the in global trade negotiations 
within the WTO. 
Central to the necessity of examining and closing the `knowledge gap' are two important caveats. 
The first of these is that all types of knowledge, and in particular local, in-country knowledge, 
have validity and agency, on the clear understanding that the flow of knowledge is a two-way 
process and that no-one has a monopoly on the kind of knowledge required for an (Lesser 
Industrialised Economy) LIE to achieve higher standards of living on an egalitarian basis. The 
second is that acquisition of knowledge is a dynamic process and equilibria are the exception 
rather than the rule, and may consist of knowledge that fails to conform to formulaic prescription. 
Following directly on from this is the fact that attempting to pre-determine the outcome of any 
investigative, knowledge-seeking development process not only contradicts the first caveat, it 
will inevitably produce at the least a flawed result. The critiques examined in this thesis present 
considerable quantities of evidence to suggest that this has already occurred and continues to 
occur. The IFIs are very specific about the types of knowledge that they are interested in, and as a 
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consequence develop evaluation processes for their activities that justify the use and 
accumulation of that very specific body of knowledge. 
The body of the thesis is concerned with analyzing the ways in which microfmance is both 
complementary, and contradictory to, each of Stiglitz's four principles. There is still very little 
evidence to show whether microfmance lending constitutes an accumulation of capital by the 
poor, or merely another transfer of capital out of poor countries through personal debt; even 
where traditional historical forms existed previously microfmance has most definitely become an 
externally-imposed practice that is rapidly becoming another doxa. Microfmance fulfills the 
criteria for a form of aid that is complementary to private investment, and has pretensions to be a 
significant component of the knowledge gap, depending of course on whether the Institutionist or 
Welfare discourse turns out to be the more appropriate form. 
The body of the thesis takes a form in which these various aspects of microfmance practice and 
theory may most readily be examined. The second chapter begins the detailed analysis at the 
macroeconomic level, examining the neo-liberal hegemony and structural adjustment in 
particular, with the intention of examining in more details the praxis and inherent theoretical 
contradictions that have been touched on in the introduction. The third chapter explains the 
methodology used to elicit the various nuances, with an explanation of the selection of data 
sources and the type of sources used. The methodology uses the type of triangulation mentioned 
by Bradshaw above in order to bring to bear as many different data sources as possible, with the 
aim of avoiding the financial systems analysis that characterizes the Institutionist approach to 
microfmance. In chapter four the focus moves down to a closer examination of Nicaragua itself, 
with an examination of the historical and current political background of the country, and with an 
analysis of the gendered economy of the country. The fifth chapter increases the focus still 
further, to examine the formal banking sector of the country and the context of the microfmance 
sector within the financial sector as a whole. In both of these chapters particular attention is paid 
to the highly politicized economic environment, and how despite the tutelage of the IFIs the 
economy of the country is monopolized by a small elite group, operating through the state and 
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the judicial system. The ramifications for this in terms of both the political and the gendered 
economy are explored in detail. 
Chapter six describes the two Nicaraguan organizations used in the fieldwork, FAMA and 
ADIM, and locates them theoretically and practically in the microfmance sector structure that 
exists in Nicaragua. This chapter enhances the explanations of the microfmance sector analyzed 
in the context of the banking sector in the previous chapter, and provides a detailed survey of 
both microfmance clients and non-clients in the city of Masaya and its' immediate environs, 
some 27 kilometers to the south-east of the capital, Managua. The analysis of the questionnaire 
and map-based survey of clients and non-clients adds detail to the nature of the socio-economic 
environment in which the population of Nicaragua survive, with the intention of outlining some 
functional and effective ways in which poverty in Nicaragua can be examined. In this way, the 
thesis adds to the body of knowledge constituted by a welfarist approach to microfmance, in 
suggesting ways and means by which microfinance might more effectively be employed for the 
benefit of the poorest, as opposed to the not-so-poor. 
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Chapter Two: Neo-liberalism And The Disputed 
Consensus 
"If the criteria of the International Monetary Fund had governed the United States in the 19th 
century, our own economic development would have taken a good deal longer. In preaching 
fiscal orthodoxy to developing nations, we were somewhat in the position of the prostitute who, 
having retired on her earnings, believes that public virtue requires the closing down of the red- 
light district" 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., `A thousand Days', 1965. 
"It's time to get more serious. The IMF is working with the wrong economic model of the world. 
And as long as it continues to do so, and to remain protected by a hapless G7 that refuses to call 
the institution to task for its failures, the rest of the world will continue to wake up to financial 
shocks that undermine living standards in developing countries and that threaten global 
stability. " 
Jeffrey Sachs, Director of Centre for International Development, Harvard, "Going For 
Broke", article in the UK Guardian newspaper 16/1/99. 
"The laws of economics, it's often forgotten, are like the laws of engineering. There's only one 
set of laws, and they work everywhere" 
Larry G. Summers, IMF summit Bangkok, 1991. 
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2.1 - Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to locate the practice and theory of micro-finance generally, and 
micro-credits in particular, within the neo-liberal discourse and its' application through the 
structural adjustment as conceived of and enforced by the IMF and World Bank. The first section 
will be a brief resume of the rise of conditionality-based macroeconomics in the light of neo- 
liberal theory since the 1980s, and the praxis of that macro-economic practice in Latin America, 
with special attention to Nicaragua, including the slow mitigation (at least in theory) of structural 
adjustment that has taken place under the developing `post-Washington Consensus'. The section 
on the implementation and critiques of neo-liberal macroeconomics will deal briefly with the 
liberalisation of the economy implicit and explicit in structural adjustment, leading on to the next 
section which points out the way in which structural adjustment has been failing in its' own 
terms, with restricted economic growth in all adjusting countries, and the benefits of growth 
restricted to a small elite. 
The second section will precis the record of adjusting countries particularly those in Latin 
America, and examine how cross-country, regional and individual country analyses fail to 
support claims made on behalf of SAPs by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Despite 
the grudging adjustments made to SAPs, the way in which structural adjustment continues to be 
practised effectively forbids knowledge of this failure of theory and practice. The figures 
presented suggest that structural adjustment has as a central failure (inter alia) an inability to 
recognise the impact of the structure of international trade in exports as being largely dominated 
by inter-regional trade regimes, intra-corporate finance and internalised foreign direct investment 
(internal to corporations located in different countries, and horizontal expansion in the form of 
mergers and acquisitions). It will be suggested that theories of economic growth and development 
that rely on export-based trade are ignoring the historical and geo-political reality of the 
development of global capitalism, as well as trends in the growth of global trade that impinge 
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directly on the development of the private sector in general, and private sector credit provision in 
particular. This has produced a distorted adjustment in which the unequal distribution of wealth 
in all Latin American countries is becoming more pronounced, and in which numbers of poor in 
all countries are rising. 
The analysis of the third section will cover the effects of privatisation and corruption that are not 
accounted for in the design of country programmes, touching on the more recent concerns for 
governability and transparency that have moved to centre-stage in the debate on adjustment 
theory and practice of the IFIs. The section touches on the way in which corruption (still, despite 
the recent interest in the topic, a considerable body of hidden knowledge) has been and continues 
to be an integral component of structural adjustment, operating as it does through corrupt elites 
and relying on their corruption to force through unpopular cuts in state expenditure against the 
wishes of the majority constituted by poorest. 
The following section deals with financial liberalisation and the destructive effects of the 
principle of universality that fuels liberalisation programmes, despite the frequently inappropriate 
nature of the discourse. In terms of privatisation and liberalisation, if not the entire concept of 
structural adjustment, this chapter and the thesis in general follow the assertion of Martin (2000, 
section 3, p. !) in that: 
"(John) Williamson's observations about Chile are a reminder that application of 
extreme neo-classical doctrine was failing in its own economic terms, as well as in 
other respects, two decades ago, some time before Stiglitz supposedly committed 
heresy by citing later catastrophes in support of his argument... " 
The theoretical response to this continuous failure the IMF and World Bank has included the 
broadening of the scope of market failures to include "informational imperfections and 
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asymmetries of various sorts" (Fine 1999, p. 2), as well as the efforts of Becker et al to simply 
universalise economistic views of utility maximisation to include virtually all areas of life. These 
however are scarcely an adequate response to such a prolonged institutionalised failure, and 
appear to indicate an intention to simply intensify failed orthodox microeconomic analysis at the 
macro level. 
The next section is a brief resume of the ways in which the current global economic trends have 
impacted on Nicaragua, as a prelude to the more in-depth analysis of the Nicaraguan section that 
takes place in Chapter 4. The section touches on exposure to subsidised food imports, the process 
of `Maquilisation' that has been growing steadily since the end of the revolutionary period in 
1990, and also on the market control exercised by the US in respect of access to US markets for 
Nicaraguan goods. The monopolisation of credit access by privileged groups and sectors of the 
economy is also outlined, as a precursor to the deeper discussion on the privileged access to the 
export economy that takes place in the analysis of Nicaragua itself, and subsequently in the 
analysis of the formal and informal banking sector in Nicaragua. 
The penultimate section, on the place of micro-finance initiatives within the neo-liberal discourse 
deals with concerns over the increased pressures for financial sustainability within the `new' 
micro-finance industry, as well as an apparent shaping of the institutionist (Woller Op. Cit. ) ideas 
of microfmance in general and microcredit in particular into a framework acceptable to the IMF 
and World Bank. The section begins with an appreciation of the historical context of what is now 
referred to as microfmance, looking at the way in which former traditional methods have been 
usurped by a metonymic transfer into an embodiment of microfmance that corresponds with 
orthodox economic prescriptions, and in particular the `new' historical hinterland that has been 
created for microfmance by organisations such as USAID. The body of knowledge represented 
by this historical context is in danger of being `disappeared' by the new discourse of `best 
practice', and despite the continual call by microfmance institutions themselves for new and 
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creative ways to best serve their clients, there is a distinct reluctance to look at the historical 
forms of socialised credit. 
A particular point of discussion will be how the pressure on microfmance organisations to 
conform to orthodox banking norms and achieve sustainability may be hindering their ability to 
reach the poorest. Sustainability and replicability drive the requirements of the institutionist 
approach: 
"Financial self-sufficiency is the essential pre-requisite for making financial services 
widely available to micro-enterprises...... A financially self-sufficient credit operation 
must cover the following through fees and interest charges: operating costs, including 
loan loss reserves; the cost of funds; and inflation, to maintain the real value of loan 
capital. To achieve genuine commercial viability, it must also yield a profit to 
owners. " (Rhyne and Otero, 1992, p. 1565, my emphasis) 
The section places microfmance in a historical context, and analyses the donor-driven pressure on 
micro-finance organisations to deepen and broaden lending, with the suggestion that this 
usurpation of historical context constitutes another form of hidden knowledge. The concealment 
of this knowledge, as well as the pressure to move towards individual micro-credit loans, runs the 
risk of sidelining vital holistic approaches to empowerment and poverty alleviation that the 
simple provision of credit, by itself, cannot address. 
The concluding section will discuss how the various types of micro-finance initiatives fit in with 
the debate surrounding aid in a neo-liberal climate, and will focus on how micro-credit lending 
especially tallies with the ideals and practices of liberalisation. The section will sum up the three 
previous sections in the light of the Nicaraguan experience, and outline the relevance of the 
research undertaken in the context of the micro-finance sector in Nicaragua. The microfmance 
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sector in Central America will be discussed in the context of the prevailing structural adjustment 
environment in Latin America, as a preamble to chapter 4 in which the political economy of 
Nicaragua is discussed in more detail. The enthusiasm of USAID and the IADB (Inter-American 
Development Bank) for microfmance throughout the Central American region will be discussed, 
and also the context of the latent hostility of the formal banking sector and associated political 
groupings towards the microfmance organisations (such as ASOMIF the representative body for 
microfinance lenders in Nicaragua). In particular, where the formal banking system is weak and 
virtually unregulated, and where trust in the fmancial system is minimal, microfmance 
organisations are beginning to represent a virtual shadow banking system for the poorest whose 
access to formal credit is minimal, and in this context the legal restrictions on microfmance 
organisations from taking savings from clients is discussed. 
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2.2 - The Praxis Of IFI Macro-economics 
"Although there have been a number of studies on the subject over the past decade, one cannot 
say with certainty whether programmes have "worked" or not......... On the basis of existing 
studies, one certainly cannot say whether the adoption of programs supported by the fund led to 
an improvement in inflation and growth performance. In fact it is often found that programs are 
associated with a rise in inflation and a fall in the growth rate. " 
Khan, M. (1990) "The Macroeconomic Effects of Fund Supported Adjustment 
Programs, " IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 196, p. 122. 
Since the first Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAFs) were made available in the early 1980s, 
despite the later addition of Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities (ESAFs) by the IMF when 
it became apparent that SAFs by themselves were not going to be sufficient the basic theoretical 
premises and practice of SAPs have remained the same. The programmes can be divided into 
four main areas (Chapelier and Tabatai, 1989); Firstly demand management, regulated by tight 
monetary and fiscal policy, especially aimed at restraining domestic absorption and cutting the 
fiscal deficit. The above-mentioned tightening of monetary policy is designed to drive up interest 
rates and reduce consumption, and is combined with the introduction of generalized taxes, such 
as VAT (Value Added Tax), to increase government revenues, whilst at the same time cutting 
government spending. 
The second part of an SAP deals with exchange rate management, generally an overall 
devaluation of the programme country currency to make imports more expensive, exports more 
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competitive, and to thus improve the trade balance and balance of payments. The third part of the 
SAP consists of structural policies, designed to improve growth in the medium term by such 
actions as a reduction in price subsidies, trade tariffs and quotas. This growth encouragement is 
complemented by the deregulation of domestic financial markets and the facilitation of 
international capital flows, designed to make investment more attractive. It is this last aspect of 
structural adjustment that critical examination has suggested to be most harmful (for instance in 
the East Asian crisis of 1997 and again in Argentina in 2001), failing to achieve the development 
of domestic capital and investment stated as its aim. 
Finally, the SAP measures to improve the economy in the medium and the long-term are 
supported by an external financing policy to keep the country going in the short-term. This effort 
to reduce capital outflows consists, in the main, of debt rescheduling and bridging loans designed 
to give adjustment the chance to improve the economy. The above categorization does not put the 
parts of the SAPs in order of importance, and the sequencing, or the order in which policy 
instruments should be put into effect, is an area identified by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for urgent study. To date however the IMF insists on a rigid 
adherence to one definite sequence, irrespective of the country or countries under consideration, 
as in the cases for example of Laos and South Africa (Mcfarlane, 2001), two very different 
countries in terms of cultural and socio-economic perspectives. 
As critics have pointed out, however, there are a series of important considerations that should 
always have been reflected in the planning of such programmes: 
"There are a number of questions which arise when a country enters into an 
arrangement for IMF loans and is asked to immediately implement a vast program of 
economic reforms so that the operations of the economy will conform to the picture of 
how the IMF technocrats and economists believe all economies (regardless of any 
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special economic history or cultural peculiarities) should operate. Some of these 
questions are: 
a) What will be the effect of liberalization and deregulation on an economy still 
heavily influenced by its experience with state capitalism, in which there are 
many controlled prices and licensing arrangements between government and 
private clients or "cronies"? 
b) Can liberalization work when, as in Indonesia Thailand and the Philippines, the 
economy is in a state of crisis already? 
c) How might an unequal distribution of wealth, assets and income...... affect the 
entire economic reform process? 
d) What role is played by strict adherence to the sequencing of reforms required, 
especially in IMF "bail out" packages? " (Mcfarlane, B. Op. Cit., p. 233). 
There is also the contestation of the argument that efficient growth under SAPs would impact 
favourably on the whole labour force (Brydon, 2002), women as well as men; from the earliest 
empirical studies it has been apparent that in a whole range of indicators women, from child and 
maternal health status (Cornia et al. 1987. ) to removal of subsidies and increased competition in 
the informal sector (Afshar and Dennis 1992., Elson 1995a), women were exposed to the 
hardships generated by SAPs disproportionately to men. Later research by authors such as Elson 
(1993,1995b) focused on the inadequacy of the underlying assumptions of economic orthodoxy, 
which join the critiques such as those of Keen discussed in the introductory chapter in 
questioning the very building blocks of orthodox economic theory, and through that theory the 
extremes represented by the neo-liberal discourse. 
It is also the contention of many critics that the effects of SAP policies, as well as being severely 
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flawed in their micro- and macroeconomic prescriptions, even whilst ostensibly directed towards 
the repayment of debt in fact have enlarged debt through four mechanisms (Chossudovsky 1997). 
Firstly, the new loans given to pay back old debt increase the net debt stock; secondly, the push 
towards trade liberalisation has a tendency to make the balance of payments situation worse as 
import levels increase, particularly in view of the declining terms of trade which most 
commodity-dependent poor countries are experiencing; thirdly, the increase in the service 
component of imports, with its concomitant increased payments towards intellectual property 
rights, increases the cost of imports; fourthly, structural adjustment lending per se has shifted to 
areas other than project lending, to the detriment of capital formation and to the advantage of the 
export economy. This exacerbation of indebtedness has increased to the point where the debt-to- 
GNP (Gross National Product) ratio of ESAF countries doubled between 1990 and 2000 (Grusky, 
2001), and whereas the severely indebted low-income countries received US$673 million in 
loans in 1990-95, debt service payments meant that the result was a net flow of resources to the 
IMF of US$2 billion. 
Whereas Central America is less afflicted by poverty than many African nations, the repayment 
of money borrowed towards adjustment processes since the implementation of structural 
adjustment is having a very real effect on key (strategically `feminized') areas on which 
economic development is grounded - health (in particular child and maternal), cash shortages 
through devaluation, removal of food and basic commodity subsidies and a huge increase in the 
workforce competing in the informal sector (Brydon 2002). Furthermore, the secretive nature of 
adjustment planning and implementation and the refusal of the IFIs to publish or explain their 
decision-making processes dove-tails neatly with the anti-democratic leanings of country elites 
and exacerbates the growing economic inequality in all Central American countries. Not only that 
but the virtually universally male, orthodox economist composition of the select group of those 
deemed important enough to participate in the planning guarantees male bias (Elson, 
Op. Cit. 1995a), and that the ignorance of the gendered nature of a country economy will continue. 
For institutions that frequently proclaim the necessity of country ownership of programmes, of 
openness and transparency, the hypocrisy involved in this secretive hiding and invention of 
knowledge is all the more glaring. 
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Whilst the changes to structural adjustment that have been introduced through the efforts, inter 
alia, of Joseph Stiglitz may be a welcome if overdue sign of reality creeping in, the ideas of 
`social capital' now being introduced to head up everything that the neo-liberal model was 
incapable of dealing with are primitive and unconvincing. An analysis of the political economy 
that fails to mention a historical concept of class and gender, and the gendered generation and 
distribution of economic surplus which is filtered through the agency and processes of class, is 
unlikely either to convince or, more importantly, to make development policy more effective: 
"By this token, development theory needs to recognise the specificity of the historical 
experience of each individual country. History, from this perspective, is not treated as 
simple accumulation of chance events, a register of accidental shocks or mere 'path 
dependency'. History is also a record of interaction among the various social classes, 
with all their inevitable conflicts, alliances and temporary truces. The development 
direction that a country is likely to follow depends on the balance of forces among its 
social classes, and that is the outcome of its history. " (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus 
2001, p. xiv). 
The historicity of the Washington consensus shows that whereas the privatisation-and- 
liberalisation discourse was nowhere to be seen in the 1960s and 1970s, it became so powerful 
during the 1980s and 1990s among other reasons because it coincided with a weakening in those 
factors opposed to liberalisation, such as Unions and corporatist employer organisations 
(Standing 2000). These historical sources themselves were weakened by the growing debt crisis, 
internal economic dislocation leading to increased unemployment and inflation, and the growth 
in power of the national and international financial elites and multinational corporations. The 
Washington consensus, however, did not merely abandon this and its' own historicity, so much 
as dress its' current discourse in the clothes of eternal truth, a model for the global economy 
which had always and will always be the true one, had we but possessed the wit to understand 
55 
and implement it. 
The post-Washington ideas, whose paradigmatic lexicon comprises concepts such as civil 
society, institution building, safety nets and governance (Jayasuriya 1999) should be seen in their 
own historical and geo-political context, however. The IMF and World Bank experienced a 
period of massive growth and expansion of power in the context of the Cold War, during which 
time the emphasis was on providing support for the economies of non-communist allies of the 
West at virtually any cost, and in support of this end any economic theory that justified the 
lending gave a spurious credibility to Bank/IMF programmes, irrespective of their efficacy. In the 
chill winds of unilateralist US isolationism that have begun to blow strongly following the Soviet 
bloc collapse, however, the Bretton Woods twins have been forced onto the defensive, as much 
by their erstwhile allies and firm supporters as by their traditional critics. Following a series of 
truly disastrous performances in the last decade, culminating in the collapse of the Argentine 
economy in 2001, the two organisations are now faced with the frightening prospect of having to 
come up with an economic analysis and policies that actually work, rather than simply paying lip- 
service to a market-based ideology. 
Irrespective of signs of a growing acceptance of individual historical, socio-cultural and geo- 
political context, however, all of the indications from the IMF and World Bank are that, pace the 
new `soft' approach to social capital and gender envisaged by whatever processes that are or are 
not involved in any `post-Washington' consensus, plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose: 
"When I think of a development framework for a country and regions, I think of a 
balance sheet with two sides. On the left is the macroeconomic presentation including 
the Article IV reports of the IMF, the National Income Accounts, the Balance of 
Payments and Trade Statistics, and all the other financial and economic analysis 
which are at the core of our current appraisal system. All of us are used to quoting 
GDP statistics, interest rates, reserve statistics, percentage growth statistics, and so 
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on as a basis for monetary and fiscal policy. Based on the analysis of the information, 
we can decide whether a country is Part I or Part II, IDA eligible, or HIPC eligible. 
It is a language that Finance Ministers find comfortable, and we all use it to make 
decisions. " (Wolfensohn, 1999, p. 1) 
Set against this clinical, gender-neutral assessment of a country situation are a variety of 
critiques, the position of which in the `post-Washington' debate depends very much (as Sparr 
(1994 p. 183) indicates on critiques of women and structural adjustment) on whether or not one is 
challenging the underlying free market economic model. 
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2.3 - The IMF/World Bank - The Record So Far 
"The 1990s, however have not been kind to the Washington Consensus. Fiscal and monetary 
conservatism might be claimed to have achieved greater price stability in some developing 
countries, but that was just about the only possible success of consensus-inspired policies. 
Growth outcomes were deeply disappointing and, to add insult to injury, typically below the 
levels of the derided 1950s and 1960s. Poverty reduction made little headway, according to the 
calculations of the World Bank itself. Vast swathes of humanity have continued to survive on a 
dollar a day, or less. Worse, the elimination of restrictions on domestic finance and on 
international capital flows resulted in huge crises but did not succeed in enhancing the volume 
and efficiency of productive investment. Last but not least, the transformation of the Eastern bloc 
countries into capitalist market economies on the basis of the prescription of the Washington 
consensus can only be described as an abject failure. " 
Ben Fine, Costas Lapavitsas and Jonathan Pincus, (2001) Ed. s "Development Policy in the 
Twenty-First Century: Beyond the post-Washington consensus", Preface, p. xi (Routledge, 
London & New York). 
In terms of both information and transaction costs theories, certain universal characteristics of 
low-income LIEs (such as most Central American countries) have to be recognized in a 
programme designed to encourage a supply side response, such as the fact that the monetary part 
of the economy is only a part of the whole, the size of which varies greatly according to country. 
As a result, taxation becomes based upon a narrow range of imports and exports, and there is 
virtually no bond market, the economy lacking the depth and infrastructure on which such 
markets are dependent (Standing and Tokman, 1991), which is the case for most Latin American 
countries. The record for adjustment in Latin America certainly does not support a keen 
appreciation of this type of regionally and structurally differentiated economy, the lack of which 
understanding has led to severe dislocation of the economy in most countries, as the evidence 
below shows. 
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In addition, formal concepts of interest rates set by the market for credit, for large parts of many 
Latin American countries may be almost irrelevant, especially in the rural areas, where access to 
money itself is often limited, barter is common, access to banking and credit facilities is virtually 
nil, and where frequently the credit and loans that are available come from sources whose rate of 
interest bears no resemblance to any nationally arranged base rate. Any subsequent attempt to 
expand the tax base on a more universal basis, such as by the imposition of VAT, will have far 
worse effects on the poor of such countries than elsewhere. Because financial investment by the 
private sector is virtually non-existent, crowding out does not occur. Small farmers, the landless 
and semi-landless, are completely outside factor inputs, so that non-price constraints are far more 
important than price distortions (Standing and Tokman, ibid. ). 
As a result of the lack of appreciation for such local and regional difficulties, despite the 
optimistic projections of the IMF of the economic growth rates to be expected from adjusting 
countries, the record globally for the 1980s and early 1990s was indifferent to poor. The World 
Bank forecast growth rates for the structurally adjusting countries as 4.5 - 5.10% for the period 
1980-85, and then higher rates for 1985-90 (World Bank, 1988). In reality, the growth rate for 
those countries for the entire period of 1980-87 was 2.3 %, with a lower output in real terms 
(ibid. ). Of 55 adjusting countries in 1988,27 were experiencing negative per capita income 
(Khan 1993), and of 24 structurally adjusting countries sampled by three criteria, rate of capital 
accumulation, diversification of economic structure (manufacturing share of GDP), and 
development of export capability, capital accumulation slowed in 20, manufacturing share of 
GDP stagnated or declined in 18, export volumes declined in 13 and in the 11 where it increased 
the effect on the balance of payments was negligible. For 13 of the adjusting countries where an 
improvement in the external balance of payments actually occurred, this was caused in all cases 
by the re-scheduling of debt payments, and an excess of grant income over government spending 
(Schadler et a! 1993). 
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Although the effects of reform differed according to region, in Latin America up to the middle of 
the 1990s the results of structural adjustment were again at best indifferent, and any encouraging 
figures for growth were matched by similarly bleak figures in other social and economic 
indicators. In terms of growth and the incidence of poverty, the programmes at best demonstrably 
made no difference up to 1995, and in many cases made things worse. Complex analyses of 
growth in constant price agricultural exports and output, terms of trade and exchange rate 
performance of highly, moderately and non-liberalised trade regimes in Latin America show that 
there is little or no evidence indicating stimulation by liberalisation of Latin American agriculture 
(Weeks 1995 p. 88). 
Despite a recovery in the Latin American agricultural sector during the 1990s, when by 1992 
regional economic growth had reached 3.8%, with expanding intra-regional and non-traditional 
trade (Grigsby 1993), the expansion of the trade deficit, increasing imports for subsistence goods 
and increasing debt show the region locked into a vicious circle. The decline in the terms-of-trade 
for primary agricultural commodities, by an average of between 2 and 5% per annum (Maxwell 
and Fernando 1989), was exacerbated by the increased export production advised by the IMF and 
the World Bank. By 1992, for instance, the prices of traditional exports as a whole were 18% 
lower than in 1970 (Grigsby, Op. Cit. ). 
In the Latin American region for the first half of the 1990s, the World Bank estimated that 140 
million people lived in poverty in 1994, up to 33% of the population, from 27% in 1980 (Oxfam 
1994). During the period 1992-1993, debt increased from US$ 432 billion to US$ 500 billion, 
which even in 1992 constituted 1/3 of the region's export earnings (Oxfam ibid. ). Whilst debt 
interest repayments went up from 9% to 42% of average government spending in the region, 
between 1981 and 1987 alone, unemployment in the region as a whole went up by an average of 
10% between 1980 and 1990. Average earnings in the informal sector, where the unemployed 
increasingly found themselves, declined by 42% in the same period (Oxfam ibid. ). More women 
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have been forced into the informal sector throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, at the 
same time as increased redundancies have meant the loss of male earnings and a general fall in 
the purchasing power of the household (Zack-Williams, 2000) 
Of the latter half of the 1990s, despite average regional economic growth rates for the period 
1990-97 ranging from a high of 7.3% for Chile to 1.9% for Mexico (Gwynne 1999), various 
studies by authors such as Berry (1998) have shown that the introduction of liberalisation 
measures is associated with a serious deterioration in income distribution. Other case studies 
showed that orthodox stabilisation is neither necessary nor sufficient for strong agricultural 
performance. Irrespective of this evidence, however, and because IMF approval of all aspects of 
governance was now vital to secure any funding, Latin American governments were locked into 
effective political bondage (Teivainen 1994 p. 20). A 17-country study of adjustment reforms 
between 1971 and 1996 completed for ECLAC indicated that: 
"In the aggregate, reforms did not have a significant direct impact on the growth 
rate, because the different individual components of the reform package have 
offsetting effects. Tax reform has a positive and lasting effect on growth; capital 
account reform also raises the growth rate, but only up to a certain point. The other 
reforms, in particular trade reform, do not seem to have a robust or significant 
impact on the growth rate, beyond the effect they may have through other variables 
in the model. " (Escaith and Morley 2000, p. 5) 
The ECLAC study adds to a growing body of evidence of slower economic growth in Latin 
America during the post-reform period than the pre-reform period, and overall there is an 
impression of growing marginalisation (Kay 1989) and uneven outward-orientated growth and 
development (Gwynn and Kay 1999), nationally and regionally. On a regional basis, the figures 
are even more dramatic: 
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Before and After the Onset of Structural 
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capita declined, external debt grew, and social expenditures were cut between 1978 and 1997 
(Hellfinger 1999). 
For `developed' countries in the period 1960-79, median unweighted GDP per capita was 3.4 %, 
whereas for `developing' countries it was 2.5%; in the period 1980-98 the percentages were 1.8% 
and 0% respectively (Wade 2001). As the organizations that undertook these studies 
demonstrated, necessary pre-conditions for liberalization of economies invariably impacted on 
the poor and semi-poor worst; weakened trades union and legal rights, removal of food subsidies 
and price protection, destruction of public-sector investment such as education and health sectors 
are all inevitable accomplices of structural adjustment. 
Ironically, recent studies by the World Bank (Psacharopoulos and 
Patrinos 2002) show that there are positive statistical relationships between economic poor 
performers and low educational achievement per capita, a low achievement that the World 
Bank's sister, the IMF, is frequently responsible for. Similar work done on gender in the 
economy indicates the economic benefits (never mind the actual morality of the situation) to be 
gained from primary and secondary education for women, and yet again education continues to 
be one of those strategically feminized areas worst affected by SAPs. Despite World Bank claims 
of incorporating Women In Development (WID) components into its' projects and thinking, 
during the 1990s critiques of this rethinking suggested that: 
"It is only within the food and nutrition interventions that women have been 
specifically targeted, generally as passive recipients of welfare, i. e. `vulnerable 
groups', and not as active participants in the maintenance of household welfare. " 
(Moser, Herbert and Makonnen, 1993, p. 124). 
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Although countries differ greatly in their socio-economic environments, certain constants that 
were present from the beginning of the implementation of structural adjustment reforms are still 
relevant not just in Latin America, but on a global basis, and it is constants such as these that 
have widely `disconnected' the majority of the poorest (and in particular the rural poor) from any 
benefits that might have been expected. Throughout the 1990s these constants were widely 
ignored by the IMF when designing and implementing adjustment programmes, because they 
represented an uncomfortable counterpoint to the economic theory underlying structural 
adjustment. As the 1990s drew on, however, the impossibility of ignoring the generalised failure 
of the 'consensus'-induced SAPs coincided with the growth in prominence of information- 
theoretic and transaction-costs-theoretic analyses (Fine, Lapavitsas and Pincus, Op. Cit. ), whose 
theoretician-in-chief, Joseph Stiglitz, came to play such a symbolic role in the developing post- 
Washington consensus, as much in his firing from his post as in the work he did whilst incumbent 
Chief Economist at the World Bank. 
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2.4 - The Crowbar - Privatisation and Corruption 
"Although neoliberals didn't want to admit it, there had been solid profit interests behind the 
"admiration for authoritarian countries such as Indonesia" held by "prominent Asian and 
Western business leaders. " Naturally, such authoritarian regimes also provided a congenial 
environment for corruption. However, this corruption played a "positive" economic role insofar 
as it helped keep ruling coalitions together, thereby ensuring, especially in South Korea, that 
industrial planning decisions were actually carried out. Importantly, although such corruption 
was eventually bound to disrupt growth, it was only after East Asian countries partially 
liberalised their financial systems and opened themselves up to short-term capital flows (at the 
advice of conservative neoliberal agencies) that financial-sector corruption began to rage out of 
control to the point of seriously disrupting investment and growth. Moreover, conservative 
neoliberals failed to explain how the funnelling of billions of dollars of external capital into such 
corrupt systems was consistent with the purported wisdom and discipline of liberalised markets. " 
Burkett and Hart-Landsberg, 1998, `East Asia Crisis', Journal of Contemporary Asia 28: 4. pp. 
443-444 
Throughout the Central American region, the privatization process in particular has been a 
profitable vehicle for corruption as telecom businesses and former state utilities such as water and 
gas are sold at low prices in secretive sales where transparency is completely absent. Civil society 
groups point out a number of concerns about privatization processes, not the least of which is that 
the overview of the World Bank and IMF, that corruption is principally caused by the state sector 
and will therefore be greatly reduced with greater private sector participation in the economy, is 
simply wrong. This persistent anti-state bias in the World Bank and the IMF is especially ironic, 
as Standing (2000 p. 738) points out, given that historically "both institutions began to denigrate 
public bureaucracies with considerable vigour, while becoming enormous public bureaucracies 
themselves. " Notwithstanding the hypocrisy of their position, however, the IMF and World Bank 
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continue to parrot the mantra that privatization is best because, following Limqueco (1996), there 
is or should be an uncontested assumption among all `serious' development theoreticians and 
practitioners that in the long run the private sector is more efficient. 
At a time when the IFIs are growing more insistent on governability and transparency, the lack of 
success and unpopularity of the processes they initiate forces them to rely heavily on corrupt and 
clientelistic parties and individuals, and thus guarantees that less and less loan money reaches its' 
intended targets. Overall, again, the process of corruption is a male-biased one, where male- 
dominated governments enrich themselves illicitly by the sell-off of public-services that impact 
most heavily on feminized areas of the economy, and that subsequently have an increasingly 
destructive effect on the social and reproductive `capital' of society as external and internal 
corporations raise utility prices to recoup their `investments'. With respect to corruption Central 
America (with the possible exception of Nicaragua, which as we shall see in Chapter 4 is 
amongst the most corrupt countries in Latin America) is not the worst region in the world. 
Irrespective, however, of the new nomenclature in the IMF by which disbursements have now 
become Poverty Reduction Support Credits and Development Support Loans, little has changed 
to make the IFIs any the less reliant on seriously flawed theory and secretive and corrupt 
implementation of that theory. Ironically therefore in view of their recently discovered 
enthusiasm for the `new' societal superglue, social capital, it is not surprising that little mention 
is made by the IFIs of the way in which corruption itself is a form of social capital. 
The fuel for this corruption is the push towards the privatization of `more or less everything' 
(Bails and Cramer 2001), perhaps the most outstanding example of universally applied theory 
under conditionality with no substantive benefits. Two widely cited reports (Kikeri et al 1992, 
World Bank 1995) on the apparently beneficial effects of privatizing monopolies became the 
motive for enforced privatization of as many state assets as possible, in a process that continues 
up to the time of writing. It became apparent even to the World Bank at a fairly early stage that 
the results from privatization were disappointing to say the least (Helleiner 1994), and yet up to 
the time of writing misdirected and ill-conceived privatizations directed by the political interests 
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of host-countries (Bellin 1994, Tangri 1995) and `investing' countries remain the order of the day 
in SAPs. There is also evidence to suggest that private firms in LIEs disinvest as a direct response 
to the removal of state protection of industries (Bennell, 1995). 
Critics of privatization processes point to other contradictions between theory and reality; 
perhaps above all, however, is the fact that the tiny elites in Latin America who both guide 
structural adjustment and who have been made billionaires by it are interchangeable between 
government and private sector, and the difference between the two is frequently 
indistinguishable. During the privatization of over 1,000 state enterprises in Mexico under the 
Salinas administration, the number of billionaires in Mexico leapt by 1994 to more than the total 
for the entirety of Latin America three years earlier (Veltmeyer, Petras and Vieux 1997) - given 
the weakness of the Mexican economy at the time and its' subsequent collapse, leading to the £54 
billion bail-out by the IMF of 1994-1995, it is unlikely that such massive wealth creation had 
anything at all to do with the greater efficiency of the private sector. 
Part of the process by which conditionality adds to the corruption of the state is the often 
secretive manner in which the process is imparted to the governing structures; as Standing 
(Op. Cit) points out, there are various channels for what he refers to as `agency' conditionality, 
and `structured' conditionality. Quite apart from the publicly declared and commonplace 
conditions, there are informal conditions hinted at in the course of negotiations and pre-emptive 
conditions where governments may act first to court the approval of IFIs. There is also 
opportunistic conditionality, where a government takes advantage of the conditionality to 
introduce policy that it would have introduced itself anyway, and interest-driven conditionality 
where a commercial concern offers an incentive to the government (such as the phone-call made 
by then-governor George W. Bush of Texas in 1988 in support of Enron purchases of Buenos 
Aires public utilities, or President George W. Bush's intervention on behalf of Westinghouse in 
Mozambique). Lastly there is political-threat conditionality, where secret pressure is applied to 
governments or officials to introduce policy in return for aid, which pressure is publicly deniable. 
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External interventions and hidden conditionalities (more hidden knowledge, in fact), 
complemented by an absence of domestic savings and minimal capital greatly increase reliance 
on foreign investment and thus the corrupting processes inherent in secretive conditionality. 
Monopolistic market structures are commonplace throughout Latin America (as indeed virtually 
everywhere in the world), and any putative competitive forces are less effective because of the 
prevalence of the common practice of holding interlocking directorships (Bails 2000). In 
Nicaragua this monopolistic situation is further complicated (as indeed in many HIPC countries) 
by the hard truth that very few bidders, external or internal, are interested in the ramshackle state 
dependencies. More particularly, it is generally the case in HIPCs (and particular in Nicaragua) 
that not only is institutional capacity weak, property rights hazy, and regulatory efficiency so low 
that clientelism is rampant, but that the same individuals and groups who in government are 
responsible for the sell-off of state assets are frequently the ones who profit directly from the sale 
in a private capacity. 
Giant corporations such as Telmex of Mexico, which currently comprises approximately 30% of 
the Mexican stock market by itself, and Telefonica of Spain", which has extensive holdings 
throughout Latin America, frequently comprise the only realistic bidders for state sell-offs, and 
where they choose to buy they extract concessions from host states that minimize any fiscal gain 
from the sale. Such foreign direct investment had grown from just over $10 billion in 1990 to $55 
billion in 1997 (ECLAC 1998a), based on three processes; privatization of state assets, 
participation of private capital in mining and infrastructure, and re-organization by transnationals 
to increase international competitiveness under various regional agreements such as NAFTA and 
MERCOSUR. In Nicaragua, the recent sale of the state electricity supply to the Spanish Union 
Fenosa group has resulted in an immediate rise in prices for those legally attached to the system12, 
a further `poverty trap' for the majority of the population who are illegally attached and now 
11 Spanish companies in particular have been quick to capitalise on their common linguistic and cultural ties with 
countries throughout Latin America. In Nicaragua one of the largest privatisations, the electricity supply, is being 
undertaken by Union Fenosa of Spain 12 Personal communication to the author from Veronica Campanile, CIIR co-operante for the NGO Puntos de 
Encuentro at the Universidad de Mujeres, Managua, Nicaragua. 
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therefore that much further away from being able to obtain a legal supply. Where there is no such 
a bid, or the outcome of the sale has already been arranged, local financial elite groups and 
individuals make the purchase, again with little or no gain to the state, and frequently a loss. 
Monopolization on an unprecedented scale has not only been permitted by structural adjustment 
but also actively encouraged by it, making little sense of recent policy initiatives by the lFIs with 
respect to governability. 
At the same time as redundancies caused by state sector sell-offs increase, followed by the almost 
inevitable downsizing of labour costs by the new owner, in many countries any existing rights of 
workers disappear as unions are de-recognised and activists lose their jobs and wage rates are 
slashed. It is another aspect of the gendered economy that a significant number of those 
`rationalized' by privatization tend to be women (Hatem, 1994), for whom the state continues to 
be a major source of employment globally. By the very process of being rationalized from the 
formal economy, of course, women become more attractive to the maquila economy (more 
responsibilities, likely to work harder for lower wages and not unionize) and make up larger 
percentages of the informal economy, not least because part of the rationalizing of the public 
sector is comprised of cutting wages to the point where even selling newspapers in the street 
becomes a more attractive proposition. But this is not problematic for the IMF (which is 
unaccountable to international law) as much as anything else because, according to Grant B. 
Taplin, assistant director of the Geneva office of the IMF, the IMF is not bound by various 
human rights declarations and conventions (Capdevila 2001). The widespread consequences of 
this line of policy have been the increased use of cheaper non-union labour and in particular 
women, in rural areas the employment of labour on a day-labour basis only and, in the case of 
countries such as El Salvador, a rapid increase in the use of child labour (SAPRIN 2000). 
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2.5 - The Suction-Puma - Financial Liberalisation 
"The rush to capital liberalisation in the early to mid 1990s without serious institutional support 
stands out as the single most irresponsible act in the whole crisis...... In Korea key people were 
bribed by Japanese and western financial institutions, thanks to which they did something that 
was counter to the whole thrust of Korean development policy for decades past. Bribery aside, 
the government placed great emphasis on joining the OECD, and the OECD made financial 
openness a condition of membership. As part of the same set of reforms, the government 
abolished the Economic Planning Board, the main body for making economic strategy since the 
early 1960s, and made the Finance Ministry dominant. " 
Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso, "The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model vs. the Wall Street - 
Treasury - IMF Complex", The Russell Sage Foundation Web site 
(ht(p: //epn. org/sage/im124. html), March 21998. 
It is in the ideas of liberalisation of financial markets and the financial system itself where 
perhaps the most insidious and destructive effects of structural adjustment policies have been felt 
in Latin America, because of the perceived notion of their emergent financial market status. 
Following theorization of the importance of the liberalisation of financial markets in the research 
of Levine (1992), Bencivenga et al (1995) and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999), the IMF has 
been rigorously, promoting the liberalisation of financial markets as an essential component of 
growth and development, deeming a fully functioning stock market as not only essential to debt 
fmancing but also to the recruitment of vital investment capital, both home-grown and foreign, 
for the basis of economic growth. On a global basis, whilst between 1989 and 1994 bilateral and 
multilateral government development finance grew by 28%, as a result of enforced liberalisation 
measures private finance flows grew by 313%; in 1996 alone these private flows increased by 
US$60 billion to US$244 billion (World Bank, 1997). 
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Just how mistaken this insistence on universalised open-access view of Emergent Market 
Economies (EMEs) was to be was shown by the series of increasingly larger financial bail-outs 
by the IFIs throughout the 1990s, culminating in the East Asian crisis of 1997 (Wade Op. Cit, 
Bello, W. 1998), but perhaps more spectacularly in the 2001 collapse of the Argentine economy. 
Having created these problems in the first place, however, the IMF has little knowledge of how to 
cure the problem beyond the usual nostrums: 
"As many have already pointed out, the financial crisis in Asia is a crisis of the 
market, of the private sector. Yet the solution of the IMF is to impose the traditional 
Fund solution that addresses mainly a problem of severe government indebtedness 
by cutting back on government expenditures and requiring government to produce a 
surplus. The problem is also one not of severe inflationary pressures, which is why 
another element of the traditional IMF formula, raising interest rates, is 
questionable. The upshot of the IMF formula is to add deflationary pressures that 
aggravate the recessionary effects of the financial crisis instead of putting into 
motion counter-cyclical mechanisms such as increased government capital 
expenditures that would arrest the decline in private sector activity. " (Bello, 
Op. Cit. ) 
For some, this liberalisation comprises an effective `constitutionalization' of global capital, an 
attempt to impart a legal and juridical status to global capital and financial institutes that would 
render them immune to nation-state control. This process of `locking in' or entrenching (Moore, 
2000) globalised capital and giving it an effective legal status superior to that of individual 
countries should also be seen in the context of the various rules governing `fair competition' for 
corporations under the WTO, which have led to examples such as the current dispute (2002) 
between the government of Canada and the giant postal firm UPS, where the government of 
Canada is being challenged on the very existence of its' public postal service, as representing an 
unfair form of competition. 
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It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that in the current atmosphere of increased freedom 
for global capital and corporate trade, certain hitherto virtually unquestioned functions inherent in 
nation-state sovereignty are in danger of abandonment. And again, at the risk of labouring a 
point, another male-dominated aspect of the globalising economy, the inherent risks of gambling 
and speculating on capital flows is paid for by the massive destruction of feminised sectors of the 
economy essential for social reproduction - women and children paying the price for a 
universalised male gambling addiction. Whilst for the rich northern countries in which such 
financial and trading corporations maintain their bases and activities this process is less 
destructive, in those globally marginalized nations whose political strength is anyway strictly 
limited by their indebtedness or their weakened economies, it is a very serious matter indeed. 
Almost 90% of the world's 200 biggest corporations are headquartered in six countries 
(Clairmonte, 1999), however, 47 in the US, 41 in Japan, 23 in Germany, 19 in France, 13 in the 
UK and 6 in Switzerland 
As a recent example of the inherent contradictions of adjustment macroeconomics and 
liberalisation of financial markets in particular, the December 2001 default by Argentina on its' 
external debt, the culmination of unsustainable economic pressures caused by obedience to IMF 
insistence on cutting the fiscal deficit and controlling inflation, has few (current) equals. The 
Then-President de la Rua had been trying to accomplish the impossible task of defending an 
overvalued peso exchange rate, keeping up full servicing of the huge dollar debt left as a legacy 
by the Menem administration, and balancing the fiscal budget in the face of rapidly increasing 
unemployment and falling production, production hit especially hard by the overvaluing of the 
peso through effective 'dollarisation'. 
In common with many Latin American countries the initial impetus towards liberalisation and 
privatisation in Argentina, plus the approval of the IMF had caused an inflow of private 
investment that boosted growth considerably. According to an ECLAC report the growth was 
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supposedly accompanied by a macroeconomic stability unlike any other period for several 
decades, and a readiness by the IFIs to act promptly to deal with any crises (ECLAC, 1998b). 
What became later apparent, however, was that the economic growth in that period appears to 
have been mainly the result of increasing the international debt, a temporary and fortuitous 
expansion of foreign markets and short-term injections of government revenues from the sales of 
state enterprises (MacEwan 2002). These inflows of investment capital slowed to a trickle as 
Argentina ran out of things to privatise, and the purchase of Argentinian bonds slowed as the 
dollar increased in strength from 1995, dragging the peso upwards with it under the 
Convertibility Law and making Argentine exports less and less competitive. 
The IMF continued to support Argentina with larger and larger rescue packages through the later 
1990s as dollar debts built up under liberalisation of capital controls rose, and meanwhile the 
markets, recognising the inevitability of eventual devaluation and perhaps debt default, reduced 
the status of Argentina from A+ on downwards. President de la Rua's determination to continue 
with this cataclysmic policy and at the same time comply with IMF strictures concerning the 
fiscal deficit simply made the inevitable collapse more sudden and destructive. The Argentine 
state, having now been abandoned by an IMF bearing equal responsibility for its' collapse, was 
faced with defaulting on a dollar debt of $155 billion (MacEwan Op. Cit. ), the largest in history, a 
reversal of fiscal austerity under the most adverse of economic conditions, and a rapid and 
destructive exchange rate depreciation. In the meantime, unemployment grew apace and cheap 
imports usurped the markets in which productivity recovery would have to take place. 
The parts played by the IMF and the Argentine government demonstrate that conditionality 
policies invoked during structural adjustment, whatever the changes in local, national, and global 
economic and financial circumstances, are still the same with little or no attention paid to 
individual country situations, irrespective of whatever post-Washington debate there may be. 
Derived from an essentially ideological cognitive model that postulates universal certainties in 
economic processes, adjustment conditionality continues to constitute a set of prescriptions that 
ignore the wider sociological and above all political global realities. The programme designers 
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themselves are still unable and unwilling to incorporate the flexibility necessary to be effective 
under the fluid changes in circumstances that are normal in global financial and economic 
environments. That these processes had and still have the enthusiastic support of Argentine elites, 
despite a decline in GDP of 14% during the 2001-2002 recession (MacEwan Op. Cit. ) is less 
surprising when the extent of the corruption that inevitably accompanied the privatisation and 
liberalisation processes is contemplated, plus the fact that those who profited most had moved 
their dollar accounts abroad long before the most recent crisis. The Argentines who had access to 
their bank accounts frozen and their withdrawals restricted and denominated in pesos, it may be 
safely said, are not those who made a fortune out of privatisation. 
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2.6 -A Sledgehammer to Crack a Walnut - Liberalisation, the US and Nicaragua 
"The principal beneficiary of America's foreign assistance programs has always been the United 
States. Close to 80% of the US Agency for International Development's (USAIDS) contracts and 
grants go directly to American firms. Foreign assistance programs have helped create major 
markets for agricultural goods, created new markets for American industrial exports and meant 
hundreds of thousands of jobs for Americans. " (USAID, Direct economic benefits of US 
assistance by state. http: //www. info. usaid. gov/procurement bus_opp/states/) 
The example of Nicaragua (as will be shown in more detail in chapter 4) shows clearly how 
economic and particularly financial liberalization works in a manner not directed toward stable 
economic growth. Financial sector deregulation, narrowly focused and without adequate prior 
institutional reform, stimulates the flow of capital to short-term, high-interest deposits and not 
toward productive investment. Interest rates are maintained at the highest levels in Central 
America driven not only by the constant need for new investment, but also the constant 
expenditures by the BCN (Banco Central de Nicaragua) to rescue collapsing deregulated banks. 
Throughout Latin America, state banks such as the National Development Bank in Ecuador or 
Banco National de Desarrollo (BANADES) in Nicaragua are forced into liquidation, leaving 
small and medium-sized businesses of all types without access to credit as the former state banks 
fall into line with the restrictive credit practices of the private sector. 
Agricultural and industrial production groups that have been displaced by or subordinated to 
financial groups frequently find that they have little or no access to credit for investment. As a 
result, the boom that has taken place amongst privileged sectors attached to large commercial 
conglomerates, such as finance and construction, provides a contrast with the stagnation of 
domestic production and the generalized deterioration in the conditions of that production. 
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Additionally, the funds provided by large anonymous fmancial and commercial conglomerates, 
invested in large infrastructure projects or commercial centers in places where they attract little or 
no custom, has more to do with the necessity of laundering cocaine dollars than productive 
investment. 
At a macro-economic level, both before and after the debt crisis of 1982 in Latin America, three 
major trends have further derailed effective growth in regional economies attempting to expand 
through liberalization. The first trend is the increasingly protectionist tendencies of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) governments, as manifested 
in Voluntary Export Restraints such as the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) of 1986 to date, and 
numerous other non-tariff barriers erected mainly against LIE competition. From the Nicaraguan 
example, meat and sugar exports, two of the most important export commodities, currently 
experience import restrictions from the US, Nicaragua's most important trading partner. The 
USA is not alone in this, however; industrialised countries devoted US$353 billion (seven times 
total overseas development aid spending) to protecting agriculture in 1998, according to the 
UNDP13, and whilst universally southern governments are forced to privatise and liberalise, 
restrictive practices in the rich north such as tariff and non-tariff barriers cost developing 
countries US$160 billion a year'4. 
The second trend is constituted by the huge expansion of internalised FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment) and intra-corporate trade as a component of world trade. The increased control of 
finance and trade with LIEs which results from this dominance means that the markets in which 
poor country exports operate are increasingly controlled from outside, and that less and less of 
LIE trade can be considered trade in the accepted meaning of the word. The aspect of SAPs that 
encourages increased trade increases exposure to these external forces without necessarily 
strengthening the economy of the LIE in any way, and often to its' detriment. The third trend is 
the increasing shift in the divisions of labour on a North-South basis (and more recently to China, 
13 Overcoming Human Poverty, UNDP, New York, 2000 14 Informal World Bank estimates quoted in UK Africa Partnership Initiative report, October 2000. 
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the ultimate, inexhaustible low-cost labour pool, with which even the poorest countries seem 
unable to compete). Many LIEs are becoming repositories for certain light industrial products and 
production methods, especially where the essential prerequisites of a docile, cheap labour force 
and cheap energy can be guaranteed by a sympathetic government. This is especially noticeable 
in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) of Latin America, notable amongst which are the 
maquila-belt industries in Mexico set up by US firms to use the cheap labour and avoid 
expensive anti-pollution legislation; again from Nicaragua, a similar example is the Taiwanese 
jeans manufacturers of the Zona Franca on the outskirts of Managua, the capital. 
The economic and social forces unleashed on the Central American region by structural 
adjustment, have in a number of ways been intensified by the closure of the 1987 round of the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), and the advent of the successor mechanism, 
the WTO. The grooming of the WTO had as its' stated intent the further and final liberalization 
of trade, however the subtext of the WTO discourse revealed rather more plausible political 
intentions, once again seen by the poorer LIEs as being mainly in the interests of the G8 
countries. It had been US pressure since the late 1980s that pushed along the development of the 
WTO, and also that brought agriculture into the GATT-WTO system in 1995. 
One underlying reason for this was clarified by the US Agriculture Secretary John Block at the 
start of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1986, who pronounced that developing countries 
should abandon the idea of feeding themselves as anachronistic, and rely instead on the lower 
cost products of the USA for their food security. As regards a number of crops, both food and 
non-food, Nicaragua and the whole of the Central American region have seen internal markets 
collapse (for instance in the cases of rice and cotton) under the weight of US imports and in 
particular the flood of foodstuffs that intended as aid under the US PL480 programmes. Overall, 
according to DGAP a majority of structurally adjusting countries experienced a negative average 
annual growth rate in food production per capita between 1979 and 1993 (Hellinger Op. Cit. ). 
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It is this unstable geo-political and economic environment that provides the backdrop to the 
operation of microfinance in Central America. Microfmance in Nicaragua in particular has to be 
seen, not just through the parlous state of the national economy, but in the light of the strenuous 
efforts made by the IFIs to `fast-track' the country into acceptable adjustment, and through the 
prism of a frequently difficult relationship with the USA. The problems of a clan-based autocratic 
political system and the endemic corruption of the region afflict Nicaragua, and as the next 
sections and the following two chapters discuss, the theoretical and practical limitations of 
microfmance in Nicaragua not only work under the same neo-liberal hegemony at an 
international level, they take on local colouration as well through being co-opted into the 
peculiarly politicised environment of Nicaragua. 
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2.7 - Micro-finance Initiatives In A Neo-Liberal Climate 
"Microbusiness is not a new phenomenon, since its antecedents of loans to small village and 
cottage industries trace back several millennia. What today is defined as microbusiness most 
likely was founded in the ancient kingdoms in the region known as "The Golden Crescent", 
between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. " 
Graham Perrett, `Access to Microfinance & Improved Implementation of Policy Reform', 
Microfinance/Microenterprise Strategic Assessment Final Report, AMIR Program in Jordan, US 
Agency for International Development, April 2001. 
Microfmance is a generic term for a group of financial phenomena that have a global history 
stretching back for hundreds, and in some instances (as above) thousands of years; microcredit is 
the appellation of one form of microfinance that deals with individual loans, and in the context of 
the `new' microcredit movement (which we might term the financial systems approach, following 
Otero and Rhyne 1992) it is microcredit lending that is beginning to take over. As well as seeking 
to remake small-scale saving and loan traditions for the poorest into a neo-liberalist model of 
microcredit, microfinance in a neo-liberal climate has also appropriated the clothing of Gender 
And Development (GAD), using the gendered poverty trap (Jackson 1998) as justification for 
increased interventions directed at women. 
Donors previously reluctant to consider gendered aspects of their projects now push for the 
inclusion of poor women on efficiency grounds (Goetz, 1994). This can sometimes appear to be 
the same idea of efficiency that is accused by some of actually representing `a shifting of costs 
from the paid economy to the unpaid economy' (Elson, 1989, p. 68), when it comes to downsizing 
and rationalising the formal economy; not only do women thus absorb much of the social costs of 
structural adjustment, they bear the burden of being society's new entrepreneurs, and their 
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vulnerability to social and other forms of pressure makes them better repayers of loans than their 
menfolk. Combined, these tendencies have made microfinance a theoretically (and perhaps 
unfortunately) valuable if heartless ally as palliative in coping with the massive social 
polarisations and increased poverty brought on by structural adjustment - "My lady, the poor are 
starving because they have no money! " "Then let them eat credit. " 
The new movement ignores the context in which credit amongst and for the poorest takes place, 
such as the fact that in many countries around the world, for instance Africa (Buckley, 1997, 
p. 1088), the vast majority of credit still takes on a non-financial form, and retains the cultural and 
social trappings which are detaching the traditional, informal forms, described by Geertz (1962) 
under the umbrella term ROSCAS (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations), from the 
usurping, 'modern' forms which have hidden this knowledge. This might simply be an interesting 
anthropological observation if it were not that in many cases the non-finance areas of credit, 
which might be termed aspects of social and cultural credit, are likely to determine whether such 
an initiative will be successful or not (Buckley, ibid., P. 1091). Not only do modern forms of 
microfinance ignore the socio-cultural hinterland of traditional forms, however, in doing so and 
in targeting women in particular, they are accused of reinforcing women's subordinate positions 
within the community and the household, by failing to train them in better-paid skills (Beneria 
and Bisnath 2000). 
The global history of loan and saving associations is both extensive and well documented, from 
research such as the first comparative study of ROSCAs by Geertz (1962); these were one group 
amongst a number of different types of mutual assistance and communal service organisations, 
observed by different researchers across the globe, from the beginning of the century. Although 
they had roots in communal organisations pre-dating colonial rule, the introduction of 
monetarization, commercialisation and taxation had a profound influence on the economy and the 
evolution of these organisations (Bouman, 1995, p. 372). Geertz looked at 'Arisans' in Java, 'Hui' 
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in China, the 'Esusu' of the Yoruba and the 'Ho' of Vietnam, amongst others, and commented on 
both the intentions of the participants, and the mutability of the associations themselves. As the 
organisations move from the rural to the urban, Geertz noted the presence of two contrary forces, 
the increasing segregation of economic activities from non-economic ones, at the same time as an 
effort was made to maintain the dominance of traditional values over developing economic 
activities. 
These earlier studies also started from the assumption that savings and credit associations were a 
transitional step to fully-fledged capitalism (Ardener, 1964, p. 221), an eventually self-liquidating 
form of capital accumulation that would be superseded by formal banking institutions. 
Describing credit associations (of whatever type) purely as instruments of capital accumulation, 
however, becomes "even more difficult when an anthropologist attempts to describe the 
institutional setting of economic activity in a non-industrial society. This is because there is not to 
be found the same specialization of institutions and segmentalisation of relationships that gives 
economic theory its descriptive significance in the analysis of modem western society (Swift, 
1956, p. 325). " In other words, orthodox economic theory tends to analyze in terms of linear 
relationships with other factors held equal, and not the network of social and cultural influences 
that permeate the economic reality of LIEs. 
Aside from studies of pre-industrial societies and their credit and co-operative organisations, 
microfmance played a significant part in the industrialisation of Europe in the 19th century. As an 
example the Raiffeisen co-operatives are of particular importance, beginning in the 1840s and 
numbering some 425 by the time Frederich Raiffeisen died in 1888. Thereafter their spread was 
rapid, the first in Italy being established in 1866, the first in Austria in 1886, and by 1912 there 
were 8,000 such organisations there. They spread globally to become perhaps the longest-lasting 
form of organised microfmance institution. They penetrated virtually every country in Europe, 
spreading to the US, China and India. In India alone by 1946 they had over nine million members 
(Hollis and Sweetman, ibid. p. 1882). This rich historical context is being swept aside, however, 
by the hyperbolae surrounding the `new' tool of microcredit: 
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"Hillary Clinton opened the World Summit on Microcredit in Washington. The 
occasion highlighted the effectiveness of using tiny loans to help the most destitute 
people on earth pull themselves and their families out of poverty. But there is 
another, astonishing side of this story: the political consequences of putting 
capitalism to work for the have-nots. Microcredit not only liberates the poorest of 
the poor from hunger, it liberates them, and us, from fanatical extremists. 
Microcredit was invented 20 years ago in Bangladesh by Muhammad Yunus... 
Microcredit does what billions of dollars worth of AWACS and Patriot missiles 
cannot. For decades, the West has tried to defeat fanatical extremists militarily; this 
has been bloody, costly and highly unsuccessful. But quietly, every day, the 
attraction of militant Islam is being blunted, at the ballot box and in people's hearts 
and minds, thanks to the economic development of the poor. We have known that 
micro-credit helps solve a host of in-tractable, long-term social ills related to 
poverty: In Norway's arctic circle, it is helping repopulate the Lofoten Islands. In 
Oklahoma, thanks to Chief Wilma Mankiller of the Cherokee Nation, microcredit is 
helping reduce alcoholism. In Chicago, it is helping get unwed mothers off welfare. " 
(Jolis 1997) 
Even if the claims being made on behalf of this development super-weapon were true, plainly 
microcredit was not invented 20 years ago by Mohammed Yunus, influential though he 
undoubtedly was in its more recent developments; what is interesting to observe from the above 
quote, and a central theme to this thesis, is the political hinterland with which microcredit lending 
is rapidly being invested. 
The construction of a theoretical framework through which the new discourse can run is not left 
to the newspapers alone. The Microfinance Network (1999) described the historical provision of 
microfmancial services to the low-income sector as consisting of an assortment of pilot projects 
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and innovative ideas, which after twenty years of experimentation was beginning to establish a 
new hybridised industry of both commercial finance and economic development. No mention is 
made in this particular history of already existing popular microcredit, devised by the low-income 
sector itself in the absence of provision by anyone else. As an example, as the fieldwork analysed 
in this thesis will show, in Nicaragua there exist groups termed asociaciones de cajas de muerto, 
which despite the dramatic name are small savings groups set up by both the Catholic church and 
the FSLN as insurance groups which cover funeral costs. These organisations plainly pre-date 
modem microfmance initiatives, particularly those of the Catholic church, and as it turned out 
some 38% of the respondents interviewed as part of the fieldwork and yet none of the 
microfinance groups interviewed by the author in Nicaragua were familiar with them, or operated 
a similar facility, having borrowed their methodology from the modernist school of microcredit. 
Truly in the modem microcredit context, "the domination of a technological logic in modernity 
means the eradication of nature and its historicity or connection to the past. " (Kellner 1994 p. 3). 
As part of the orthodox discourse of financial technology taking over the communal, historical 
discourse of microfmance, financial self-sufficiency and above all profitability have taken over as 
the motivating force behind provision for the most recent converts, and for this reason the legal 
framework in target countries must be adapted to the demands of corporate finance. The 
establishment of the CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest) by the World Bank in 
1998 has led to calls for an end to all usury laws in target countries, for microlending institutions 
to be privatized, for a cessation of government subsidies, and for far stronger debt-collection laws 
(Singh, Dawkins-Scully and Wysham, 1999). 
Pursuant to the construction of an orthodox discourse surrounding the new microfmance industry 
(and the burial of its' historical knowledge) is the construct of the innovative nature of private 
financial institutions and actors: "There is evidence that where opportunities for profit-making 
exist, private sector actors will innovate to overcome failures in important markets, including 
those for seasonal credit and inputs. " (Dorward, Kydd, Lyon, Poole, Poulton, Smith and 
Stockbridge, 1998). In direct contrast to this statement, Mohammed Yunus himself has suggested 
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that the efforts of NGOs and state organisations over the last three decades to construct 
commercial versions of microcredit initiatives have been necessitated by the refusal of the private 
banking sector to work with the poorest communities. The Grameen Bank, for instance, despite 
successful attempts to show that the poorest represented a good fmancial risk, was unable to 
persuade mainstream Bangladeshi banks to deal with them: 
"We have demonstrated in the last 21 years that the poor can take money and pay 
you back better than anyone else ,....... So 
how can you say poor people are not 
creditworthy now? This excuse is gone, and we say that some financial institutions 
are practising apartheid......... Financial institutions divide the whole society in the 
middle. If you don't call it apartheid, what else is it? " (Yunus, quoted in Sarno, 
1998, p. 2). 
The co-opting of microfmance and its' rapid expansion have invited the concern of NGO 
practitioners for some time. Warnings of the need to look at the whole area of poverty rather than 
focusing on microcredit as a universal instrument, however, have run into criticism. Oxfam 
issued a press release prior to the Microcredit Summit of 2-4 February 1997, which concluded 
that microcredit was obviously useful but couldn't be seen as a panacea for poverty, given that 
people living in poverty are not simply affected by the lack of money. For Oxfam, microfinance 
and credit initiatives should be integrated into broader strategies for poverty alleviation that 
include access to health services and education (Oxfam, 1997). This attitude has been backed up 
by other leading practitioners of microcredit, such as Opportunity International, and was 
reinforced by Ben Rogaly, employed by Oxfam and a leading researcher in the field. These 
warnings, however, angered Clare Short, then-opposition spokesperson for overseas development 
and now minister, who expressed astonishment at the "damning attitude" of one of Britain's 
largest development charities. She expressed the opinion that it was possible that 
nongovernmental organisations found empowerment of the poorest a threat to their own power 
(Short, quoted in Millar, 1997). 
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There is growing evidence, however, that the unitary microcredit model being sold in so many 
different countries on a one-size-fits-all basis, is beginning to experience problems on a number 
of fronts, causing theoreticians and practitioners alike to rethink the model. Even some of the 
bigger and better microfmance institutions are beginning to experience desertion rates of between 
40-60% (Richardson 2000), caused by the plethora of institutions offering loans in many LIC 
urban areas. Cherry-picking the `better' clients, itself a phenomenon forced by the drive for 
sustainability amongst donors and a trend that the section on microfmance in Nicaragua will deal 
with in more detail, is pushing lending organisations to try and compete by lowering interests 
when they are ill-adapted to do so and the pressure to expand and repay their funding is growing. 
The other trend that this pressure has caused is portfolio concentration and increases in the levels 
of default (Countdown 2005 1997), most famously in the case of Bolivia in 1999. 
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2.8 - Conclusion 
"A myth has existed over the past few years in the microfinance industry that it is a lack of 
institutional capacity, not capital, that constrains significant growth in outreach to the poorest. 
This myth has been fuelled by the experiences of many donors, social development agencies, and 
social investors in the West, who say there are not enough "good MFIs" out there, particularly in 
the developing world, and thus these funders aren't able to distribute all their available funds for 
microfinance. We have long believed that this was an oversimplification of a more complex 
dynamic. Yes, funds are earmarked for microfinance, but they are only made available to select 
microfinance institutions. Those who do not qualify, either because of their small scale of 
operation, stage of maturity, location, or focus, are the majority, and are left to struggle. " 
David S. Gibbons and Jennifer W. Meehan, `Financing Microfinance For Poverty Reduction', 
CASHPOR Draft document for comment, 20 March 2002 draft 
In the preceding sections, the context of structural adjustment in neo-liberal theory has been 
discussed, as planned and practiced in Latin America. The dubious effects of conditionality are 
obvious, from external sources as much as the IMF's own figures, and subsequently the 
popularity of microfmance initiatives amongst the IFIs derives in part at least from the need to 
find - new mechanisms to combat poverty, and justify intervention. Microcredit lending in 
particular, as a subspecies of the genus microfmance, has a particular resonance with neo-liberal 
theory. As a direct consequence of this and the advance of the institutionalist credo that we have 
discussed ' above, many microfinance organisations are being left to struggle on their own, as the 
quote above indicates, and for reasons that have little to do with their effectiveness as lending 
organisations, but instead arbitrary decisions about whether and how quickly they can become 
self-sustainable and whether they match up to `best practices' dictat. The net result of these two 
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convergent tendencies is increasingly an effective amputation of old, socialized forms of 
microfmance from their historical context, and their re-invention as the `new' school of 
microfmance, sprung fully armed against poverty from the pain-wracked heads of the IFIs. 
In combination with a number of other initiatives designed to redress civil society and NGO 
criticisms of a lack of poverty focus in conditionality, such as the insistence on poor country 
production of Poverty Reduction Strategies and the creation of IMF bodies such as CGAP, 
microfinance is increasingly being promoted as a ready-made poverty alleviation tool intö which 
renewable assets can be directed whilst more theoretical concerns over the structure and reality of 
poverty can be analyzed and addressed at leisure. Above all, however, although it is advertised as 
a grassroots approach to poverty alleviation, control over the theory and structure of the approach 
has already been removed from the grasp of the poorest. 
In the meantime, in Latin America as in many other regions of the world, there is a large and 
growing amount of finance and organizational capacity moving into the region for 
microenterprise development - in Chile alone, for instance, one quarter of the entire labour force, 
about 1.2 million people, works in microenterprises, rising to 46% in Colombia; in Bolivia 
between 1992 and 1995, the proportion of people involved in micro-enterprises and family 
enterprises grew from 58% to 63%, (Latin America Press, 1998). In common with the rest of the 
world, because the poorest are an extremely heterogeneous group who exhibit complex and 
discrete forms of behaviour necessary for survival in extremis, detecting the impact of any kind 
of aid can often be difficult, as indeed can be defining the poor. Measurement purely by income 
deprivation fails to capture what may be more important forms of deprivation, which are 
concerned with lack of access and vulnerability. As a result of sociological inter-reaction, it has 
been observed that whilst micro-enterprise and poverty alleviation may coincide, they are not 
necessarily synonymous (Johnson and Rogaly 1997) or households often have multiple sources 
of income and may well be involved in migratory labour patterns, which can make poverty 
87 
alleviation directly attributable to fungible loans hard or impossible to measure. 
USAID in particular states that Micro-enterprise development is a priority for them, and that the 
willingness of the poorest to pay for services was an indication of the value of the services (Hunt 
and Neill 1998); the organization claims to be targeting micro-finance for a 15% annual growth 
rate in the number of clients. USAID expected to reach 1 million people by the end of the century 
(USAID 1998), and all USAID bureaus except Africa are spending more than two-thirds of their 
funding to promote sustainable financial programs for micro-enterprises. In the Latin American 
region as a whole, USAID claims some 30% of currently funded programmes to be fully 
sustainable (Hunt and Neill, Op. Cit. ). This should be seen in the context of the large reductions in 
overall funding by USAID in Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, from $1141 million in 
1988 to $535 million in 1998 (USAID Congressional Presentation FY 1998 cited in Brown 
2000). 
The IAI)B states that much of Latin America and the Caribbean has experienced a wave of 
financial liberalization resulting in market- determined interest rates, higher investment 
efficiency, greater banking competition, and a wider offering of financial products (IADB, 1996). 
The market, however, has not provided credit in the way that the neo-liberal discourse suggests it 
must (Hulme and Mosley 1996), and particularly not in the rural zones. Additionally, as will be 
outlined in the following chapters, `market-determined interest rates' in the Central American 
context is far from the positive, neutral phrase that face value would seem to indicate; 
additionally, where the banking sector is a restrictive, oligopolistic structure as in Nicaragua, it 
can mean anything or nothing. 
Furthermore, the efficiency of any investment depends on a very careful reading of the word 
efficient, and indeed in many countries of the region and Nicaragua in particular the type of 
`competition' involved is creating a systemic instability that causes lasting economic damage. As 
the IDB notes, this wave has left the rural areas of many countries virtually untouched, and in any 
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case the untrustworthiness of the formal banking sectors leaves a niche which micro-fmance 
organizations, driven by their own need to expand (as noted above), are rushing to fill, although 
again far less in the rural areas. It should also be noted that the only expansion that was 
acceptable to the IFIs was privatized expansion, and a consequences of this has been the closure 
of state development banks such as BANADES in Nicaragua, causing a dramatic decrease in 
credit available, particularly in the rural areas, which private banks have been unwilling and 
unable to counter. 
This chapter has described the context of adjustment in Latin America, the interplay of structural 
adjustment rhetoric versus reality, political intervention and the structure of organized, 
adjustment-dependent corruption. These all constitute areas of knowledge that are either 
forbidden or hidden, as does the gendered reality of the regional economy, the attributes of which 
can be see in stark detail in the example of Nicaragua. Following the methodology in the next 
chapter, Chapter 4 will focus downwards on Nicaragua itself, and the internal and external factors 
that constitute the environment in which microfmance operates within the country. The chapter 
deals in more detail with the effects of structural adjustment in Nicaragua, and has as a central 
theme the gendered, political economy that dominates the microfmance environment, and the 
internal and external political priorities that control the Nicaraguan socio-economy. The chapter 
will link the broad themes of structural adjustment within Central America to the country-specific 
features of Nicaraguan conditionality, a country where as Babb (1996) has noted women are 
functioning as shock absorbers against the worst effects of structural adjustment, at the same time 
as being targeted by microfmance practitioners as the agents of a dynamic mechanism for poverty 
alleviation. The chapter will analyze how the Nicaraguan case acts as an echo of the broader 
concerns of microfmance theory and practice within the region, as well as analyzing specific 
phenomena of Nicaraguan microfmance praxis. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
"The traditional, almost obligatory approach is to send a team of researchers, often from 
the University or perhaps a consultancy firm, and sometimes even a team with a strong 
representation of white, European development experts from various disciplines. An expert on 
women in development is obligatory these days, and the social anthropologist is becoming a 
required fixture ... These teams stay maybe a month, sometimes two. They hire interpreters, and 
university students, or young graduates who can speak the local language. They bring with them 
their well-tested questionnaires. They move around in Land-rovers. If they stay the night, they 
usually stay with the well-to-do, the elite. They collect their data and retire to their offices. They 
tabulate and analyse their data, and write reports and proposals. 
But where were the people in all of this? They were invaded, occupied, assaulted with 
questions, no explanations, no discussions. Everything filtered through the local elites, the 
interpreters, the urban university middle-class, the expatriates and sometimes even the computer. 
The poor knew the team had 'parachuted' into their area, but the team most likely never even 
talked with the really poor and disadvantaged because the poor live up on the hillsides, down in 
the ravines, away from the roads, are away working, are sick, are invisible. " 
(Stan Burkey, 1993, "People First: A Guide To Self-Reliant Participatory Rural Development 
(Zed Books Ltd, London)) 
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3.1 - Introduction 
The purpose of this and the succeeding chapters is to explain and employ diverse methods of 
analysis used in attempting to describe the reality of the microfmance sector in Nicaragua. 
Returning to the statement quoted from Bradshaw (Op. Cit. ) in the introductory chapter, the 
analysis undertaken is defined more by its focus than by individual methodological types, and the 
use of diverse methods is intended to give validity and rigour to the investigation through the 
employment of a type of triangulation. Ultimately, the intention is to provide a wealth of detail at 
the micro and the macro levels to give a realistic picture of the environment in which 
microfmance organizations and policy operates in Nicaragua. From the theoretical, international 
and national ambits to the local, this chapter focuses on and describes the methodology used, 
from the global to the personal, and outlines those areas in which the hidden and forbidden 
knowledges discussed in Chapter one may be said to operate. Nicaragua itself constituted an 
unique country for surveying the microfinance sector as it is currently defined, given that up to 
1990 all credit access within the country had been the prerogative of state banks and funds under 
the heavily politicized direction of the revolutionary government. The date 1990 therefore 
constituted a complete break and a sea change in the orientation of such credit access as 
continued to exist in the country. As a result of this, the oldest microfmance operations in 
Nicaragua date from no earlier than 1992, giving an homogeneity of market development in the 
country equaled by few others. 
The focus of the thesis begins with the global and international background to microfinance 
theory and practice, and moves down towards the local with each successive chapter. The 
penultimate chapter deals with the local field survey of credit users and non-users in a small area 
of Nicaragua. The selection of respondents, interviewees and data sources in each chapter is 
related to the scope of that particular chapter, and this chapter will cover how and in what ways 
the methodologies changed in accordance with the circumstances encountered in the locality of 
the fieldwork, and in Nicaragua in general. The chapter will also discuss the changes in the 
questionnaires and the training of interviewers undertaken, especially after consultation with the 
Universidad de Mujeres in Managua, and will cover in particular the gender-differentiated 
response patterns encountered in the interviewing (the actual data of which will be covered in 
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details in the following chapter), and how they affected and changed the pattern of the 
investigation. The discussion in this chapter will also cover the methodological implications for 
household-based surveys, and potential meanings for intra-household resource allocations. 
The first section of the analysis in the two preceding chapters consisted of examining the praxis 
of orthodox economic prescriptions in the development debate, both by looking at the evolution 
and historicity of IFI control, and by examining the record of IFI effectiveness. This will be 
achieved through the use of internal World Bank/IMF records, and documents from USAID and 
the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and other key international 
actors, as well as the literature of criticism that has grown since the debt crisis of the early 1980s. 
The thesis seeks to outline the role and structure of these IFIs that currently control the process of 
structural adjustment, by locating them within the global political economy of the post-Cold War 
era. Special attention will be paid to the theoretical modelling underlining the process of 
structural adjustment, juxtaposing theoretical with real outcomes. The role of microfmance, both 
theoretically and practically, is examined within this context with the aim of clarifying the 
situation of microfinance both as functional aid tool and ideological construct. This analysis of 
the geopolitical global economy seeks to clarify the dichotomy that is already apparent between 
the claims made on behalf of microfmance by its' most ardent proponents, and the practical 
limitations that are currently evident. This analysis will be achieved by a thorough examination of 
the literature in terms of research, theory and propaganda. 
The next chapter of the thesis focuses on the Nicaraguan political economy, as a dependent and 
heavily overlapped sector within the global economic and political environment. Because in terms 
of GDP the Nicaraguan external debt is so heavy, because of the strategic place occupied in US 
foreign policy by Nicaragua out of all proportion to its size, population, wealth and economic 
power, and because of a number of internal cultural and socio-economic factors (some shared by 
other Latin American countries, some unique to Nicaragua), Nicaragua's economic situation, 
after an initial intense period of aid inflows in the first three years following the hand-over of 
power by the government of the FSLN, has deteriorated steadily. This deterioration has involved 
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a number of causal processes, some preceding the revolutionary period of 1979-90, some 
stemming from that period, and some from the period 1990 to date. The net result of this 
combination of pathological internal and external influences, however, has been to create a 
complex socio-economic structure which has been particularly effective in neutralising most of 
the beneficial effects that theory might suggest could have arisen from the structural adjustment 
process in the country. It will be a central point of this section that the combination of this 
individual socio-economic country signature, and the misconceived and misapplied postulates of 
orthodox economic theory, have combined to make the current economic situation of Nicaragua 
worse than virtually every other country in Central America. 
This analysis of Nicaraguan political economy is undertaken throughout the thesis through a 
myriad of different instruments inside and outside the country, including government and civil 
society documents from the national assembly of Nicaragua, the Superintendent of banks, 
INIFOM (the government institute for economic promotion) the IDR (Institute of Rural 
Development, again part of the state structure), NGO releases and research from Oxfam, the 
UNDP, DANIDA (the Danish NGO), Nitlapan (part of the University of Central America 
involved in research and practice of development projects), Microstart (a body of the UN for the 
support and development of microfinance initiatives) and the CCER of Nicaragua, the co- 
ordinator of the civil society groupings, party political propaganda from both the FSLN and the 
PLC, newspaper and magazine sources such as El Nuevo Diario, Tiempos del Mundo, La Prensa, 
Envio, El Observador Economico and Confidencial and internet sources from all of the above as 
well as academic and NGO sites globally, with the intention of creating as holistic a picture as 
possible. On a personal level, the analysis includes interviews conducted by the author with the 
personnel from the Superintendencia de Bancos, USAID, ADIM, ASOMIF, FAMA, 
PRESTANIC, FIDESA (all involved in microfmance in Nicaragua), NGOs such as CRIES, 
OXFAM, Puntos de Encuentro. Additional data is provided from conferences attended at the 
University of Central America and the UN, on both microfmance issues and the general economic 
situation of Nicaragua. The analysis includes an historical precis of themes in the Nicaraguan 
socio-economy, which combine within the complex of inter-linked rural and urban social 
structures to drive both the formal and informal economy; it seeks to highlight the constant 
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interplay of rural/urban interchanges, as well as broadening and amplifying the gendered 
contradiction within Nicaragua's social and economic complexity. 
Following directly from this chapter, the focus moves further downwards to examine the financial 
and banking sector within the Nicaraguan economy, with the aim of pointing out the close links 
(within and outside the country) between the political sphere and the financial and banking 
sphere. The intention behind this chapter, as well as seeking to locate the microfmance sector 
within the formal finance sector, is to show the constant interplay of domnating political factors. 
Another important theme within this section is that this dominance of political considerations, 
along with cultural and social influences in Nicaragua render the orthodox treatment of the 
financial sector as solely motivated by economic considerations, not only irrelevant but also 
damaging. Since these political and cultural factors are blatant and self-evident, this section 
returns to an analysis of forbidden/hidden knowledges by suggesting why such factors and 
processes are ignored. 
The analysis of the financial and microfmance sectors is split into two chapters. The first of these 
analyses the microfmance sector within the context of the political economy of the formal 
banking sector, whilst the next chapter begins by providing background to the area surveyed and 
the organisations participating in the survey, and then presents the local and survey data as the 
culmination of the downward focus. It has been undertaken through the use of government 
documents such as official publications of legal instruments by the national assembly of 
Nicaragua, data provided to the IMF and IADB as part of the conditionality of adjustment, bank 
and organisational publications in the form of leaflets and information from the Superintendencia 
de Bancos and publicity and information from microfmance organisations including FAMA, 
FIDESA and ASOMIF, interviews undertaken with actors within the sector, amongst whom were 
the gerencia of ASOMIF, co-operantes from NGOs such as Oxfam and Puntos de Encuentro, and 
academic research and documentation undertaken by universities and business schools within the 
country, in particular the Universidad de CentroAmerica, UCA, the library of the business school 
INCAS and the documentary centre of the Universidad de Mujeres. 
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The explanatory background of these two chapters and the use of sources is correlated against the 
actual sequence of events in the financial sector during the period of the field survey which 
comprises the second of these two chapters, and which took place between November 1999- 
January 2001. The chapters also include analysis undertaken at the time by media, government 
and civil society groupings both inside and outside Nicaragua. Such an analysis at the sector, 
national and international levels illustrates clearly not simply the praxis of structural adjustment, 
but the way in which the construction of the official discourse of the Nicaraguan government, the 
external donors to the country, the IFIs and even independent NGOs, accepts as given basic 
interpretations and nuances of events and actions which are at the least open to doubt. 
At the local level the thesis presents an analysis of the structures, functions and processes of two 
different Nicaraguan microfinance organisations, FAMA and ADIM, from their relationship with 
the organisation ASOMIF, which represents the more successful of Nicaraguan microfmance 
entities, to their operations within the city of Masaya, some 17 kilometres to the south-west of the 
capital, Managua. FAMA in particular was chosen because it is one of the group of `primary 
colonisers' of the microfmance sector in Nicaragua, dating its' operations back to the beginnings 
of the sector in 1992, of which Masaya is the oldest branch. ADIM was chosen because, although 
a relative newcomer to lending, it is one of the few operations that works exclusively with women 
in Nicaragua, and combines its' credit operations with communal projects aimed at the 
empowerment of women. The analysis includes the operations of these organisations in terms of 
their location in the structure of the microfmance sector inside Nicaragua as well as internal 
organisational set-ups. It includes the interviews of key actors locally and nationally, and 
concludes with a field survey in a key area of operation's which examines the productive, 
reproductive and social activities of a selection of credit users and non-users alike, with the 
intention of providing information on the reality of microfmance activity in Nicaragua at the 
micro level. 
15 In a country described as the most heavily provisioned with microfinance funding in Central America (Von 
Stauffenberg, Farrington and Tortorelli 1998), the location of the field survey takes place within the most densely 
populated area in Nicaragua (see INDES/FUNDENIC 1996). 
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This chapter also deals with the a detailed description of the local enquiry site, a description of 
the three phases of the map and questionnaire exercises undertaken, and how these exercises 
fitted in with the more qualitative components of the analysis such as the socio-economic, 
gendered and political economy analyses. The concluding section of this chapter discusses the 
methodology of the fieldwork in the context of the general microfmance debate on methodology, 
and in particular the CGAP virtual debates and papers on best practices. The section will cover 
how this particular methodology answers some of the questions on how and what to measure in 
microfmance clients, and provides a good basis on which time-series investigations could be 
made in the context of the wider political economy. It will further be suggested that attempting to 
evaluate such lending-based projects by strictly economistic, financial criteria provide at best a 
crude, short-term and strictly two-dimensional picture. This methodology, it will be suggested, 
constitutes a reasonable, holistic alternative approach by leaving the remit of the research as wide 
as possible, and by subsequently focussing in on problems/solutions actually suggested by the 
evidence gleaned. 
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3.2 - Initial Methodology Selection 
"Social scientists must take into account not only intellectual and feasibility considerations when 
planning their research, but also the tacit ethical and political issues raised by their work, 
because they engage in activities that are often politically consequential, even when they believe 
that they are politically detached. " 
(Eckstein, S., 1979, `On Questioning The Questionnaire: Research Experiences', Latin American 
Research Review, Vol. XIVNo. 2, p. 148) 
Before the practical considerations of how the research was to take place were considered, it 
seemed appropriate to determine the conditions under which it would have to take place, in view 
of the body of literature on the exploitation and ethics involved in social science research. It also 
seemed appropriate to attempt to remove at least one layer of the detachment by not acting 
through agencies represented by local government or political institutions, and instead for the 
researcher to live in the area in which the survey was to take place, in accommodation with a 
family in a barrio that were representative of the area. At the same time, ethical considerations 
dictated the necessity of sharing any data with both the local populace and with academic 
institutions. As a further step towards a participatory approach (quite apart from the 
methodological justifications outlined below), since it was obvious that the researcher alone 
would not be able to conduct a sufficient number of interviews as well as processing the 
information, it was determined that local inhabitants would be paid to help with the interviewing. 
As it turned out, the house in which the researcher lived formed an extremely useful base for the 
interviewing operation, as well as providing space for training and post-interview discussion, 
until the accommodation fell down following the earthquake (terremotito) that caused extensive 
damage to Masaya in June 2000. 
97 
In theoretical terms, the essence of this methodology was to be descriptive of the situation of 
microfmance in the socio-economy of Nicaragua, and as such elected to approach the analysis 
from three different directions, distinct but complementary. The first set of data was to be from 
documentation and literature drawn from the discrete levels of power and control acting on 
microfmance, from the theoretical hegemony to the practical at national and international levels, 
with the intention of dissecting the praxis of microfmance. The second set of data was to be a 
structural analysis of the sector inside Nicaragua, using a series of unstructured interviews with 
key informants, plus an analysis and description of the sector itself and the flows of power and 
control within it. The third set of data was to be derived from a questionnaire- and map-based 
field survey, based in a city in the Pacific zone of Nicaragua. The intention behind this third set 
of data was, again, to be descriptive of the situation as regards credit as it occurred, taking areas 
of rural and urban characteristics to draw a picture of how microfmance is situated at the local 
level, and differences in characteristics, behaviour and attributes to be observed between users of 
credit and non-users. 
Members of the CGAP Working Group's virtual meeting of 1997 made a very important 
distinction when it said that it was difficult to `prove' impacts from microfmance intervention, 
and that what they were concerned with should be how to `improve' such interventions. This need 
sprang from the requirements for accountability in managing funds destined for microfmance 
organisations, and this accountability was, by its' very nature, going to be more closely linked 
with auditing the organisations concerned than with impacts in the population at large. Whilst 
taking this into account, the methodology selected for this thesis was intended to examine the 
widest possible context in which microfmance in Nicaragua operates, in order to understand the 
conduits through which it might have impacts, and through which the effects of such programmes 
might be enhanced or neutralised, rather than exact measurements of those impacts themselves. 
The use of such a universalised methodology was intended as evidence to try and help breach the 
gap (again observed in the CGAP conference) between the needs of clients and institutions, to 
contrast with evaluation practice up to now, which maintained a definite separation of 
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institutional performance evaluation and impact assessment. It will be demonstrated by the use of 
this methodology that for instance the donor insistence on rapid growth toward self-sustainability 
by microfinance organisations is at once a product of this gap and a mechanism by which it is 
increased. The lack of knowledge about this one aspect of the sector in Nicaragua has, it will be 
argued, the potential to be extremely harmful. 
Above all, the methodology sought to analyse some of the assertions that underlie impact 
assessments (Ias): 
"Behind all microfinance programs is the assumption that intervention will change 
human behaviours and practices in ways that lead to the achievement (or raise the 
probability of achievement) of desired outcomes. IAs assess the difference in the 
values of key variables between the outcomes on `agents' (individuals, enterprises, 
households, populations, policymakers etc) which have experienced an intervention 
against the values of those variables that would have occurred had there been no 
intervention. The fact that no agent can both experience an intervention and at the 
same time not experience an intervention generates many methodological problems. 
All changes are influenced by mediating processes (specific characteristics of the 
agent and of the economic, physical, social and political environment) that influence 
both behavioural changes and the outcomes in ways that are difficult to predict 
(Sebstad et al 1995). " (Hulme 1997, p. 19) 
In terms of the levels at which the methodology should operate, too, the thesis seeks to avoid 
restrictions at the individual, household or institution levels and instead discuss the whole sphere 
of operations up to the international, for the reasons outlined in the introductory chapter. As much 
as for any other reason, this is because of the uncertainties involved in the fungibility of credit; 
most impact assessments of microfmance restrict the idea to the finance of the original loan, and 
where it ends up or is distributed to. Fungibility, however, can have wider implications than the 
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purely financial - the impact of increased economic well-being extends well beyond the 
household, as even orthodox theory admits with the concept of multipliers. Fungibility of harmful 
or beneficial dynamics between the informal and formal economies may well have completely 
unforeseen effects, and thus in order to study a phenomena such as microfmance, it would be 
difficult to truly understand its' function and impact without developing a wider picture of the 
complex socio-economic mesh within which it moves. 
At the local level too, there are more difficulties associated with fungibility and selection bias, 
and in particular the use of control groups, that make a multiple approach more appropriate. 
CGAP (Op. Cit. ) identified a series of possible problems to do with the selection of control 
groups: 
a. Difficulties in fording a location at which the control group's economic, physical 
and social environment matches that of the treatment group. 
b. The treatment group systematically possessing an `invisible' attribute which the 
control group lacks (most commonly identified as entrepreneurial drive and 
ability). 
c. Receiving any form of intervention may result in a short-term positive response 
from the treatment group (the Hawthorne effect). 
d. The control group becoming contaminated by contact with the treatment group. 
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e. The fungibility of the treatment (e. g.; when a loan is transferred from a borrower 
to someone else or when the loan is not used in the planned way). 
There are, however, more fundamental problems with the use of the control group method. There 
is a quantity of evidence to suggest (and certainly in the case of Nicaragua, as later analysis will 
show) that microfmance clients are being `cherry-picked'. This is to say that barriers to loan 
access, such as the need to be in possession of a land title, to have had a business running for two 
years (FAMA in Nicaragua) or to be in possession of a vehicle (one accepted form of guarantee 
by FIDESA in Nicaragua), have already ensured that clients are more likely to be from the 
already entrepreneurial, `less-poor' poor. If this is more generally the case, the task of selecting a 
valid control group under such circumstances is exacerbated by attempting to differentiate 
between benefits derived from loan access and those already derived from being in this relatively 
better-off group to which microfmance organisations are willing to lend. 
The approach envisaged by this methodology at the global, national and local level incorporates 
elements of sociology, anthropology and geography, elements that the more traditional 
objectified, economistic impact assessment lacks almost completely. The methodology for this 
thesis was therefore an inductive approach that focuses on key informants, the recording by notes 
or image and the data analysis, and this tradition does not try to `prove' impact within statistically 
definable limits of probability. From the international and theoretical on downwards, it seeks to 
provide an interpretation of the processes involved in intervention and of impacts that have a high 
level of plausibility, without attempting to stuff them and mount them in a two-dimensional 
framework that loses essential dynamic elements. 
With the above in mind, following Sebstad and Cohen (2000), at the individual level the thesis 
looks at four groups of indicators: the first of these is financial assets, and in this group are 
included indicators such as household income from varying sources, loans, gifts, work done in 
kind and in reciprocation, regular remittances and pensions, as well as participation in various 
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insurance groups, including health and funeral expenses. The second group of assets includes 
physical assets such as housing, other buildings and land, improvements to lands and buildings; 
also included in this group are items such as vehicles (including bicycles, horse- and ox-carts). 
The third group consists of human assets, by which are meant how many workers in the 
household and their relationship, the type of businesses engaged in (including part-time, 
occasional and unpaid labour). The fourth group of assets is that of social assets, such as relatives 
with whom land or work is shared, family networks for loans of money or work, and reciprocal 
bargaining relationships such as deals in the market for food, within and outside the family 
network. It was a conscious decision in the process of compiling the survey in this manner to 
avoid simply compiling lists of possessions or financial assets, for the reason that in the unstable 
existence of the majority of poor families, possession of objectivised assets such as these may be 
purely temporary. The relationship networks of poor households are frequently more durable and 
thus more important than physical or financial assets. 
Issues of power and decision-making within the household were included in a series of questions 
concerning decision-making in a wide area of household activities (exemplified in Frankenberg 
and Thomas (2001)). Questions included concerned not just the more mundane (although 
important) affairs of the household budget, but also responsibility for child-care, medical costs, 
educational costs and, as it turned out crucially, ownership questions such as land/property 
ownership and responsibility for credit use and repayment. Taking questions such as who had 
responsibility for various areas of household management one step further by comparing male 
and female household head responses added a layer of information about knowledge of the 
household which was to prove extremely important. The prototype questionnaire (Annex 1) was 
always seen as constituting core questions around which further questions could be added as 
unforeseen phenomena cropped up, through consultation and discussion with the interviewers. 
The questionnaire went through five separate transformations as further areas of interest were 
developed after discussions with the interviewers, and a few questions proved irrelevant or 
fruitless. In particular, in cultures and countries where households work as close and intermingled 
economic units, it seemed that questions about responsibility for costs, as well as more focused 
questions concerning earnings, were more relevant than questions about individual ownership 
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and control of money, which might appear to be asked from a westernized bias towards the 
importance attached to individuality. 
The field survey itself was very much grounded research, intended to take form according to 
patterns and phenomena that arose as a result of the pilot survey and initial training activities. 
Ultimately, three separate but conjoined surveys were undertaken, the first of which was a pilot 
study conducted of 100 respondents which took place over the period of a month and employed 
three other interviewers besides the researcher, in a distinct triangular zone of habitation that 
bordered the main road selected for the main survey (Map 1, shown below). The road itself had 
been selected on the basis that the sample population, situated in both urban and rural zones in 
and around Masaya, should both be accessible and have open access to transport routes into and 
out of the city itself, and the roadsides constituted a continuous area of residence and domiciliary 
work from the center of the city to some 7 kilometers out into the countryside. There were 
effectively five main roads out of the city, two to the north which led to the Carretera Managua 
(the capital) - Granada, a third which left to the east and which again transected the Carretera 
Managua lower down, and two which left due south and south-west. The northern roads were 
unsuitable because they were dominated by businesses and warehouses, especially as they drew 
closer to the Carretera, and the eastern route was unsuitable because the residential area was 
terminated abruptly by the one of the municipal cemeteries, after which there was an agricultural 
zone of virtually no habitation. Of the two southerly routes, only one was continuously residential 
out into the countryside, with a clearly defined change in use beginning at the urban boundary 
towards agricultural purposes. 
The second set of surveys took place along this southerly route from the very center of Masaya to 
a small location called the Concentracion de Sacuanjoche, some 7 kilometers out into the 
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rural zone. As with the pilot study, the intention was to interview all the heads of households, 
male and female, in every property that bordered the road, in order to pick up credit users and 
respondents without credit in the quantities that they would `naturally' occur. The whole survey 
ended up with a total of some 415 interviews, including those of the pilot study, with a 
remarkably low refusal rate (some 5% of the total). This time an original total of 8 interviewers 
were ' reduced, including the researcher, 3 men and five women, but the number of male 
interviewers dropped to two after it was unfortunately necessary to fire one early into the 
interviewing schedule. His interviews were checked, and the verifiable ones allowed. 
Analysis of the first two surveys, amalgamated into one database and with the couple responses 
aggregated to produce one response set per household where we had two household heads, was 
conducted using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software, primarily to elicit 
statistically significant relationships between credit-users (who turned out to be 38% of the 
survey population) and non-users. With doubtful questionnaires weeded out the aggregated 
database formed a total of 318 cases. In combination with the maps used, the idea was to outline 
spatial and social patterns and relationships, as much between men and women as between credit 
clients and non-users. The SPSS analysis pointed out significant numerical, responsibility and 
household structural trends for further analysis, whilst the maps pointed out spatial differences 
and patterns related to the productive, reproductive and social activities of men and women that 
acted in tandem with the statistical phenomena. 
As a direct result of the SPSS analysis in terms of differentiated responses to certain questions, 
depending on the gender of interviewer and respondent, as well as the need to for further credit- 
user data to act as a separate database, a third survey was undertaken. This database constituted 
another 130 cases, and provided a database to elicit not just any statistical and spatial differences 
in the households of two different sorts of credit organizations, but also to amplify the gender- 
differentiated response patterns elicited from the main database, and to see if there were any 
differences in the gender-differentiated responses between credit-using and non-using 
respondents. This database stood on 
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its' own, but was also amalgamated with the credit-user data from the previous survey to form 
another database, that of credit-users. 
The field survey thus produced a wealth of details concerning the spatial, social and economic 
aspects of a sample population of credit-users and non-users in Nicaragua. The individual activity 
maps (Annexes 2- 4) and their respective weekly activity diaries were amalgamated onto larger 
maps to provide collective activity patterns for men and women, and for credit-users and non- 
users, for future investigation into the spatial differences. The three maps used to locate activities 
consisted of a map of Masaya itself and its' immediate environs, the area roughly located 
between Managua (the capital) and Masaya, and a map of the entire country for those whose 
work took them further abroad. In addition, the information provided helped to locate the 
household statistical data spatially, so that instead of merely having anonymous numerical totals 
between households, genders and credit and non-credit respondents, the information can be 
represented in a manner closer to the multi-dimensional aspect in which it occurs. 
Three main databases had therefore been created, one from the pilot project, one from the larger 
amalgamated and aggregated survey, and the separate credit-users database. From these were 
created a series of sub-sets of data, for instance the `couples' database from the information that 
was taken from couples only before it was aggregated for the main database, which provided 
interesting information concerning the state of knowledge, or at least agreement/disagreement, 
between couples over essential household information. There were also two databases to be 
compiled from the clients of ADIM and FAMA, to analyze putative differences between the 
client-bases of the two organizations as a result of their discrete organizational and purposive 
cultures. 
In terms of the interviews themselves and interviewing techniques, the researcher developed a 
procedure using the expertise of gender specialists at the Universidad de Mujeres in Managua, 
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and in particular that of Dr Sarah Bradshaw of the University of Middlesex, at that time working 
on gender issues arising from the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Essentially the 
survey was concerned with interviewing household heads and not specifically couples, but where 
interviewing couples arose and it was possible to interview both partners, we determined to 
interview separately, frequently going back at different times and on different days so as to 
ensure this16. The questionnaire was devised to elicit as many details as possible of the gendered 
activities of the household, as were the maps. As vital to the survey as the structure of the 
questionnaires and maps, though, was the way in which the interviews were conducted. 
The selection of interviewers, and the basis on which they were selected, was an essential part of 
the methodology. Various government bodies in Nicaragua, as well as academic bodies such as 
UCA (the Universidad de CentroAmerica) and the Universidad de Mujeres, had bodies of 
interviewers that they used at a statutory pay level for completing the social surveys that were 
carried out. The researcher felt however that with the levels of suspicion and hostility towards the 
state and official bodies in Nicaragua it was more suitable to select interviewers locally, subject 
to levels of education etc., because openly local interviewers with a knowledge of the locality and 
lifestyles of the respondents might have a better chance of putting respondents more at their ease 
with the interviewing process. The interviewers were all provided with a letter from the 
researcher plus a copy of the relevant page in his passport as further evidence of good faith, and 
by the end of their training were well able to explain the purpose of the research and the reason 
for the questions. Their local knowledge and familiarity with the area was also extremely useful 
when it came to detecting which information or questionnaires were doubtful, and where there 
was reasonable doubt these interviews were deleted. 
The researcher was able to use techniques gained through personal experience of constructing 
training courses in the UK civil service (in particular Equal Opportunities courses), to combine 
the expertise of the gender specialists at the Universidad de Mujeres with personal practical 
16 Eventually we were able to ensure separate interviewing in 80% of the couples. The interviewers were trained to 
try and ensure that this was the case, and to always advise where it was not possible 
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knowledge to construct a training course for the interviewers. The training course went over 
every aspect of the maps and had as its' intention complete familiarization for people unused to 
maps, as some of the interviewers were. The training also included days spent locating essential 
points on the maps in the city itself17, as well as walking the entire length of the survey route for 
familiarization purposes, and the questionnaire was discussed at length, question by question, not 
only to clarify why the question was being asked and what it meant, but also to use the local 
expertise of the interviewers to detect any possible problems. The training also involved a series 
of role-playing exercises where the interviewers were encouraged to interview each other, with 
the particular aim of making male interviewers aware of the problems that might ensue from their 
attitudes and behaviour towards women respondents. 
In particular, the subject of women's roles and activities was exhaustively discussed in the local 
context, to underline the importance of eliciting data on each and every activity, even those which 
respondents might be conditioned to think unimportant, by initiating questions and discussions in 
key areas. A further feature of the training of interviewers, given the political divisions not only 
within barrios, but within households, was to emphasize the importance of the utter neutrality of 
the interviewer, and the vital importance of not offering any opinion or comment that might 
colour the respondents' attitude to the interviewer, and hence the interview. Similarly, if any of 
the interviewers were likely to come into contact with respondents with whom they knew they 
were likely to experience antagonism or bad feeling for any reason, the situation was avoided by 
swapping interviewers for the interview in question. 
Once the interviewing had begun, each day's interviewing was completed with an analysis of 
each day, in terms of problems with the questionnaires or the maps, or locating particular points 
17 Interestingly as regards the map used of Masaya, because it had streets and locations marked but had no names, 
fitted in well with the way in which directions are given in Nicaragua. Because streets are often new and have no 
names or have been frequently renamed and there are no, or very few, house numbers, in Nicaragua directions are 
given by reference to an important building or object such as a church, hospital or lake. Thus (for example) to give 
someone directions to your house, you would say "from the Iglesia Santa Maria one quadrant south, two west". Once 
the essential points had been marked on the map of Masaya, the interviewers and respondents, being used to 
counting off streets and quadrants, found that the blank maps fitted in well with the local sense of direction. 
108 
mentioned on the maps by respondents that were unknown to the interviewers. At this point any 
ideas for abandoning or changing questions were mooted, and the researcher ensured that the 
previous days' questionnaires and maps had been thoroughly revised and the need for any 
clarifications discussed with the interviewer. Each activity marked on the activity diary for the 
respondent had to correspond to a point marked on the individual map, and clarifying maps 
became essentially the task of making sure this was done. Each interviewer was required to keep 
a notebook for comments on each interview done, and so the process of validation and 
clarification was made much easier; the process of accuracy-checking was therefore continuous 
and self-referential, with each day's analysis continually reinforcing those lessons learnt in 
training, whilst at the same time being sufficiently flexible to adjust where the reality of 
interviewing necessitated. 
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3.3 - The Reality Of The Research 
"Initially, the study was premised on the assumption that poor people differ from other socio- 
economic strata in their level of institutional participation and knowledge of national and 
international affairs. Although concerned with community and national institutional 
arrangements, I viewed poverty at the outset primarily from an individualistic perspective: the 
main focus was upon the attitudinal and behavioural integration of "marginal" people into the 
dominant, national society, given a belief that once "integrated" they would cease to be poor. It 
was also assumed that as long as they were poor they would be deprived, frustrated, and 
alienated, and they would use the electoral apparatus to articulate their dissatisfaction. These 
notions proved to be empirically incorrect. The fieldwork revealed that the `fate" of urban poor 
is primarily shaped by forces rooted in the national political economy... " 
(Susan Eckstein, Op. Cit., p. 141) 
Despite the inevitable changes made to the methodology as a result of the field survey and the 
socio-economic reality of Nicaragua, the thesis holds to the idea that the investigation at all levels 
should be consistent in approaching the subject from three different but complementary angles: 1) 
the thesis contains a `genetic' explanation, by which is meant a type of explanation that seeks to 
explain why the microfmance sector in Nicaragua occurs in its present type by examining history 
of its' development in the context of the formal banking sector; 2) the thesis seeks to be an 
intentional explanation applied to individuals and organisations, attempting to explain their 
actions by intentions, both explicit and implicit, and 3) the thesis seeks to provide a dispositional 
explanation, which is to say that it seeks to explain why individuals and organisations behave in a 
certain way, due to predisposition towards certain types of behaviour. It will be obvious from the 
chapters on neoliberalism and the political economy and banking sector of Nicaragua, that the 
thesis has as an important premise that the intentional and dispositional factors have a heavy 
influence on the generic development of microfmance. 
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At the field survey level, the problem of addressing the intentional and dispositional explanations 
was intimately mixed with the gendered focus of microfmance itself, and required careful 
attention to the proportion of male and female interviewers to be used in the survey, as well as 
respondents. Despite the preponderance of women as clients of Nicaraguan microfmance 
projects, a considerable number of men were clients as well and thus not only was the local 
experience of women interviewers a necessity but that of men as well, with the obvious intention 
of developing as clear a picture as possible of generic differences in the experiences not just of 
credit users, but non-users as well. Interviewers of both genders were also selected on the basis of 
local residence and educational levels, with the researcher participating as a further control on 
anomalies that might arise as a result of interviewing done by a `chele' (stranger or foreigner). 
By seeking to investigate and describe the activities of both female and male users of credit as 
well as non-users, it became clearer that the survey should follow Kandiyoti (1998, p. 146): 
"We may have to remain agnostic over the relevance and utility of the category of 
gender itself if it lessens our alertness and sensitivity to the myriad forms which 
social organisation and hierarchy may take and if it results in extracting men and 
women as social categories from the contexts in which they are embedded. "(quoted 
in Cornwall 2000). 
With particular reference to the extended family networks encountered in Masaya and the 
variation in allocated roles between genders, developing a flexible and open-minded approach to 
household structures, without visiting preconceived prejudices, became particularly important. 
Other apparent divisions, such as that between rural and urban businesses, became less 
meaningful as the full patterns of household employment became apparent and households were 
encountered whose work ambit was firmly urban, but who owned or shared access to a rural 
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property (finca), of which either the occasional crop was sold to subsidise family income, or food 
crops were a direct supplement. Similarly, numbers of rural households were encountered where 
the principal means of support appeared to be rural, but divisions of labour meant that whereas 
the man might work as jornalero (day labourer) on someone else's land as well as maintaining 
his own, the role of the woman might be marketing and selling produce and artesania in the city, 
thus having a firmly urban focus. 
With the actual interviewing, a number of details arose which had not been envisaged by the 
researcher, down to the level of what actually counted as an activity, reproductively, 
economically or socially. Eventually an arbitrary definition was arrived at that any purposive 
activity of more than one hour's duration counted towards one of the three definitions, rather than 
simply going to a pulperia (general supply shop) for a box of matches. Similarly when each 
activity was marked on the map, irrespective of how frequently it might take place it would be 
marked only once, given that it was the spatial and locational distribution that was being 
measured. 
Changes were also made to the questionnaires in the light of the interviewing process itself and 
the active participation of the interviewers, as mentioned above, such as the deletion from the 
original questionnaire of question 11 which simply duplicated information concerning family 
income, and adding options for `both' and `don't know' for who was. the titleholder of the 
property on which the respondents lived, the first in the eventuality of a couple, and the second in 
case they were renting the property. As an example of the value of interviewer participation, 
questions about the costs of electricity and water were added, as an important household cost 
overlooked by the researcher. Further questions added as a result of local knowledge acquired 
included that concerning membership of Asociaciones de Cajas de Muertos (small funeral costs 
insurance groups), also pointed out by the interviewers, and questions concerning the receipt by 
households of remittances from abroad or internally. 
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3.4 - Investigative Phenomena 
"There is a need for careful and systematic documentation of the research process: who is 
participating, interrelationships between them and how particular visual products and diagrams 
evolved and why. Participants will also need ongoing access to information to enable them to 
participate meaningfully. " 
(Linda Mayoux, 1999, `Participatory Programme Learning For Women's Empowerment In 
Micro-Finance Programmes: Negotiating Complexity, Conflict And Change', working paper 
from DFID pilot project 'Micro-Finance Programmes and Women's Empowerment: Strategies 
for Increasing Impact', October 1996-July1997, p. 13) 
In a paper from the CGAP on-line conference on microfmance held in April 1997 (CGAP 1997), 
Paul Mosley outlines the perceived key to selection problems to be expected in attempting to 
make any kind of a localised, field evaluation of microfmance projects: 
"The objective of this paper is to define ways of applying the control-group 
methodology in micro finance which take us as close as possible to the ideal of 
estimating the pure impact of the project, with all non project influences distilled out 
of the assessment; alternatively put, we are trying to find ways of steering clear of the 
elephant-traps which most easily befall the user of the control-group technique, 
which we describe as sample selection bias, misspecification of causal relationships 
and motivational problems. " (Mosley 1998, p. 3) 
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The survey and analytical work undertaken in the thesis outlines the aspects of these phenomena 
encountered in Nicaragua, as well as amplifying the category of types to be encountered, to the 
extent of questioning the value of using any kind of control groups. The local field survey in 
particular uncovers a number of hitherto unknown investigative anomalies to suggest that, in 
particular, gendered responses to a number of questions common to sociological/economic 
survey work will always produce disparities. If these disparities are not clearly measured and 
understood, it will be the contention of the thesis that they are sufficient to render certain aspects 
of the questionnaire extremely flawed. 
In terms of the field survey, Mosley outlines a list of potential problems. First amongst these is 
that of sampling, postulated as a prime reason for using control groups. Problems arising from 
this include differences in initial income and assets, land possession and quality, gender, 
ethnicity, and it is suggested that the primary method to counter this is the use of control groups. 
By this methodology the groups are selected from clients of the organisation that already have 
loans, and those who have applied and been accepted as borrowers but not yet received their 
loans. In this way it is suggested that both clients and non-clients will have been accepted from 
groups so closely related as to be as homogenous as humanly possible. It is further suggested that 
the groups should be selected from areas as geographically distinct as possible in order to avoid 
any other kind of inter-group `contamination'. 
Mosley also mentions problems arising from possible attribute differences between the target 
group and the control group, for instance the putative existence of inherent qualities such as 
"entrepreneurial ability" in clients. It is this factor that points out (for this researcher) one of the 
weaknesses' of the control-group methods, because however "entrepreneurial ability" is defined, 
the ability to strive, innovate and thrive at commerce in the socio-economic environment of low- 
income countries is undoubtedly composed of a variety of different factors. These range from 
gender, educational levels, home environment and upbringing, the extent and asset base of your 
extended family network to family, clan, religious or political connections, to name but a few. 
The sheer multiplicity of different and obscure factors leading to a thriving, or at least viable 
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business simply do not allow of controls, because the sheer volume of information necessary to 
control for them would be impossible within the limited resources of time and money available to 
any practical survey. 
Impinging directly on the question of selection of clients for surveys, and directly related to the 
process of the survey itself, is the question discussed in the introductory chapter of the 
constitution and functioning of the household. In using the questionnaire and map technique 
developed in the field, it rapidly became apparent that a type of `non-co-operative' model of the 
household (Agarwal 1997) was closest to the situation to be encountered in Nicaragua. 
Interviewing both male and female partners in couples showed that whilst some couples gave 
answers exhibiting a very similar pattern of response, this was not the norm as is shown later on, 
and that the responses of most couples, particularly those based on areas of responsibility, varied 
greatly. There can be a number of different reasons for male and female household heads giving 
such different answers, but imperfect knowledge and concealed knowledge within the household 
are at least reasonable possibilities. That the respondents were not simply making up the answers 
is contested by the strongly gendered pattern of variation in the replies that, on analysis through 
the use of SPSS, were positively and significantly related to gender. 
The response patterns showed overt signs of differing preferences between individuals, as well as 
production decisions, and very definite asymmetry between parties with respect to information. 
Numbers of households exhibited separate spheres of activities as well as co-operative 
endeavours, and indeed there were households engaged in as many as five different economic 
activities, with the help of different relatives, some members of the household and some not. 
These households demonstrated clearly separate, semi-autonomous loci of production and 
consumption (Carter and Katz 1997), as well as joint loci. Contingent on this differentiated 
response pattern and the question of knowledge within the household, it rapidly became apparent, 
is the question of the validity of recall of respondents and subsequently of the economic data 
obtained. 
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In Nicaragua the incidence of completing primary grade education is only 30% in the urban 
areas, and declines to 10% in the rural zones, and evidence from this survey suggests that over 
90% of the population may have no kind of bank account at all. The keeping of written records 
and accounts, particularly for the kind of informal business that microfmance specializes in, is 
therefore likely to be minimal, and for all of the above reasons the accuracy of statements 
concerning income received is likely to be questionable: 
"In addition to these analytical problems there are well-documented methodological 
problems in the research process itself. Respondents frequently do no know or recall 
the particular information required and may only be able to give a partial picture. 
This is particularly the case with very detailed information about incomes, 
livelihoods, decision-making or other dimensions of empowerment unless locally 
important indicators and events have been established beforehand. " (Mayoux Op. Cit. 
p. 5). 
As the patterns of differentiated response emerged in the field survey, it became obvious that 
what was important was gauging the difference in replies to measure the likely level of accuracy, 
both in terms of gendered differentiation and the differences in response between couples on the 
database. The importance of the survey therefore lay in what it could tell about the probable 
levels of inaccuracy in more orthodox impact evaluations, as well as evolving new ways to look 
at the socio-economic processes involved. 
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3.5 - Conclusion 
It will be one of the tasks of the thesis to critique some of the more commonly held assumptions 
about microfmance interventions, for instance that increased outreach of institutions plus 
increased capacity for sustainability (Yaron, Benjamin and Piprek 1997) necessarily implies a 
successful intervention through widening the fmancial market in a sustainable fashion. The case 
of Nicaragua, where microfinance organisations face pressure from donors both to expand and 
become sustainable rapidly, may show otherwise. There, whilst some organisations have become 
self-sustainable, and outreach in the urban areas has reached saturation point, it may well be that 
this speedy expansion is causing problems. The rate of drop-out from urban clients is high and 
rising, and it remains to be seen if the urban market may not yet decline, whereas the rural areas 
have been only slightly penetrated. The high interest rates necessitated by the drive towards self- 
sustainability have the potential to sicken urban clients 18, whilst that same drive leaves the rural 
areas devoid since the returns on loans may not be as high or as rapid. 
There is evidence to indicate that the major benefits to come out of microfinance projects, in the 
case of female clients, may have less to do with the direct financial benefits derived than from the 
new avenues and fora for mutually supportive and empowering activities that derive from them. 
Where contributions of women and men to the household, as well as claims on each other's 
income, is a contested issue women globally feel that control of their own income is important. 
Not so much the quantity of that income per se, but control of it. Not only do most evaluations of 
microfmance projects fail to analyse this, there is little research material to suggest how best this 
might be done. And yet, as the thesis describes, revealing the hidden knowledge that constitutes 
the real contribution of women to the formal economy through informal economy mechanisms 
depends on just such revelations. 
18 It remains to be seen what will be the effect of the law introduced by the FSLN to the National Assembly in 2001, 
the ley contra usuarios (Law against Usury), which sets a cap on the interest rates that can be charged by 
microfinance organisations at a rate lower than most of them charge, and lower than that available to private banks. 
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Literature on microfmance repeatedly mentions the need to develop new methods of intervention 
that tap into the requirements of the clientele in poor countries, and yet such analysis and 
evaluation as exists, for the main part concentrates on narrow estimates of economic indicators on 
an individual or household level. Not only is there an urgent requirement for new methods of 
analysis, this thesis suggests, these new methods of analysis will not appear without developing 
new ways of seeing and examining such interventions. The thesis therefore seeks to suggest a 
number of ways in which analysis can be expanded, with the intention of looking at the socio- 
economic patterns and rhythms of life for the poorest to detect other areas in which effective 
intervention of savings and loan projects might be implemented. 
External donor pressure, inherited methodology and the beliefs of mircrofmance practitioners 
themselves are mitigating against group lending methods in Nicaragua that favour the poorest. As 
the interviews with such actors in Nicaragua in the thesis show, and as the trends in microfmance 
practice in Nicaragua clearly show, methods that enhance the effectiveness of interventions for 
the poorest are given less priority than the need to increase individual loan coverage and 
penetration as rapidly as possible. None of the microfmance practitioners to whom the researcher 
spoke believed that group lending methods had a future in Nicaragua, and yet evidence from 
countries such as Bangladesh (with the Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee, BRAC) show that such labour intensive methods have a considerable effect on the 
poorest. Given the current economic situation in Nicaragua, and that as of 2000 only half the 
population had an income of more than a dollar a day on which to live, clearly there is a 
significant section of the population that are as badly off as microfmance clients in Bangladesh. 
If, however, microfmance organisations are continually subjected to pressures such as that from 
USAID, that new organisations become self-sustaining within five years, then their room for 
developing new initiatives is considerably restricted. To this extent, microfinance in Nicaragua 
has become hostage to the new discourse of the current generation of lenders and organizations, 
themselves captive of the orthodox makeover that microfmance has undergone in the last decade 
or so. 
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At the very least, this thesis and the methodology attempt to open up new pathways for analysis, 
and widen the debate. The current political economy of Nicaragua dictates that the considerable 
political influence of the formal finance sector jealously guards the monopolistic and 
monopsonistic market for credit in Nicaragua, as the next two chapters will clearly show, and yet 
if microfmance is to be effective for the poorest it must include some savings component, which 
currently only co-operative associations are permitted to do. Microfinance operations can still 
develop innovative practices in areas such as health costs and funerals, for instance, which while 
not replacing the need for savings vehicles for the poorest, at least provide cover in two areas of 
primary concern for the very poor. The thesis seeks to show that not only is this the case, but that 
the implementation of such urgently needed instruments, in tandem with a thorough analysis of 
the income-generating activities of the poorer sectors of Nicaraguan society to provide further 
credit in vital areas of commerce, is a far more effective way of providing assistance than the 
current shot-gun approach of rapid expansion of individual loans. 
} 
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Chapter Four: The Political, Socio-Economic And 
Cultural Environment of Nicaragua 
"They are but drivellers who speak of establishing fixed relations between the pure white 
American race, as it exists in the United States, and the mixed Hispano-Indian race, as it exists in 
Mexico and Central America, without the employment of force. The history of the world presents 
no such Utopian vision as that of an inferior race yielding meekly and peacefully to the 
controlling influence of a superior people. Whenever barbarism and civilization, or two distinct 
forms of civilization, meet face to face, the result must be war. Therefore, the struggle between 
the old and the new elements in Nicaraguan society was not passing or accidental, but natural 
and inevitable. By the bones of the mouldering dead at Masaya, at Rivas and at Granada, I 
adjure you never to abandon the cause of Nicaragua. Let it be your waking and your sleeping 
thought to devise means for a return to the land whence we were unjustly brought. " 
William Walker, 1860, "The War in Nicaragua", pp. 429-430 (S. H. Goetzel, Mobile, Alabama) 
"And always, since the political constitution promulgated by president Zelaya at the end of the 
nineteenth century, and known as `La Liberrima' (the most free) for its advanced political, 
economic and social content, there has existed a divorce between the juridical fiction of the 
democratic constitution and the reality of oppression. " 
Edmundo Jarquin Calderon, `Pedro Joaquin: Juega! ', quoted in El Nuevo Diario 6/1/001, 
p. 3C, (author's translation) 
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"When I hear criticisms of Daniel Ortega and Arnoldo Aleman, I wonder if we're not criticizing 
the part of them that exists in ourselves. By this I don't mean that what they have done or 
continue to do is not objectionable, not spiritually and materially damaging to the majority of 
our people, including the indigenous and mestizo peasant communities. But I do not believe that 
Ortega and Aleman are particularly perverse. I believe that they make more visible the serious 
defects of our political culture, our illegitimate state and the mechanisms created to administrate 
the country. " 
Bolt, A., ' Nicaragua - Roots and Patterns of our Political Culture', Envio June 2001(English 
version). 
4.1 - Introduction 
It has been a continuing theme in the thesis so far that the purportedly neutral and objective 
teachings and practice of orthodox economics in all cases contains a heavy leavening of political, 
cultural and gendered bias. There can be few countries, however, in which the politicized culture 
of the country takes over the economic to the extent that is the case with Nicaragua. From the 
small group of elite families such as the Tehrans, the Pellas, the Montealegres that dominate the 
heights of the most profitable and economically important financial, export- and import-based 
commercial activities, down to the smallest Alcaldia in the most obscure Atlantic coast 
municipality, such is the intimate and intertwined nature of the political and commercial economy 
in Nicaragua, that many of the principal political actors are also critical in commerce, finance, 
agro-fishery and construction. 
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The theme of this chapter is to describe this complex intermingling in all sectors of Nicaraguan 
society and the economy, with the principal aim of outlining how misguided and damaging the 
adjustment prescriptions of the IFIs and the external donors can be, in a political economy which 
constantly seeks to co-opt all development-base initiatives to the strengthening of centralized 
control of both the major political parties, the PLC and the FSLN, and their networks of support. 
Whilst the economic situation of Nicaragua is plainly central to this analysis, the chapter eschews 
the usual economistic country analysis favoured by the IFIs, and instead portrays the economic 
situation of the country very much as the product of socio-economic and cultural processes that 
are hidden from/forbidden to orthodox economic analysis. The positioning of each section in the 
chapter, therefore, reflects not necessarily their perceived order of importance if not the order in 
which the analysis should proceed in order to arrive at a clearer and more detailed description of 
why the Nicaraguan economy is as it is. 
Leading in from the more generalised discussion of global changes wrought by neo-liberalism in 
general and structural adjustment as a function of that hegemony (see Chapter 2), The first 
section of this chapter will deal briefly with the socio-economic changes that have taken place in 
Nicaragua since 1990, to put the current relationships between Nicaragua, the IFIs and the 
external donors that keep the Nicaraguan government afloat in their historical context, rather than 
the purely macroeconomic `reality' of the IFIs. The section will describe the socio-economic 
reality of Nicaragua as it tries to fulfill the conditionality imposed on it from outside, with 
particular reference to the most recent Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, and the change of 
government following the national elections of November 2001. In particular this section and the 
next will focus on the four pillars and three themes identified in the joint staff assessment by the 
IMF and the IDA (IMF/IDA 2000) of Nicaragua's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, or IPRS, 
the pillars being i) broad-based economic growth focused on employment and the rural sector, ii) 
better investment in human capital of the poor, iii) better protection of vulnerable populations and 
iv) the strengthening of institutions and good governance. Each section will discuss various 
aspects of these four pillars, with the aim of contrasting the reality of the Nicaraguan socio- 
economy with the supposed aims of the Strategy. The three themes identified in the IPRS are i) 
reducing the environmental and ecological degradation of the country, ii) bringing about greater 
122 
social equity, and iii) a further decentralization of the government, and the background to each of 
these themes in Nicaragua will be discussed in terms of their impact on policy. 
It will be a continuing theme throughout the chapter that, in a country where the state is heavily 
aid dependent and the NGO sector comprises a significant part of formal sector employment, 
large amounts of external funding are rapidly co-opted towards the clientelistic needs of a 
centralized and authoritarian political economy. Clientelism in this chapter is used to describe a 
form of government which, in place of right- and law-based democratically elected government, 
is a highly autocratic, centralized, reward-based form of government and leadership, where the 
resources of the state are used to purchase personal loyalty, thereby outflanking and effectively 
subverting the legal system and avoiding accountability. The necessity to reward friends and 
followers, and the need to close off sectors of the state to rivals, for instance, are necessities that 
are implemented through the diversion of aid towards political party control, rather than the aid 
being utilized in the manner envisaged by the nomothetic predicates of conditionality. Where 
institutions and practices in Nicaragua supposed to improve policy, governance and transparency 
are put in place, the facade of compliance is continually undermined by the politicization of 
office and practice, so that de facto the mirage of conditionality, the careful picture of theoretical 
structures created in World Bank/IMF and Government of Nicaragua documents and the 
discourse of development itself, act to conceal the reality of highly exclusionary, privileged 
access to Nicaragua's clan-based clientele economy. 
The clientelistic needs that currently drive the use of the state and individual ministries in 
Nicaragua as personal and party fiefdoms ensure that, as Cristoplos (2001, p. 6) points out: 
"there is virtually no connection between the Strategy (IPRS) and the 
projects that make up the content of the response. These projects largely 
represent the pre-existing portfolios of each ministry prepared before the 
strategy" 
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It will further be a contention of this chapter that the ratification by Nicaragua of the Marrakesh 
agreement in 1995 (which began its' membership of the WTO) and the subsequent opening of its' 
markets in services, telecommunications, tourism, professional services and distribution among 
others19, acted to increase the links of the economy to the practices of clientelistic corruption in 
Central America generally, and inside Nicaragua in particular. 
The chapter will therefore discuss the increasing democratic exclusion of the majority of the 
population by the two principal political actors in Nicaragua, the PLC and the FSLN. The chapter 
will also deal briefly with the manner in which the executive, national assembly and bodies 
invigilating the constitution of Nicaragua have been divided up by the two parties, to the 
exclusion of other contenders for government. These trends will be analysed with the central 
theme of how anti-democratic tendencies disenfranchise the majority in Nicaragua, but also work 
to defeat economic reforms mandated by the IFIs; the section will conclude with an analysis of 
how the partial supervision of the conditionality dictats of the IFIs help to maintain a flourishing 
regime of corruption. The processes by which corruption subverts conditionality will be 
discussed, as well as the fact that the growth of this corruption has been sufficient to see 
Nicaragua slide to 77th place out of 91 countries in the 2001 Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2001). 
As a second important component of the socio-economic background to conditionality, the 
second section of this chapter presents a brief discussion of the importance of the NGO sector in 
Nicaragua, and the confusion of planning and project implementation that results from the myriad 
of different organizations and their differing aims and agendas. Leading on from this, the section 
widens the discussion to describe the importance of external aid as a whole in the economy of 
Nicaragua, and deals briefly with Nicaragua's problematic relationship with the IMF. As a 
complement to the large amounts of aid that Nicaragua has received since 1990 and the confusion 
of institutions and organizations established by external donors and NGOs, the section goes on to 
"'Nicaragua gana o pierde con los acuerdos de la OMC? ', El Observador Economico, Febrero-Marzo 2000, No. 97. 
pp 28-31 
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illustrate, with the use of recent examples, how the Government of Nicaragua squanders large 
quantities of the aid that it does receive, through corruption and waste. The section presents a 
picture of the increasing centralization of all sources of revenue towards the presidency, plus a 
tax burden which is the highest in Central America, implying that the primary use of government 
in Nicaragua is to divert the state's resources towards family and friends of the incumbent 
political parties, whilst leaving the vast mass of the population to the sporadic and uneven care of 
NGOs and external donor projects. 
Leading directly on from the second section, the third section describes the way in which the 
clientelistic political system of Nicaragua uses the formal judicial and executive structures of the 
state, again using recent examples. The section goes into the manner in which state and judicial 
offices, and the electoral system itself, are subverted by patronage to exclude political and civil 
actors not directly subservient to the ruling duopoly, and how the use of immunity for members 
of the National Assembly not only guarantees the continuity of corruption but also acts directly 
contrary to the ideas of transparency, accountability and governability that the IMF and World 
Bank now believe essential to the foundation of effective, multi-sectoral poverty alleviation and 
economic development. 
The fourth section covers the general economic situation in Nicaragua. The section looks at both 
state and private sector in order to show the interrelationship of both sectors, and the roles played 
by both in the general economy. The section describes the formal and informal economy within 
the general economic background, and the increasing aid-dependency of the economy, along with 
the rapid dislocation of the impoverished formal- and informal-sector economies from the export- 
and aid-orientated sectors, with their linkages to the political and commercial elites. The section 
covers the labour markets and levels of poverty within Nicaragua, as well as describing briefly 
the importance of remittances from abroad in subsidizing the economy. The section also 
discusses the increase in external and internal debt in the context of the general impoverishment 
of the economy, the lack of productive investment occasioned by this, and the statistical 
manipulation of information by which aid is maintained, on the part of the state and the IFIs. 
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The fifth section gives a description of the agencies, processes and beliefs through which gender 
affects the Nicaraguan socio-economy. Beginning with a brief description of the sociological 
phenomena of machismo and marianismo, two key discourses through which gender is expressed 
not just in Nicaragua but throughout Central America, this part goes on to discuss female 
participation throughout the economy, and in education and health. The section also analyses 
female participation in the labour market, the informal economy and the household economy, 
outlining the changes in female participation as household head and also as a component of 
migrant labour. The section describes how despite the under-reporting of the contribution of 
women in the formal economy, female participation in all areas of economic and political 
endeavour is increasing, at the same time as moving into newer areas of the Nicaraguan economy 
such as the maquilas of the zonasfrancas in Managua and elsewhere. 
The sixth section deals with the environmental and socio-economic problems of the Nicaraguan 
agricultural sector that not only forms a crucial component of Nicaraguan exports, but can also be 
said to encapsulate the problems that undermine the whole economy. The section briefly analyses 
the disputes over property reform of the revolutionary period in 1980-90, the post-revolutionary 
period 1990 to the present, and undertakes a precis of the environmental limitations of agriculture 
in Nicaragua. The section describes the natural environmental problems in which agriculture 
takes place in Nicaragua, as well as linking productivity and environmental problems to the 
continuing disputes over land ownership that render ineffective plans for long-term investment in 
agriculture in Nicaragua. The section also deals with Nicaragua in the context of the wider global 
economy, with special reference to the problems associated with coffee production, one of the 
most important of Nicaraguan exports. The agricultural sector is linked in with the preceding 
sections on other aspects of the political economy to illustrate how concentrating on poverty in 
Nicaragua as a question of increasing productivity and economic growth fails completely to touch 
on the institutional, social and cultural factors which are at least as important. 
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4.2.1 - Political Developments And Exclusive Democracy In Nicaragua Since 1990 
"Political leaders must continually balance their pursuit of policy objectives (including 
development) and their primary goal of remaining in power. In order to do both, they must strike 
bargains with other power-holders in government, society, and in aid agencies. Aid dependence 
gives aid agencies extraordinary power in these negotiations, but this can backfire. Aid 
dependence can make reforms less likely to occur. It can contribute to a "strong president, weak 
parliament" syndrome, distort political accountability, weaken government ownership of reforms 
(and thus reduce their likelihood of enactment, or of being sustained), contribute to the short time 
horizons and uncertainty that plague efforts at cooperation in poor countries, and may reinforce 
patronage practices. By-passing central governments and shifting large amounts of aid to NGOs 
or local governments may not alleviate any of these problems, but simply cause them to appear in 
another form. " 
Deborah Brautigam, "Aid Dependence and Governance ", Expert Group on Development Issues 
(EGDI) 2000: 1 (Almgvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm). 
Subsequent to the victory of Violeta Chamorro and her coalition government in the national 
elections of 1990 over the FSLN led by Daniel Ortega, ideas of national unification were rapidly 
subverted by the entrenchment and polarization of wartime factions into political parties, and the 
need to combine an effective and durable disarmament process with satisfying the demands of the 
IFTs and the US government. The coalition led by Dona Violeta2° represented a plurality of 
factions, from the conservative opposition to the Somoza dictatorship she herself and her 
murdered husband, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro personified, to the more extremist factions of Miami 
and New Orleans Nicaraguan exiles who had thrived under Somoza. These last envisioned a 
rapid return to pre-revolutionary business as usual, championed by right-wing members of the 
Congress, Senate and government of the all-powerful USA. 
20 Who shamelessly appealed to the marianismo of Nicaraguan culture during her electoral campaign by persistently 
appearing in public in simple blue and white clothes (the national colours) in an attitude of supplication to heaven, 
arms wide-spread - an important example of the occasional power of using gender as a political weapon. 
127 
Dona Violeta, having been a participant in the Nicaraguan unification government after the 
overthrow of the dictatorship in 1979 until sidelined and isolated by the FSLN, was determined 
that this would not be the case again and attempted to forge a workable but conservative-leaning 
government. The weakness of the government, however, rapidly became apparent. Having 
recovered from the initial shock of electoral defeat and the need to work with the incoming 
Chamorro government, the FSLN spent most of 1990 before the handover of power consolidating 
the material necessary to maintain themselves as a political party rather than a revolutionary 
force. Roughly speaking this meant transforming the hierarchical and autocratic command 
structure of the FSLN into a similarly autocratic quasi-political party, and `acquiring' many of the 
financial sources, goods, vehicles, buildings and land that had been accrued to the state in the 
name of the people of Nicaragua in the 1979-90 period, a process of appropriation that became 
known as the pinata. As Sergio Ramirez, vice-president of the FSLN government during the 
revolution, wrote of the transition of government of 1990: "The FSLN was not prepared, as a 
whole, to assume its role of party of opposition inside a democratic system because it had never 
been designed for this. Its vertical structure was the inspiration of Leninist manuals, of the 
impositions of the war and of caudillismo, our oldest cultural heritage. " (Ramirez 1999). 
Initially an intransigent opponent of the Chamorro government, the FSLN and the small cupula 
of revolutionary commandants-turned-politicians who continued to run the Frente rapidly came 
to understand that electoral defeat did not exclude them from a share in the spoils of victory. The 
FSLN still represented a massive bloc of support in state and civil structures and the country at 
large, and without the compliance of the leadership of the FSLN Nicaragua would simply be 
ungovernable. In practice, the reality of having to deal with the Frente gave the Chamorro 
government no option but to defy the will of the USA in a number of areas; for instance in the 
maintenance of Umberto Ortega, brother of FSLN leader Daniel Ortega, in the position of head of 
the army, for far longer than the US would have preferred. It became the plan of the FSLN 
leadership to co-operate with what had in reality been an inevitable outcome of the 1990 
elections, and share in the power of government until the next elections of 1996. 
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The political scenery of the first five years of post-revolutionary government was dominated by 
three factors: 1) the massive number of armed men and women from both sides of the conflict 
who needed disarming and relocating in a war-shattered economy, 2) the unyielding pressure 
from the IFIs and the USA, to which Nicaragua was once again heavily indebted, to liberalize the 
economy and rapidly re-enter the global economic system, irrespective of the damage, and 3) the 
heavy pressure from the USA to resolve the question of property ownership in Nicaragua by 
returning land to or compensating all those who had land seized by the revolutionary government. 
These three horses, chained to the shattered body of Nicaragua and pulling strongly in opposite 
directions, quickly achieved the dislocation and destruction that was a foreseeable outcome of a 
dramatic lack of vision by those who claimed to be exercising the most effective long-term 
strategy, the IFIs and the external donors. 
The biggest losers in the immediate post-war peace settlement were the mass of de-mobilized 
Contra and ESLN, victims of the massive growth in unemployment that followed the election of 
1990, and their families who applied for aid under the peace agreements between the FSLN and 
the Contra armies. Subsequent to the elections in February of 1990 some 21,863 (UN 1990) ex- 
combatants of the anti-Sandinista fronts had been registered, whilst in the Sandinista Popular 
Army the demobilization was even more extreme. From a wartime peak of 676,000 of all types of 
effectives in 1987, the numbers had already shrunk to 236,000 in 1990,127,000 in 1993 and, 
incredibly, 12,000 in 1995 (Bonn International Centre 1997). The magnitude of the re-settlement 
and employment problem may readily be imagined when it is realized that estimates made in 
1991 suggest that at that time there were as many people demobilized as were formally employed 
in Nicaragua, and that the demobilized population was greater than the number of registered 
workers in the formal labour market (Government of Nicaragua 1995). The resources required to 
cope with this massive movement of people were not available at the time, and were not allowed 
for by the IMF when negotiating Nicaragua's first structural adjustment programme. 
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For those demobilized members of the armed forces who were lucky enough to be given land, the 
struggle began to survive in an almost complete absence of factor inputs, credit, transport, and 
rural infrastructure such as roads and bridges. The difficulty of making a sustainable livelihood 
under the conditions that most demobilized combatants of either side found themselves in rurally, 
contributed to the continuing presence of groups of armed bandits in those rural areas, causing a 
level of fear and disturbance out of all proportion to their actual numbers. As late as 1999, for 
instance, the Police registered a total of 206 men in the country comprising some 44 armed 
groups, who were responsible for killing some 146 people, more than any other single cause 
(Equipo Nizkor 1999). In this same year the army killed some 99 members of the armed groups, 
and their numbers are growing fewer each year. Despite the occasional threat of groups such as 
the FUAC, remnants of the extreme left, the biggest remaining group with both the potential and 
the members to constitute what might be termed an uprising, is YATAMA, the political 
organization set up during the period of war in 1980-90 to represent the Mesquite peoples (Sumo, 
Rama, Garifuna etc. ) in the indigenous communities of the north-east and the Atlantic coast. 
For the presidential elections of 1996, the mayor of Managua, Arnoldo Aleman, arose to head a 
new coalition of liberal groupings on a strongly anti-Sandinista platform, the PLC (Partido 
Liberal Constitucionista). The PLC promised massive employment and economic growth, and in 
a hotly contested election rife with fraud (Mailman 1996), beat the FSLN. The pre-election anti- 
FSLN propaganda, however, wilted in the face of Nicaraguan realpolitik, which was once again 
that without the active participation of the FSLN, the country was ungovernable. In the run-up to 
their assumption of power in 1997, the PLC rapidly came to terms with the leadership of the 
FSLN in forming the infamous pacto, which has governed Nicaragua since the election and 
determined the form of the 2001 elections, perhaps the most egregious representation of hidden 
knowledge in the facade of Nicaraguan democracy. 
Since the 1996 elections, there has been a growing political opposition, but with the absolute 
PLGFSLN control of the Corte Suprema Electoral (CSE - the electoral supreme court), the 
Corte - Suprema de Justicia (CSJ - the supreme court) and the Controloria General de La 
130 
Republica (CGR - the comptroller general's office) all opposition that might be effective has 
been kept firmly out of the electoral arena by those bodies ostensibly responsible for the growth 
of democracy. The PLC having been confronted with the necessity of working with the FSLN 
despite their antithetical beliefs, the defining moment of cynicism for both parties came with the 
packet of 16 constitutional reforms approved by the national assembly of Nicaragua on 9th 
December 1999. In this packet of laws, representing a giant step backwards from the 
democratizing reforms of the 1995 changes to the constitution (Reporte Politico, 2000), the PLC 
and the FSLN between them legitimized the dividing up of the spoils of the estado botin (the 
booty state). 
For the FSLN, the benefits of the `reforms' of 1999 were manifold. They contained a new 
property law that guaranteed possession of a series of businesses, farms, agricultural co- 
operatives and residential properties that they had appropriated in the pinata of 1990, as well as 
forgiving them rent arrears from some 240 state businesses in their hands since 1992, a sum of 
some US$50 million. The Frente were guaranteed a seat on the managing committee of the 
Superintendent of Banks and the managing committee of the Central Bank, as well as seats in the 
CGR, the CSE, and 40% of all the offices in regional, departmental, municipal, comarcal and 
zonal electoral bodies. They were further guaranteed 40% of the electoral budgets for the general 
and municipal elections, and the reduction in the number of votes required for a second round in 
the presidential elections from 45% to 35%, a change dear to the heart of Daniel Ortega, leader of 
the FSLN. They also gained seats on the ruling bench of the Supreme Court (CSJ), as well as 
posts in all the Appeals Tribunals, Criminal and Local Courts throughout the country. The Frente 
gained positions in the ruling committee of the national assembly, their banks were guaranteed 
participation in the Wet or Dry canal project, and the division of Managua into three 
municipalities which would give the FSLN a better chance of winning overall, whilst leaving the 
PLC in charge of the wealthy ghettoes from which their support was derived. 
For the PLC, the gains were equally great. The FSLN agreed to stop disruption of governance and 
allow the PLC to function as a government, as well as agreeing to dismantle unions in the state 
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businesses to be privatized, ENITEL (the state telecoms company), ENEE (the state electricity 
company), INAA (state company responsible for bridges and aqueducts), the airport and the ports 
authority. The PLC gained control of the Comptroller general at a time when it was embarrassing 
both by its' exposure of corruption, and by the conferral of a deputy's seat in the national 
assembly as of right to Arnoldo Aleman, guaranteed his immunity from prosecution for 
complicity in corruption when he left the presidency. The PLC gained control of the Supreme 
Electoral Court, and thus the whole electoral process from the counting of votes, to the electoral 
budget and the constitution of the local electoral boards; the PLC also gained control of the 
Supreme Court and other justice tribunals essential to interrupting any proceedings against 
corruption. Finally, the PLC achieved the promulgation of a series of laws privatizing a series of 
state businesses in favour of the PLC and at the same time allowing members of the PLC 
government to work in them as shareholders or associates, as well as the privatization of ENEE, 
ENITEL, the international airport, INAA, the state bank BANIC, all in ways which guaranteed 
that the PLC and party functionaries profited from the sale. 
As well as the massive corruption institutionalized by the new Ley Electoral, this law and the 
other constitutional reforms passed in 1999-2000 have become the key by which the government 
has firmly locked the door constituted by the CSE against effective citizen participation in 
democratic processes. Numbers of parties have been disallowed under the rule that requires 
parties to acquire signatures of 4% of the electorate (article 173 number 12C of the constitutional 
reforms passed on 9/12/99 and 18/1/00 by the national assembly) in order to continue to exist as a 
political party, and were simply told that numbers of their signatures were duplicates, or didn't 
conform to the details held on the cedula (ID card) or electoral role. It is this centralized control 
of the democratic apparatus which chiefly contradicts the optimistic view of the `pillar' of 
institution-strengthening and governance identified by the IMF/IDA in their report on the IPRS 
discussed at the beginning, as well as the theme of decentralization of government. 
Despite being deliberately excluded from contesting any elections, several other parties and 
coalitions have attempted to build a third force in Nicaraguan politics, such as the Movimiento de 
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Renovacion de Sandinismo (MRS), Jose Alvarado's Liberal Democratic Party (PLD), the 
National Resistance party (RN, representing various Contra organisations), the MUC 
(Movimiento de Unidad Christiano) and Joaquin Cuadra's MUN (National Unity Movement). All 
of these have failed to make any mark on their own, because of being barred by the PLC/FSLN 
controlled CSE, and inevitably end up forging an alliance with one of the big two parties. The last 
attempt to build a third force, a Conservative party-led coalition called Tercera Via (third way), 
came to grief on its' own internal politics and the banning of popular candidates for the coalition 
by the CSE. In the municipal elections held on 5th November 2000, the people of Nicaragua 
recognized this electoral fait accompli with massive electorate abstentions (45% nationally). The 
gains to the two big parties during the municipal elections were obvious and blatant; in Puerto 
Cabezas on the Atlantic coast, where YATAMA (the party representing the indigenous Mesquite 
peoples) fought for access to the elections but were excluded, the FSLN won the alcaldia with 
only 9% of the vote. 
4.2.2 - The NGO Sector, Aid, And Fiscal Irresponsibility 
"In the arena of this thought one finds consultants, advisers, promoters and officials from the 
government, NGOs and the multilateral agencies, all middle-class professionals making notable 
efforts to breathe life into their social standing. They are the consumers, creators and 
disseminators of this line of thought......... The promotion of development and the resulting 
market for consultancies and advisory services has managed to expand the middle class and its' 
purchasing power. We are talking here about a market that has its illusions, such as the illusion 
that something really is being done for development, independent of whether it is or not. They 
believe what they say thanks to a Berkelian vision of the world, according to which the social 
being is nothing other than the being perceived, the mental representation of a theatrical 
representation. These professionals have swallowed the development discourse and learned to 
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juggle the concepts because they have to justify their climb: discourse provides them the means 
and schizophrenia the license to forget. " 
Jose Luis Rocha, ' The Matrixes, Traps and Tricks of the Development Discourse 
NICARAGUA- CLOSE- UP, Envio April 2001, Nitlapan/UCA, Managua. 
Although globally by the mid-1990s only some 13% of official aid was channeled through NGOs 
(Blokland, 1996, p. 197), in Latin America the retreat of the state from the provision of social 
services continues to provide a growing role for domestic NGOs, frequently in partnership with 
foreign NGO partners. Because of the high levels of poverty in Nicaragua, the huge external and 
internal debt and the constant need for aid, the NGO sector is one of the most important players 
in the political arena, although it rarely if ever functions as a coordinated whole. The sheer 
confusion of aims, agendas and methods promoted by the multiplicity of NGOs in Nicaragua 
adds heavily to the burden of attempting to define, much less plan and execute meaningful 
strategies for sustainable development: 
"The image of dozens of NGDOs, financed by donors with different interests, 
and working without coordination among themselves or with the State does 
not paint a very encouraging picture. It generates a chaotic scene with co- 
operantes of all political and ideological stripes implementing all kinds of 
projects, duplicating work, stepping on each other's toes and competing with 
the State. Within this chaos it is exceedingly odd, or more to the point 
suspicious, that many NGDOs that zealously embrace the neo-liberal 
postulates implement the same kinds of projects as, or are even partners of, 
supposedly progressive organizations from the North. They both implement 
credit projects and/or other support to micro-businesses and sustainable 
agriculture, which are "politically inoffensive" areas. " (Cortes, 2001) 
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Far from being restricted predominantly to the areas of planning and policy, NGOs are closely 
involved in every sector of the economy. The NGO sector is now the second largest employer of 
people in Nicaragua with an estimated 78,000 employees of different forms (Hopmann, 2000), 
and with each year the number of NGOs increases as the economic situation of the country 
worsens. The increased `projectisation' of Nicaragua and the confusion of aims and agendas 
therefore have a very real impact on the labour market and throughout the economy. In the year 
2000 alone, of 233 pieces of legislation approved by the national assembly of Nicaragua, 175 
were for the creation of personas juridicas under Ley 147, governing the creation of non-profit 
organizations, or NGOs21. In tandem with many of the highly indebted poor countries (such as 
Bangladesh) NGOs are big business, and as a source of (relatively) stable employment they are 
much prized. The same sources of funding that allow them this privilege, however, are 
increasingly tempting to a government with an inability to control its expenditure and a limitless 
appetite for other people's money. Additionally, the government sees the expansion of NGOs in 
the country as an effective duplication or usurpation of state functions. Many Nicaraguan NGOs 
are vulnerable to attack where they lack sufficiently powerful political allies in the FSLN or the 
PLC, and the externally organized and funded NGOs are especially anxious to sell themselves as 
well meaning and apolitical in a highly-politicized economy. 
In combination with the above expansion of the NGO sector and central to the anti-democratic 
tendencies of Nicaraguan politics has been the increasing role in the budget of the government by 
external donors, and in particular-the Inter-American Development Bank (BID by its' initials in 
Spanish), the World Bank and the IMF. One effect of increasing aid dependence has been the 
separation of the state sector from the manufacturing/agro-fishery economy, as an increased 
percentage of the political classes cease to be dependent on the `real' economy and instead are 
absorbed into the aid-dependent economy. Because of the massive post-war settlement problems 
mentioned briefly above and the continued economic dislocation to be analyzed in the following 
sections, Nicaragua has repeatedly failed to comply with the conditionality imposed on it after 
21 Editorial, "El Gobierno y las ONG", La Prensa, 22/12/2000, p. 122. 
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1990, and is frequently reminded of its unsatisfactory compliance by the IFIs (an example of this 
was the autumn 1999 return to the government of memoranda concerning financial and economic 
policy by the IMF, as lacking sufficient attention to equity, independent monitoring organizations 
and the ending of corruption (Equipo Nitlapan-envio 1999). De facto, Nicaragua is able to meet 
only about a third of its' debt service liability. 
The March 1998 agreement on Nicaragua's ESAF with the IMF decreed severe cut-backs in the 
fiscal deficit (US Embassy of Nicaragua 2000); the government at that point relied for some 29% 
of its entire budget on external donations. Rather than cut back the fiscal deficit at all, however, 
the state budget for 2001 involved an increase in the deficit from 14.8% in 2000 to 15.7%, 
outside the bounds of the ESAF, and of which a large and important part was an increase in the 
budget of the presidencia. The budget proposals put before the National Assembly for the 
financial year 2001 proposed increasing the income of the government (and the current budget 
deficit, which will exceed C$ 5.5 billion) by some C$ 1,404,500,000, having increased at each 
stage of the budget review process. The bulk of this money (58% of the entire budget for the 
presidencia) (Tellez 2001) was not for increases in social or productive spending, but in current 
costs such as salaries and services for the executive bureaucracy. Despite Nicaragua being a 
country wealthy in highly-paid functionaries, however, there is gradually less and less for them to 
administer; the numbers of health workers in the country per capita, for example, dropped from 
60.63 in 1990 to 42.47 in 2001 (Tellez, ibid. ), whilst overall expenditure in areas linked to the 
reduction of poverty decline as a percentage of the budget from 47.09% to 42.36% of the whole. 
It is this centralization of the state budget towards the presidencia and the offices under the direct 
control of the president that again counters verbal commitments to improve governance and 
transparency, a topic discussed in further detail below with reference to the burgeoning 
corruption of the Nicaraguan state. Budgetary problems resulting from this are made worse by the 
opaque processes and practices of government accountancy, and the power exerted by the 
presidencia to divert money where it wishes. In 1997, for instance, the state budget passed by the 
National Assembly contained a mysterious element for `internal debt' of C$940 million, which 
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nobody could explain and which was therefore unaccounted for (Equipo Nitlapan-envio Op. Cit. 
1997). 
The tendency towards centralizing financial and political control has accelerated sharply in 
Nicaragua since the accession to power of the PLC in 1996, and in particular since the package of 
laws passed by the national assembly in 1999 (discussed in more detail below) which divided up 
the offices of the state between the PLC and FSLN. The government budget contains in any event 
an element of the surreal, given that the actual budget submitted to the asamblea nacional 
(national assembly) for the following year is generally far less than the actual total spent; 
`slippage' is simply spent illegally, and then approved in retrospect by the bancadas of the 
FSLN/PLC; the budget for 2000, for example, increased illegally by C$1,404 million during the 
first few months of the year, an overspend subsequently legalized without objection by the 
national assembly on 15/11/00 (Barbarena S. 2000). These occurrences plus the need to keep 
dealing with the frequent bankruptcies of Nicaraguan banks explain the dramatic decline in 
foreign reserves held by the Central Bank of Nicaragua. In 1999 the reserves had been US$216 
million; in 2000 they went down US$187 million, and in 2001 they were only US$16 million 
remained (Nicaraguan Network Hotline, 2002). 
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Table 2: Aid Dependent Countries 
Country Aid as percent 
of GNP 
Aid as percent 
of Central Gov't 
Expenditure 
bid as percent 
of Gross Dom. 
Investment 
Aid as percent of 
of Imports 
Benin 11 .. 57 31 Burkina Faso 16 .. 61 50 Burundi 13 52 183 76 
Cambodia 12 .. 76 29 Chad 14 
.. 72 37 Congo, Rep. 15 .. 45 13 Eritrea 15 .. 46 21 Ethiopia 10 .. 52 36 Gambia, The 10 
.. 57 14 Guinea 10 .. 45 40 Guinea-Bissau 50 .. 198 104 Haiti 12 
.. 116 40 Kyrgyz Rep. 14 .. 63 27 Lao PDR 20 .. 68 46 Madagascar 24 .. 201 71 Malawi 14 .. 113 28 Mauritania 24 120 57 
Mongolia 26 .. 131 45 Mozambique 37 .. 119 82 Nicaragua 23 .. .. 23 Niger 19 
.. 170 73 Rwanda 32 294 116 
Sierra Leone 16 89 -311 87 
Tanzania 13 
.. 68 45 Uganda 13 .. 84 49 Zambia 17 107 35 
Note: ".. " signifies "data not available. " 
Only countries that received aid at levels of 10% of GNP or above In 1995 are Included. 
Source: Compiled from data In World Bank, 1999 (cd"nxN. 
(From Brautigam 2000, Aid Dependence and Governance, EGDI 2000: 1) 
To put this in context, the planned budget of the government of Nicaragua for 2001 was the 
equivalent to 45% of GDP (Montenegro 2000). Within the amount of money paid by the IFIs to 
subsidize the state, however, it has been estimated that the figure for paying bureaucratic salaries 
alone is some 30% of the national budget (Candia 2000a); this figure becomes all the more mind- 
boggling when one realizes that, with ministers of whatever department in the Nicaraguan 
government being paid between $7-$10,000 per month in basic wages alone before `extras' are 
taken into account, they are receiving reimbursement in money and allowances equivalent to their 
counterparts in the USA, in an economy 1/87`h the size. Put another way, they are the highest paid 
officials (elected or un-elected) in Central America (Candia 2000b), in the poorest country. The 
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salaries and benefits, in addition, are certainly not merited by the workload of the deputies and 
functionaries; in January of 1999, for instance, despite convening at the beginning of the month, 
the national assembly went for 40 days without holding a full session because of the lack of 
agenda, despite there being over 100 projects with a social content outstanding, and in May of 
that year there was only one full session a week (Equipo Nizkor, Op. Cit. ). 
The IFIs are not the only ones who pay the costs, though; the cost of water through state- 
controlled companies, for instance, increased by 58% between December of 1996 and February 
of 2000, whereas the price of electricity went up 74% between January of 1996 and March 2000. 
In addition, Nicaragua has the highest rate of IGV (VAT) (Candia 2000b) in Central America, 
being the most regressively taxed country in the region with 81.72% of government income 
accounted for by indirect taxation, affecting business and private citizens alike, but especially the 
poorest - Of every 100 cördobas of GDP produced by the Nicaraguan economy, 30 are paid in 
taxes (Leyton Op. Cit. ). To put this in context, with respect to the size of the economy the tax 
burden is ten times greater than El Salvador and Guatemala (Perez, 1998). 
By contrast, reading the US State Department Country Report on Nicaragua of 1999 (US 
Department of State 1999), welcoming the Nicaraguan 1997 Tax Reform law as eradicating non- 
tariff barriers to imports, reducing municipal taxes, import tax restrictions and eliminating income 
tax on interest and capital gains from stock exchange transactions, it is fairly evident that for the 
US government at least the criteria for successful compliance with conditionality, as regards 
taxation at any rate, have been selected from a narrow range concerned solely with US business 
interests which have very little or no relevance to the majority of poor Nicaraguans, or long-term 
economic development. 
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4.2.3 - Caudillismo And The Corrupt Use Of Power In Nicaragua 
"The basic structure of the Spanish colony was the encomienda, in which the Spanish king gave 
an Indian village and all of its inhabitants to a colonizer, and it later evolved into a plantation or 
hacienda. This structural basis survives. In Somoza's time, it was said that all of Nicaragua was 
his farm, or that he behaved as though it were. The same is said today of Arnoldo Aleman. The 
plantation owner rules the plantation, and appears to own even the lives of the people who work 
there. Human rights are not necessarily respected on a plantation. Worse yet, people don't know 
or exercise their own rights. This daily renunciation serves to increase the owner's power. " 
Allan Bolt, Envio June 2001, Op. Cit. 
It will be apparent from the previous analysis that, despite the recent spate of arrests (2002) and 
legal cases against the previous government over corruption, thus far the closure of democratic 
spaces by the political elite of Nicaragua, far from being sanctioned by governments monitoring 
the situation and the IFIs, has been rewarded. It will also be apparent from the next two sections 
that in an absence of transparency and with only the facade of economic growth going on, the 
bankrupting of the country by the political elites of Nicaragua is being rewarded by the IFIs with 
more loan funds which they will never have to account for, and with which Nicaragua will 
continue to be burdened for the foreseeable future: 
"Large amounts of aid delivered over long periods, create incentives for 
governments and donors that have the potential to undermine good 
governance and the quality of state institutions...... Statistical analysis across 
a number of countries indicates that there is a statistically significant, 
negative relationship between aid intensity and quality of governance, even 
when controlling for economic decline. " (Brautigam, Op. Cit., p. 6). 
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In common with a number of Central and Southern American countries, there has long been a 
tradition in Nicaragua of this kind of tight, centralized control of power, this tendency having its' 
roots in the colonial period when the will of the Spanish crown was expressed or thwarted by the 
small minority of individuals responsible for governing each of the colonies -The fuel which 
maintains this centralized clientelism is corruption, itself engendering and engendered by the 
patronage politics that characterize modern Nicaragua. Since the elections of 1990, the growing 
concerns of civil society and NGO groupings with governance, gradually reflected in the 
programmes of the IFIs, has come into increasing conflict with this corrupt, authoritarian 
centralization. At the beginning of structural adjustment programming in Latin America, there 
was little or no conflict with the interests of the elite groupings. De facto, structural adjustment 
became complicit in traditional patronage systems, involving the favouring of large businesses, 
the traditional elite families and newcomers, who maintained a neo-liberal dialogue whilst 
strenuously avoiding effective regulation (Neira 1996) promoting good governance, transparency 
of accounts, or anything that might expose elite oligopolies to external commercial pressure. 
The principal manner in which corruption is expressed and utilized in Nicaragua is through co- 
opting assets and institutions of the state by the appointment of friends and family. As an 
example, as of 5/1/2001, for instance, the ex-vice president and current PLC President, Enrique 
Bolafios Geyer, had at least 16 members of his family in state posts of one description or another. 
One of these relatives, Fernando Abauza Noguera, nephew of the ex-vice-president and 
subsequently DGI (Inland Revenue) delegate in Masaya, a family political stronghold, was 
appointed to his post in January of 1997, some five months before he actually came back to the 
country in May 1997, having in the meantime obtained Canadian citizenship (El Nuevo Diario 
2001). The possession of many relatives working in government is not of itself indicative of 
corruption, of course, in a small country with a small population where the state is the most 
important employer and lack of education effectively bars a majority from white-collar work. 
What denotes the corruption is the use to which family and social connections are put - it may be 
safely assumed, for instance, that the creditable actions against the corruption of the previous 
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Aleman regime taken by President Bolanos in his first 100 days in power in 2002 will not be 
extended to members of his own family or entourage. 
An overt example of corrupt use of state resources and family contacts has been the case of 
Byron Jerez Solis, who used his position as head of the DGI (Departamento General de Ingresos, 
or Inland Revenue) to issue cheques to `buy' equipment such as air-conditioners, paper, labels 
and computer parts from a number of companies in Miami, some of which didn't exist and the 
others of which were owned by his brother Gerold, at that time in prison in the USA for drug- 
trafficking. Jerez authorized PETRONIC, the Nicaraguan state petrol company, to issue cheques 
to a firm called MODULTECSA (Marenco 2000), which was then constructing a palatial summer 
house for him on the coast, and again to a firm owned by his brother in Miami. The work done by 
MODULTECSA on the Jerez summer palace was also taken from Hurricane Mitch funds 
intended for repairs to damage done by the hurricane. 
DGI money was also used to open short-term high interest bank accounts, from which the interest 
was retained after the money went back to the DGI, itself an illegal act; several members of 
Jerez' immediate family were also put onto the DGI payroll as soon as he became head (Mayorga 
2000), under the title of `special assessors', a post whose duties were non-existent. This 
behaviour,, while perhaps more obvious than most, is by no means unusual; what was unusual in 
this case was that Jerez, after firm pressure from external donors, was made destitute from his 
post. Jerez remained an important figure in the PLC until the Aleman regime handed power over 
to the new President Bolanos in January of 2002, at which point the process began under which 
Jerez has now been imprisoned and sundry members of the Aleman government have fled into 
exile to avoid charges brought against them. 
Corruption has been underpinned by frequent manipulations of the Nicaraguan constitution, and 
by the embodiment in it of immunity for various elected and unelected offices; it is the abuse of 
this legal immunity that presents the biggest obstacle to improving governance in Nicaragua. The 
142 
current Nicaraguan constitution allows for immunity from legal action for the President and Vice- 
president of the Republic, the magistrates of the Corte Suprema Electoral and the Corte Suprema 
de Justicia, members (diputados) the National Assembly, the members of the Contraloria 
General, ministers and vice-ministers of state22. Despite external donor pressure for transparency 
and accountability, which has resulted in reforms of such laws as the Penal Code23 and the Ley 
Orgänica de la Contraloria24, thus establishing new crimes and punishments, until the case of 
Byron Jerez noone had actually been tried or punished for corruption under these changes. The 
concession of immunity has been made worse by the addition to the legal canon of Ley 290 in 
199825, which effectively concedes to the president the discretion to impart immunity to other 
functionaries where (s)he sees fit, and in keeping with Nicaraguan politics in general attempts at 
reform because of external pressure have had little or no effect. 
Historically, the privilege of immunity derived from Spanish law as a means by people were to be 
protected from the power of the crown, however in modern Nicaragua its original logic has long 
since been superseded by its use as a control mechanism and a means of reward for the political 
faithful. Thus the constitutional reforms passed by the national assembly on 9/12/99 and 18/1/00, 
in which article 13326 confers automatic diputado status (and thus continuing immunity from 
legal action or accountability) on the ex-president and vice-president, as well as the candidates 
for both posts in the losing party, and article 13027 paragraph IV, in which the number of votes 
needed to deprive the president of immunity before the law is raised from a simple majority to 
ZZ Ley de Inmunidad No. 83 of March 1990, Capitulo 1, Articulo 1, Government of Nicaragua website 
http: //legislacion. asamblea. gob. ni/Normaweb. nsf/164aal 5ba012e567062568a2005b564b, 24/6/02 23 Reformed in 1990,1991,1992 and 1996, which version is at 
http: //legislacion. asamblea. gob. ni/Normaweb. nsf/164aal 5ba012e567062568a2005b564b, 26/4/02 1-4 In 1999,1997, and 1995 during the post-revolutionary period. See `Ley Organica de la Contraloria' on 
Government of Nicaragua website http: //legislacion. asamblea. gob. ni/Normaweb. nsf/, 24/6/02 25 Article 8 of the Ley de Organizacion, Competencia y Procidimientos del Poder Ejecutivo (Ley No. 290 of 27/3/98) 
gives the President the right to create sectoral cabinets whenever (s)he sees fits, Article 11 gives the President the 
right to create Secretaries whenever (s)he deems it necessary and with whatever governmental rank (s)he wishes to 
bestow, Article 31 gives the President the vague power to create other administrative necessities outside Article 151 
of the Constitution, and most impressively Article 47 gives the President the right to confer whatever governmental 
rank (s)he sees fit to functionaries deemed on official service, rank of determined sorts of course bestowing 
immunity from prosecution. See Government of Nicaragua website 
ht_ tp: //legislacion asamblea. gob. ni/No mmaweb nsf/164aa15ba012e567062568a2005b564b, 24/6/02 26 See Article 133 of the Ley De Reforma Parcial A La Constitucion Politics De La Republica De Nicaragua, 
published in the Nicaraguan government Gazette No. 13 on 19/1/00. 7 See Article 130, ibid. 
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2/3 of the national assembly, a virtual impossibility to achieve under the current political 
circumstances28. Daniel Ortega and Arnoldo Alemän, barring some radical change in political 
circumstances in Nicaragua, have thus arranged themselves immunity from the law for life. 
The costs of continuing corruption, and the increasing if as yet ineffective attempts by the IFIs to 
enforce governability and transparency criteria in adjustment programmes becomes apparent 
when it is realised that as much as 20% of GDP is simply lost, just disappears (Leyton 2000). In 
context, some estimates have suggested that Nicaragua lost as much as US$5 billions through 
corruption in the ten years 1990 - 2000, only US$ 1.7 billion less than the entire external 
debt29. 
The US$ 600 million Nicaragua received in international aid in 1990-95 and the US$ 400 million 
that it received in 1996-99 (Fitzgerald, Bruck and Grigsby 2001) may have disappeared into 
private pockets virtually in its' entirety. It is further estimated that 30% of total aid is lost through 
`inefficiency', including inability, technical incompetence and bad management, but it would be a 
mistake to assume that this is unrelated to corruption; in municipios where most if not all of the 
officials in an alcaldia have been appointed because they are related to someone powerful or are 
deemed `reliable' by the party they belong to, and they then disrupt projects and damage and 
destroy materiel because they are unable to do the job, this process of inefficiency obviously has 
as its intellectual author corruption. Other forms of corruption related to this kind of clientelism 
are rife, such as the `voluntary' donations of one month's salary by state employees to PLC 
funds, arranged without their knowledge or consent, from departments such as the INSS 
(department of social security) INTUR (ministry of tourism), the National Lottery and most 
recently from FISE (the emergency social investment fund) (Chamorro 2001). 
28 But which is indeed currently (September 2002) being attempted by the new president, Bolanos, in the `luchs 
contra corrupcion', the fight against corruption which is being heavily stage-managed by the US State Department. 29 Economist Oscar Rene Vargas, quoted in article "Desmontar regimen mafioso! " by Octavio Enriquez, El Nuevo 
Diario, 24/11/01. 
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4.3.1 - The General Economy of Nicaragua 
"Some big business-people guiltily confess their dependence on the financial system 
today, but none admit that they divert the credits toward ostentatious consumption. The 
little farmhouse, the beach house, the big house in Managua, the fleet of vehicles worth 
$20,000 and up, the trips to Miami, etc., are just some of the luxuries they cannot give 
up, which has prevented them from saving and taking other precautions. They have 
therefore opted to reduce costs by laying people off, preserving their own lifestyle by 
spending less on wages. Such a decision is out of line with bourgeois austerity: they 
have neither the classic Calvinist austerity Weber identified as a capitalist cultural 
mechanism nor the rationale of constantly investing in the hacienda that allowed their 
parents and grandparents to amass the fortunes that they left them. " 
Jose Luis Rocha, `The Chronicle of Coffee: History, Responsibility and Questions', 
Envio August 2001. 
Following the economic chaos of war during the 1980s, the borrowing from 1990 onwards and 
the unavoidable re-assumption of responsibility for the pre-1979 debt, the economy of Nicaragua 
has been heavily dependent on external borrowing, especially from the USA. The US is the 
trading partner of primary importance, absorbing $475 million of Nicaraguan exports (and 
receiving $379 million of imports in return). Private investment in Nicaragua (despite an increase 
in 1993-1998 from US$149 millions to US$195 millions) has decreased as a percentage of total 
investment from 75% to 36%, whilst external private investment went up from 0-19% and public 
investment from 25-45%, the majority of which is from external loans and donations (Corea 
2000). This unhappy state of affairs conceals the fact that, in addition, the comparatively small 
state fiscal deficit is principally caused by the massive amount of financial outflow constituted by 
debt service, an average of over 12% of GDP per annum between 1990 and 1995 (Neira 1999). 
Liberalization of non-tariff and tariff barriers alike under the usual IMF prescriptions has left 
small producers of agricultural and manufactured goods alike unable to compete with cheap 
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imports (flour from the US and clothes and shoes from Costa Rica and El Salvador, for instance). 
The market and price protection that still exists is concentrated in export goods such as sugar, and 
Nicaragua has exported basically the same goods for decades, more than 50% of which are 
agricultural produce (UNDP 2000b). 
Because of this, and the fact that per capita the external debt is some 270% of GDP, external aid 
flows remain macro-economically important, to the extent that in some sectors of the economy 
aid is the predominant source of money (Wattel and Saunders 1998); Per capita debt is 231% of 
GDP, about the highest in the world. Estimates of the growth in GDP for 1999 ranged from 5% to 
8% (US Embassy, Op. Cit. ), but whatever growth in GDP is that may be occurring, the vastly 
unequal income distribution in Nicaragua and the sectors in which most of the growth occurs 
ensure that most of the population experience no benefit from it; current growth is being led by 
commerce, financial services, agro-fishery and construction, and of these only commerce and 
finance are estimated to be truly profitable (Vargas 1999). In fact, income distribution has 
become significantly worse in all Latin American countries undertaking market-friendly reforms, 
during the period of reform, by an increase of 5-10% as measured by the Gini coefficient (Berry, 
1997, p. 31). Already the most agriculturally dependent nation in Central America, in Nicaragua 
the contribution of agricultural production to GDP actually rose steadily from 23% in 1977 to 
34% in 1998, in contrast to the other countries of the region where agriculture is a shrinking 
portion of GDP (Findley & Salgado, 2001). 
The continuing economic weakness of Nicaragua is the main cause of the rising poverty and 
unemployment in the country; a study conducted by FIDEG in Nicaragua's three major cities 
between 1992 and 1998 indicated an increase in the percentage of houses living beneath the 
poverty line from 43.5% to 61% (Agurto 1999). Not unconnected with this is the disappearance 
of 109,000 jobs between 1990-94 (SIMAS 1996) under the Chamorro government, which whilst 
contracting the tax base and thus government revenues, also massively swelled a private sector 
labour market unable to deal with the labour supply it already had. With this rise in poverty has 
come a concomitant rise in the incidence of malnutrition; whereas throughout Latin America and 
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the Caribbean per capita average calorific intake rose from 2,340 in 1961-63 to 2,600 in 1976-78 
and 2,770 in 1988-1990, in Nicaragua the maximum calorie consumption was 2,400 in 1986, 
even then well below the world average for 1950 (Rocha 2001b). 
By 1999,86 out of every 100 Nicaraguans was affected by poverty, 57 out of every 100 by 
extreme poverty, and the number experiencing actual indigence was 29 out of every 100. The 
number of people living below the poverty line increased from 2 million to 2 million 9 hundred 
thousand between 1993 and 1998 and in addition, the gini coefficient of Nicaragua increased 
from 0.55 to 0.57 (IPEAIUNDP 2000). Compare this, again, to the pillar of economic 
development identified in the IPRS (above) of broad-based. economic growth focused on 
employment. It also provides a direct contrast to the assertion by the IMF/IDA joint staff 
assessment mentioned above, that there was a modest reduction in poverty in Nicaragua between 
1993 and 1998 (IMF/IDA Op. Cit. p. 2). 
In terms of the labour market, the effects of such widespread chronic poverty are reflected in the 
huge informal sector of the economy and the migration of labour of both genders and all ages, 
mainly to Costa Rica or the US. So important is migrant labour to the economy that remittances 
to Nicaragua may amount to as much as $800 million a year, more than all foreign aid. Of this, 
some $200 million is estimated to come from Costa Rica, and between $400-$600 million from 
the USA, an amount of remittances equivalent to as much as a third of the total exports of the 
country (Equipo Envio 1995). There are an estimated 'h million Nicaraguans working in Costa 
Rica and possibly 2 million in the USA, and although a quantity of the money remitted home 
ends up in savings accounts in Nicaragua, some research suggests that a significant quantity of 
remittance money is used for consumption expenditure and very little is used for productive 
investment (Meyers, 2000). Because of failings in the banking system, remittances fail to make 
any real impact as investment, and migration out of the country to find work is now so extensive 
as to be diminishing the economically active population, according to one survey by the 
Nicaraguan economic institute FIDEG in Leon, Managua and Granada. In a survey published in 
1999, FIDEG estimated that in some departmental capitals as much as 22.3% of the economically 
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active population that had been living there in 1998 had migrated to find work outside the 
country, thereby diminishing the open unemployment rate by as much as 11 %. 
As a consequence of the stresses of under-employment and informal employment (what might be 
termed `semi-employed') the shape of labour itself is changing, re-defining what can be called 
formal employment. The level of unemployment in the euphemistically termed Economically 
Active Population rose in the period 1990-1994 from 11% in to 21%, to the extent that by 1996, 
54% of the population actively involved in seeking work was either unemployed or unable to find 
single employment sufficiently well paid to maintain themselves and family (SIMAS, Op. Cit. ). 
Again however, official government estimates of open unemployment are far more optimistic, 
citing open unemployment at 13.2% and underemployment at 10.9%; other sources put the 
overall unemployment rate as high as 50%, with totals as high as 80% on the Atlantic coast 
(CENIDH 1999). 
As a direct consequence of the multiple survival strategies by which adult Nicaraguans gain a 
bare subsistence, even those with some kind of formal sector employment are frequently 
multiply-employed and supplementing income by some form of commerce, for instance the 
teachers encountered by the author in the fieldwork who also made shoes when they weren't 
teaching, and supplemented the household income with the production of food crops, chickens, 
pigs etc. Measures of employment and unemployment, however, tend to differ greatly depending 
on which documents are read and who produced them, amongst other reasons because definitions 
of what constitutes employed, under-employed and unemployed in an economy such as 
Nicaragua's are variable. Correlated with this is the fact that some 53.3% of households in 
Nicaragua now no longer conform to the conventional model (Equipo Nizkor, Op. Cit. ); in 
addition, ` different variations of the extended-family type household are increasingly common 
(Langbroek 1998), especially as male desertion of the family, along with migration to work 
outside Nicaragua, likewise continues to increase. 
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The formal and informal semi-employment that is the lot of the majority of Nicaraguan adults 
barely earns a subsistence living; In 1999,56% of the urban economically active population 
(EAP) was earning less than C$1,000 monthly, at a time when the basic basket of consumer 
goods used to measure inflation cost C$1,667 (UNDP Op. Cit. ) and only 17% of the entire urban 
population (over 50% of the population as a whole) was earning more than C$2,000 monthly. 
Estimates by the UNDP are that as much as 50% of the population are surviving on a dollar a day 
or less. The contrast between this subsistence income for the majority of the country and the huge 
sums of money swallowed by the state, and paid in salaries to ministers, state functionaries and 
deputies of the national assembly helps to maintain the situation whereby external aid flows 
remain macro-economically important to the extent that in some sectors of the economy aid is the 
predominant source of money (Wattel and Saunders Op. Cit. ). 
In addition to the external debt, Nicaragua faces problems with the internal debt, caused among 
other reasons by bonds called BPIs (Bonos por Pago de Indemnizacion) issued to indemnify 
those with property or goods confiscated during the 1980s. These bonds, mainly of long-term 
duration up to 40 years, pay the holder interest for the period over which they are held, and have 
been sold on the international market at up to 40% of original value; the current quantity 
outstanding is some US$ 500 million (Lacayo 2000). They have also been used as a form of 
currency internally, to buy shares in Nicaraguan companies, a practice only recently halted by the 
government. Along with `cleansing bonds', monetary revaluation and general losses written off 
by the Banco Central de Nicaragua (BCN) as a result of frequent bank failures, the total internal 
debt payable by the Nicaraguan tax-payer may be as high as C$ 26 billion. For every year of the 
PLC administration since 1997, according to Nicaraguan economist Nestor Avendano, the BCN 
lost US$ 40 million (Lopez 2000), and now CENIs, the bonds most commonly issued by the 
government to cover its losses and raise fresh capital, are consuming more and more of each 
year's revenue as interest payments must be met. 
In order to maintain this unstable and unsustainable economic situation at the service of elite 
groups and individuals, an intense process of centralization of sources of funding and 
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employment has taken place, in defiance of IFI conditions re decentralization, transparency and 
governability. Thus, despite the perceived need for decentralization of particularly financial 
authority, one of the key themes of the Stockholm agreement, the state in Nicaragua is in fact 
rapidly increasing the concentration of power in the presidency, whilst pretending to do the 
opposite30. Thus, the creation in 1997 of the Nicaraguan Sectoral Commission for 
Decentralization was more than offset by the creation of 24 departmental secretariats by president 
Alen-än (Equipo Nizkor, Op. Cit. ), which was widely denounced as a mechanism to bypass the 
national assembly, and also in 1997 president Alemän introduced the Ley de Justicia Tributaria, 
which reduced the most important component of municipal budgets, the 2% tax on sales and 
services, to 1%. Whereas in 1999 the budget element for transfers to the municipalities was 1%, 
4% less than the legally stipulated 5%31, the government budget for 2001 submitted to the 
national assembly in December 2000 contained no transfer of funds to the municipalities at all. 
A secondary but no less important part of this process, as has been discussed in part above, is the 
manufacture of economic statistics designed to indicate successful compliance with IFI 
conditionality - whether or not they represent reality. The BCN, for instance, not only controls 
the mechanisms by which economic statistics are produced, but likes to experiment with the 
methodology of their production, as well. In 1996 the BCN registered the rate of open 
unemployment as 51.1%, but following the elections of 1996 there were changes in the methods 
employed to measure unemployment, with the result that the open rate magically dropped to 
24.1% (Equipo Nizkor, Op. Cit. ). This figure seems to have been accepted by CEPAL and the 
UNDP, who stated that in 2000 the rate of unemployment in Nicaragua dropped from 10.7% in 
1999 to 9.0%, better than many European countries (La Prensa 2000b). Similarly, the then-vice- 
president and now President Enrique Bolanos Geyer pronounced in September 1999 that the 
economically active population of the country was 1,695,400, and that during the 32 months of 
PLC government 250,000 new jobs had been created (Equipo Nizkor, Op. Cit. ) - until it was 
30 Creating, as Perez (1998) points out, not only a very high rate of taxation but also a hopeless imbalance between 
local and national taxation. 31 CCER, "Balance General de la CCER sobre el cumplimiento de los objetivos, prioridades y principios definidos en 
la declaracion de Estocolmo", Managua, May 2000, p. 30 
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pointed out that during this entire period, INSS (the Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security) had 
registered an increase in social insurance for only 58,748 new jobs, the majority short-term. 
This section has pointed out the economic situation of Nicaragua, and focused on some of the 
causal mechanisms. Current efforts by the government of Nicaragua and the IFIs, in search of a 
long-term solution, is towards securing entrance to the HIPC programme32, given the status of 
Nicaragua's debt. As of October 2000, the total external debt of Nicaragua had gone up to US$ 
6,704 millions. Total current debt forgiveness under discussion by the Paris Club at that point, 80 
% of their debt as of 1/11/99, was only 18.5% of Nicaragua's total external debt. Even under this 
Paris Club scheme, therefore, in 8 years Nicaragua would be back to exactly where it started 
(Nitlapan UCA 1999). Whilst entrance to the HIPC process has been envisaged by the 
Nicaraguan government as a solution to Nicaragua's economic problems, there are fundamental 
structural and socio-economic problems in the Nicaraguan economy and its' relationship to the 
global economy that will not be addressed by HIPC. 
There is also a basic dichotomy between stated aims and actual achievements towards poverty 
alleviation, which the government of Nicaragua and the IFI are contributing to. This is caused by 
the anti-democratic uses to which the structures of the Nicaraguan state are being put, and the 
increasingly profligate use of aid and loan money, the waste of which increases the debt and 
increase the appetite of corrupt elites who are more or less left to their own devices by the IFIs, so 
long as lip-service to conditionality is paid. Underpinning all of these tendencies within the 
Nicaraguan socio-economy is the continuing instability of land ownership, both urban and rural 
and the concomitant heavy dependence of the Nicaraguan economy on the agro-fishery sector 
(predominantly the same agricultural goods that were being exported decades ago and from 
which export earnings have declined since 1997 and are now back to 1995 levels (UNDP 
Op. Cit. )), which will be analyzed in the following section. 
32 The Highly Indebted Poor Country programme is an initiative by the IMF in recognition of the high levels of debt 
with which some of the poorest adjusting countries are afflicted with, and the intention is effectively to reward 
compliance with a combination of restructuring and forgiveness of debt that is intended to dispose of unpayable debt. 
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4.3.2 - Gendered Nicaragua 
In Nicaragua as in most of Central and Latin America, a rapidly increasing female contribution to 
the economy continues to be affected by the cultural handicap of machismo, and the damaging 
effects of this phenomenon and its' twin, marianismo, a central doctrine of the modem Catholic 
church. Machismo is effectively the social acceptance if not outright approval of selected traits 
deemed to be central to masculinity, such as pride, physical force and the aggressive sexual 
pursuit of women - men are `like that', it is in their character and they cannot help themselves: "a 
heady mixture of paternalism, aggression, systematic subordination of women, fetishism of their 
bodies, and idolization of their reproductive and nurturing capacities, coupled to a rejection of 
homosexuality" (Sternberg 1999). 
In an idealized Latino-catholic world these characteristics, perceived as necessary adjuncts to 
virility, are seen as the central pillars by which the bread-winner of the family provides for wife 
and children, and because of the necessity of struggle in life. Marianismo, given its formal 
definition in the dogma of Munificentissimus deus (AAS 1950 753ff. ) pronounced by Pius XII in 
the Holy Year of 1950, is essentially the symbolic representation of Mary, the mother of Jesus, as 
the role by which all women are to be judged and an ideal by which Latin American women are 
expected to live. 
The idealized Mary (and therefore all ideal women) maintained a "resigned acceptance of any 
and all reality as the will of God. " (Bidegain 1999). The most palpable expression of the dogma 
took place with the canonization of Maria Goretti on June 24,1950 (AAS ibid, p. 581). In 1902, 
Maria Goretti, then aged 11, had been murdered by a lodger in her home, after being raped by 
him; her canonization was earned by her purported readiness to die rather than surrender her 
virtue: "People like Maria Goretti.... have an ever-present realization that lightly to surrender 
one's bodily integrity, even to the most compelling needs of the moment, upsets the whole 
rhythm of the universe. " (Concise Biographical Dictionary of the Saints 1958) 
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As one of the consequences of the perception of women as passive vessels for the will of god 
(according to studies realized by the Nicaraguan governmental Institution INEC) over half of 
Nicaraguan women are pregnant by the time they are 19, a rate which by 1999 represented an 
increase over 1998 of 25.6% (Equipo Nizkor Op. Cit. ). Of women who complete some form of 
secondary education, the average number of children is 2, whereas for women with little or no 
education the average is 6. Underneath this bare fact, however, are a number of supportive 
cultural problems; the culture of denial as regards sexuality, for instance, in an ambience of 
intolerance and shame, in the continuity of which the current government, catholic and the 
evangelical churches play equal parts, ensure that adequate sexual education is not forthcoming in 
schools and communities. 
The fatal combination of the culture of machismo and religious intolerance, particularly in the 
area of contraception, ensures that the rate of increase in sexually transmitted diseases is among 
the highest in Central America; the rate of infection from HIV/AIDS, for instance, has doubled in 
the years 1993-99, with men comprising 76% of the cases and women 24%33,87% of which 
infections have taken place as a result of sexual relations. Government neglect of the public 
health service weighs disproportionately on women in terms of sexual health, too; the rate of 
infant/mother mortality is also the highest in Central America, for instance, and of maternal 
deaths from causes related to giving birth, 72.5% occur in rural areas where the disappearance of 
health services and clinics in many areas amounts to a virtual abandonment of rural Nicaragua. 
As a result of cultural restrictions on contraception and sexual education, only 11% of women 
under 19 use any kind of contraception, 10% of all women have had a child by the age of 15 and 
there are practiced between 27,000 and 36,000 abortions a year34. The same cultural cognitive 
model which has pressured women in Central America into early marriage and childbirth for 
hundreds of years has really changed very little in modern Nicaragua except for a minority in the 
more affluent classes; what has changed dramatically is the participation of women in the real 
and informal economies, as a consequence of which archaic attitudes to gender do increasing, 
lasting damage to the socio-economy of Nicaragua. 
33 Equipo Nizkor Op. Cit. 
Equipo Nizkor, Op. Cit. 
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Throughout Latin America since the 1970s there has been an increased female participation in the 
economy, in all jobs and at most levels, but especially in the lowest levels and worst paid jobs. 
The increased feminization of the labour force has of itself created new socio-political processes; 
women in Latin America have been recruited (especially into the agricultural sector) in huge 
numbers, and at the same time temporary contracts and piecework have become increasingly the 
norm for male workers. The drive to push down costs and dispense with expensive contractual 
stability meant that women, who worked for less and are less likely to be represented by male- 
oriented unions are ideal. In Colombia, for instance, by the mid 1990s, 70% of the labour force 
involved in flowers for export and 40% of the coffee harvesters were women (Kay Op. Cit. Pp. 26- 
27). A development from this, however, has been an increase in the number of campesin@ 
organizations dealing specifically with women, such as CEFEMINA in Costa Rica, and a gradual 
increase in the number of women involved in new peasant political organizations. 
According to the organization INPYME women constitute 37% of the Economically Active 
Population (EAP) of Nicaragua (INPYME 2001b), a figure that vastly understates the role that 
women play in holding the fragmented and desperately poor economy together; studies have 
suggested, for instance, that up to 66% of female activities are not captured by the System of 
National Accounts (UNDP 1995 Op. Cit. ). All of the following estimates, therefore, should be 
read with this in mind. The EAP in Nicaragua is divided roughly between urban and rural areas as 
47% and 36% respectively, although the balance is shifting rapidly (4% per annum at least) in 
favour of the urban areas; women compose 43% of the urban workforce and 24% of the rural35. It 
may well be that women as a component of the EAP in urban areas are expanding more rapidly 
then men, for a number of reasons such as the preference for female workers in the Zona Franca 
in Managua, for instance, where 80% of the workforce is female, and because of the amounts of 
men migrating out of the country to find work; accounts vary as to whether more men than 
women are migrating, however. Underemployment is believed to be affecting about 37.7 % of 
35 INPYME, Op. Cit. 
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rural women as opposed to 50% of rural men, and overall, of every 100 women who work 75 do 
so in the informal sector. 
The civil war of the 1980s in Nicaragua contributed greatly to the increased participation of 
women in the economy; female labour increased dramatically in the workforce from, for instance, 
25 to 41% in coffee production, and from 30 to 56% in cotton, between 1980 and 1985 (Faune 
1995). Despite the cessation of open war in 1990, and despite the patriarchal views and policies 
of government since, immigration (both to the cities and abroad) and the diminution of public 
sector employment have served to maintain levels of women in the labour force, but have 
especially increased their numbers in the informal sector. Some calculations of value added as a 
component of GDP indicate that about 35.64% is produced by women and 64.36% by men. In the 
agro-fishery sector, 75% of the aggregated value is produced by men, the rest by women, 
however the figures for minifundia in particular and the rural market for produce are sufficiently 
vague that a considerable amount of produce doesn't find its' way into the official figures. There 
are also the not-inconsiderable figures appending to the `economia de patio', which roughly 
translates as household livestock produce, pigs, hens, etc., in which women are estimated to 
produce some 75% of aggregate value. 
In common with the rest of Latin America, in the reproductive/social economy of Nicaragua, it 
has been estimated that 85% of the labour accomplished is by women, whereas in the productive 
sphere, the proportion of time invested is 47% by women and 53% by men; some studies of Latin 
American households have suggested, however, that far from being any help at all in terms of 
domestic labour, the presence of a male partner actually adds up to 8 hours a week to the 
domestic chores (Andersen 1991). The combined figures for domestic work, reproductive labour 
and the percentages for the EAP and the informal sector are all the more remarkable when it is 
considered that most women in Nicaragua over the age of 7-8 double up in two of these sectors 
(reproductive and domestic), and at least 80% in three, either in full-time labour or the informal 
sector. Notwithstanding the above, average earnings for women are scarcely 40% of male 
earnings (UNDP 2000b Op. Cit. ). 
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The culture of work itself is a formidable creator of gender divisions, which permeate sub- or 
under-employment as well; a survey of three Nicaraguan cities between 1992 and 1993 showed 
the curious fact that at the same time access to full-time employment was being reduced (from 
49% to 44% for men and 37% to 35% for women), sub-employment for men decreased at the 
same time, from 55% to 53%, whereas for women it increased from 64% to 67% (Vilchez 1994). 
Women manage 54% of Nicaraguan microbusinesses (businesses employing between 1 and 5 
people), but in perhaps the most glaring example of gendered access to employment, of the 
184,000 women who were independently employed in 1998, not a single one appeared in charge 
of larger-sized businesses (INPYME, Op. Cit. ). 
Evidence also suggests that men refused to take jobs that they considered denigrating, or not 
work for `real men'; Pressure of domestic responsibilities makes such a take-it-or-leave-it attitude 
a luxury which women are simply unable to afford. There is evidence, mainly anecdotal, to 
suggest that cultural divisions of labour, and more particularly men's restrictions on women's 
economic and social space, are both more widespread and more rigid in the rural areas (SIMAS 
1994). Small wonder, then, that between 10 and 28% of family income for families below the 
poverty line in Nicaragua is being earned by children. For poorer Nicaraguan households, 
children may contribute as much as a fifth of household income (Faune Op. Cit). 
In terms of politics, women after the 1996 elections constituted no more than 10 alcaldesas and 
23 vicealcaldesas; for the municipal elections of 2000 the Conservative party was in the lead in 
terms of female representation, with 14.7% of their candidates being female. At the bottom of the 
league, ironically in view of its egalitarian pretensions, was the FSLN, with only 8.45% and 
11.97% respectively of female candidates for alcaldesa and vicealcaldesa (Rocha and Martinez 
2000). As of 1999,10% of diputados in the national assembly were women, a decrease from the 
18.5% of the previous government. There were two female ministers by the same date, and three 
vice-ministers, although women made up the majority of the local judicial powers, being 60% of 
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the local and district judges, although only 25% of the Supreme Court magistrates and Appeals 
Tribunal magistrates (Equipo Nizkor, Op. Cit. ). Overall, the prevailing attitude in Nicaraguan 
politics amongst men of whatever political stripe (and especially in rural areas) is that women 
involved in politics are simply ciphers for doing what their husband tells them. 
4.3.3 - The Agricultural And Environmental Background 
"The FAO's analysis of the state of agriculture and food in Asia in the mid-20th century sounds 
like a description of Nicaragua's problems as it enters the 21st century. Productivity is below the 
average for underdeveloped countries; land use is extensive rather than intensive; a good part of 
the rural population is engaged in producing insufficient amounts of food, the majority of then 
subsistence farmers who consume almost everything they produce. We are fifty years behind, but 
in a distinct milieu that is unfavorable to agriculture. At the start of the 21st century, we are just 
emerging from the 19th. 11 
Jose Luis Rocha, `Agriculture to the Emergency Ward: Intensive Care Required', Nicaragua - 
Close-up, Envio August 2001, UCA/Nitlapan, Managua. 
Central to an understanding of the environment in which the Nicaraguan agro-fishery sector of 
the economy works, is the fact that Nicaragua qualifies as a country `in permanent emergency' 
(Rocha and Cristoplos 1999). Between 1972 and 1996 alone there have been 11 disasters that had 
a serious affect on socio-economic development, including one earthquake (1972), torrential rains 
(1982), two hurricanes (Juana 1988 and Cesar 1996), two volcanic eruptions (Cerro Negro 1992 
and 1995), one tidal wave (1992) and two tropical storms (Brett 1993 and Gert 1993). 
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The massively destructive effects of the last hurricane, Mitch, in 1998 are to a large extent still 
un-repaired and many thousands of the (predominantly rural) damnificados whose livelihoods 
were destroyed remain among the indigent poor; large quantities of the aid promised by, inter 
alia, the European Union have still to be supplied (unsurprisingly, given the average 4 year delay 
between approval of aid and its' delivery by the EU). This series of disasters, between 1972 and 
1996, have affected directly or indirectly 3,201,734 people, or about 77% of the entire current 
population. The destructive effects of the environment and the impoverishment of the rural 
economy due to cheap imports and declining prices are primary reasons why Nicaragua has the 
highest rate of urban migration in Latin America, which is set to increase over the next twenty 
years (Parrilli 1999). 
In the face of overwhelming pressure towards concentration and monopoly, agrarian reforms 
throughout Latin America since WWII were fitful and of variable success; at their height, Cuba 
aside they affected barely 15% of the total of potentially reformable land area, and only 22% of 
the possible beneficiaries (CEPAL 1985 p. 120). Rollback of reform in most countries began 
virtually as soon as the formalities had been completed, from the parceleros of Chile who began 
to sell their land as soon as they were given it, or signed their rights away because they were 
illiterate and had no idea of what they were signing (by 1988 32% had sold their rights (Ziche and 
Rojas 1991), to the repealing of Article 27 of Mexico's constitution in 1991 opening the eijidos to 
external ownership (Kay 1995 p. 22). Ironically, the most important effect of agrarian reform may 
well have been the break-up of the large estates which obstructed the path to liberalization and 
foreign ownership, thereby speeding up a process more damaging to the peasantry than mere lack 
of access to land. In the post-1990 era the land reform in Nicaragua begun by the revolutionary 
government of 1979-90 has undergone a similar process of contraction, although the original 
redistribution and the process of breaking up co-operatives has ensured that in Nicaragua peasant 
smallholders remain a significant component of the agricultural sector, including the export 
sector. 
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In Nicaragua, up until 1979 and under the tenancy system that prevailed before the revolution, 
4% of the families owned 52.4% of the land, whereas 47.6% of the rest of the land remained in 
the hands of the other 96% of the population. 22% of the fincas comprised 85% of the total area 
(El Observador Economico Op. Cit. ). Following the Revolution of 1979, by 1984 37.2% of the 
finca area passed into the reformed sector, whilst about 62.8% remained in the private sector; the 
FSLN 
. redistributed between 2.5 million (Equipo Nitlapan-envio 
Op. Cit. ) and 4 million 
manzanas, depending on the source36. Latifundias diminished from 52.4% of the total area before 
the revolution to 24% in 1984. This process continued under the Chamorro government, but in a 
far more diverse pattern; about 1 million manzanas changed hands, some 12% of the finca area, 
added to which another 300,000 manzanas were simply occupied by families, a process which 
continues. There remain in the hands of small producers, according to some estimates, up to 
700,000 manzanas of land that requires legalization 37; the area controlled by small and medium 
producers. in the private sector grew from 45.1% of the total area to 48%, during 1996-1998. The 
Chamorro government delivered 34,000 new titles between 1993 and 1997, about 8,500 per year, 
contrasted with the 3,000 per year of the current government; it is estimated, however, that 60% 
of properties in Nicaragua lack proper documentation (World Bank 2001). By 1999, however, 
estimates have suggested that up to 30% of lands redistributed by the Agrarian Reform had been 
taken back from or sold by their campesino proprietors. 
Currently, the rural population of Nicaragua is estimated to be about 230,000 rural families, of 
which 100,000 count as extremely poor (Montano 1999). This may comprise a total of 1,874,000 
people, divided roughly by 937,500 men, 936,500 women, or very nearly 50150 (Martinez 1998). 
Of these, given the legal problems of ownership, many are currently in possession of land for 
which they have no title, and will be forced to sell at speculative prices. Many with titles will sell 
because of the lack of access to credit and services. The legacy of the agrarian reform undertaken 
in the period 1980-90, however, meant that as of 2000 Nicaragua still had potentially the most 
equitable land-tenancy structure in Latin America38 (again, apart from the special case of Cuba). 
36 According to the Office of Rural Titling (Oficina de Titulacion Rural 1999) 3.3 million manzanas. 37 Some estimates say that by 1999, however, up to 30% of lands divided up by the Agrarian Reform had been taken 
back from their campesino proprietors. 38 El Observador Economico, "20 Anos Despues: Que Paso Con la Reforma Agraria? ", no. 89, Junio de 1999. 
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The agricultural frontier, however, has now arrived at some 70% of the national territory, driven 
by the concentration of land under the Somoza dictatorship and then exacerbated by the 
resettlement programmes following the war, where many ex-Contras and ESLN were simply left 
on properties with no technical training or finance, and survive by selling the trees on their land 
for a pittance; the fertility of the soil declines rapidly under cultivation, as well, so that whereas a 
manzana of virgin land may produce 20-25 quintals of maize in the first year of cultivation, by 
the third year the yield will have dropped to 7-10 quintals. 
The uncertainty of the reform process was intensified by the accession to power of the PLC in the 
elections of 1996; president Alemän came to power insisting that the whole process of agrarian 
reform be revised back to 1979. He denied the validity of leyes 85,86 and 88 under which the 
original agrarian reform had been authorised, which in 1990 legalised some 70% of the properties 
redistributed since 1979, as well as accords of 1991 and 1992 privatizing 344 of the 351 state 
enterprises under the Sandinistas. The FSLN insisted that if the revision was to be historical, it 
must include the Somoza era as well, given that the Somoza family and their supporters had 
simply stolen much of the land in their possession; in the meantime, as much as 28% of the rural 
population of Nicaragua lives in a state of uncertainty because of this. Meanwhile, seizure of land 
from poor beneficiaries of two government attempts to legalize their situation continues, ordered 
by justices in increasingly corrupt courts, who will also judge the validity of the Somoza family's 
claims on 324 properties in Nicaragua, or some 352,000 manzanas. Corruption exists not only in 
the courts, however - in the Property Registry, titles are being falsified, altered and stolen within 
the registry itself (Equipo Nitlapan-envio Op. Cit. ). 
Following on the heels of the uncertainty of tenure and economic desperation that is causing so 
many smallholders to sell their land, however, are a number of large corporations that have been 
buying up land in large quantities, the largest of which until recently was the 
CONAGRA/AGRESAMI conglomerate of the Centeno Roque brothers, who brought about the 
collapse of INTERBANK in Nicaragua in 2000. Not only was the FSLN-linked 
CONAGRA/AGRESAMI conglomerate responsible for some 40% of Nicaraguan coffee 
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production by the time of the collapse of INTERBANK, but it had also accumulated some 10,000 
manzanas of prime coffee lands in its hands by the simple policy of lending to small producers 
who had no other source of finance, letting them go broke or bankrupting them and then taking 
their lands at a fraction of their value. A lot of this land was from the Area Propiedad de los 
Trabajadores set up by the FSLN during the revolution, some of whose directors have been 
imprisoned by AGRESAMI. 
The FSLN are not the only ones to profit, however. Lurking in the background has been the 
GENINSA SA, owned 51 % by the Alemän family. Not only might it have been deemed a conflict 
of interest for the then-president to have a financial advantage in the lack of state agricultural 
support and credit which allowed his family company to buy land at ridiculously low prices, and 
to know before-hand which lands were going to receive state developments such as roads, water 
and electricity, but it was also revealed that the ex-president was making dubious if not illegal use 
of state assets to pursue his purchases of land. The director of the state Rural Development Fund 
(IDR), Edward Maena, was shown recently to have been acting as administrator of these Alemän 
properties, and the Subprocurador de Justicia was arranging the purchases (Proceso 1999). 
In terms of productivity, the vast mass of rural production, whether it be coffee plantations, sugar, 
cattle fracas, fruit, rice or basic grains, takes place in the Pacific region to the west of the central 
highland areas of Nicaragua, running from the north-west east of the Lago de Xolotlan, to the 
south-east of the Lago de Cocibolca. The most profitable of these crops has historically been 
coffee, but for reasons given below the profitability of coffee for small and medium producers is 
at the moment in sharp decline. There is no one agricultural crisis, if not separate recurrent crises 
for each crop-type, sometimes due to the extremes of the environment, but above all by the 
continuing, long-term decline in relative prices which render most crops grown by small 
producers unable to compete with cheap imports; a current exception to this is sugar, where 
prices have risen steadily over the last decade as demand abroad (particularly in China) has 
grown rapidly. Even with sugar, however, the protection given by the government to the price 
and the currently (2001) high price internationally can be considered to be at most temporarily 
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favourable conditions, and the value-added per quintal of sugar is minimal. Rural markets for 
granos basicos (basic grains) and other consumables in Nicaragua conform to a classic Central 
American type, not catered for by neo-liberal market prescriptions; highly imperfect, with high 
transaction costs outside the community, asymmetrical information, lack of collateral and highly 
covariant risks (de Janvry, Sadoulet and Thorbecke 1993). 
Returns on rural productivity (barring, currently, sugar) have not grown at all in the last 30 years. 
In 1999 Nicaragua produced double the coffee that it did three years before, and coffee and sugar 
cane production were the highest they had ever been, but received less money for the increased 
quantity, the price of coffee being half what it was three years ago (Equipo Nitlapan-envio 1999). 
Products such as Rice, Maize, Sorghum and Beans have grown annually by only 2% in the last 45 
years (Nitlapan-CRIES 1998). Nicaragua imports more than it exports across a range of 
agricultural produce of which it was formerly a net exporter, from fruit and rice to cooking oil 
(Rocha, 2001b Op. Cit. ). Campesin@s-finquer@s, beneficiaries of the Agrarian reform and semi- 
campesin@s comprise some 70% of the rural population, and despite the low productivity figures 
generate net dividends from external credit of $4.69 per $1 spent, whereas agribusiness generates 
only 14 centavos (Nitlapan-CRIES ibid. ). Nicaragua, despite these low and declining productivity 
figures, is still dependent on the agricultural sector for some 27% of GDP, the highest in Central 
America. 
In 1993 the price of coffee was as low as $45, a drastic decline in price since the heights of 1977 
when it reached $326 per quintal. The price of coffee is beset by violent fluctuations, and 
although the highest price reached in 1998 was $130, throughout 1999-2000 it hovered at around 
$85, declining through the first few months of 2001. This is set in perspective by the overall basic 
cost of producing a quintal of coffee in Nicaragua, which was $70-75 in 2001, and in global 
terms a relatively high cost. It is furthermore estimated that of the average $15 gap between 
current price and cost, some $10 is spent on debt repayment. All the countries in the region that 
are recovering from their various wars are rapidly increasing coffee production as a direct means 
to hard currency, and in addition in the far east countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam (with 
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lower labour costs even than Nicaragua) coming on-line as producers of coffee, further over- 
supplying an already declining market. Brazil alone, in whose economy coffee now plays a part 
of minimal importance, increased its production over the ten years from 1990-2000 by 26 million 
sacks to 45 million. Orlando Nunez, director of CIPRES (an important centre for the teaching and 
the development of peasant agriculture in Managua), estimates that continuing low prices for 
basic grains have done more long-term damage to the small farm economy than Hurricane Mitch. 
Underlying the above-mentioned economic and socio-political factors that are continuing to 
diminish the prospects for smallholder agriculture in Nicaragua, however, are facts that have been 
central to the weakness of that sector for decades. Lessons from the past which need to be learnt, so 
far as the peasantry of all of Latin America are concerned, contain essential prerequisites that 
contradict the interests of the ruling elites; that export monoculture for them is too risky, and simply 
does not provide a stable path to growth, that the internal regional markets are too weak and 
undercapitalized for Latin American countries to turn inward to, and that traditional agricultural 
export production is too risky, and does not generate sufficient levels of growth or employment 
(Lindenberg, 1988). Strategies to address this problem have included agricultural export 
diversification, mixtures of diversifications in products, markets and commodities, and mixed 
approaches to internal/export markets, and there is certainly theoretical value in these approaches as 
a means to alleviating rural poverty. In the meantime, the survival of the poorest rural households in 
Nicaragua relies increasingly on a multiplicity of income generating activities, at least intermittently 
or cyclically linked to urban zones, and on the strength of the individual extended family network. 
The Atlantic Coast, culturally and economically marginalized by the more homogenous latino 
culture of the Pacific coast, exhibits some unique problems of its' own as well as sharing those of 
the Pacific rural areas. In the east of Nicaragua are the still-vast forested tracts and scarcely- 
populated lands of the RAAN and RAAS, where many communities lack even the most basic 
infrastructure such as electricity, water, sewage, and most particularly communication and 
transport. These areas not only contain large areas of underused agricultural land, they also 
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contain huge and valuable timber resources, an increasing focus of local discontent, especially 
after INAFOR, the national forestry institute, admitted in 2000 that there were in existence more 
than 4,000 falsified permits for the sale and transport of timber, generously provided by 
employees of the institute at an average price of C$6,000 each (Garcia 2000). 
Companies such as PRADA S. A. and MADENSA, for instance, illegally extract large quantities 
of valuable timber from indigenous lands, untouched by environmental regulation, which is then 
shipped out from Puerto Cabezas (CCER Op. Cit. ). This continuing environmental depredation, 
brought about with the willing co-operation of the state (vide the case of the indigenous peoples 
of Awas Tingui below) speaks directly to the third pillar of the Nicaraguan IPRS, the protection 
of vulnerable communities, as well as the theme of increasing environmental protection. The hard 
reality of the Nicaraguan political economy is that the demand for hard currency from exports to 
finance the state, plus the need to maintain the flow of rewards in the clientelistic political 
environment. means that protection for the environment and paper plans such as the agreed 
Central American Bio-corridor are more often than not mere rhetoric. Land to the north of the 
RAAN, on the coast and further inland, is being bought to exploit of the offshore oil reserves in 
Nicaraguan waters in the future; additionally, the advent of either the dry or wet transcontinental 
canal project, an intended rival to the Panama Canal, is making hitherto unwanted areas of the 
RAAS and RAAN into highly desirable property. Ex-President Aleman and his family property 
company, GENINSA, were also busy buying land around San Carlos and other ripuarine 
settlements to take advantage of whatever canal project evolves. 
Relations between the indigenous populations of the Atlantic coast and the government have 
deteriorated since 1990 as promises of indigenous autonomy under the RAAS and RAAN are 
continually subordinated to the centralizing and authoritarian tendencies of the PLC/FSLN 
duopoly. This was reinforced in 2000 by the refusal of the CSE to allow the YATAMA 
organization (heavily supported by and representing the indigenous community since the 
revolution) to take part in the municipal elections of 5/11/2000, thereby occasioning near-riots 
and the abstention of some 80% of the RAAN population in protest. It was important for the CSE 
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to exclude YATAMA so that the PLC or FSLN could retain control of the northern `autonomous' 
region and any future coastal developments. Lands claimed as communal lands under various 
treaties guaranteeing `autonomy' have been attacked on two fronts, either by the state contesting 
the extent of the lands, original settlement of peoples and tribal homogeneity through the courts, 
and the suborning of councils of elders or token tribal representatives to sign away or sell rights 
to lands on behalf of their people. In terms of investment in infrastructure and developing 
economically viable employment, the peoples of the Atlantic departments consider the region to 
have been all but abandoned, except for exploitative and extractive export-based activities such as 
logging and mining from which they derive little or no profit. 
Typical of the relationship between the indigenous peoples of Nicaragua and the state has been 
the case of the indigenous Mayagna peoples of Awas Tingui in the RAAN. The dispute between 
the government and the Mayagna began in 1995 when Violeta Chamorro's administration granted 
a logging concession of some 130,000 acres of prime forest to SOLCARSA (Sol De Caribe), a 
timber company backed by Korean capital (Nicaragua Network Hotline 2001). The Mayagna 
community claimed the forested land as part of their communal territory, and, with the assistance 
of the Legal Aid Center for Indigenous Peoples (CALPI), submitted no less than four injunctions 
to block the concession in the Nicaraguan courts. Each injunction was rejected, on grounds 
including casting doubt on the exact area claimed by the Mayagna, as well as whether or not they 
actually constituted a distinct people since there were groups of individuals of mixed-race origin 
amongst them. On 17/09/01 the Inter-American Human Rights Court ruled in favour of the 
Mayagna against the Nicaraguan government. The case is representative as much for the 
concessions to Asian investors as it is for the denial of indigenous communal rights where 
commercial exploitation has been involved. A similar example is the sale of various small islands 
(the Pearl Quays) on the Atlantic coast for tourist development, where the islands have been 
identified as being the communal land of Sumo or Rama peoples, and therefore inalienable under 
the various autonomy agreements before and after the elections of 1990. 
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The situation as regards the Mayagna is by no means an isolated example, however. In 1999 the 
World Bank and the Nicaraguan state were involved in a consultation process with the Council of 
Ancients representing 386 communities of the indigenous peoples of Nicaragua over legalising 
the demarcation of communal lands, which broke down. The Council warned that it would 
declare the World Bank `non grata', because of what it called the open politicizing in favour of 
the government of Arnoldo Aleman, which even as the process had gone on was selling vast 
tracts of communal lands to private owners, as well as dividing up disposal of these lands 
amongst its' own party members (Equipo Nitlapan-envio 1999 Op. Cit. ). 
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4.4 - Conclusion 
The chapter began by outlining the four pillars described in the Nicaraguan Interim Poverty 
Relief Strategy as being vital to stable and equitable economic development. The first of these 
was broad-based economic growth focused on employment and the rural sector, the second better 
investment in human capital of the poor, the third better protection of vulnerable populations and 
the fourth strengthening of institutions and good governance. The analysis presented in thes 
chapter of each of these four pillars has argued that, to a greater or lesser extent, what is in fact 
happening in Nicaragua is the reverse of these processes, and that the continued facade of 
conditionality serves to obscure this forbidden body of knowledge; it is in the context of this 
praxis that the growing Nicaraguan microfmance sector is located. 
Currently, the indeterminable amount of economic growth occurring in Nicaragua is not broad- 
based, being derived almost entirely from the financial, construction and agrofishery sectors, and 
the benefits of that growth are restricted to a small minority of the population involved in short- 
term, capital intensive pursuits, rather than being focused on employment. In terms of the rural 
sector, the research efforts being made to set up and maintain sustainable rural livelihood 
programmes is greatly outweighed by the damage done through the decline in prices for export 
goods such as coffee and a series of natural disasters such as the 2001 drought. The agrofishery 
sector as a whole is characterized mainly by the indebtedness of small farmers, fishermen and 
indeed virtually the whole of the campesino sector and their consequent lack of credit, leading to 
a rapid concentration of the best agrofishery capital and assets in the hands of banking and 
financial elites. 
As for investment in the poor, and the protection of vulnerable communities, the consensus of 
non-government opinion is that the quantity of households living in officially-defined poverty has 
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increased since even 1996, and the more optimistic figures being offered by the Nicaraguan state 
and consequently the IFIs can at best be charitably described as inaccurate. Investment in the 
future labour force has been declining; illiteracy, having declined greatly during the 1980s began 
to climb again from 1990, and as of 1999 30% of Nicaraguans were illiterate (Equipo Nizkor, 
Op. Cit. ). About 1 million children a year remain outside the educational system, and in the urban 
centers only 30% of children complete their primary education; in the rural areas the figure is 
down to 10%, and in combination with the fact that secondary education covers only 34% of the 
entire population, the result is a massive process of de-skilling, a direct result itself of the poverty 
and unemployment that it fuels. 
It is perhaps in the areas of institution-building and governance that progress is the worst. There 
is always the tendency for external critics of countries such as Nicaragua to comment on the 
socio-economy from the viewpoint of their own countries, and thus impart unfair criticism. In the 
case of Nicaragua, however, the damage done by an unholy combination of over-eagerness to 
comply with US commercial and political concerns, the unyielding nostrums of the IFIs and a 
socio-historical predisposition towards clientelistic (not to say dictatorial) state and party 
structures, has led to the situation where native Nicaraguan perceptions of the corruption in their 
own country is worsening year on year (Transparency International, Op. Cit. ), even when set 
against the record of the Somoza dictatorship and the subsequent years of civil war. The 
IMF/IDA joint staff assessment has been complimentary about Nicaraguan efforts towards 
institution building and governance, and yet only very recently has any serious attention has been 
paid to outstanding allegations of corruption. 
Despite the aid-induced corruption that has been taking place in Nicaragua, when the IMF 
decided to suspend aid to the Nicaraguan government, the reasons given in the IMF "Article IV" 
consultation Public Information Notice issued on 2/10/01 stated that: "Because of recent 
slippages in the implementation of macroeconomic and structural policies, the establishment of a 
satisfactory track record is needed before the resumption of Fund assistance under the 
PRGF....... In addition to public expenditures restraint... implementation of a tight monetary 
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policy would be crucial... proceed vigorously with public sector reforms... deepen trade 
liberalization". In other words, the deregulation and destruction of the state sector in combination 
with the unregulated privatization that have fuelled the increase in corruption, has not been going 
fast enough. In the final analysis: "Nicaragua has a progressive anti-corruption plan, but the 
government failed at every juncture to put it into action. " (Gutierrez Op. Cit. p. 160). For the IFIs, 
however, this is simply more evidence of the damaging effects of the state sector, which must be 
disposed of as quickly as possible, in order that `healthy', private sector-led growth can begin to 
revive the country. 
Thus, at a time when the World Food Programme (WFP) has described Nicaragua as being in a 
situation where starvation threatened an estimated 32,600 families (MacCuish 2001) because of 
three separate factors, the coffee crisis in the north-central area, the drought in the north and 
northwest and, perversely, flooding due to non-stop rains on the Caribbean side of the country, 
Nicaragua has now had its aid suspended for not cutting back enough on public spending. It is, of 
course, dubious under the circumstances exactly how much public spending would reach the 
actual victims of the drought, but to insist on cutting back public expenditure when some 10,000 
campesino families have had to abandon the farms that no longer produce coffee or plant basic 
grains for the workers, would seem to be perverse in the extreme. The WFP also calculates that 
another 22,000 families are starving because of the drought in 47 municipalities of the dry zones 
in the western, northern and central regions of the country. Surveys show that between half and 
all of the first-cycle planting of maize and beans has been lost together with other crops in these 
municipalities. 
There is very little that microfmance programmes in Nicaragua have been able to (or could be 
expected to) do in a rural setting to offset this level of incidence of natural and institutional 
disasters. There is some evidence, however, that amongst the less poor campesin@s the access to 
savings acounts through co-operative institutions, and the type of repayment insurance that a few 
microfmance institutions insist on, act as a palliative and help the client to get back to their feet 
again. In Nicaragua, however, the majority of microfinance programmes operate in a focussed 
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way and, increasingly, in a predominantly urban setting, selecting their clients with some care (as 
we shall see in the next chapter). Thus, although as Kidder says: "The Microstart consultancy 
report describes Nicaragua as an exceptional case in the Americas for `MFI proliferation' and 
funding for MFIs, which they estimate `has accumulated to US$100m' for a country of 4.5 
million people (Kidder 1999a)", there is a considerable disparity between urban and rural 
coverage and capacity, and an even greater disparity between Pacific and Atlantic coasts. 
The EU and UNDP estimate that as of June 1999 there were about 300 institutions in Nicaragua 
operating credit funds, of which 25 were co-operative associations, 3 banks, and about 65 NGOs 
with active micro-credit components (Kidder ibid. ). At that time, ASOMIF comprised 16 main 
Microfinance institutions and an association of cooperatives (CARUNA), which reported a 
combined loan portfolio of about US$35 million and approximately 75,000 clients. The number 
of organizations starting microfmance operations increases every year, and as the pressure from 
external donors for self-sustainability grows, so does the pressure for these organizations to divert 
their efforts towards urban zones, and `cherry-pick' their clients. 
As an indication of growth in the sector, a selection of 19 Nicaraguan microfmance institutions 
by Microstart (including the five largest in the country) indicated that in one year only, October 
1997 and October 1998, the sample total of outstanding loans grew to US $20 million outstanding 
in loans, which represented a 37% growth over 1997 figure of US $ 14.6 million (von 
Stauffenberg, Damian, Farrington, Todd and Tortorelli, Luca 1998). The Microstart team noted 
that Nicaragua had the highest concentration of microfinance organizations anywhere in the 
Americas; prior to 1990, however, unlike other Central American countries Nicaraguan 
microfmance (in the new interpretation of the phrase) and micro-credit lending did not exist. The 
current influx of external donor funding is effectively a post-1992 phenomenon, although co- 
operatives were a central plank of the revolutionary agrarian reform, and continue to constitute an 
important segment of the microfinance sector - many of them are beset with financial problems, 
however, as well as the political legacy of the revolutionary regime. 
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The microfmance sector in Nicaragua, although lagging behind many in the regions in terms of 
coverage and rate of growth, still represents one of the faster growing sectors of the economy at a 
time when the government of Nicaragua is fording it increasingly difficult to persuade any but a 
few donors (South Korea, Japan and Taiwan) to disburse more money, and when the IMF has 
suspended aid under its latest adjustment agreement with Nicaragua. The sector appears to be 
awash with donor money on concessionary terms, as the following chapter explores in more 
detail, and is maneuvering to implement a formal structure and regulatory mechanism in the face 
of mistrust by the government and formal banking sector. At the same time, in the main private 
banks have neither the expertise nor the desire to orientate themselves towards the poorest of 
Nicaragua, with some exceptions where the same concessionary funds and technical training 
programmes are available. The next chapter explores this formal sector/microfmance sector 
relationship in more detail, focusing downwards once again on the composition and structure of 
both sectors, their relationship to each other and the political environment in which they operate. 
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Chapter Five: The Structure of Microfinance and 
The Formal Banking Sector in Nicaragua 
"In theory, the paradigm is clear. Anyone with enough money can buy. Anyone who can pay for 
technical assistance can have it and anyone who can pay the high interest rates and put up 
collateral can get a loan. In practice, long-term credit has disappeared. Access to commercial 
bank loans has become a privilege of those who meet the conventional mortgage requirements. " 
Jose Luis Rocha, `Agriculture to the Emergency Ward: Intensive Care Required', Nicaragua- 
Close-Up, Envio August 2001, UCA/Nitlapan, Managua. 
"Commercial microfinance is not appropriate, however, for extremely poor people who are badly 
malnourished, ill, and without skills or employment opportunities. Starving borrowers will use 
their loans to buy food for themselves or their children. Such people do not need debt. They need 
food, shelter, medicines, skill training, and employment - for which government and donor 
subsidies and charitable contributions are appropriate. For these people, microfinance is the 
next step - after they are able to work. " 
Marguerite S. Robinson, 2001, "The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor 
(World Bank, Washington), p. 8. 
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"Compared with their homologues in other countries, the NGOs in Nicaragua are characterised 
by their sparse development. Whilst during five years the Bolivian institution `Caja de los Andes' 
has increased its loan placings up to a total of 11,000 microcredits with an average value of 
US$400, the greater part of the Nicaraguan NGOs that have existed for the same amount of time 
or even longer, have yet to exceed a thousand borrowers. " 
Jose Luis Rocha, `Micro-credito, ONGs y regulacion financiera en Nicaragua', Encuentro, Ano 
XXX N6.45 1998, UCA, Managua, p. 34, Author's translation. 
5.1 - Introduction 
The first section of this chapter will deal with the formal banking sector in Nicaragua to explain 
how the weakness of the sector and its' structure constitutes a bottleneck in the economy, 
effectively pooling up liquidity for short-term gain. The section will explain how the instability of 
the Nicaraguan economy and the policies of the BCN act in two ways to exacerbate this problem, 
the first of which is by the maintenance of high interest rates to attract external investment, also a 
result of IMF-imposed conditionality concerning inflation. The second part of the problem is that 
this inflation of interest rates further increases the profitability for banks themselves to restrict 
credit to a favoured few clients, who provide financial and political support to the governing 
boards of the banks. The institutionalization of instability within banks exacerbates this process, 
in that maintaining the environment of institutional instability pressures savers to keep their 
assets in short-term high interest dollar-denominated accounts in the banks, rather than looking 
for ways to invest them internally. 
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The second section of this chapter will explain how the restrictive and short-term outlook of the 
banking sector not only exacerbates the weakness of the agricultural sector in particular, but 
serves the interests of a rich elite who continue to consume sequestrated land assets and increase 
their control over vital export sectors such as rice and coffee. Monopoly profits accruing to the 
same elite, made from short-term, high-interest investment, additionally make the maintenance of 
the banking sector status quo an attractive proposition. So do the loans from banks to board 
members and their friends and family that are frequently little more than gifts, made available by 
the opaque accountancy of the banking sector, and by the chronic clientelism discussed in the last 
chapter that ensures a regular intermixing of employment of state functionaries, executive 
directors of banks, and legislators. 
The third section will constitute a more detailed description of the microfmance sector in 
Nicaragua, and where it is located in relation to the formal banking sector. The section will 
outline the importance of microfinance in Nicaragua, where estimates suggest that over the last 
decade, depending on how it is measured, as much as 50% of the potential market in Nicaragua 
of clients for microcredits of whatever type may have been served, or 1.12% of the current 
population of about 5.2 million (Christen 2000). The section will explain how despite the growth 
in numbers of both organizations and clients in Nicaragua over the last five years, the micro- 
fmance industry has been operating in an uneasy environment, caused particularly by the 
hoostility of the formal banking sector and its' close links with various powerful economic and 
political groups. 
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5.2 - The Weakness of the Formal Banking Sector In Nicaragua And The Role Of Credit 
Restriction In The Economy 
"A German mission - from IPC - realised on behalf of the 1DB to evaluate its' micro-credit 
programme, identified as an obstacle to the greater participation of small businesses in financial 
services "the variable attitudes of the Superintendent of Banks with respect to the greater 
participation of the target group ". The Superintendent of Banks considers that in the last decade 
the State Bank functioned as "an instrument of the political and social economy, in that the 
private resources captured from the public and the complementary resources from the Central 
Bank were put to credit ends and objectives pre-determined by the state. " 
Jose Luis Rocha, 1998, Op. Cit, p. 37, Author's translation. 
In Nicaragua, banking is the most flourishing sector (Equipo envio 1995) in the middle of a 
general economic crisis crippling and destroying small and medium business. High interest rates 
driven by hard currency requirements and investment needs, extremely short term loans due to 
the instability of capital and investment, and collusive behaviour amongst the closed banking 
cartel, conspire to widen the economic gap between the economically-deprived sectors of the 
populace, and those on the `inside'. There is additionally an aversion to borrowing credit through 
the private banks, driven by the high interest rates and fear of losing everything through 
bankruptcy and seizure of assets (Vuskovic, Cespedes, Parra and Zamora 1996). 
Seizure of assets by banks in Nicaragua and their subsequent re-sale at `guate mojada' (drop of 
water) prices is commonplace, as the lack of credit makes survival for all but the large combines 
increasingly difficult. The practice of seizing assets from small borrowers without due process of 
law or recourse to courts is also allegedly widespread. It should also be remembered that the 
generalised restriction on credit within Nicaragua has taken place in an environment of rapidly 
increased monetarization of the economy. For 20 out of 25 Inter-American Development Bank 
borrowing member countries, the ratio of M2/GDP (the ratio of liquid cash in circulation plus 
money held in banks to GDP per capita) was higher in 1997 than in 1990. For 14 of these 
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countries, the increased depth was 25% higher in 1997 than it had seen 7 years earlier, amongst 
which was Nicaragua (Wenner and Proenza 2000). 
The development of the banking sector in Nicaragua since 1990 has been characterized by 
institutional instability and corruption, high interest rates and a general and dramatic restriction in 
the amount of credit available, particularly after the closure of the state bank BANADES in 1996 
(the closure of which disclosed losses by the bank of $180 million, and after which closure some 
20,000 manzanas of property went missing (Barbarena S. 2001)). The weakness of the banking 
sector has been continually emphasized by the bankruptcy of 11 Nicaraguan banks since 1990, 
among them important providers of credit such as BECA, BANCOSUR, BANADES, 
INTERBANK, Banco del Cafe and BANIC. The juntas directivas (boards of directors) of private 
banks in Nicaragua and their families' and friends' businesses are mutually reinforcing and 
dependent, relying for protection from the law and supervision on their political contacts, 
themselves frequently the recipients of favourable loans and financial services. 
Commercial banks are widely distrusted by Nicaragua's poor, both for their instability and the 
rapidity with which they act against debtors. The banks reciprocate by ensuring the poor have 
restricted access to ordinary or savings accounts through various measures, for instance the 
minimum deposit requirement (as of 2001) for opening an account with the Banco de America 
Central (BAC) of $200. Research into aversion to official credit through the banks indicates a 
range of factors, including the (justifiable) belief that their interest rates are too high, that the 
client had insufficient guarantees, and fear of losing everything through bankruptcy and seizure 
of assets (EU 1996). This last fear is backed up by anecdotal evidence collated by the author 
during the enquiry phase of the fieldwork, indicating that banks and finance organizations are 
liable simply to seize assets from debtors without going through the formality of any kind of legal 
action. 
As an example of the environment of clientelistic favouritism under which the banking system 
works and bankruptcy so frequently occurs, the junta directiva of INTERBANK (closely linked 
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with the cupula of the FSLN) which went broke in August 2000 had allowed one commercial 
group, CONAGRA, to borrow over five times the legal limit for lending to one commercial 
interest, established at 30% of the calculated capital base of the bank. The junta directiva publicly 
stated that they knew nothing about the loans to this one group, and the Superintendencia de 
Bancos intervened, a day or so after the intervention had been announced by the then-President of 
Nicaragua, Arnoldo Aleman, on Radio Corporacion, a government-funded radio station. The 
insistence by the IFIs on a healthy regulatory environment for the banking sector and the repeated 
verbal and written agreements of the Nicaraguan government to comply must be seen in the light 
of this complex intermingling of wholesale involvement by ministers, functionaries and deputies 
in the banking sector, the political affiliations of the banks and their boards of directors, and 
resultant conflicts of interest. 
INTERBANK, founded in the post-1990 era with Sandinista funds and providing loans to groups 
with close Sandinista links, had become part of a political stratagem through which pressure was 
put on the FSLN. The PLC was seeking the electoral inhibition of Pedro Solorzano for the 
position of Alcalde (mayor) of Managua before the municipal elections of November 2000, as 
being an immensely popular candidate who could win; the Procuradoria de Justicia, a PLC 
functionary, could not get to the courts fast enough to start bringing charges against the junta 
directiva of INTERBANK. Whilst the frauds involved in the INTERBANK case continued to 
multiply, the intervention of the bank by the SB (Superintendencia de Bancos) was sufficiently 
serious to endanger the ESAF currently governing Nicaragua and cause further doubts about 
Nicaragua's eligibility to join the HIPC programme. In point of fact, the continual drain on state 
currency reserves, occasioned by the series of bankruptcies, was one of the reasons why the IMF 
declared Nicaragua to be in breach of its' adjustment conditions in October of 2001, leading to a 
suspension of aid. 
With the case of BANIC, the sale of the first 51% of its state-controlled shares occasioned serious 
irregularities. In the lead-up to this semi-privatization from 1997-99, a large number of loans 
were approved by and on behalf of members of the junta directiva to persons who are still (2001) 
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unknown, amounting to as much as C$210 million (Lopez 2000), and the public offering process 
itself was of dubious transparency. The CGR under Contralor Jarquin demanded an audit of the 
process and declared the privatisation process null, a declaration that the Corte Supreme de 
Justicia (by then firmly under government control) voided. The World Bank insisted on an audit 
by independent auditors, which confirmed the serious irregularities, but which the government 
refused to allow to be released, as being under the `banker's seal'. The CGR then suggested that 
this report be made public before the last set of 35,000 shares were sold, it supposedly being a 
pre-requisite of a public offering that the buyers be given full information on the state of health of 
the bank. The government in the form of Esteban Duquestrada, ex-ministro de Hacienda (and 
currently fugitive from charges of corruption somewhere outside Nicaragua, and beneficiary of 
the original `capitalization'), and Noel Ramirez, president of the BCN, refused to release the 
report, in which members of the government were alleged to have been linked to the irregular 
loans. 
In addition to the atmosphere of uncertainty and mistrust that is maintained by the structure and 
control of private banks, a further factor diminishing the roles of the banking sector in the 
economic development of Nicaragua is a generalised restriction of credit. The reluctance to lend 
in'Nicaragua is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in the relative portfolios of the private 
banks and the state banks. After the collapse of BANADES, credit for all activities had been 
sharply curtailed, the 1998 ESAF agreement with the IMF in particular restricting the ability of 
the Banco Central to create credit (Evans 1998). Up to 1999 the 11 significant private banks 
(Nieuwkirk 1998), distributed amongst the ruling families and political parties, were run with a 
distinct disinclination to lend outside the circle of large-scale producers. 
Suggestions that Nicaraguan banks lack resources to widen access to credit are spurious in a 
country awash with aid money on generous terms and excess liquidity (Nieuwkirk 1998). There 
is also research to suggest that private banks practice discrimination against female-headed 
households (Poltz, Larson and Lopez 2000), even in situations where production equations 
suggest that female-headed households had effectively the same revenues as male-headed 
households (but see Chapter 1 concerning household modelling). This would appear to be 
supported by evidence that particularly women may prefer to deal with moneylenders (Fernando 
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1997), suggesting that the costs are lower and that it is easier to deal with local moneylenders. 
Plainly, in a national socio-economy where female-headed households are becoming more 
common, and where their economic role is increasingly important in both rural and urban zones39, 
such a discriminatory lending practice over time will cause increasing damage to the economy. 
As of 1996, as a direct result of the drive to promote private sector credit under IFI conditionality 
(and pressure from the US and USAID) private banks controlled a major share of personal and 
commercial credit (46 percent) and industrial credit (30 percent). Only 15 percent of the total 
private-bank portfolio was concentrated in the agricultural/livestock sector, whereas: "the state 
banks, meanwhile, were lending the equivalent of 15.8 percent of GDP, with 74 percent of the 
portfolio concentrated in the farming sector and only 11 percent financing a combination of 
commercial and personal activities" (Neira 1999). In other words, the drive towards opening up 
private sector finance had been extremely skewed, the private banking sector investing heavily in 
the most profitable sectors, the state taking care of the less profitable, but economically vital, 
agricultural sector. 
By 1996 agricultural and livestock credit was less than half the amount granted in 1991 in real 
terms,, while overall commercial credit was 65% higher (Neira ibid. ). While access to credit for 
agriculture was being rapidly cut off in a heavily agriculturally dependent country, therefore, 
large amounts of credit became available for the consumption of luxury goods and expensive 
imports. This unbalanced structure becomes more obvious when it is realised that 2.9% of bank 
clients in both sectors take up some 64% of all lending, and since the disappearance of 
BANADES between 1996 and 1998, private banks have made up only a fraction of the gap in 
agro-fishery lending and virtually none of the small business lending. The gap is only partially 
being filled by the expansion of NGOs into micro-lending. 
39 The urban and non-agricultural work sectors are overwhelmingly more feminised; 89% of women in the labour 
market in Nicaragua work in non-agricultural jobs, as opposed to women being only 10% of the agricultural 
workforce (INPYMFJINEC/PROMICRO-OIT, 2001 a). 
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The rural banking system acts in a more restrictive manner still, especially since the closure of 
BANADES. The use of NGOs for banking services up to that time, and the availability of `soft' 
loan money on easier terms created friction between the formal banking sector and the NGO 
sector. Non-financial priorities such as the promotion of food security as a national necessity had 
meant that rural groupings such as campesin@/finquer@s had far better access to credit than the 
increasing number of landless, unsalaried poor. Some studies of rural credit markets showed that 
in 1995, before the disappearance of BANADES, as many as 80% of campesin@/finquer@s had 
access to credit, often on `soft' terms through specialised development schemes or NGOs 
(Dauner 1998). 
The rural credit environment, as with the urban, consists of a financial system whose operations 
are protected by the political environment of the state (see Chapter 6 for incidence of access to 
credit in the field survey). This induces a high appreciation of interest rates and diversion of 
public deposits towards the commercial banks (SIMAS 1996). Dauner (1997) identifies five 
sources of credit: firstly commercial banks, state and private, with a minimal presence; secondly 
"banquitos", non-regulated institutions run by ONGs; thirdly international or state development 
projects, offering monetary or goods credit; fourthly commercial moneylenders, offering loans 
connected to the supply of commercial crops, and fifthly individual moneylenders, lending 
without guarantee at interest rates of up to 20% per month, from local markets. Each of these 
sources covers a small part of the total, with the commercial lenders in particular sticking to a 
small, well-defined part of the populace where risk can be avoided as much as possible. 
Finally, a breakdown by sector of rural banking shows the degree of rural segmentation which 
makes the niicrofinance and informal banking sectors so important, even in their relative scarcity. 
Such sources of finance as there are (apart from the MF institutions) are focused on high-return 
activities such as coffee, cattle, etc. These sources are geographically extremely concentrated, and 
the costs are frequently high (Garcia 1998). A study of the amounts each type of organization 
lends (carried out by Nitlapan in 1996, see Table 3) reveals that differentiation of clients between 
loan sources is not just geographic and cultural, but institutional. The table indicates an average 
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size of loan for private banks and commercial lenders far outside the abilities of all but a minority 
of Nicaraguans to pay - the minimum size of loan for private banks, at C$ 1,000, would be at the 
upper end of the borrowing requirements for the microfmance constituency. At the other end of 
the scale, only the individual moneylenders and the non-regulated financial institutes, as well as 
development organisations, cater for the tiny size of loan that would be required amongst the 
poorer sectors of borrowers. 
Table 3: Analysis of Loan Size by Institution Type (in 1995 C$) 
BP BL IFNR OD PI CP 
Average 16,278 3,749 1,360 3,028 2,414 38,937 
Median 11,000 1,600 1,500 1,000 950 2,500 
Minimum 1,000 300 164 250 100 800 
Maximum 40,000 30,000 3,000 20,000 8,340 300,000 
Stand. Err. 3,346.29 397.71 248.88 1,269.50 866.42 20,069.24 
(BP: Banco Privado (private bank), BL: Banco Local (local bank), IFNR: Institucion Financiers 
No Regulada (non-regulated financial institute), OR Organismo de Desarrollo (development 
organisation (NGO)), PI: Prestamista Individual (individual moneylender), CP: Comerciante 
Prestamista (commercial moneylender) - Source Dauner 1998). 
This precis of the formal credit sector and banking practices in Nicaragua would seem to provide 
firm evidence in support of the contentions of Mohammed Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank 
(Yunus 1998). For Yunus, lack of appreciation of the cultural context of lending (also discussed 
in the analysis of the historical context of microfmance in Chapter 2) is what renders orthodox 
economic theory flawed, and consequently he developed what he calls three fallacies he ascribes 
to orthodox theory. The first fallacy is to believe that credit is neutral rather than a social 
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construct and tool, whereas in the instances of Bangladesh for Yunus, and the oligopolistic 
lending structure of Nicaragua described above, those people with control of credit are ignoring 
both the profitability to be had in microfmance lending, as well as the vital economic necessity 
for it, to follow their own agenda. The second fallacy is a belief that entrepreneurs are a small, 
special group of people, whereas both Yunus and organisations such as the Microcredit Summit 
organisation plainly believe that everyone has entrepreneurial ability if it can just be given 
expression. 
The third and perhaps most important fallacy that Yunus outlines is the idea (certainly heavily 
promoted in the US) that capitalism is reliant on profit maximisation, with no thought to social 
and cultural context; as the change in the post-Washington consensus discussed in Chapters 1 and 
2 clearly indicates, however, even the orthodox bastions of the IFIs have ceased to believe so 
whole-heartedly in that particular creed. Nicaragua is a clear example of a country whose corrupt 
banking sector operates through the medium of a highly politicised economy40, actively 
supported by and supportive of structural adjustment, an entirely foreseeable result which is 
implicit in the basic flaws of adjustment theory, and a refusal to take into account the reality of 
the political economy. In Nicaragua, banks whose officials and executive boards brought about 
their collapse through fraud and theft were maintained at the public expense, and the corrupt 
functionaries of a government that stole millions of dollars annually were similarly rewarded in a 
process that might be deemed profit maximisation for the people concerned, but which had little 
or nothing to do with being more competitive and efficient. 
The Superintendencia de Bancos (SIB) and the CGR (discussed further in Chapter 4), entrusted 
with the effective functioning and auditing of government and banking finance are able to do so 
only in the areas and under the circumstances permitted them by the duopoly FSLN/PLC, and the 
president in particular. The veto by ex-President Alemän of the Ley Organica put before the 
national assembly in 2001, in particular, concerning legal sanctions to be imposed by the CGR 
effectively removed whatever teeth the CGR might have gained, and thus it remains almost 
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completely impotent. Two examples of banking default and supervision, that of INTERBANK 
and the last effectively state-controlled bank, BANIC, illustrate the manner in which the banking 
system in Nicaragua functions. 
The sale of BANIC shows clearly how the privatization of state assets are diverted towards elite 
group interests, thus further weakening the regulatory environment in which such banks operate. 
One of the major beneficiaries of BANIC loans written off by the junta directiva immediately 
before the sale of 51% of the state-held shares was Ivan Urbina Sanchez, GENINSA colleague of 
the then-President himself, who had a loan for $70,000 (Bodan 1999), and a loan for GENINSA 
itself was arranged for $859,255 (Umanzor 1999), both in clear violation of banking laws. 
Another beneficiary was the junta directiva of the PLC, which had loans totalling some $107,800 
written off, without any effort being made to reclaim the loans or to sequestrate goods from the 
guarantors for the loan. All of these loans from a then-state bank were arranged by the junta 
directiva and the president of the bank, Donald Spencer, another close friend of ex-President 
Aleman's who additonally made further loans to taxi co-operatives which bought their cars in his 
businesses and which were like-wise affiliated to the governing PLC. The writing-off of the loans 
in the manner in which it was done constituted a direct breach of Article 77 of the Ley General de 
Bancos y Otras Instituciones, as is mentioned in the independent audit requested by the World 
Bank, which independent audit was suppressed by Enrique Duque Estrada, then Minister of 
Hacienda and another beneficiary of loan write-offs by BANIC. 
Despite attempting to fulfil an independent monitoring and regulatory function, the SIB, 
theoretically in charge of the independent monitoring and regulation of the banking sector, has 
effectively acted as a political tool. The SIB was created to comply with G8/IMF pressure, but 
has been increasingly divested of effective power to carry out its' role, and continues to intervene 
or not intervene according to instructions received from the government. Testimony to the 
weakness of the SIB's position and performance was provided, for instance, by its' report of June 
2000 on BANCAFE, some six months after intervention had started, in which, two months before 
40 see Chapter 4 for an analysis of the politicized socio-economic environment of Nicaragus 
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the collapse of the bank, the SIB made no mention of the irregularities that brought the bank 
down, and classified 96.7% of its loan portfolio as category A: without any risk at all (Equipo de 
redaccion de envio 2000). It was also during this period that BANCAFE contracted loans in 
excess of $8 million with the Centeno Roques brothers, who had already been responsible for the 
intervention and collapse of INTERBANK in 2000. 
184 
5.3 - The Microfinance Sector And Formal Banking 
"Rural financial markets are nearly non-existent in Nicaragua. Where they do exist, they have a 
high degree of segmentation. The few sources of finance that do exist are linked with activities 
that show greater competitiveness (coffee, cattle, sesame production, commerce etc. ) and are 
geographically concentrated in certain zones of the country. In these markets, the costs of money, 
expressed in the interest rates, are very high. " 
Alfredo Ruiz Garcia, 'Que ensenan los programas de micro-credito? ', Encuentro Ano XXX, 
N6.45 1998, UCA, Managua, Auhor's translation. 
The provision of non-conventional credit in Nicaragua is roughly 53% from state programmes, 
6% from co-operatives, 9% from NGO development funds, and 32% by the private organisations 
represented by ASOMIF. (ASOMIF Op. Cit. ). Despite the growth in numbers of both 
organizations and clients in Nicaragua over the last five years however, the micro-finance 
industry has been operating in an uneasy environment (see Chapters 4 and 6), particularly after 
the election of the penultimate President, Arnoldo Aleman in 1996; NGOs in Nicaragua have 
come into conflict with the ruling PLC/FSLN for a number of different reasons. 
As an example of this conflict between the formal commercial and the microfinance sectors, the 
MICROSTART team (von Stauffenberg, Farrington and Tortorelli 1998) reported that the largest 
single source of funding for MFIs had been the Inter-American Development Bank with a US$ 
20 million "Global Loan" accompanied by a $5 million technical assistance component. In 
keeping with orthodox theoretical concerns about stimulating the private sector, the initial Global 
Loans were channeled through the formal banking system. Contrary to the IADB's expectations, 
however the money was not passed on through NGOs to microenterprises n the forms of micro- 
loans. The overwhelming majority of the funds went either to the formal banking sector's 
corporate clients who reportedly were going to use these funds to extend credit to small 
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enterprises with whom they did business (for example Coca Cola is said to have been a 
significant channel, using IDB funds to provide working capital to retailers) or directly to their 
small business clients. 
The main impact of the IADBs Global Loan was through three commercial banks, Banco del 
Cafe, Banco Popular and Interbank (two of which had as of 2001 gone out of business and whose 
outstanding loans therefore may safely be assumed to have disappeared) to begin placing loans to 
microentrepreneurs through specialized agents. Under this system, the agent of the bank was 
supposed to place and supervise a portfolio of microloans on behalf of the commercial bank. The 
last section discussed how the Nicaraguan banking sector is run and regulated, and whilst the 
cognitive model that mitigated such funds be transmitted through the commercial sector is 
understandable, what is less understandable is why the IADB should be surprised that the money 
didn't end up in the micro-enterprise sector, and that most of it by now is presumably 
irrecoverable. 
In terms of geographic extent and population coverage, the urban market for microfmance in 
Pacific Nicaragua was perceived as being saturated in 1998. The Microstart team of the UNDP 
(an organization created to support private sector microfmance development) reported that as of 
1998 Nicaragua was 'awash' with funding and technical assistance, but predominantly directed to 
the urban areas, and very little to the Atlantic coast in particular. As of 2000, of the estimated 
400,000 micro/small businesses in Nicaragua some 105,000 were estimated to be getting credit 
from microfmance associations (Lopez and Cores 2000), predominantly in the urban areas. 
Estimates of market penetration of microfmance in Nicaragua vary widely, but based on the fact 
that it is now realised that not all micro enterprises want loans, it is suggested that it may be as 
high as 72%, whereas the theoretical potential limit is far higher (Christen Op. Cit. ). 
In tandem with the manner by which Nicaraguan microfinance is overwhelmingly targeted on 
women, by the end of the 90s microbusinesses provided 70% of all jobs for women 
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(INPYME/INEC/PROMICRO-OIT, 2001b). There is thus a massive gendered differential in this 
fastest growing area of employment in the crippled Nicaraguan economy. Even though the 
microfmance sector in Nicaragua dates only from 1992, as early as 1997 USAID reported the 
overwhelming targeting of women: 
Table 4: Gendered Portfolio of Microfinance Institut ions in Nicaragua 
Microfinance Institutions with Portfolio Data by Location of Institution, 1997 
Org. No. of Clients Portf. US$ % Women clients At Risk Loss 
ASODENIC 7,229 606,718 87.90% 4.10% 0.95% 
ASODERI 350 30,918 72.00% 10.00% 0.00% 
CRS/Nic. 8,089 656,595 75.00% 5.40% 1.50% 
FAMA 11,384 1,334,485 73.40% 0.71% 0.65% 
FINCA/Nic 10,370 815,000 100.00% 1.30% 0.00% 
Fund. J. Nieb. 175 12,597 74.80% 10.00% 0.00% 
F. L. 2000 177 19,076 84.10% 11.00% 0.00% 
CHISPA 5,340 1,217,513 71.00% 1.30% 2.00% 
ProMujer/Nic. 2,072 95,467 90.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Rural C. U. Pro 2,268 1,194,612 0.00% 30.00% 25.0% 
(Source USAID 1997) 
Irrespective, however, of the targeting of women as being the better payers, as Kidder (1999a) 
points out: 
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"Respondents confirm that specialized MF institutions tend to be dominated by 
men and have little understanding of gender strategies, even those targeting 
women and with high percentages of women borrowers. "41 
The Microstart survey of Nicaraguan microfmance operations suggested that the average cost of 
loans from external donors was only 4.1%, and that the majority of funding was on extremely soft 
terms, or even zero interest. This is obviously a further source of discontent for the commercial 
banking sector, which can only access funds on commercial terms. Given also that until May of 
2001 these organisations were effectively unrestricted as to the interest charges that could be 
levied, it is perhaps unsurprising that, as the Microstart report complained, most of these 
organisations had no true appreciation of the costs of their operations. Other studies show that 
established groups are beginning to show a marked resistance to offers of technical assistance, 
especially that provided without attempting to determine the needs of the group first (Langbroek 
1998), many micro finance projects are now beginning to analyze whether or to what extent their 
products match the needs of the currently untouched sectors. 
The underlying context of reports such as that of Microstart on Nicaraguan microfmance, 
however, neatly illustrate the increasingly economistic 'Institutionist' (see Chapters 1 and 2) 
hegemony under which the microfmance sector now has to work. The microfinance sector is 
'inefficient' for various reasons: 
"The European Union's microcredit programs for instance are mainly designed to 
achieve resource transfer to parts of the population which have been hard hit by the 
civil war. Market interest rates and vigorous collection efforts would impede this 
°t This of itself constitutes an intriguing `layered' gendering of the financial sector, whereby the male-dominated 
formal banking sector acts to suppress the informal banking sector aimed primarily at women, although the 
organization of the informal banking sector is itself male-dominated. 
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objective. The mission came across cases where the EU had specified maximum 
lending rates which were about half the market rate. High delinquency seemed to be 
the norm in EU funded programs......... USAID is more conscious of the importance 
of building sustainable financial intermediaries. Its programs include sizable 
technical assistance components that are expressly designed to achieve this end. Yet, 
all AID support for microfinance is in the form of grants. As will be shown, the 
mission concluded that the pervasive presence of soft funding has, more than 
anything else, held back development of a viable Nicaraguan microfinance 
industry. "(von Stauffenberg, Farrington and Tortorelli, Op. Cit., p. 4) 
Central to this appraisal is the idea that somehow there is universally a 'market' whose interest 
rates would be more efficient42. Yet not only are the EU's efforts aimed at resource transfers to 
impoverished populations, they are also pioneer operations in areas in which for the most part 
access to credit didn't exist until the post-1992 expansion of microfmance. It would seem 
unrealistic, then, to compare the EU interest rate with the interest rate in a market that had 
previously excluded clients of EU projects as if they were the same market, a market which even 
now would not take most microfmance clients as commercial bank clients. The final sentence, 
however, is the most telling in terms of a revealed political preference. A viable microfinance 
industry is axiomatically assumed to be one in which self-sustainability of itself is the aim, rather 
than the artificial creation and careful development of a hitherto non-existent market, which 
would not have existed at all without the 'pervasive' presence of soft funding. It could be 
suggested that what is really holding back the spread of microfmance in Nicaragua is the drive for 
self-sustainability by external donors who push Nicaraguan microfinance operations to ignore the 
poorest in their hurry to cherry-pick the better-off poor. Hence the creation, for instance, by 
USAID of an arbitrary three-year period (suggested to the author by USAID) in which it was 
'reasonable' to expect a microfinance operation to be become self-sustaining. 
42 A central tenet of the institutionist approach to microfinance discussed in the first chapter. 
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As pressure to expand and become self-sustaining increases for the Nicaraguan microfmance 
sector, membership of ASOMIF is becoming harder as more organisations seek to begin 
microfinance operations. Under this pressure for self-sustainability (for further discussion of 
which see Chapter 1), as well as increasing regulation, microfmance organisations are becoming 
increasingly client-selective, and do not target the poorest. FIDESA for example requires clients 
to give evidence as guarantee of land titles, whereas FAMA clients have to have been running 
business a year and be able provide some guarantee of stability in order to receive a loan, or some 
form of collateral such as a vehicle. Speaking generally, managers in ASOMIF members don't 
believe their approach can help the poorest, and certainly do not believe there is any incentive to 
do so, under current sustainability pressures from external donors43. There is in addition an 
increasing belief in the theoretical literature from and about Central America that technical 
assistance and finance should not be provided by the same institutions (IADB Op. Cit. ). 
The drive towards self-sustainability has been brought about by other factors, too; change was 
hastened by hurricane Mitch in 1998, because few MF organisations had any reserves to meet the 
disaster, and in addition donors had turned them down for reserve funding (Kidder 1999b). Client 
organisations of bodies such as LA CARUNA (a co-operative banking organization), for 
instance, were better able to recover from hurricane Mitch because they were entitled by law to 
take client savings, and individual institutions could borrow funds from other members of 
federation in less damaged areas, thus allaying costs. The need to attain independence from 
donors is not just occasioned by a perceived need for sustainability therefore, it is an end-driven 
need for security in an economy where instability is the norm (Kidder, 1999b. ). 
There are other beneficial signs of the growing microfmance sector, too - another interesting side- 
effect being a lowering of interest rates offered by prestamistas (individual moneylenders). In 
addition, one study by Nitlapan showed that, of former loan sources from which clients had 
changed to the MF institutions, 79% of prestamista clients had left their former sources, and 84% 
of commercial bank clients (Garcia Op. Cit. ). Prestamistas in general have only a very small 
43 Sr Victor Telleria Gabuardi, personal interview with the author, Novemebr 1999. 
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clientele, one survey suggesting a maximum of 30 clients (Dauner 1997 Op. Cit. ), and are of 
negligible effect, macro-economically speaking; their importance to local communities is great, 
however, especially in terms of emergency/consumption loans. 
One possible indication of potential further demand for credit in Nicaragua, on an individual and 
microenterprise level, may be the level of credit received from pulperias, small informal 
neighbourhood shops, often no more than a table set in the doorway of a private residence. 
Purchases on credit from pulperias, distribuidoras (distributors of merchandise) and so forth can 
vary considerably in terms of interest charged, as may be the repayment period, although almost 
invariably short-term. Studies have suggested that as much as 32.1% of the rural population may 
have credit arrangements of this type with local outlets (Dauner 1998 Op. Cit. ). These studies 
have also suggested that the majority (more than 70%) of such credits are used for the purchase 
of food, in keeping with the figure of 66% of these credit outlets being pulperias. 
i 
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5.4 - The Drive Towards Self-Sustainability 
"The operational policies, organizational values, and behavioral norms of many MFIs 
overwhelmingly focus on credit discipline creating a rigid repayment culture that emphasizes 
short-term repayment extraction over long-term relationship building. Because the very poor are 
more vulnerable to repayment interruptions caused by external and personal shocks, they are 
frequent casualties of this repayment culture. " 
Gary Woller, 2002, ' From Market Failure To Marketing Failure: Market Orientation As The Key 
To Deep Outreach In Microfinance', draft paper, Marriott School, Brigham Young University, 
p. 7 
Finally, despite the rapid growth of the microfmance sector in Nicaragua, very little/no impact 
evaluation of microfmance projects has been done, predominantly because of the cost (SIMAS, 
Op. Cit); when it is done, repayment rates are generally used, evaluations of system impact and 
improvements through best practices, and efficiency and portfolio evaluation rather than client 
investigation. It is probable that there are already growing problems with credit `saturation' 
amongst urban clients, to whit the extension of unnecessary credit which leaves clients working 
just to pay back the bank (Garcia Op. Cit. ); this remains, however, anecdotal evidence for which 
more thorough analysis might provide proper figures. It is also likely that drop-out rates from 
clients who do not repeat their loan application is high and climbing, especially in the urban areas 
where there is more choice. 
Caught between the unwillingness of commercial banks to lend to them or allow them to open 
savings accounts, and the restriction by the legal environment of the formal banking sector which 
forbids microfmance organisations from taking savings, there is nonetheless evidence, from 
empirical evaluations of microcredit projects done by organisations such as FDL- 
Nitlapan/Banarte that the poorest in Nicaragua value the ability to save money in a secure outlet, 
probably as much as access to credit itself (Garcia Op. Cit. ). Other empirical evidence also shows 
that the poorest clients, `asalariad@s' and 'campesin@s pobres' tend to achieve very little 
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success in increasing their capital. Nitlapan puts this down to the need for the poorest to fand 
work that generates income quickly, and at rates of return higher than the interest rates; the 
chances of fording this kind of work in rural zones is very low (Garcia ibid. ). The need for secure 
savings mechanisms, however, is met by very few Nicaraguan MF organisations, and up to 2001 
the SB blocked attempts to allow alternative banking institutions to capture savings, because of 
law 244 which prohibited this activity to non-regulated institutions (Hernandez 1999). In 1997 
the SB actually obliged Nitlapan to withdraw from savings operations, which is another reason 
why ASOMIF has been proposing Anteproyectos de ley in front of the National Assembly to get 
the law changed. 
In terms of best practices models utilised by Nicaraguan microfinance organisations, there is a 
distinct trend amongst those organisations affiliated to ASOMIF, at the moment, away from 
groups and towards individuals44. This is particularly because of the movement of these 
organisations towards the institutionist model under pressure from important donors such as 
USAID, and also because of the income levels of their clients. Solidarity groups and rotating 
funds have been shown to be better for the poorest and additionally function better where lower 
loan amounts, longer repayment periods and lower interest rates are involved, and for all these 
reasons they come into conflict with the external donor pressure to achieve self-sustainability that 
Nicaraguan organisations are now experiencing, added to the more staff-intensive methods 
necessary to ensure effective performance and repayment in rotating loan/solidarity groups. 
There is in addition to at least a sufficiency of capital funding in Nicaragua for microfinance 
organizations, a plenitude of technical assistance for their setting up and running. The majority of 
donors have provided some form of technical assistance in conjunction with their funding. 
Significant technical assistance for the sector as a whole was provided by Programa para la 
Asistencia a la Microempresa (PAMIC), a government agency established to support M Is in 
Nicaragua (von Stauffenberg, Damian, Farrington, Todd, and Tortorelli, Luca Op. Cit. ). PAMIC 
44 Nicaragua is unique in Central America in having most of its' microfinance operations directed towards individual 
loans rather than group lending - Katalysis 1999 
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has been responsible for providing many NGO's with seed capital to commence operations and 
has also been involved in initial training and capacity building efforts. The very complexity of 
funding bodies and arrangements in Nicaragua can result in a confusion of aims as new and 
existing microfmance organisations pick their way through, and seek to conform with, the various 
mission statements and core values of the plethora of funding bodies. The map of microfmance 
structures below gives some idea of the situation: 
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5.5 - Conclusion 
"Like many popular mass movements, the microfinance movement is characterized both by 
widespread agreement on broad objectives and by multiple rifts on key issues. The movement 
itself is driven by the shared commitment to provide credit for small enterprise formation and 
growth. It is also bound together by a common rhetoric of concern for the poor. This unity of 
commitment and rhetoric, however, masks a variety of philosophical approaches, types of 
institutions and borrowers, and delivery systems that shelter uneasily together under the big tent 
called "microfinance. " 
Gary M. Woller, 1999, ' Where To Microfinance? ', Romney Institute of Public Management, 
Marriott School, Brigham Young University. 
Up until 2001 Numbers of micro-finance organisations in Nicaragua had been failing to comply 
with the law (Asociaciön de Consultoras Centroamericanas Mujeres Para El desarrollo 1997) 
governing fmancial institutions and commercial lending, particularly Ley 244 (Ley General de 
Bancos y Otras Instituciones), and the Ley de Reforma of this law, stating that only organisations 
which habitually and exclusively dedicated themselves to the arrangement of credit could be 
considered to be Entidades Financieras No Bancarias sin Fines de Lucro under Ley 147, the law 
under which all NGOs operate and are constituted. There is a distinct element of politics in the 
frequency with which regulatory laws for NGOs are being promulgated, and it must be suspected 
that the large private sector banks are exerting considerable political influence. This becomes 
more understandable when it is realised that some research suggests that of former loan sources 
from which clients had changed to the MF institutions, 84% of commercial bank clients (Ruiz, 
Op. Cit. ) had left their former sources 
ASOMIF is intended to form a regulatory mechanism, with the intention of conforming with the 
equivalent of the Superintendencia de Banco's rules for financial organisations. Currently MF 
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institutions have a legal existence under the title of Personas Juridicas Sin Fines de Lucro, under 
ley No. 147 of 1992 (SIMAS, Op. Cit. ). This, apart from law 176 of 1994 (Ley de Prestamos 
Entre Particulares45 which allows current lending activities apart from the taking of savings, is 
where NGO credit activities were located to 2001, outside the Superintendencia de Bancos' 
supervision (co-operatives being regulated under a different law). Meanwhile, ideas and research 
concerning the expansion of microfmance institutions into all sorts of different areas, life 
insurance, credit cards, housing loans abound are proliferating. 
The passage of Ley 374 "Ley de reforma a la Ley 176, Ley Reguladora de Creditos entre 
ri " Particulares" by the Nicaraguan national assembly was the culmination of a move to restrict 
microfmance interest levels to those charged by the banks, which for the month of July when the 
law was passed, was 15.46 per cent - this in comparison with microfmance organisations 
charging up to 60% annual interest rates (La Prensa 2001). Not only is the new law a step 
backward in terms of expanding credit access generally, it will have the effect of reducing rural 
credit and long-term credits, as well as diverting credit further towards the most immediately 
profitable sectors of investment (ASOMIF 2001). The law will have the effect of reinforcing 
protectionist barriers around the areas of private finance controlled by the political elites, under 
the guise of protecting the poor from usurers. This has been the clearest recent legal expression of k. , 
the relationship between the formal banking sector and the microfmance sector, which reacted by 
proposing through ASOMIF its' own alteration to Ley 374, an effort to formalise legally the fact kj 
that Nicaraguan microfmance organisations are non-profit organisations and should therefore not 
be treated the same as private banks, and allow them at least to charge the same interest rates as 
banks. 
In essence, the applications of the law discussed above (and the failure to apply them) draw a 
two-dimensional picture of the progress of the microfmance sector, which the thesis has 
expanded on by discussing the socio-economic processes influencing the creation and application 
as Explained to the author by Sra Martha K. Orschel, Director of Public Relations to the Superintendencia de Bancos, 
personal interview, March 2000. 
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of these laws. The quote from Jose Luis Rocha that began this chapter indicated the slowness of 
the spread of microfmance in Nicaragua, and with this analysis the causal mechanisms behind 
this slowness of growth have become clearer. Not only the reasons behind the speed of growth 
are apparent, however, but the type of growth, from a generalised prejudice against co-operative 
organisations down to a preference for individual loans as opposed to group loans (whose 
usefulness for the poorest borrowers has become a form of the `forbidden knowledge' discussed 
in Chapter 1), in contradistinction to the rest of Central America. 
In the first and second chapter the thesis discussed microfinance more generally in the light of 
structural adjustment and economic orthodoxy, pointing out the hidden aspects of gendered bias 
and the political economy, and in this chapter microfmance has been discussed in the light of the 
highly politicised and corrupt nature of the Nicaraguan socio-economy. We have seen how the 
more generalised disputes within the body of microfmance practitioners is reflected on a national 
level within Nicaragua, and in the preceding chapter the thesis discussed how the theory and 
practice of structural adjustment are filtered through the same social, cultural and political 
mechanisms which act on the microfmance sector. 
Leading on from the continued downward focus of the preceding chapters, the next chapter 
studies the structure of microfinance at the lowest level, and surveys the circumstances of the 
clients of these organisations. The survey of local organisations and clients is not intended to be 
an impact evaluation, if not a clear description of the type of people who are clients, as well as 
non-users, of the various types of credit available. Perhaps most importantly, the survey is 
intended to look at those areas of the local that are typically left out of more orthodox surveys of 
microfmance projects. The survey looks at what both clients and non-clients do, how they live, 
and relates both their and the local organisational circumstances to the larger picture of 
microfmance already discussed, with the intention of giving a clear picture of how the macro is 
reflected in the micro. 
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Chapter Six: Credit and The Local 
6.1 - Introduction 
This chapter is intended to show how the processes, influences and institutions discussed at the 
macro level affect local reality. The chapter contains an outline of the two organisations 
discussed in the methodology, Chapter 3, and the survey of Nicaragua in an area where there are 
a number of microfmance organisations operating. The investigation of the citizens of Masaya 
and its rural surrounds, far from being an attempt at an impact evaluation, looks at as many socio- 
economic factors as possible that impinge directly on the daily reality of Nicaragua's poor, with 
the intention of highlighting factors affected by and affecting microfinance operations, whether 
adversely or beneficially. The first section discusses further the position of microfmance within 
the local political economy, outlining sources of funding and jurisdictional anomalies within the 
microfinance sector. The position of ASOMIF, the representative association of the more 
successful microfmance providers is described with reference to its' importance to the sector as a 
whole46. FAMA, one of the organisations studied at the local level, is a member of ASOMIF, 
whereas ADIM (in 2001) had applied for membership but had not been accepted. The section 
uses the information from various informants within the sector to broaden the analysis, as well as 
documentary data from a range of sources to underpin the opinions and statements of the 
informants. The section outlines the area in which FAMA and ADIM operate, using a descriptive 
analysis of Masaya to describe the type of environment in which microfmance organisations in 
Nicaragua function, as a background to the survey itself. 
In the second section, the maps made in the survey will be discussed as a background to Masaya 
itself, with the intention of describing the environment in which the field survey took place. The 
section describes Masaya in the light of general household activity analysis, and general patterns 
46 Despite representing a considerable amount of the loan portfolio in Nicaragua, numerically ASOMIF actually 
represents few of the hundreds of microfinance organisations in the country, mainly as a policy of deliberate self- 
selection that is designed to ensure a certain level of competence, efficiency and regulation. 
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of productive, reproductive and social activities will be discussed. The vital commercial links 
with Managua, as well as the small villages and towns surrounding the city will be discussed, as 
well as larger patterns of country-wide and ex-country activities47. The extended household 
pattern of existence in Masaya will be analysed briefly, together with the dependence of 
households on a number of different economic activities, frequently dispersed over a wide 
geographical area. The importance of gender-differentiated activities will also be analysed, and 
in particular the importance not just of female labour in general, but the increasing frequency of 
multiple-female headed households48 with extended families of children. 
The third section begins by looking at an analysis of statistically significant variables related to 
credit-use (by comparison with households not using credit) derived from the database of the 
pilot and main surveys. The reason for using SPSS software as a means of analysis in the first 
place was that it enables the researcher to process a mass of inter-related variables, picking out 
relationships that appear statistically significant, but without the temptation or indeed the 
necessity to move towards correlative or causative suppositions about any one area of the 
investigation, and thus weighting the field survey as perhaps more important than the other 
components of the research. In keeping with the perceived need to focus on diversity rather than 
statistical rigidity, the anomalies in the variables are used in conjunction with the more intangible 
socio-economic analysis, rather than as a substitute. 
The analysis of variables brought up two distinct areas of the field survey, one where no gender- 
differentiated response patterns were indicated by analysis, and one where differentiated 
responses impinge - Leading on from the discussion of the gender environment in Nicaragua 
discussed in Chapter 4, it is scarcely surprising that the field survey should indicate differentiated 
responses by men and women, according to whether they were being interviewed by men or 
women. The section emphasizes statistical anomalies that demonstrate that in a number of inter- 
linked areas of the household socio-economy there are indeed substantial differences between 
47 But see Chapters 4 and 5 for more detailed discussion of these issues. 48 Discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 
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households with and without credit, but also emphasizes that it is impossible to say whether the 
differences are caused by the access to credit, or access to credit has caused the differences. It 
will be made clear from the fact that of the random sample chosen in what constitutes one of the 
less poor areas of Nicaragua, that only some 30% of the population appear to have access to 
credit of any kind (including mere credit at a pulperia, which is a small, general provisions shop, 
often no more than a table in the front door of a house). This level of coverage would seem to 
support the assertion that microfmance organizations in Nicaragua are targeting ('cherry- 
picking') the less poor. 
The fourth section of the chapter analyses the statistically significant relationships elicited in 
discrete areas of the survey, areas in which statistically anomalous relationships arose which 
speak to the validity of parts of the questionnaire method, as well as gender-blind assumptions 
made by more usual forms of organisational and impact analysis (See for example Mosley 1998). 
In part this section adds to the body of literature already extant, concerning doubts over sample 
selection, limited recall, response bias and other methodological problems (Harper and Finnegan, 
1998; Morduch, 1999). These anomalies consist of a database of gender-differentiated answering 
patterns and are used to illustrate firstly that gender-differentiated knowledge (both inside and 
outside couples) appears to cause uncertainty and error in survey techniques, and secondly that 
the evidence from the couples interviewed provides strong support for a non- or semi-co- 
operative model of the household (see Agarwal 1997, Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000) as 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
The concluding section will be a resume of these survey results in the light of both micro- and 
macro-issues involved in microfinance, and reprise in particular the need to better understand the 
socio-economic background to gender-orientated microfinance projects. The need for further 
analysis of microfmance clients over time will be argued, and indeed the need for analyses and 
understanding of the different functions of different types of projects (Particularly in the light of 
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reports such as Kidder 1999) will be discussed as a preview to the following chapter that focuses 
on policy recommendations. The apparent tendency for Nicaraguan organisations to focus on the 
`better-off poor will be discussed in the light of the difficulties that raises for the use of control- 
group analysis (for a particularly good discussion of the problems of which see Kaplan, 2001), 
and how to achieve random selection of credit and non-credit household groups whilst still being 
assured of similar income levels. It will be the contention of this conclusion that more 
sophisticated methods of combined survey and map-based analysis, with such anomalies as the 
gender-differentiated responses fully mapped out and allowed for, are vital if comprehensive 
economic analysis at the local level is to be undertaken in countries such as Nicaragua (or indeed 
anywhere else). 
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6.2 - Local Microfinance Structure 
In Nicaragua the decision to set up a microfmance or microcredit operation is subject to gaining 
approval under the Ley General sobre Personas Juridicas sin Fines de Lucro (Ley 147), the 
general law governing the setting up of non-profit organisations. As we have seen in the 
preceding chapter on the Nicaraguan sector, a considerable portion of the business of the 
Asamblea Nacional currently is occupied in approving just such organisations. There are a 
number of reasons for this, chief amongst which is that the current economic situation in the 
country ensures that the setting up of some type of NGO with a recognisable development, 
poverty alleviation or civil society mission has as much chance of securing, employment as any 
commercial activity or more so if it is well-connected with either of the two major political 
parties, the PLC or the FSLN. Additionally, since NGOs are important actors in the political 
economy, both important political parties and others are increasing their presence in this sector as 
a means to increase presence, patronage and thus control in the localities. 
Because of the plethora of microfmance activities and organisations and the large quantity of 
money available for them (complained of inter alia by MICROSTART (MICROSTART 
Op. Cit. )), a number of the larger, more successful and more stable organisations in Nicaragua 
formed the organisation ASOMIF, having as a central idea the attempted regulation and control 
of microfmance development, with membership of the organisation acting as some kind of 
guarantee, but with the eventual end of promoting legislation to be enacted through either the 
Superintendencia de Bancos, or some special microfmance Superintendencia. The push for 
formalisation and legalisation of a microfmance standard began in 1999 (ASOMIF 1999a) with a 
legal project, still before the Asamblea Nacional at the time of writing. This project attempts to 
make standard such issues as how many partners an organisation must have, how much in 
reserves to begin with and minimum reserves, types of financial activity in which the 
organisation may engage, and in general construct a regulatory framework to be applied by the 
Superintendent of Banks. 
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For itself, ASOMIF is seeking to construct fiscal and regulatory mechanisms for members (and 
eventually non-members) to provide standardised accounts and some guarantee of transparency 
of accounts, as an industry standard (ASOMIF 1999b). Quite apart from the practical and legal 
difficulties, however, ASOMIF in the past had run into obstruction from various parties on the 
right and the left of the Nicaraguan political spectrum: 
"The concept they have of micro finance institutions is now different. Now they take 
them into account and treat them seriously, things that didn't happen before. They 
used to think of them as the dirt of society that didn't help but only helped themselves 
to the money sent by donors. " (Sra. Magdalena Juarez, personal assistant to the 
president of ASOMIF, personal interview with author, 22/11/01). 
One particularly obvious example of this was the announcement on 16/04/01 of Ley 374 
(discussed in the previous chapter) by the national assembly49, a law reforming Ley 176, Ley 
Reguladora de Creditos entre Particulares (the law regulating individual credit), that set a cap on 
the rate at which microfmance organisations could lend at the monthly average charged by the 
private banks. This initiative from the FSLN was promulgated as a law against usury, but was in 
reality a politically populist move with an eye on the national elections in November 2001. The 
practical effect of this law will be to put many microfmance organisations out of business50 
(given that their higher running costs alone necessitate higher interest rates), as well as to stifle 
the capacity to expand even of the most efficient. 
Between 1999 and 2001, ASOMIF members (of which FAMA, one of the credit subjects of the 
field survey is one, and the other ADIM not. ) increased lending from $36 million to nearly $50 
49 `Ya Nos Ajustamos A La Realidad', article by Martha Danelia Corea, La Prensa 18/7/01 p. 9c. Personal interview 
with author 
S0 Sra Magdalena Juarez, personal assistant to the president of ASOMIF, 22/11/01 Personal interview with author 
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million, claiming in 1999 to be providing some 32% of `non-conventional' credit, which is to say 
the credit provided outside the formal private banking system (ASOMIF 1999c, 2001). Clients of 
ASOMIF members increased from 76,555 in 1999 to 125,056 in 2001, or approximately 1.5% of 
the population of Nicaragua at that time to approximately 2.4% of the population (ASOMIF 
2001); ASOMIF also claimed to be providing credit to 28% of urban and 22% of rural PYMES 
(Pequenas y Medianas Empresas - Small and Medium Businesses). By comparison in 1999, 
despite having a loan portfolio of only $36 million in comparison to that of the formal banking 
sector's $857 million, ASOMIF member loans of less than $2000 went to 30,179 clients, as 
opposed to only 18,165 for the whole of the formal banking sector. Similarly, in 1999 ASOMIF 
lent agricultural loans to 30,532 clients (39.8% of the total), as opposed to only 6,936 clients for 
the whole of the formal banking sector. As the sector expands (and ASOMIF is expanding 
steadily through applications for membership on an annual basis), a further intention is to set up a 
second tier of microfmance associations, as distinct from microfmance organisations, with the 
aim 'of providing funding to organisations, presumably with the eventual intention of being able 
to provide funding internally without recourse to external lenders. 
In terms of the two organisations surveyed, FAMA and ADIM represent the two ends of the 
microfmance spectrum in terms of size and organization. FAMA has 18 officessl covering the 
whole of the Pacific region of Nicaragua, whereas ADIM (having begun operations only 
recently) has a head office in Managua and two branches52, one in Masaya and one in La 
Concepcion, a small town in the same departamiento as Masaya. Similarly in terms of active 
clients, FAMA grew from the 10,301 in its' first year of operation, 1992, to a 199953 total of 
16,389, whereas the total client list for ADIM as of 2001 was 300. Both organisations serve both 
women and men (despite ADIM's title), and FAMA states that 73% of their clients are women, 
and ADIM actually has a minimum quota of 70% women. Additonally, Both organisations offer 
training in business skills, accounting and various kinds of technical assistance, although only 
ADIM claims to have a specific gender component to its' training. 
51 As of 2001 
52 Again, as of 2001 53 Personal Interview by researcher with Sr Victor Telleria Gabuardi, Managing Director of FAMA, 29/2/00 
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Despite credit from both organisations being accessed by clients as a result of one specific 
business initiative, as will become apparent from the survey results such households are 
frequently involved in at least one other, and frequently multiple, informal business endeavours. 
Additionally, despite both organisations apportioning types of loans under strict categories such 
as `agricultural' and `small business', in reality such definitions are employed only as 
accountancy measures and really of little help in discerning the uses of such credits. As the 
survey of both FAMA and ADIM clients as well as non-users of credit shows (and as was 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 4), informal commercial initiatives in a country as heavily dependent 
on agriculture as Nicaragua are very rarely entirely divorced from the rural54. Similarly, the 
analysis of credit use by reference to individuals and individual loans and businesses is of far less 
use than knowledge of the household/family group into which the loan is received, and the 
extent, cyclical nature and fluidity of their socio-economic activities. 
54 For a fuller discussion see Berdegue, Reardon, Escobar and Echeverri, 2000. 
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6.3 - Mapping The Household Socio-Economy 
The Department headed by Masaya (the city in which the field survey took place) is the most 
populous in Nicaragua, with a population density that by 1996 had reached 400 inhabitants per 
square kilometre (INDES/FUDENIC 1996), as a result of rural/urban migration. In the city of 
Masaya itself this density reaches 737 inhabitants per square kilometre, and whereas the 
population registered in the census undertaken in 1995 indicated a city population of some 
80,051, the rural population for the entire municipality of Masaya was estimated to be some 
40,805. The total population of the municipality had grown from some 45,174 in 1971 to 
120,856 in 1995, indicating an annual average growth rate of 4.01% (INIFOM 1999). The 
estimated economically active population of the municipality in 1995 was 64,608, some 53.45% 
of the municipal population, involved in a great variety of occupations, many of them linked to 
the artisan sector making furniture, artistic goods of many different types, ceramics, shoes and 
sandals and clothing. 
The types of agricultural activity which dominate in the municipality (besides the above) and 
which the field survey came into contact with include the cultivation of cattle, pigs, poultry, 
beans, maize, sesame seeds and oil, Yucca S5, a wide variety of different fruits ranging from 
mangoes and tangerines to more exotic types native to Nicaragua such as Pithaya, the fruit of a 
cactus which makes a vivid purple drink, coffee and sugar cane. In terms of manufacturing and 
commerce, a major form of activity is the running of pulperias (small general goods 
shops/stalls), bakeries56, mills, bars and cantinas, tailors' workshops, cloth shops, hotels, 
machine shops, pharmacies, shoe-making shops, carpentries and construction yards. Many of the 
agricultural and artisan-based trades focus around the two markets in Masaya, the larger, older 
market located to the east of the city near the bus terminal, which acts as commercial centre for 
villages and towns for miles around, and the smaller more tourist-orientated market in the centre 
which focuses on artesania. These two markets by themselves constitute an important part of the 
ss A floury root-crop used in Nicaragua in pretty much the same role as potatoes in the UK 56 The city of Masaya supplies bread to a large number of villages and towns in the surrounding areas, both inside 
and outside the municipality. 
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revenue of the alcaldia57 (for 1996 the budget for the municipality of Masaya was the equivalent 
of $527,397.2858, using the average conversion rate for 2000-2001 of C$12.50 = $1), from whom 
the maps used in the survey were in the main obtained 
The maps used for the interviews in fact came from two different sources. The map used to 
describe activities taking place within the city of Masaya itself for the pilot survey came from a 
1994 map owned by the AlcaldiaS9. The area of the larger survey was described by two maps, one 
a 1978 ordinance survey-quality map produced in the last year of the Somoza dictatorship, and 
for the rural areas the 1995 maps produced in that year for the census by the government. The 
relevant sections of each map were expanded or cut to meet the requirements of the area under 
survey, with the aims of producing both usable A4-sized maps for the interviews themselves, and 
1 meter by 1.5 meter master copies, blown up and laminated by the Xerox photocopying centre in 
Managua. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the city centre sections of the maps were notable for the 
absence of street names, and in fact where the most accurate of them, the 1978 Ordinance 
Survey-style map, had names these were left off. This was quite simply because with the 
geometric style of direction-giving in Nicaragua people were more accustomed to working out 
locations by points of the compass and numbers of cuadras (quadrants, or blocks). Additionally, 
streets and barrios (neighbourhoods, roughly speaking) had sometimes frequently been renamed 
as a consequence of the revolutionary period, and what they were called by various families or 
individuals might well depend on the politics of that group or person. The maps were completed, 
therefore, by putting generally recognised reference points, such as the colegio salesiano (the 
salesian college) in the barrio of Monimbo, the parque central (central park), containing the 60 
57 The alcaldia, the mayor's office, is headed by the alcalde, which roughly translates as the mayor. An alcalde is a 
far less ceremonial figure than the mayor in the UK, however, and effectively constitutes the leader of the 
municipal/town/city government and a powerful figure in local and frequently national politics. 58 INIFOM, Op. Cit., 1999. 
59 The office of the mayor, an extremely important office in Nicaragua, combining many of the functions of local 
Vovernment and the more traditional aspects of mayoralty, and itself an important symbol of the patronage system. 
Reknowned for being a centre of anti-FSLN resistance both in the lead-up to and during the revolution, 
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parroquia (the principal Catholic church in the city), and the laguna de Masaya, the small and 
heavily polluted volcanic lake to the west of the city. 
The mapped activities of the respondents showed Masaya to be a city where formal full-time 
employment was a rarity, and where the occurrence of larger households (and consequently the 
number of people working) was relatively high. The distribution of household sizes encountered 
in the survey is shown below: 
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Table 5: Numbers Of People In Household 
Valid Numbers Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Couple 
disagreement 
24 7.5 7.5 
1 
8 2.5 10.1 
2 
29 9.1 19.2 
3 
40 12.6 31.8 
4 
46 14.5 46.2 
5 
56 17.6 63.8 
6 
45 14.2 78.0 
7 
22 6.9 84.9 
8 
23 7.2 92.1 
9 
7 2.2 94.3 
10 
6 1.9 96.2 
11 
2 0.6 96.9 
12 
6 1.9 98.7 
14 
2 0.6 99.4 
16 
1 0.3 99.7 
18 
1 0.3 100.0 
Total 318 100.0 100.0 
(NB - The 'Couple Disagreement' figure represents the response in the aggregated61 database 
where both members In a couple-headed household disagreed on a given response. A 'Couple 
Disagreement' indicator was therefore added to all variables where valid) 
61 The database in which answers from couples were amalgamated to produce one response, in order to 
avoid bias. 
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Several important focal points emerged from the surveys, the market and the various local 
churches being the centre of much of the productive activities (defined as activities directly 
concerned with earning income for the household), reproductive activities (defined as activities 
directly associated with maintaining the household but not directly associated with earning 
income) and social activities (activities undertaken as leisure which may or may not have a role 
in maintaining the household) recorded. Many of the activities recorded for women centred round 
the household and the Mercado de Masaya, although the larger survey in particular recorded 
patterns of commercial activities for both men and women in the immediate region. Further 
afield, outside the region bounded roughly by Managua to the North and Granada to the south- 
east, lay a work zone encompassing the whole of Nicaragua and bordering countries which was 
predominantly male. 
As discussed briefly above, Masaya is the centre of craftwork (artesania) in Nicaragua of many 
different types, and the types of work encountered certainly reflected this in the widest sense. In 
terms of the gendering of types of work encountered, carpentry and the more manual aspects of 
craftwork showed as still being male-dominated, although there were certain other types that 
appeared more egalitarian in terms of employment, such as the making of shoes that proliferates 
in Masaya, and the bread-making for which it is well-known. Inside these areas of work, 
however, it appeared that there was a fairly strict division of labour, with for instance in bakeries 
the men being concerned with the actual production of bread and the women with its' 
merchandising and sale. This pattern was repeated in the lower-income activities associated with 
agriculture, where men were the most directly involved in the manual labour of agricultural 
production, whereas it was frequently the responsibility of the women to transport the goods to 
market and deal with the buying and selling of produce. As a direct consequence of this the 
market figured as importantly in terms of reproductive and productive activities for men as for 
women, being an area in which household maintenance activities were combined with 
commercial activities. 
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Although for women such traditional activities such as domestic employment, the washing and 
ironing of clothes and the making and repairing of clothes figured highly as either employed 
work or a business venture, there were also concrete signs of expanding commercial activities for 
women outside Masaya. Although the market dominated the economic landscape, there were also 
many women whose commercial activities took them to Managua to buy and sell in the markets 
there, particularly the Mercado Oriental, which is a major source of cheap commercial goods 
such as sweets, lighters, batteries and general small goods, as well as vegetables, fruit and all 
kinds of foodstuffs. There were a number of women involved in ambulant commerce in the 
villages and towns outside Masaya such as Niquinohomo, Nandaime, San Juan del Oriente, 
Nandasmo, La Concepcion and Catarina. These women sold a variety of goods, including bread 
and home-made sweets to home-made baskets as well as the general merchandise mentioned 
above from the Mercando Oriental. 
As well as this ambulant form of commercial activity, one of the main forms of income-earning 
for many households encountered in the survey was the running of a Pulperia from the house in 
which the household lived. Dominated by women, this form of commerce was frequently little 
more than a table set in the front-porch area of the residence (especially in the rural comarcas), 
selling such items as drinks, chewing gum and cigarettes. Fairly obviously, this form of 
commerce had much to recommend it if the household head was effectively restricted to the 
house by household obligations such as childcare, and could only occasionally leave the house to 
get into market for family and shop provisions. The scale of small commerce, not just spatially 
but in terms of the general rate of participation of the local populace of Masaya, gave ample 
evidence of the overwhelming importance of this kind of informal service sector in maintaining a 
large percentage of families in Nicaragua. This kind of commerce has advantages for both 
participants and loan organisations in that it requires minimal start-up capital, it can be run on a 
shoe-sting budget and with a just-in-time stock replacement system, and with such a small turn- 
over, indebtedness rate and run by a family it is difficult to `bankrupt' in any accepted sense of 
the word. 
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Traditional blue-collar work such as electrician, plumber, builder/construction worker and tax- 
driver were almost exclusively male-dominated, but households with more regular formal 
employment of this kind as the main form of support were a rarity, and households dependent on 
two or more working adults in various forms of more informal employment were far greater in 
number. In geographical extent, the informal work tended to take place over greater distances, 
whereas apart from construction work, which by its' nature was mainly sporadic, seasonal and/or 
short-term, formal blue-collar work tended to be associated with a fixed workplace (most 
frequently the home as well) if not with the state companies associated with, for instance 
Telecoms or power supply (recently privatised under the Spanish company Union Fenosa). 
Perhaps most noticeably, teaching as an employment was almost invariably associated with other 
forms of employment, such as teachers who taught in the morning and then did shoe-making or 
other artesania in the afternoon. Teaching in Masaya, apart from the scattering of administrators 
and higher education professionals encountered in the survey, is a profession roughly equally 
divided between the genders and for which the average wage is $50 per month, thus necessitating 
involvement in other forms of income-earning activities. 
Outside the petty commerce triangle bounded roughly by Managua to the north, Granada (the old 
capital of Nicaragua) to the east and the small town of Nandaime to the south, there was a wider 
work related circuit covering most of the locations connected by road in the Pacific region to the 
north, and this more peripatetic labour circuit was male-dominated. It consisted of work such as 
day-labour construction and brick-laying work, the sale of shoes (particularly in the market in 
Ocotal in the north), occasional mentions of seasonal work coffee-picking in the north, and the 
sale of bread and other goods. These forms of employment mentioned the same circuit of towns 
around Lake Managua (Lago de Xolotlan) and the northern departments, Leon, Chinandega, 
Somotillo, Somoto, Ocotal, Esteli, Jinotega, Matagalpa, Muy Muy, Sebaco, Ciudad Dario and 
Boaco. Outside this circuit there were a few people who travelled as far as Rivas in the south to 
buy and sell in the markets there, and a few itinerant travellers who went out to the Atlantic coast 
to buy and sell for their businesses in locations such as Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields, but these 
were a rarity; almost all productive and reproductive activity took place within the Pacific region. 
Two respondents mentioned travelling into Costa Rica to buy and sell, however for most people 
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economic contacts outside the country were restricted to those who had relatives abroad sending 
back remittances from the USA and Costa Rica. 
Lastly, in terms of the actual types of work encountered by the survey, at the upper end of the 
social scale, the survey encountered a smaller number of men and women in white-collar 
professional/public/administrative jobs, ranging from a deputy in the national assembly, through 
public notaries and accountants, to university professors, dentists, doctors, various public 
functionaries and business owners. Interestingly, although these people represented the upper 
ends of the earnings scale in Nicaragua and there were more men than women, the disproportion 
was only slight. Women figured nearly as much in the various medical, legal and business classes 
in particular as men, and these kinds of activities were mainly (although not exclusively) 
restricted to the area bounded by Granada and Managua, the capital obviously acting as a focus 
for many of the full-time white-collar professional activities. 
At the bottom end of the scale were jornaleros, agricultural day labourers who earned as little as 
C$ 2-300 monthly, their wives selling or trading produce in the markets from their own small 
fincas, sometimes involved in the patio economy through selling chickens, eggs, or producing 
pigs for slaughter. Frequently these families lived an unstable existence on small properties 
where they may or may not have had a proper title, and where a water supply and any kind of 
electricity would be an expensive luxury. The working life of a jornalero was described in the 
field survey as rising at 2.00 or 3.00 am, working until mid-day on someone else's lands and then 
returning home. After a brief lunch break the jornalero would then tend his own crops and 
animals until the light went (at about 5.30 pm), at which point, particularly if the property had no 
electricity supply, the worker simply went to bed. Under the circumstances of the back-breaking 
labour involved in agricultural work, the few hundred cordobas earned monthly from this 
occupation constitutes the closest that modern-day Nicaragua has to slavery, and surely is an 
example of how: "The poor in extremely diverse situations experience a loss of social contact, 
humiliation and stigma that results in isolation and exclusion, eventually cutting them off from 
opportunities and support (UNDP 2001, p. 2). 
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6.4 - The Statistically Significant Variables Associated With Credit Use 
This section outlines a number of areas where possession or non-possession of credit elicited 
certain differentiated responses that were statistically significant. Without attempting to go into 
causation or which way correlation runs, possession or use of credit seems to be associated with 
certain household characteristics. These include a tendency for credit-users to be among the more 
recent arrivals, relatively speaking, on the properties that they inhabit, a strong association with 
higher income brackets by credit-users (within which tendency the higher the income bracket the 
higher the loan amounts), credit possession associated with higher expenditure on travel costs. 
Possession of credit is also associated with a lower probability of being in receipt of remittances, 
and more interestingly still amongst those credit-users who do receive remittances there is a 
strong correlation between gender and the amount received, with women reporting significantly 
greater amounts. This section will discuss the statistical importance briefly, and the full details of 
each relationship table are contained in Appendix D. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly there was a strong correlation between current possession of credit and 
past use, with those who have had credit in the past being far more likely to have it now; past use 
of credit is also significantly associated with a higher probability that the user will have a bank 
account. Past use of credit is also significantly associated with (again perhaps unsurprisingly) 
with higher current amounts of credit used. The way in which the databases were assembled 
attempted to elicit different responses, if any were to be had, between non-credit households and 
credit-users, but the continual intervention from gender differentiated responses made firm 
relationships very hard to establish. As an instance, the relationship between credit and higher 
household income totals was coloured by the gendered bias in reporting female income, as the 
tables below will discuss. 
As outlined in the methodology chapter the three databases from the pilot survey, the main 
survey and the credit-users survey, after a lengthy process of accuracy checking were initially 
215 
compiled with disaggregated results, i. e. with both household heads of married couples counted 
as individual interviews. The original disaggregated pilot project had 88 cases in it, the main 
survey had 326, and the amalgamation of the two had 414 cases. The next database was 
produced with all the couple answer duplication aggregated, in other words with all the cases that 
are for the household heads, male and female, for the same couple, made into one set of replies 
and this ended up as 318 cases. The answers from the 192 females and males from the same 
couples were also maintained as a separate database, as a means of attempting to describe the 
areas of disagreement inside the couples. 
In terms of aggregating the couple answers, where the man and woman agreed there was no 
problem in the aggregating, but where they gave different answers, say for income estimates, an 
average answer was given. Where it wasn't possible to reconcile the answers (in suggestions of 
responsibility for housework for instance), a signifier for couple disagreement was used. As a 
result of the last (3rd) set of interviews, there were a further 136 interviews with clients of ADIM 
and FAMA were added to the separate `credit-users' database, and therefore after aggregation 
there remained two principal databases comprising a total of 452 cases between them (two further 
interviews having been rejected on the advice of the interviewer because of a perception of the 
dubious nature of the information). The credit-users database obviously had to be maintained 
separately because they were selected from specific lists of credit clients, and could therefore be 
expected to exhibit different types of statistical anomalies from the randomly selected 
respondents of the two previous surveys - to have added them together would have biased the 
patterns exhibited by both. 
The analysis became a matter of going through every variable set against every other variable 
(bearing in mind that the questionnaire ended up with 89 questions that divided up into 151 
subsets), after which it became apparent that there were a large number of variables related to 
each other in a statistically significant manner, far more than could reasonably be analysed within 
the scope of this thesis. At this point however it also became obvious that when a large number of 
these variables were analysed using the gender of interviewer and interviewee, numbers of them 
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elicited statistically significant responses between men and women. In other words, large 
numbers of apparently staistically significant relationships could not stand because of the 
significant gender-differentiated responses in one or the other of the variables analysed. This 
gender-differentiated response pattern is dealt with later on. 
All of the data comparing credit-using and non-using households and outlining simple 
differences is contained within two appendices, A and B (located at the end of the thesis), 
labelled household structure and frequencies. The household structure appendix contains all of 
the qualitative data concerning the household structure and make-up, whereas the frequencies 
aappendix contains the quantitative data in terms of questions such as income comparisons and 
so forth; this section of the thesis analyses in detail only those relationships which the analysis 
deems statistically significant. The third appendix, C, contains simple graphic comparisons 
between the credit and non-credit relationships analysed in the section below. As outlined above, 
this section deals with only those credit and non-credit variable comparisons that are discernibly 
free of the gender-biased response patterns analysed below. Additionally, all variable 
relationships where there was insufficient data in one of the four key gender matches as a means 
of stating a non-gender-related relationship, have not been included in the analysis. From a 
relationship analysis viewpoint, what are contained within this section are only those areas where 
the samples are large enough to say with certainty that a statistically significant relationship 
exists; the rest are included in the frequency and structural sets in the appendices. 
The first of these variables to be examined was length of residence, by which is meant the 
responses to the question on how long the household had been resident in its' current location. 
This variable had to be treated with caution, as the analysis of the aggregated database suggested 
length of residence as being related to gender differentiation in the areas of responsibility for 
medical costs and educational costs. Initial graphic analysis of the credit-holding and non-credit 
databases suggests however that there is a definite difference in household length of residence 
based on whether or not a household has credit, apparently unaffected by gender differentiated 
responses. The graphic analysis of this variable is in Appendix C. 
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The mean length of residency for households with credit is 20.3 years as compared to 26.3 for the 
householders without credit; not only that, but the distribution curve for credit-holders is 
weighted far more towards the lower end of the scale. Although caution should be exercised in 
placing too much weight on the mean and distribution, analysis appears to confirm a statistically 
significant relationship between length of residence and possession of credit, where 49.5% of 
those with current credit had been resident in their current property for between 0-15 years, as 
opposed to 31% of those with no credit (see Appendix D: 1). Significantly the older residents 
(particularly those resident for longer than 26 years) showed a marked aversion to credit; 47.4% 
of those who had no credit were in this range, as opposed to 31% of those with credit. Why it 
should be the (relatively) recently arrived householders who are more likely to possess credit is 
an open question, but it could be that younger householders are more likely to experiment with 
credit, or that older householders may be of more restricted income and therefore more cautious 
to take on credit commitments, or simply a generational attitude. 
The next variable for which a statistically significant relationship is suggested is, crucially, total 
reported household income, where households with credit indicated higher average monthly 
income levels. Initial analysis of the credit-holding and non-credit-holding householders gives an 
idea of the differences, and suggests that the mean monthly income for credit-holding households 
is some C$506.40 higher than for non-credit households, a not insignificant amount when it is 
considered that the mean variation in numbers of people working in the household between 
credit-holding and non-credit households is only minimally higher for credit-holders, being 2.16 
to 2.07. Again, analysis of the comparative totals is in Appendix C. The significance of this 
becomes even stronger when the analysis produces a significant and positive relationship 
between present use of credit and which monthly income bracket the household falls into (see 
Appendix D: 2). 
Whilst 40% of households without credit report themseves as being in the lowest income bracket 
(as opposed to 20.3% of credit users), nearly 40% of the credit-holding households are in the 
highest income bracket - households with credit also dominated in the middle-income bracket 
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(C$ 1501 - 2500), by 40.6% to 25.3%. This must still be treated with caution, however, since 
correlation does not demonstrate that possession of credit guarantees a higher income, 
particularly if it is not known whether credit clients were selected from higher income brackets in 
the first place. Given the considerable evidence that most microfmance organisations impose 
entry barriers to access credit, such as possession of property62, a business that has been running 
for two years before the application is made63 or some other form of guarantee, which way round 
the relationship works is impossible to detect from the evidence so far. Despite there being a 
relationship between length of residence on a property, as we have seen, use of regression 
analysis was unable to discern any difference between credit-holding and non-credit households 
in terms of actual existence of property titles, the most usual form of guarantee; given that entry 
barriers do exist this is something perhaps unexpected, except that the usual form of guarantee 
asked for by microfmance organisations is proof of the existence of a business, assets and 
income, so that possession of a property title may be less relevant. 
Income, then, is one variable that appears to constitute a supportive link to the possession of 
credit, given the significant and positive relationship between the total of credit applied for and 
total household income, but again there is little evidence to suggest which way causation runs 
(see Appendix D: 3). 91.8% of those households in the lowest monthly income bracket are in the 
lowest loan total bracket (C$ 0- 1000), with only 8.2% in the higher loan total bracket (C$1001 
upwards). In the highest monthly income bracket the total in the lowest loan total bracket is still 
high, 70.1%, but now 29.9% are in the higher loan total bracket. There is a slight cautionary note 
to be added to the variable reporting total household income, however, at least as far as the 
aggregated database is concerned (the database from the main survey before being split into two 
with the addition of the third credit-holder survey). 
As significant as the presence of a valid income/credit relationship is that although there appears 
to be no gender differentiated pattern when the gender of the respondent only is used for replies 
62 Personal interview with Director of Credit at FIDESA, Ulises Garcia Montano, FIDESA, 10/12/99 63 Personal interview with Sr Victor Telleria Gabuardi, gerente of FAMA, 18/11/99 
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to the question of household income, when the interviewer gender is introduced a distinct pattern 
of bias enters where female interviewers are concerned. 33.3% of men and 35.7% of women 
interviewed by men put themselves in the lower income bracket, in this case C$ 0-2000, whereas 
67.6% of men interviewed by women and 51.1% of women interviewed by women put 
themselves in the lower income bracket (see Appendix D: 4). 
Further analysis from the aggregated database seems to indicate that the above pattern of 
response may spring from a clear bias, a `perceived contribution response' (Sen 1990), that 
appears to exist within that set of responses reporting female income by both genders. 41.9% of 
men interviewed put female income in the household in the lowest bracket (C$ 0-750 monthly), 
as opposed to 23.8% of women (Appendix D: 5). This might well speak to the literature 
concerning persistent undervaluing of women's income contributions: "Systematic 
undervaluation of women's contributions or needs, in a system where these are important 
distributive principles, would reinforce gender-related deprivation. " (Agarwal 1997, p. 20). 
The reported total by men and women of female income in the middle bracket (C$ 751-1500) 
varied again, with men putting 37.8% of female income in this bracket to women's estimates of 
45.2%, and for the top bracket (C$ 1501 upwards) men only put 20.3% of female earnings in this 
bracket, as opposed to 31.0% for women. The significance of this relationship would certainly 
appear to provide strong support for the literature on the undervaluing of female work in the 
household by men, however caution is necessary; if a semi-co-operative household model as 
discussed previously is accepted, it may well be that neither partner knows exactly what the other 
earnsM. Certainly anecdotal evidence from the local interviewers suggests that men frequently 
conceal the true amount of their income from their partners, to keep some back, and there is no 
reason to doubt that some women at least might do the same as a `fall-back' (Agarwal, Op. Cit. ), 
thus creating domestic forms of `hidden knowledge' within the semi-co-operative household. 
64 Certainly other research has revealed the phenomena of retention of a part of individual income by partners in 
other areas of the world - see for example Frankenberg and Thomas 2001 
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The same pattern continues through to the separate credit and non-credit databases, and as we can 
see when analysed against the gender of the interviewer a similar pattern emerges, although once 
again on the male interviewer side the relationship is invalidated by the paucity of male 
interviewers. On the female side, 47.4% of men report female income to the household as being 
in the lowest income bracket to female interviewers, as opposed to only 23.5% of men to male 
interviewers. 
As interesting a question is why there appears to be no differentiation in the reporting of male 
income, at least not to the extent that analysis indicates a statistically significant level. This 
difference in reporting female incomes in the household, however, must throw doubt on any other 
relationships elicited by the analysis of income, as well as reported total household income. 
Despite the occurrence of this gendered response differentiation in terms of income, it is worth 
noting that although the same differentiated pattern occurs in both the credit and the non-credit 
database, in other words that the bias occurs in the same way and virtually to the same 
percentages in both, the mean difference in total female income is considerably higher in the 
credit database, although male incomes differ a lot less. 
The next variable in which there is an undifferentiated response pattern involving possession of 
credit is the variable concerning stated transport expenditure by the household. Graphic analysis 
in Appendix C shows that average monthly expenditure by households with credit is appreciably 
higher than for non-credit households. Further analysis of the aggregated database shows a 
statistically significant relationship between possession of credit and expenditure on transport. 
47.8% of those households with credit report their income expenditure as being in the middle 
bracket of C$ 21-60 weekly, as opposed to 44.6% of those with no credit who report expenditure 
as being in the lowest bracket, C$ 0-20 (Appendix D: 7). Are the people without credit in the 
poorest segment of the population (as the total income reported between the groups might have 
us believe), or are the group with credit using more of their income in the transport needs for 
business? 
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Given the circumstances of the cheap bus transport system inside and outside Masaya, it is 
possible that credit-holders are paying more for the same quantity and type of transport, and also 
possible that credit-holders travel more, through the requirements of commercial activity. Since 
as will be shown below, the response set to the variable possession of own transport is 
differentiated by gender, it isn't feasible to investigate further in that direction. Analysis of type 
of transport owned (for those who responded positively), although it reveals that type of transport 
is not gender-differentiated, also reveals virtually no difference between credit-holders and non- 
credit households in terms of types of transport owned, the most common being a bicycle, the 
second a car, and the third category a mixture of types such as horse, horse-cart and ox-cart. 
Receipt of remittances, either from inside Nicaragua (say from a relative or partner working in 
the Zona Franca) or from Costa Rica or the USA is a phenomenon of growing importance in 
Nicaragua, as in other countries of the region. These are quantities of money sent to family 
members from migrant labour both inside and outside the country; work done by Diana Pritchard 
for CEPAL, for instance, suggests that there may be as many as a million Nicaraguans working in 
Costa Rica, and between 1 and 2 million working in the USA. In all probability the number is 
higher, and figures that have been suggested for the quantity of money sent back to Nicaragua 
each year of up to $800 million, which obviously have a substantial effect on such a relatively 
small economy. 
With this in mind, questions were added to the questionnaire to attempt to elicit more exact 
information on a micro-scale as to the implications for families in and around Masaya, thereby 
hopefully adding information to the body of literature as to the pattern of effects of remittance 
receipt (Banerjeel984, Appleyard 1989, Hoddinott 1992). In the final analysis, the quantity of 
households in the first survey who received remittances of some kind was 26.8%; furthermore, 
households with remittances emerged into two distinct groups, one group getting larger monthly 
sums and receiving money mainly from the USA, and another group getting lesser monthly sums 
receiving money mainly from Costa Rica. Families that had access to credit were less likely to be 
in regular receipt of remittances, and the aggregated database indicated that of those people with 
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access to credit 17.6% indicated that they received remittances, whereas of those with no present 
credit 30.8% were in receipt of remittances (Appendix D: 8). 
Analysis of all three databases shows no gender differentiation in respect of the question as to 
whether someone in the household receives remittances or not, however in respect of the actual 
amount received, a pattern emerges. There are indications that women who receive remittances 
receive more than men, 76.2% of women being in the higher monthly remittance bracket of 
C$301 upwards, whereas only 34.8% of men in receipt were reported as being in that bracket 
(Appendix D: 9). The differentiated pattern is repeated in the non-credit database (Appendix 
D: 10), but chi-squared analysis of the credit database shows no statistical significance at all, a 
trend that becomes more explicable in the light of our remittance tables showing credit-holders to 
be less likely to have remittances. 
In terms of credit itself, as a self-referential dynamic, there is a further suggestion from the 
survey (perhaps unsurprisingly) that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
present use of credit by the household, and use of credit in the past. Basically, households that are 
using credit at the moment are a lot more likely to have used it in the past, with 65.9% of those 
households with present credit having had credit in the past, as opposed to 34.1 % not having had 
access before (Appendix D: 11). The quantity of households stating that they had credit in the 
past, but didn't currently access it (30.6%) is slightly larger than the quantity encountered at 
random in the aggregated database that currently do have it, some 30.5%. 
Much depends on why those who had credit in the past do not have it at present, and whether this 
represents a refusal of credit, or merely a temporary decision. If the reasons behind the decision 
not to access credit again are to do with the high interest rates and short-term nature complained 
about by many of the respondents in their interviews, then arguably credit-lending in Nicaragua 
stands to decline pretty quickly as the number of suitable credit clients declines, especially if the 
microfinance organisations fail to develop the kind of flexibility that the poor economic situation 
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of Nicaragua dictates. In such a situation, Ley 374 mentioned above might prove beneficial to 
those organisations able to stay afloat with the capped interest rates dictated by the law. 
Intriguingly, this picture of past use of credit can also provide some of the time-series 
information that would be needed to fill out and validate such a credit survey. Not only is it the 
case in the credit-holding database that households with credit are more likely to have bank 
accounts (Appendix D: 12), but in the non-credit database, people who now don't have credit but 
have used it in the past are more likely to have bank accounts (Appendix D: 13). In a country such 
as Nicaragua, with a tiny middle class and where very few people trust the banks, growth of 
capital for investment is stifled both by the attitudes of the banks themselves (see chapter 4) and 
by economic instability, leading to a very slow rate of savings by the general population. This 
analysis at least suggests65 that even if there is no other positive benefit to access to and use of 
credit, it is possible that it encourages the opening and use of bank accounts66. For the private 
banking sector, however, the argument is less that there should be more bank accounts despite the 
national dearth of savings and the investment that more might bring, so much as any new 
accounts opened should be theirs 
In addition to a greater probability of using bank accounts, possession of credit in the past 
appears to be positively related to how much credit is still owed in the present, which is to say 
that those households with past experience of credit are likely to owe a lot more at present (again, 
perhaps unsurprisingly). Of those with past experience of credit (in the credit-holders database) 
only 14.6% were in the lowest credit still owing bracket, C$ 0-750, whereas 52.3% were in the 
highest bracket, C$ 2500 upwards (Appendix D: 14). For those with no past experience of credit 
the percentages were 41.7% and 13.9% respectively, a virtual reverse. 
65 Always bearing in mind that the correlative mechanism may be working in the opposite direction, and it may just 
be that microfinance organisations are more likely to pick people who already have bank accounts as clients; since 
most microfinance organisations actively encourage the opening of accounts, this may be unduly cynical. 66 However the reported totals of people with any kind of accounts for both credit-using and non-credit housing is 
very low in comparison with other areas - see e. g. Copestake, Bhalotra and Johnson 2000. 
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Lastly and in correlation with the indicators for credit-users being associated with higher total 
household 'incomes analysis gives some indication that current credit use is associated with 
significantly higher household expenditures in the area of education, medicine and food 
(Appendix D: 15,16,17). This concurs with other literature researching impact of credit access: 
"Borrowers, , across all the case-study institutions, have higher levels of education and health 
expenditures than non-borrowers, " (Mosley 1999, p. 3, see also Cheston 1999) however the 
evidence detected in the field survey is unable to confirm that these expenditures "may be 
interpreted as, a beneficent leakage from the loan proceeds into human capital investment. " For 
the reasons given above concerning which way causation runs and how it operates, it is the 
contention. of this research that stating causation with the certainty expressed above is not 
possible. 
When analysing the credit-holder database the amount of credit applied for by a credit-holder 
household, which is to say the amount of credit they were actually given, appears to be related to 
a host of peripheral variables, as well as total monthly income as we have seen above. We have to 
again be cautious with these statistical relationships, because as the next section explains, 
reporting of these costs appears to be subject to the gender-differentiation anomaly, but if these 
relationships are a truthful reflection of at least expenditure tendencies, there is still the question 
of whether higher expenditure is due to credit clients being selected from higher income brackets, 
or whether more credit expenditure than is reported is being diverted to these vital areas of 
consumption. Or indeed, are they reflective of higher profits from entrepreneurial abilities being 
channelled back into the household? 
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6.5 - Differentiated Response By Gender 
This section explores the gender-differentiated response patterns mentioned above, with an 
analysis of the problems they represent for social science enquiries67. In terms of other costs, 
analysis of the separated credit-holding and non-credit databases (as we have seen above) shows 
consistently that the mean monthly expenditure by credit-holding households is higher for 
education, medicine, food and electricity. As a note of caution, regression analysis of the 
differences in the aggregated database indicates no statistically significant relationship between 
the variable for present use of credit and these expenditures; there are, further, indications of 
differentiated response in the reporting of these costs. The sets of costs that show the biggest 
gender differentiation in the response patterns are the variables dealing with water and electricity 
costs, and food. In the aggregated database there appears to be little or no difference between 
expenditure in terms of credit-holders and non-credit household, but the database shows distinct 
differences in the stated costs paid, between genders. 
44% of women respondents (Appendix E: 1) reported their household expenditure on water 
charges as being in the highest bracket (C$ 101 upwards), whereas 45.9% of men placed their 
expenditure in the middle bracket (C$ 51 - 100), with correspondingly more men (28.4% to 
19.4%) than women in the lowest bracket (C$ 0 -50). Water costs in Nicaragua are likely to be 
highly variable in any case, depending on whether or not one is legally connected to the water 
supply, and where supply is procured from if not legal. Even a legal connection does not ensure 
uniformity of charge, but what is unclear is why women should be so strongly reporting higher 
charges than men. This difference is reflected in other expenditure, for instance electricity costs 
(Appendix E: 2), where 78.4% of men report themselves as being in the lower charge bracket (C$ 
0-150) as compared to 59.8% of women, and whereas only 21.6% of men report themselves as 
being in the highest bracket (C$ 151 upwards), 40.2% of women are in this highest bracket. 
Perhaps the strongest differentiation pattern is discernible in reported expenditure on food, where 
across the four expenditure brackets men report themselves as spending less than women, starting 
67 Although the numbers of female respondents were greater than those of male respondents (148 women to 85 men 
in the credit-holders database, for instance), the strongest patterns of gender-differentiated responses mainly emerged 
on the female side of the divide, where greater numbers appear to give more validity to the response. 
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in the lowest expenditure bracket (C$ 0- 750 monthly) where 31.4% of men as opposed to only 
17.3% of women report their household expenditure to be (Appendix E: 3). In terms of possible 
error in the methodology itself, it is highly improbable that internal error would produce such a 
consistent pattern across three separate variables, acquired from such a diverse enquiry; for 
whatever the reason, in the aggregated database women are clearly reporting their household as 
being in the higher cost brackets in each case in a statistically significant manner. This 
differentiated response pattern is not repeated for the separate credit-holding and non-credit 
databases, however, but when further analysis is done of the aggregated database by gender of 
interviewer, the pattern is expressed again with female interviewers experiencing the most 
differentiation. 
When water cost reporting is analyzed by gender of interviewer as well, although SPSS reports 
the male interviewer side as not significant or positive (due mainly to the low numbers, perhaps) 
the pattern is clearly discernible again, and even more so on the female interviewer side 
(Appendix E: 4), thus reinforcing a generalized pattern of bias that is reinforced by the gender of 
the interviewer. It is also frequently the case, however, that local workmen use their official 
capabilities in an unofficial manner to connect water and electricity supplies and pressurise 
women householders, particularly lone household heads who are more vulnerable, to pay more 
for this kind of service. 
Again, this pattern is not repeated for the (smaller) credit-holder and non-credit databases, 
although it comes close on the female interviewer side for the non-credit database. For both 
electricity costs and food costs the same pattern is repeated in the aggregated database when 
analyzed taking interviewer gender into account. The female interviewer side of the table shows 
consistently higher reporting of costs to a positive and significant degree, whereas male 
interviewers experience no such differentiation - the internal consistency of this pattern with 
reference to household costs is remarkable., The credit-holder database, however, only displays a 
significant relationship of respondent gender by electricity costs and none at all when the variable 
for interviewer gender is introduced. The non-credit database shows significance for both food 
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costs and electricity, with water costs very close to significance. When the interviewer variable is 
introduced, all three sets of costs show the same pattern as the aggregated database, but lack 
significance on the male interviewer side because of the lack of interviews. There is also a 
relationship between water costs and length of residence of the household on the property 
indicated by the survey, as well as ownership of other property, however given the gender bias 
shown above concerning expenditure on water, the tables are not shown here. 
For the aggregated database, gender bias is introduced in the variable that deals with the gender 
of the credit-holder. Again, as with the variables dealing with responsibilities for education and 
medical costs, the responses between genders are virtual images of each other68.47.8% of men 
interviewed reported the credit-holder in the household as being male, as opposed to 31.4% of 
women reporting the holder to be male. Alternatively, women reported the credit-holder to be 
female in 45.1% of the interviews, whereas men would admit that the holder was female in only 
15.2% of interviews (Appendix E: 5). As perhaps might be expected, the analysis for the credit- 
holders database produces an even more extreme symmetry, to the extent that the 'couple 
disagreement' and both' categories have been reduced to virtual insignificance. In this database 
(Appendix E: 6) 86.4% of men interviewed report the credit-holder in the household as being 
male, whereas 86.5% of women interviewed reported the credit-holder as being a woman. 
Plainly, there is bias in the reporting according to gender, and given the specific targeting of 
women by microfinance organisations generally and in Nicaragua in particular (see Chapters 1 
and 5), it is improbable that there are as many men holding credit as male respondents would 
have us believe. 
The gendered pattern is continued for the variable constituted by the question of who in the 
household is stated by the respondent to be responsible for repaying the loan, which according to 
analysis of the aggregated database is statistically significant in terms of the gender of the 
respondent. Again we see the diametrically opposed pattern of allocation of responsibilities, 
where 44.2% of males state a male is responsible, and 50% of women allocate responsibility to 
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females, with relatively high levels of couple disagreement on the male side (Appendix E: 7). This 
again is further differentiated when the gender of the interviewer is introduced, although again 
the male interviewer responses are outside the level of significance required because of the 
smaller number of interviews with male respondents (Appendix E: 8). Again perhaps 
unsurprisingly, this gendered response pattern is seen even more strongly in the credit-holding 
database, where 72.1% of men report a male as being responsible for repayment of household 
credit, whereas 61.9% of women report a woman as being responsible (Appendix E: 9). Plainly 
again it is highly unlikely that these reported totals reflect a true picture of the situation, 
especially when the pattern is clearly repeated when the gender of the interviewer is introduced as 
a variable (Appendix E: 10). 
Other more peripheral relationships that are suggested include a positive link between the total of 
credit owed and whether or not transport is owned by a member of the household, with a strong 
indication that the more credit that is owed, the more likely it is that transport be owned. Given 
the suggestion of gender bias that we have seen above so far as the ownership of transport by the 
household is concerned, however, it is necessary to use caution with other relationships 
associated with the variable, and the table is not produced here. Other gender-differentiated 
activities are more clearly suggested, such as the gender of the credit-holder being linked to the 
variable dealing with whether or not the household does deals on food. With this, however, again 
it is necessary to be cautious because of the doubts thrown on the gender of the credit-holder. 
This question was carefully explained by the interviewers to include such phenomena as deals 
with relatives who have stalls in local markets, being 'special clients' of a market stall or pulperia 
and receiving lower prices, or simply bartering with friends or family to swap products of afinca 
or patio business with something else required for the household (Appendix E: 11). 
68 It is also interesting to note the relatively high level of couple disagreement 
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Although the numbers involved in this kind of dealing or bartering are relatively small, the 
response pattern suggests a significant and positive relationship with the stated gender of the 
credit-holder, it being predominantly women who are responsible for such deals; in the credit- 
holder database the link is even stronger, and 196 respondents out of 231 are involved in some 
type of deals for food, as opposed to 66 out of 318 for the aggregated database. According to 
SPSS, the relationship does not hold for the gender of the respondent, nor to that of the 
titleholder, and so would appear to be linked solely to credit-holder behaviour, if the degree of 
accuracy of the credit-holder gender were possible to verify. An additional piece of evidence is 
evinced from the aggregated database, suggesting that whether or not a household does deals on 
food is linked positively and in a statistically significant way to whether or not the household has 
credit, irrespective of gender (Appendix E: 13). 41.2 % of Households with credit report doing 
deals on food, as opposed to only 25% of those without. 
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6.6 - Comparative Non-Significant Analysis Between Credit-Holding And Non- 
Credit Households 
These variables, as above, are examined in the order in which they appear in the questionnaire 
under the various group headings; they are the variables for which SPSS indicates no statistically 
significant relationships. There are distinct if smaller variations in some of these variables 
between credit-holding and non-credit households, however, and the variables are themselves of 
interest69, especially where gender-differentiation is evident in the responses. The first variable 
that is examined deals with whether or not a title exists for the property in which the respondent 
lives. There are a number of interesting points to this, not the least of which is how high the `yes' 
response in both credit-holding and non-credit groups is; 96.8% of households without credit and 
94.4% of households with credit reported there being a legal title to the property, percentages that 
seem extremely unlikely given the known problems of land entitlement in Nicaragua (see Chapter 
4). The situation is further complicated by the existence of partial titles, for instance where a 
property may have been awarded a provisional entitlement under the revolutionary regime but not 
have had that title accepted and registered in the cadastre and the property register. 
Another interesting situation is outlined by the variable denoting the gender of the titleholder, 
which we will analyse in some detail. At this point, however, it may well be worth mentioning 
that in each database there were 85 men interviewed, with 136 women in the non-credit and 148 
in the credit database. The imbalance between the two genders is a product of the random way in 
which the interviewees were selected initially, compounded by the fact that women are a large 
majority amongst credit-holders in Nicaragua anyway, given the policies of micro-finance 
organisations. The proportion of men to women certainly affected capacity to analyse some of the 
gender-differentiated response properly, however many of these gender-differentiated responses 
did not become obvious until analysis was already under way, by which time it was too late. In 
households without credit, men were reported as titleholders in 35.3% of the cases and women in 
69 Their apparent lack of statistical significance may also simply be the result of low numbers in the sample, for 
instance. 
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46.2%, with small percentages for combined titleholders, whereas in households with credit men 
were reported as titleholders in only 34.6% of interviews, whereas women were reported as 
titleholders in 49.8% of cases. Taken at face value (irrespective of the ratio of male to female 
respondents) this would appear to indicate that in valid percentage terms, in Masaya and its' 
surrounds female titleholders outnumber males by 4.5%; this indication is considerably at odds 
with much published research into gendered land ownership in Nicaragua. Closer examination of 
these surprising figures, however, indicates that the figures should be treated with some caution. 
Correlating indicated title ownership by gender of respondent, men report male titleholders in 
51.8% of interviews, whereas women report men as titleholders in only 30.5% of cases; men 
report women as titleholders in 38.1% of cases, whereas women report women as titleholders in 
54.6% of interviews (Appendix E: 13). Following the third set of interviews, where the resultant 
databases are split into credit-holders and non-credit-holders, the differentiation becomes even 
more pronounced (Appendix E: 14, E: 15). Thus male respondents report proportionately far 
higher numbers of male title-holders, whereas female respondents report more female title- 
holders; it appears that credit-holding respondents report more female titleholders of land, but not 
by a large amount. This response pattern vis-ä-vis respondent gender is further complicated when 
interviewer gender is introduced (Appendix E: 16). At this point, regrettably, the smaller number 
of male respondents interferes with the data, at least for the larger aggregated database; the same 
pattern is repeated for the credit-holders database and the non-credit database (Appendix E: 17, 
E: 18). 
It would be impossible without further investigation to hazard a guess as to the causality of such 
strangely symmetrical response patterns, but the evidence above, crude though it is, makes it 
plain that there is a statistically significant difference in the way men and women respond to the 
question of the gender of the titleholder of their property, and that this answer differs again 
depending on whether the interviewer is a man or a woman. The tendency appears to be (always 
allowing for the unequal numbers of male- and female- conducted interviews) that each gender 
exaggerates the percentage of titleholders to the opposite gender, and this pattern of exaggerated 
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response to the opposite gender is something that is repeated in the tables that follow, in a 
number of different areas. It would be tempting to ascribe these and subsequent differentiated 
response patterns as pertaining to the strongly patriarchal culture of Nicaragua, however there are 
a multiplicity of `noise' factors that would make this inappropriate, such as the reported efforts of 
the FSLN during the revolution to re-distribute land to women, or a mistrust by locals of external 
questioners. One other variable was associated with the reported gender of the titleholder that 
was, interestingly, the amount paid in electricity costs monthly, but since the above suggests 
good reason to doubt the reported gender of the titleholder this variable is not explored at present. 
An interesting network of relationships is constructed around the variable dealing with migrants 
to the household within the last five years, a network which exemplifies how complex the 
surveys indicate family socio-economic relationships to be, and how interdependent many of the 
variable are. The analysis below shows a slight difference between the credit-holder database and 
non-credit-holder database in terms of whether any migrants have moved to the household within 
the last five years, but there is an indication that for the initial aggregated database, the variable is 
not related to possession of present credit. In the aggregated database only 15% of households 
report that someone has come to live in their household within the last five years, and the total is 
slightly higher in the credit-holding database (16.4%). 
What the analysis reveals is a statistically significant relationship between the migrant variable 
and possession of credit in the past (a time period not defined). 25% of households that had 
received credit in the past had also had migrants within the last five years, as opposed to only 
9.5% of those with no past credit use (Appendix E: 19). Possession of credit in the past is 
indicated by SPSS to be related to a whole host of other variables among which is present 
possession of credit (as demonstrated above), which might appear to be contradictory depending 
on which way causality flows; there appears to be no gender differentiation in answers to the 
migrant variable, however whether migrants have come to live in the household within the last 
five years does appear to be related to whether anyone in the household owns their own transport, 
the responses to which question, are affected by gender differentiation. Irrespective of the 
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statistical inferences arrived at, it is necessary to be very cautious about the expanding network of 
relationships that appear to have been drawn by this mechanism. It is also extremely difficult 
(although relevant and certainly necessary) to differentiate between dynamic or causal variables 
(such as current possession of credit), and peripheral variables that are factors of the causal ones 
(such as household possession of transport). 
Possession of other propert y70 is also a factor that (perhaps unsurprisingly) is related to other 
aspects of credit possession, although there appears to be at first glance little difference between 
the quantities of credit-holders and non-credit-holders that actually possess secondary (or more) 
properties. 20% of respondents in the non-credit database report possession of at least one other 
property, whereas for the credit-holding database the percentage is slightly higher at 22.6% 
(Appendix E: 20). Interestingly, analysis indicates that possession of other property is (lightly) 
related to possession of credit in the past, although an additional question added to the last survey 
was unable to establish any indications of credit being used directly for the purchase of other 
property. 51.6% of respondents in the aggregated database who had reported ownership of 
another property also reported past credit use, whereas 48.4% of those with no past credit access 
also had property. 
Households that have had credit in the past are therefore significantly more likely to have other 
property, and furthermore possession of other property is indicated as being linked to the amount 
of credit currently possessed for (and by extension credit still owed), especially in the top band of 
C$10,000 and upwards. Again, the question is raised as to the exact direction of the causality of 
this relationship. Household respondents declaring possession of other properties are heavily 
represented in the upper bracket for total credit applied for (C$ 10,000 and upwards), at 45.8% of 
respondents as opposed to only 11.9% of those with no other properties. For those not declaring 
possession of other properties, 50.7% of the whole are in the lowest bracket of total credit applied 
70 Apart from the property in which the household is resident. 
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for (C$ 0-2,500) (Appendix E: 21). This is perhaps unsurprising, since possession of more than 
one property (by Nicaraguan standards) would very definitely place a household in at least the 
category of better-off poor, and therefore the propensity to consume credit and confidence in 
applying for larger sums might be assumed to be greater. 
Responsibility for various household tasks is an area that produces some extremely varied 
responses. In response to the general question of who has responsibility for doing the household 
chores, there is no significant variation between credit and non-credit households, and correlating 
this set of replies by gender doesn't indicate any differentiation either". When the general 
question is broken down into specific areas, however, the patterns of response are extremely 
varied. Starting with the area of childcare responsibility, a cursory glance at the analysis for both 
credit-holding and non-credit-holding databases seems to indicate a distinct difference between 
credit and non-credit households, specifically that there appears to be far more sharing of this 
task in households with credit. 
Regrettably the lack of male respondents who admitted to being responsible for childcare made 
analysis of the credit-holding and non-credit databases invalid, however analysis of the 
aggregated database shows some interesting differentiation by gender of respondent and 
interviewer, even if statistically it is just outside the bounds of significance (Appendix E: 22). 
High levels of women and men stated a shared responsibility to male interviewers, whereas 
women stated a far higher level of female-only responsibility to female interviewers. It would be 
interesting to know whether the number of both men and women who admit male responsibility 
for childcare to female interviewers is simply the product of higher numbers of interviews, or 
possibly an entirely different interpretation of what exactly constitutes childcare. Again, a 
concrete and statistically significant response pattern, in terms of gender at least, is interrupted 
not just by the low level of male/male interviews, but also by the low levels of men claiming 
responsibility for childcare. For the credit-holding and non-credit databases the number of 
71 It might well be that the household chores are such a concrete part of the female realm in the local culture that no 
motive for concealment/exaggeration is present with this variable. 
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insufficient responses is obviously higher and therefore the gender-differentiated patterns, 
although similar to the above, are at present not sufficiently valid to show here. 
To the question as to whether anyone in the household made earnings out of selling or bartering 
anything besides the main income earners, there was a small but distinct difference between non- 
credit (6.3% of households with patio earnings) and credit-holding households (14.3% of 
households with patio earnings) in the aggregated, credit and non-credit databases, in which 
people in credit-holding households were more likely to be involved in some kind of patio 
business. Analysis of the aggregated database deemed this bartering/selling difference to be 
statistically significant for both past and present credit-holders. The analysis is rendered more 
concrete by the suggestion that answers concerning participation in patio businesses seem to be 
unaffected by gender differentiation, and here another facet is added to the set of differences 
between credit-holders and non-credit households - not only are they more likely to have higher 
earnings, possess other properties and be spending more on transport, medical costs, education 
and food, they are also more likely to be involved in the patio economy. Once again, however, we 
have to be careful not to imply causation from correlation. 
Gender-differentiated response patterns were also evinced in questions concerning household 
possession of transport (which includes, it should be noted, bicycles). Analysis of the separate 
credit-holding and non-credit databases shows little difference between percentages of 
households where one or more member have their own transport, indicating at first glance72 an 
area of little interest. Although there appears to be little difference between credit-holding and 
non-credit households, as perhaps might be expected there is a statistically significant difference 
between responses from male and female respondents in terms of household ownership of 
transport, in the aggregated database; 71.7% of male respondents declared possession of some 
kind of transport by the household, as opposed to only 58.2% of female respondents (Appendix 
E: 23). Interestingly, this gender difference virtually disappears in the credit-holding database, but 
72 Despite a marginally higher percentage of credit-holding households stating ownership of some kind of transport, 
64.1% as opposed to 59.7% 
236 
is more pronounced in the non-credit database, where 71.5% of male respondents report a form of 
transport owned by the household, as opposed to 55.6% of female respondents (Appendix E: 24). 
The indication is that whilst marginally fewer men report household possession of some form of 
transport amongst credit-holders, there is very little difference, percentage-wise, between female 
and male respondents (Appendix E: 25). 
The gender difference in reported household ownership of transport is apparently statistically 
insignificant in credit-holding households. Further analysis of the aggregated database, however, 
indicates that although there is similar differentiation between genders in reported ownership of 
transport, there is no statistically significant difference when the variable for interviewer gender 
is introduced. This is not the case for the non-credit database, where gender-differentiated 
response patterns are visible when tested by interviewer gender (Appendix E: 26). What this 
appears to suggest is that in non-credit households both men and women report lower and less 
unequal levels of transport-possession to female interviewers than to male interviewers - the 
credit-holding database follows the client-only gender pattern - does this indicate that the 
evidence is more reliable, and if so why? The aggregated database indicates that possession of 
transport is also positively correlated with other variables, such as whether the household has had 
other people coming to live there in the last five years, and whether or not members of the 
household possess bank accounts. These are eminently reasonable relationships, since we might 
feel that with more people in the household the likelihood of transport ownership is higher, and 
that households with bank accounts are likely to be either better off or at least involved in some 
form of economic activity where transport possession is more likely. 
The problem is that as has already been shown, the gender-differentiation indicates that there is 
already reason to doubt these responses. Furthermore, when both the recent migration variable 
and the bank account variable again possession of transport are analysed in the separate credit- 
holding and non-credit databases against the gender of the client, the relationship only holds in 
the non-credit database. Does this imply that household with credit experience differently- 
structured gender relations, and perhaps more intriguingly, if they do is this because of access to 
237 
credit, or are they more likely to be seeking and using credit because they already have different, 
perhaps more egalitarian, household structures? Because, when the same migrant and bank 
account variables are analysed against ownership within the credit-holding database, there now 
appears to be no statistically significant relationship with ownership of transport. 
A different pattern is evident with the question concerning who takes responsibility for paying for 
the children's education, where the gender-differentiated pattern holds true for all of the analysis. 
The, analysis of the credit-holding and non-credit households indicates that there are differences 
between the two groups of respondents, where although the reported incidence of each gender 
having responsibility differs little, but where the most significant difference between the two is 
that the credit-holding households (Appendix E: 27) report a far higher incidence of shared burden 
for education costs, 36.8% as opposed to only 17.6% in the non-credit households (Appendix 
E: 28). 
Analysis of the aggregated database, however, plainly shows differentiated response patterns by 
gender that cast the above analysis into doubt. Clearly, less male respondents state that females in 
the household are responsible for paying educational costs (13.1%) than do females themselves 
(39.3%), and men indicate a higher level of shared responsibility than do women, by 51.2% to 
36.1% (Appendix E: 29). This pattern is repeated in the analysis of the non-credit household 
dataset (Appendix E: 30), and reflected more strongly in the credit-holding dataset, with an 
increased level of reported shared responsibility (Appendix E: 31). When analysed by interviewer 
gender and client gender, unfortunately the problem of insufficient male interviews re-occurred, 
although the analysis of the aggregated database showed the pattern to continue, even though the 
response analysis for the male interview set was not within the bounds of positive and significant 
(Appendix E: 32). Clearly, both genders present a mirror image of levels of stated responsibility 
for paying educational costs. Apparently (allowing for the higher levels of numbers of 
interviews), male respondents are inclined to exaggerate their levels of responsibility to female 
interviewers, and so do female respondents; male respondents apparently state a higher level of 
joint responsibility to male interviewers. 
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A very similar pattern is observed over the question of who takes responsibility in the household 
for the payment of medical costs, where the aggregated database the percentages allocated by 
each gender for responsibility is also significant in claiming for itself the burdens of 
responsibility, males allocating responsibility to males in 35.2% of the interviews, and females 
allocating responsibility to females in exactly the same proportion - men also allocate shared 
responsibility in 60.2% of interviews, far higher than females at 45.2% (Appendix E: 33). The 
pattern is repeated along the same lines in both the credit-holding (Appendix E: 34) and non- 
credit households (Appendix E: 35). Unfortunately the problem of paucity of male/male 
interviews interferes against the results, apart from the table for the credit-holders, although 
numbers are still small (Appendix E: 36). 
Although both the response sets to the questions relating to responsibility for educational costs 
and medical costs appear to be biased by the gender-differentiated response patterns shown 
above, they also indicate gender-differentiation in other ways. Both questions indicate gender 
sensitivity to length of residence, i. e. how long the household has been resident at its' current 
location. The indications from both questions in the aggregated database are that responsibility 
for both medical and educational costs devolves to the females of the household the longer the 
household has been resident at its' current location, which holds for the credit-holding and non- 
credit databases as well (Appendix E: 37, E: 38). 
Both responsibilities for medical costs and educational costs appear, perhaps less spectacularly, 
to be related to the variable numbers of people working in the household in a statistically 
significant manner. Responsibility for both sets of costs in households with more than one person 
working devolves rapidly towards a combined/shared responsibility, a trend that is followed by 
both credit and non-credit household databases. Additionally, both variables appear to be related 
to the variable concerning household ownership of another property besides the property of 
residence; in this relationship, households with other properties display an equivalent amount of 
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respondents claiming male responsibility for payment of both sets of costs, but far more suggest a 
shared responsibility than for households with no other property, which apportion the difference 
to female members of the household. Given the doubt cast on stated responsibility for both sets of 
costs by their correlation against gender of respondent and interviewer, however, it would be 
redundant to display the more peripheral analysis here. 
The next variable showing statistical significance, so far as gender differentiated answering is 
concerned, is membership of Asociaciones de Cajas de Muertos, literally `associations of boxes 
of death', or funeral expense insurance/credit organizations. Throughout Nicaragua these 
informal and unregulated organizations have been set up by organizations varying from the 
Catholic church to the FSLN, with the intentions of providing assistance for the costs of one of 
the more onerous burdens for Nicaragua's poor. The range of services that are provided by each 
association tends to vary, ranging from straightforward funeral costs to lump sum payments on 
death. The members of these organizations pay a few cordobas a week (typically C$6 per week) 
to set against the costs of family funerals, and a characteristic common to all of them irrespective 
of who sets them up, judging by the complaints of members, is how frequently the funds 
disappear or are misused. The oldest female respondent to the interviews, some 78 years of age, 
complained bitterly to the researcher that she'd been paying into her association regularly since 
the death of her husband some 38 years ago, and there hadn't been one death for which she was 
responsible for in all that time. 
The evidence from the credit and non-credit databases shows a slight variation between the two 
sets, with credit-holding households being slightly less likely to be using these associations 
(26.8% to34.4%, Appendix E: 39). The aggregated database appears to show no gender- 
differentiation when the variable for the question asking if anyone in the household is a member 
of an association is correlated against the gender of the respondent (Appendix E: 40). When the 
next level of analysis of respondent gender and interviewer gender is arrived at, however, the 
table shows a significant and positive result for those respondents interviewed by a female 
interviewer, and supposing this result is not a statistical anomaly there may be a number of 
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reasons for this. Membership of such groups may have an undisclosed social stigma to do with 
the revolutionary period, or simply the perception that people involved in such groups are the 
poorest, however why that should attract a gendered bias is unknown. Analysis indicates that 
both men and women are both less likely to indicate membership of an association to a woman 
than a man (bearing in mind that the number of male interviewer interviews is 55 against 259); 
this pattern doesn't hold for the credit-holding database, but carries through to the non-credit 
household database (Appendix E: 41). 
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6.7 - Conclusion 
As the chapters preceding this one have shown, there is no simple solution to a complex 
problem, and there are few problems more complex than the causation of poverty. In this chapter 
and the methodology in Chapter 3 the value of a diverse approach to field surveys has been 
amply demonstrated in the number of different levels of the database analysis by the SPSS 
software. These not only allow statistically significant socio-economic phenomena to be 
highlighted, but can also point out the possible problems in analysing them or allocating them 
undue importance, when experimental background `noise' such as differentiated gender response 
patterns cloud the data. The use of such tools, instead of constituting the body of the analysis by 
themselves, compliment the more intangible datasets such as the analysis of the socio-economic 
context at local, national and international levels. In this way the methodology used in the field 
survey has a strong contribution to make for organisations seeking to ensure that: 
"... institutional success be defined by the degree to which MFls identify and satisfy 
the needs and wants (expressed and latent) of the very poor. The surest way to 
achieve long-term financial self-sufficiency AND to remain true to the MFI's social 
mission is to identify the needs and wants of the very poor and to provide products 
and services of value to them. " (Woller 2002, p. 21) 
The preceding chapters have covered the breadth of the political economy in which the 
microfmance sector as a whole operates, with the intention of analysing the external and internal 
processes and dynamics that make examining the effects of credit provision as an isolated and 
discrete factor in the economy, virtually impossible. This chapter and the previous chapter have 
presented a body of analytical material in which the anatomy of the microfinance sector is 
described in some detail, and in which microfinance has a vital role to play in a number of areas, 
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not the least of which is policy on the systems and processes by which the growth of RNAI, a 
vital area in poverty alleviation strategies, is promoted: "Policies aimed at the rural sector must 
be oriented toward providing incentives ('engines') that stimulate households to participate in 
rural non-agricultural jobs, as well as the capacity of households to respond to such signals. " 
(Berdegue, J. A., Reardon, T., Escobar, G. and Echeverri, R. 2000, pp. 5-6) The purpose in 
providing this data has been, as stated in the chapter (2) on the methodology, to explain the 
multiplicity of paths through which microfinance in Nicaragua operates and demonstrate the 
difficulty of comparing like with like in terms of assessing the impact of such organisations. 
This chapter has also presented evidence that contests the sole use of questionnaires in attempting 
to assess the impact of credit on individuals and individual households. The evidence suggests 
that the manner in which questionnaires are employed needs to take more account of phenomena 
such as the gender-differentiated patterns described above, and that rather than being used on 
their own they should be used in combination with other analytical tools that fill in some of the 
complex detail ever-present in human society. There are a variety of reasons why question-based 
analysis may pick up an inaccurate picture from respondents, among them the high rate of 
illiteracy in the country, the low rate of completion of primary education and the extremely low 
percentage of people with bank accounts and written financial records. 
In terms of the gendered aspect of questioning there are, as has been pointed, out areas of 
questioning where the gender-differentiated response patterns did not occur, and an interesting 
question is why this should be. The differentiated pattern itself can be allowed for if its' presence 
is suspected and measured, but obviously not if the evidence presented in questionnaires is taken 
at face value. Furthermore, this chapter strongly suggests that the questionnaire evidence should 
be used not as a strict measure of numerical values to be fed into a linear equation, but as 
indicative of socio-economic patterns adhering to credit use. This is shown in the statistically 
significant relationships detected by regression-based database analysis, which in combination 
with the spatial patterns detected in the mapping exercise provide a focus on areas that may be of 
vital importance to credit-users and hence, to microfinance organisations. In this, the survey 
takes the intermediate argument postulated by Copestake, Balhotra and Johnstone (2000, p. 3), 
which: 
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"trusts more in the ability of practitioners to interpret and be guided by a mixture of 
routine monitoring and qualitative studies, more akin to market research than to 
academic research [Hyman and Dearden, 1998; Cheston and Reed, 1999]. " 
The intention behind the survey presented in this chapter was originally to widen the focus of 
enquiry to include as many different local, household and individual phenomena as possible. In 
doing so, the survey has at once opened up new avenues of exploration that move away from 
strict econometric measurements. This thesis asserts that, for the multiplicity of causal factors 
presented, there are better ways to improve at least the coverage and use of microfmance, if 
enough effort is made to examine closely vital micro-scale factors and processes; the need to 
achieve such an improvement is made all the more vital when it is realised that many 
microfmance organisations are experiencing drop-out rates of between 40-60% (Richardson 
2000). These are also the same processes and factors that are central to the continuity and 
improved economic circumstances of the vital informal, multiple employment lifestyle which a 
large majority of the population of Nicaragua are forced to endure, given the current economic 
circumstances of the country. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
"After all, credit is a two-edged tool. To a borrower, credit means debt, and debt can destroy as 
easily as it can build. If we seek to help people lift themselves out of poverty, we will want to 
know that they were poor when they started borrowing and they were less poor as a result of 
borrowing. We don't want to see them stuck, cycle after cycle, earning low returns. Just knowing 
that we increased the debt of 100 million people will not tell us that we accomplished what we 
set out to do, even if we delivered that debt in a financially viable manner. " 
Suzy Cheston & Larry Reed (1999) `Measuring Transformation: Assessing and Improving the 
Impact of Microcredit', paper given at the Microcredit Summit Meeting of Councils in Abidjan, 
Cöte d'Ivoire, 24-26 June 1999. 
7.1 - Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine in five sections the implications for future 
microfmance theory and practice derived from the analysis of the preceding chapters, providing 
an overview of the most essential points and to conclude each section with a set of policy 
considerations. Starting with the chapters on the hegemony of Neo-liberalism and structural 
adjustment, the first section discusses how microfmance generally, and microcredits in 
particular, are becoming heavily influenced by an institutionist discourse (see Chapter 1) that 
itself owes much to the economistic precepts of the neo-liberal discourse. The section goes on to 
discuss how research into microfmance is being increasingly influenced by demands for self- 
sustainability (for a particularly good example see Robinson, Op. Cit., 2001), and that in common 
with structural adjustment, rather than such programmes being designed with reference to the 
local socio-economy and macro-economic conditions, the pressure to move quickly towards self- 
sustainable lending programmes is leading to a one-size-fits-all-approach. 
245 
The need for more appropriate credit instruments to stem high drop-out rates from microfmance 
programmes is one response to this pressure, and one which calls for innovative and sensitive 
research which, as Chapter 6 pointed out, was an issue central to the fieldwork and, indeed, the 
thesis as a whole. It has already been argued that the organizations themselves are vulnerable to 
hostility from the formal banking sector, as well as national political groupings, and the pressure 
on microfmance organisations to `drift' from their mission towards becoming more traditional 
banking operations in pursuit of greater profitability. Despite the large quantities of money 
available for microfinance in Nicaragua (see Chapter 5), penetration is still insufficient to have 
had any discernible macro-economic effects, and the institutional drive towards self- 
sustainability at once exacerbates the narrow focus on the middle-ranking poor, at the same time 
as ignoring and weakening experimental initiatives targeting the poorest73. Approaches that focus 
on the poorest by their very nature tend to incur extra expense for higher staffing costs and client 
training, thereby rendering self-sustainability as a secondary objective. Microfmance as an 
effective means to effect of poverty alleviation, as has been discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, is 
being held hostage to an essentially ideological view of what it should become. 
The second section concludes that the current exercise of a bipartite division of political power 
within Nicaragua not only undermines effectiveness that might be hoped from structural reforms 
of the state and the economy, but also represents a threat to the governance and accountability 
which ASOMIF-member microfmance organisations in Nicaragua could be said to possess in 
greater abundance than does the formal banking sector. It further suggests that these 
organisations, already obliged to bow to the political realities of the country (see for instance the 
discussion on Ley 374 in Chapters 5 and 6), will decline in effectiveness in any move towards the 
generalised alleviation of poverty if they fall under the same opaque and unregulated political 
influences. 
73 As for example indicated by personal interviews conducted by the author with Sr Victor Telleria Gabuardi and Sr 
Ulises Garcia Montano of FAMA and FIDESA respectively, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 
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This theme is continued by discussing how the placing of microcredit lending at the top of the 
microfmance agenda, as well as dramatically increasing its' importance to the wider 
development agenda in particular coincides with the decline in US aid (in particular but by no 
means in isolation) to Nicaragua in real terms. The enthusiasm from USAID and the IADB 
towards microfinance reflects a move toward sustainable lending projects that both promote 
ideals of entrepreneurism, and hold out the apparent promise of a finite temporal limit to aid 
donations. The highlighting of the specifics of microfmance within the political economy of 
Nicaragua discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 is discussed, starting with the limitations placed on the 
effectiveness of all NGOs within an effective dictatorship (see Chapter 4 in particular), and the 
hostility arouse by organisations operating outside state and party political control. 
The third section discusses the increasing restrictions placed on formal credit through the 
inflation-controlling activities of the BCN74, as well as the high interest rate policies that attract 
dollars for investment and for vital foreign currency reserves to make up for the constant 
depletions caused by rescuing private banks (see Chapters 4 and 5). As a counterpoint, this part 
completes the analysis of the formal banking sector by discussing the decline of the state banking 
sector at the behest of the IFIs, concluding that the comparatively small amount of new credit 
produced by microfmance programmes has done little to close the gap in credit provision. The 
comparatively small amount of (particularly agricultural credit) that is available is offered at 
interest rates reflecting only the short-term gain of the formal banking sector. Plainly, in terms of 
policy considerations, there is a large theoretical and practical gap in access to finance, between 
the quantity and type of credit offered by the formal banking sector and the quantities of 
microfmance currently on offer in Nicaragua, which innovative forms of credit adjusted to local 
realities could play a vital part in filling. 
The collapse and continued lack of supervision of the banking sector is plainly beneficial to elite 
groupings who, as well as participating in the looting of bank assets, have privileged access to 
74 From 1990 to 1997, credit offered in Nicaragua, expressed as a percentage of GDP, dropped from 206.6% to 148.6% - see Wenner and Proenza (2000) 
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credit and are using the collapse of the rural economy to buy up valuable coffee-growing land, 
land earmarked for the putative dry canal/wet canal project, and land strategically important to 
the future growth of the offshore oil industry in Nicaragua (see Chapter 4). Effectively this 
corrupt system of elite banking access and misuse is paid for by increasing the external debt, the 
costs of servicing and forgiveness of which is levied from taxpayers in the donor countries and 
regressive taxation of the Nicaraguan poor. In the absence of international will to take effective 
economic action to change this situation, at the current rate of growth in Nicaragua and under the 
current orthodox economic ideology, microfmance is likely only ever to be a minor palliative to 
the increased immiseration of the increasing numbers of poor. 
Leading on from the above, the fourth section re-emphasizes how impact evaluations of 
microfinance to date have chiefly involved accounting evaluations of the organizations 
themselves, whereas the methodology used in this thesis (see Chapter 3) attempts to take 
cognisance of the evaluation of all of the above socio-economic concerns in which microfmance 
operates in Nicaragua. This section describes how the thesis sought to elicit trends and patterns 
that might lead to the development of a clearer and more participative approach to what it is that 
microfinance actually does and could do, with a particular focus on the necessity for accurate, 
gender-sensitive analysis. Given the vast and growing network of formal and semi-formal 
commercial networks in which women play at least as important a part as men (see Chapter 4), 
initiatives that seek to analyse and assist these peripatetic, migrant commercial networks dealing 
in a multiplicity of goods can and should play an increased role in fostering rural-urban 
economic patterns, as part of a `development-pole' strengthening force driven by Nicaraguan 
micro-economic reality. 
The discussion emphasizes that the particular combination of mapping and questionnaire work 
developed in this thesis has the potential not only to provide `hard' economic data and the 
statistical analysis to point out important, fluid dynamic relationships involving credit, but also 
sets them in a geographic framework which is vitally important in analysing the determinant 
processes behind the type of migrant/seasonal labouring, female/multiple-headed, extended 
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household economic groups. The section also emphasizes that this kind of analysis goes hand-in- 
hand with the wider systemic analysis, not just of the formal structure of a microfinance 
organisation or group of organisations, but the changing legal and political environment in which 
they work. In order to undertake this kind of analysis properly, the research contained within the 
thesis implies that a similarly graduated process to that contained in this fieldwork, undertaken 
through multiple stages and over time should be used. 
The fifth section discusses the more vital aspects of the survey results in the light of the above, 
with particular reference to the gendered response patterns (see Chapter 6). Although plainly an 
important aim of the data was to pick up essential differences between credit-holding and non- 
credit-holding respondents, one extension of the investigation would be to locate how the 
gendered differences occur, where they don't occur and why they don't. The complexity 
introduced by these patterns, it is suggested, is a strength rather than a weakness, especially in 
comparison with more simplistic economic models. Instead of depicting socio-economic 
structures in a two-dimensional cause-and-effect manner, the type of approaches described in 
this thesis has engaged with far more complex, fluid dynamic processes, as they occur. In terms 
of the gendered nature of microfmance (having women dominant as borrowers), the section 
concludes that perhaps the most significant phenomena examined in the fieldwork has been the 
importance to women in particular of different types of ambulant and informal commercial 
activity, in combination with the multiple female/female-headed extended household. 
249 
7.2.1 - Conclusion: Orthodox Economics And The Microfinance Debate 
The first two chapters began the thesis by outlining the interlinking spheres of knowledge and 
policy that comprise the environment in which theories of microfmance are expressed in 
practical terms, with the particular purpose of locating the practice and theory of micro-finance 
within the orthodox economic discourse and its' application through the structural reforms 
enforced by the IMF and World Bank. By using the ideas of hidden and forbidden knowledge 
that have recurred throughout the thesis, attention has been drawn to two vital bodies of 
knowledge, political economy and gender, that occur at best partially in the orthodox economic 
discourse that still guides structural adjustment in poor countries. 
The first two chapters emphasized how, despite an increased presence of gender in the discourse 
of the IFIs, women are still denied agency in policies that depict them merely as victims. In a 
similar fashion, critics of microfmance describe the concentration of organisations on women, 
not as a positive move towards empowerment, but rather an institutional measure to maximise 
repayment by utilising the vulnerability of women. Further critiques suggest (e. g. Babb 1996) 
that rather than being empowered, women are increasingly required to function as social `shock 
absorbers' for structural adjustment as well as being targeted by microfmance practitioners, thus 
increasing their productive burden but not relieving the reproductive burden. Chapter 6 in 
particular suggests, therefore, that the analysis of difficult and frequently immeasurable socio- 
cultural phenomena such as gendered processes in the household and the community is a vital 
area for research, which is frequently sacrificed for the spurious clarity perceived in econometric 
analysis. 
The analysis presented also criticises the use of economics as a rigid ideological construct, 
heavily imbued with ritual meaning and containing within it doxae that are an attempt to 
underpin a specific vision of capitalism with the trappings of positive scientific inevitability. 
Along with Elson (1998, Op. it. ) the thesis presented quantities of evidence showing the 
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economic `certainty' of the orthodox discourse of the IFIs as denoting an exclusionary system 
denying significant bodies of knowledge. The homogeneity of country and socio-cultural 
experience embodied in the approach of the IFIs, challenged from the beginning of structural 
adjustment implementation, has been subjected to increasing criticism throughout the 1990s as 
the economic benefits claimed for the model have signally failed to materialise for the poorest. 
That microfmance has been seized on with such enthusiasm is at least partly a result of the 
synchronicity of having occurred at this time of widespread prescriptive failure on the part of the 
IFIs and of their development prescriptions in the South. The rapid growth of microfmance in the 
last fifteen years owes a good deal to the establishment of various models that have established a 
loan-based discipline in which successful practice has been measured in commonly high loan 
repayment rates. This rapid growth of a homogenous, universalised model for microfmance 
organisations, as well as the heavy pressure on them to become self-sustainable within an 
arbitrary time limit, however, has uncomfortable echoes in the same universalised approach by 
the IFTs to conditionality. 
As much as anything else, it is the timing of microfmance's success that has therefore rendered it 
hostage to a hegemony of globalized `best practices', which owe a lot in theoretical terms to the 
neo-liberal discourse that constituted the ruling hegemony during the early period of modern 
microfmance growth. The rapid development of theory and best practices within the field has 
accompanied a theoretical response to conditionality failure on the part of the IMF and World 
Bank, which has included the broadening of the scope of market failures and other theoretical 
precepts to account for the failure. Such failures include information asymmetries, as well as the 
efforts of Becker (1965,1981) et al, whilst referring to social capital, to postulate revamped 
forms of utility maximisation as a method of analysing virtually all areas of life. Further 
examples include the incorporation of more nebulous concepts such as governability and 
transparency into the putatively more friendly successors to Structural Adjustment Funds, called 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Funds. 
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The institutionist camp adduces evidence to support the empowering nature of microfmance 
from examples such as the effects of the East Asian crisis of 1997 on clients of the BRI 
organisation (Robinson 2001), who were able not only to maintain their loan repayments and 
savings, but allowed BRI to continue its' outreach at the same time as remaining stable and 
profitable. Crucial to the global spread of microfmance is the idea that through improving the 
economic well-being of the poor (and in particular poor women), lending reduces vulnerability 
(Rutherford 1999, Sebstad and Cohen, 2000), and that growth in economic well-being is 
synonymous with empowerment (Mayoux, 2000a). The analysis in the previous chapters, 
however has followed the line of feminist researchers who define lack of empowerment for 
women in terms of overall socio-economic vulnerability. 
The stability of microfmance institutions is one thing, certainly, but it does not necessarily imply 
the well-being of clients - there are certainly circumstances under which institutions might 
purchase financial stability in adverse economic circumstances at the expense of their clients. 
Much of the effort and research into impact evaluations has been therefore directed at `proving' 
that microfmance has achieved determinable increases in the standard of living of clients, at the 
same time as stabilising that increase and thereby determine a definite reduction in at least one 
measure of vulnerability. Thus far, however, it has proven impossible to separate the impact of 
credit from background socio-economic `noise', irrespective of research into control group 
methodology (see Hulme 1997, Mosley 1999 for a fuller discussion). 
In many areas, and certainly in Central America, the difficulty of proving impact is made harder 
by the fact that although the poorest are represented in the ranks of microfmance clients, 
organizations are focusing most strongly on clients who are not amongst the poorest deciles of 
the population; there is still an immense, currently unmet potential for more widespread poverty 
alleviation in the field, as both institutionist and welfare schools contend. As was pointed out in 
Chapter 1 and is certainly re-emphasized by the fieldwork in Chapter 6, the debate surrounding 
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microfmance practice reflects the possibilities both for institutional change, and for generating 
sources of innovative research and practices to begin answering the widely asserted need for 
financial services and products which better reflect the needs of clients. Currently, however, the 
institutionist point-of-view is very much in the ascendant (Woller 1999), and it insists that 
priority must be given to expanding the quantity of credit available under current practices, 
rather than the quality of credit available under a variety of practices. 
Nicaragua exhibits the highest concentration of microfmance organizations and funding in the 
Central American region (see Chapter 5); it is additionally a country where the institutionist 
influence on methodology is very much the strongest in the region, for reasons that are more 
closely associated with recent political history then best practices. Given the very weak state of 
the Nicaraguan economy, the rapid urbanization of the population and the fact that Nicaragua has 
the highest per capita debt in the world at the same time as being the poorest country in Central 
America, for microfmance there to be dominated by a discourse which its' own practitioners 
admit is not focused on the poorest would seem (at the least) to be misguided. Not only has this 
made Nicaragua an excellent example of the way in which the concept of objective `best 
practices' are in fact heavily influenced by the dependent context, it further suggests that the 
dependent context is very much an area of influence which must be taken into account on a 
national/regional/local basis in any country, if implementation of the most effective microfmance 
tools and practices is to be achieved. 
Chapters three and four in particular have looked at gaps in knowledge that World Bank research 
is supposed in part to address, with the intention of pointing out that the `knowledge gap' derives 
largely from an ideological discourse on `development' that is exclusionary. As the concept of 
the stake-holder has become more prevalent in the rhetoric of the IFIs, some of the more 
autocratic facets of conditionality have become increasingly obvious. There are obvious and 
fundamental differences between ideas of democratic, participatory and ownership-based 
approaches to development and what is still being practiced as necessary conditionality, 
especially if the World Bank in particular wishes to practice its own definition of participation as 
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being a `process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development 
initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them' (World Bank 1994b, cited in 
Cornwall 2000). The thesis has presented a considerable body of evidence to argue that a similar 
process should not be allowed to happen to innovative and adaptive research and practices in the 
microfmance sector, to serve the demands of a headlong drive towards self-sustainability at all 
costs. 
Just as the acknowledgement that all types of knowledge and in particular local, in-country 
knowledge, have validity and agency has been a long-neglected part of structural adjustment 
theory and practice, so has the historicity of older practices (such as the tontines of the 
Cameroons) been neglected in the development of modem microfmance best practices. Until 
now, the IFIs have been very specific about the types of knowledge that are acceptable, and as a 
consequence have developed evaluation processes for their activities that justify the use and 
accumulation of that very specific body of knowledge. This research has taken the line that the 
globalisation of a set of institutional best practices in the microfmance sector runs the same risk 
of becoming exclusionary; in recognition of this, Chapters 1 through 6 have explained the 
background to microfmance practice in Nicaragua to explain and analyse that risk, whilst at the 
same time pointing out areas and directions for further research. 
., 7.2.2 - Policy Considerations 
1. There is urgent need to broaden the remit of research into microfmance, although 
organisations such as CGAP frequently work within structures and discourses that make a 
change in focus difficult. The current domination of best practice theorising (as well as 
the hegemonic implications of an artificially objective construct, `best practices') by the 
institutionist view of microfinance ignores the multi-dimensional linkages that all such 
programmes have with the socio-economic environment in which they function. Rather 
than attempting to impose universal models irrespective of location, research should be 
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seeking to locate projects within a given environment and seeking to understand how 
they can best be adapted to that environment. 
2. With reference to the targeting of women by microfmance organisations and the 
beneficial financial returns to the organisations arising from it, there is a great need for 
research to analyse the effects not merely of increased female participation in the 
informal workforce, but at household, community and regional levels to examine wider 
sociological ramifications of this targeting. In particular, as Mayoux (2000a) points out, 
there is need to investigate whether the assumedly `virtuous circles' of best practices are 
in fact empowering. 
3. The money and effort being spent on impact assessment of microfmance has been able to 
show little concrete evidence75 of specific, measurable impacts that are directly 
attributable to credit access and to nothing else, and what research there has been has 
been of little use to the actual organisations that provide the information. Rather than 
continuing the development of ever more sophisticated methods involving control 
groups, more vital areas for research are to be found in client drop-out from programmes 
after (for instance) the first loan, clients borrowing only intermittently and clients who 
default. 
4. Irrespective of arguments pro and con institutionist/welfarist theories of microfmance and 
the levels of repayment success achieved, microcredit lending (as opposed to solidarity 
groups and the peer-group monitoring of Grameen) has a tendency to be an anti- 
democratic and anti-participatory activity. It is capable of burying native forms of credit, 
75 "Most impact studies do not pass academic muster: Studies that show changes in income, assets, or employment 
prove that something is different in the lives of the clients, but they do not prove that the lending program caused the 
change. Without measuring changes in the lives of people who did not receive loans (such as through the use of 
control groups) you cannot attribute impact to the credit that has been provided. Also, most studies take place at one 
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both financial and social, and in effect offers one route toward a loan whose gate- 
keepers' interest in local or personal circumstances may be strictly focused on how to 
achieve the highest repayment rates. If the ideas of stakeholders, country ownership of 
development and participation and consultation now being put forward by the IFIs are to 
mean anything, then they must be reflected in lending research and institutions as well. 
point in time and rely on the often unreliable memories of clients to determine their status before receiving a loan. " 
(Cheston and Reed, 1999, p. 6). 
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7.3.1 - Conclusion: Microfinance In The Nicaraguan Political Econom 
The development of the Microfinance sector in Nicaragua (as has been analysed in Chapters 4 
and 5) has been slowed until it is well behind those of neighbouring countries, irrespective of the 
far more favourable position in terms of the provision of funding and technical assistance 
mentioned above. Even so, as described by the Microstart survey of 1998, out of 19 Nicaraguan 
microfmance institutions surveyed, in one year only the sample total of outstanding loans grew 
by 37%, indicating that although slower in relative terms Nicaraguan microfmance is by no 
means standing still. 
The intimate and intertwined nature of the political and financial economy in Nicaragua has 
however obstructed the growth of a sector that does not fit in to the traditional clientelistic 
structures of patronage, and which various sectors of the political elite that control the state 
regard with some degree of suspicion. The sector had, in addition, to make progress whilst 
determinedly sticking to a model of best practice that is certainly not the most effective for the 
levels of poverty in many areas of the country76, and the rural zones in particular. 
The conditionality imposed by the IFIs on Nicaragua has exacerbated an already poor economic 
situation for all but a few sectors of society linked to the state and the aid money that comes 
through it, NGOs, finance, construction or the profitable parts of the export and consumer import 
sectors. Because of the increasing dependency of the state and indeed the entire economy on 
levels of external aid that are declining, development-orientated initiatives increasingly become 
tools towards the strengthening of centralized control by both the major political parties, the PLC 
and the FSLN, and their networks of support. 
76 Evidence for the effectiveness of solidarity groups on the poorest is presented in, for instance, 
Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega and Jorge Rodriguez-Meza (2000) 
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This process is made worse by arbitrary actions of the IFIs, such as the suspension of aid by the 
IMF on 2/10/01 (see Chapter 4) on the grounds not only that public expenditure been 
insufficiently controlled, but that public sector reforms to deepen trade liberalisation had not 
been vigorous enough. Chapters 2 and 4 demonstrated how rapid and unregulated trade 
liberalisation had already increased the oligopolistic power of elite groupings in Latin America 
without concomitant economic growth and macroeconomic stability, as was most spectacularly 
demonstrated by the collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001. 
The analysis used in Chapter 4 of the socio-economic circumstances of Nicaragua and the 
microfmance sector in particular, deliberately avoided the economistic country analysis favoured 
by the IFIs, as being simply inadequate to the task. In order to understand how a country with a 
population that is still only 5.2 million and which received aid equivalent to $600 million yearly 
between 1990 and 20007, can still end up with the lowest per capita GDP of any Central 
American country and a higher per capita debt than any country in the world, the thesis made 
clear that the economic situation of the country must be seen very much as the product of socio- 
economic and cultural processes that are hidden or forbidden in orthodox economic analysis. 
The description of the poverty reduction strategy (IPRS) agreed between the IMF and Nicaragua 
outlined in Chapter 4 appeared to begin the recognition of the role of various social actors in a 
new use of language, and yet the reality of conditionality remained the same, irrespective of the 
damage done. In particular, themes identified in the IPRS such as greater gender awareness in 
planning and policy, reducing the environmental and ecological degradation of the country, 
bringing about greater social equity and further decentralization of the government have been 
simply impossible to achieve. The macroeconomic regime under which the country labours and 
on which aid is dependent, is moving the country in the opposite direction. Other forces moving 
it in that direction include the certainty of the political elite that governing Nicaragua is an 
invitation to help yourself to the estado botin, and the powerful influence of the Catholic church 
77 Nicaraguan economist Oscar Rene Vargas, interviewed by Octavio Enriquez in El Nuevo Diario 24/11/01 
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towards the abandonment of all gender-egalitarian development and a return to the socio- 
economic framework of the last century for women. 
The subversion by the party in government of policy, policy analysis and research towards the 
main aim of keeping aid flowing into the clientelistic mechanisms of the state has resulted in a 
cacophony of plans, strategies and projects throughout, Nicaragua, which are matched in civil 
society and the NGO sector by a similar confusion of agendas, issues and planning. Chapter 4 
outlined how the NGO sector in Nicaragua is the second largest employer of people after the 
state, and that as a direct result of this growth is perceived as a rival by the political 
establishment, both in terms of power and access to funding. 
Despite explicit and implicit assumptions in state/NGO policy documents and discussions that all 
actors are working towards the same goal, the equitable development of Nicaragua, another form 
of hidden/forbidden knowledge is the resentment and hostility felt by many in the established 
political parties towards the NGO sector, expressed overtly in attempts to legislate over it, tax it 
and take legal action against it. Much of the hostility of the PLC, for instance, is caused by a 
perception of the NGO sector as little better than an adjunct of the FSLN in control of valuable 
resources. As part of the NGO sector, although attempting to distance itself as much as possible, 
the microfmance sector attracts resentment on these grounds as well. 
Chapter 4 went into some detail over the processes of centralisation and subordination of state, 
judicial and electoral offices by which the clientelistic mechanism in Nicaragua is serviced, and 
described the speeding-up of this process since the election of the Aleman government in 1996, 
which has arrived at the point where PLC and FSLN are unable to govern without each other. 
The chapter also described the situation of the informal economy (on which the microfmance 
sector is dependent) as a result of this economic impoverishment and dislocation, and 
particularly the rapid growth in participation of women in the informal sector, in the context of 
the general economic background and also the effects on households and families. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 both described how, despite the under-reporting of the contribution of women 
in the formal economy, female participation in all areas of economic and political endeavour in 
Nicaragua is increasing. A lack of understanding and proper analysis of female participation in 
the economy has thus far meant that policy aimed at poverty reduction in Nicaragua through 
increasing productivity and economic growth has failed completely to touch on the institutional, 
social and cultural factors which are at least as important. Because of this increased and enforced 
female participation in the informal economy caused by Nicaragua's adjustment programmes 
and general impoverishment, there are likely to be multiple un-researched knock-on effects in 
future. One critique of microfmance as it seeks to give credit to women and men alike locked 
into the informal sector, is that by aiding them it formalises families and households in a 
situation of increasing impoverishment and social deprivation, allowing the state to escape 
responsibility for initiating employment-generating policies. 
In the rural areas of a country as poor as Nicaragua, it is even less clear what the role of 
microfinance can and should be. There is more credit available in many areas of Nicaragua than 
in other Central American countries because of its' agricultural dependency, but what there is 
has not been nearly enough, and has been concentrated almost entirely in the Pacific/Northern 
sector. Currently the state of agriculture is so bad that most small farmers are in danger of 
bankruptcy and many in the north are in danger of starving if not already suffering from 
malnutrition, according to the World Food Programme. It seems unlikely that the 10,000 
campesin@ families that have had to abandon farms in the north of the country are likely to be 
microfinance clients within the near future, and yet there is some evidence that amongst the less 
poor campesin@s the access to savings accounts through co-operative institutions, and the type 
of repayment insurance that a few microfmance institutions insist on, act as a palliative and help 
the client to get back to their feet again. In addition, as described in the changing patterns of 
work in Nicaragua discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, sources of Rural Non-Agricultural Income and 
networks of migrant, seasonal and semi-urban labour are quite likely to be fruitful areas of 
research and investment for NGOs and microfinance organisations alike, as campesin@s 
increasingly seek other means of survival in an increasingly bleak agricultural sector. 
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7.3.2 - Policy Considerations 
1. So long as microfmance in Nicaragua remains under suspicion by both major political 
parties, the progress of ASOMIF is likely to remain slow. Irrespective of pre-electoral 
promises of a change in attitude made by the Bolanos government, the PLC is now 
enmired in internal conflict between the incumbents in power and the faction of 
corruption beneficiaries loyal to ex-President Aleman, so that ASOMIF's legal projects 
are unlikely to get through the national assembly in the foreseeable future. As for the 
FSLN, the official position seems still to regard microfmance lending as little more than 
usury. 
2. The current relationship between the IMF and Nicaragua is based on a form of 
conditionality that is a) doing the opposite of what it claims to be doing and b) rewarding 
the corruption that continues to subvert its' intentions. In order for this to change at all, 
the IFIs have to practice what they preach and in particular actively include the civil 
society groups and the NGO sector in anti-poverty policy and its' execution, as opposed 
to the lip-service that is currently paid to the idea of consultation. Since microfmance 
organisations plainly have a major part to play in the future of Nicaragua, proper 
consultation would of necessity involve them, and increase pressure on government and 
political parties to support them. 
3. In tandem with the considerations from section 7.2. b, there is an urgent requirement in 
Nicaragua for research into the implications for women of the current dominant model of 
microfmance. Because of the current insistence on an individual loan model women are 
likely to decline in incidence as the sector grows. This in turn will be affected by the 
growing incidence of the extended family group, frequently headed by one or more 
women. The state and dynamics of productive, economic and social relationships within 
such households is a vital area of study for all concerned with the development of 
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Nicaragua, but particularly for the microfmance sector, and especially in circumstances 
where partners may be working away or abroad. 
4. The Nicaraguan microfmance sector must take on board the experiences of the rest of 
Central America as far as solidarity group lending78 is concerned, if it really wishes to 
have some impact on the poorest. This priority is matched by the priority for legalising 
savings operations for organisations other than co-operatives, but is currently 
experiencing the same political bias as other ASOMIF projects. 
78 A type of lending where, at its' simplest, a number of clients who lack collateral or a guarantee for a loan group 
together to contract a communal loan, each member of the group agreeing to act as surety for any member who may 
fail to repay their loan or their portion of a group loan. 
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7.4.1 - Conclusion: Microfinance and Formal Banking, In Nicaragua 
Chapter 5 outlined the way in which the formal banking sector in Nicaragua constitutes a 
bottleneck in the economy, effectively controlling liquidity and access to credit for short-term 
gain - and that this control is maintained by the close political links between the owners and 
executive boards of the banking sector. The policies of the Central Bank of Nicaragua (BCN) 
exacerbate this problem, by maintaining high interest rates to attract external investment, also a 
result of IMF-imposed conditionality concerning inflation. This credit regime has resulted in a 
collapse of supply to agricultural producers in particular, and at the same time there has been a 
general decline in the prices of most export crops, and an increase in cheap imports. 
Profits made from short-term, high-interest investment and kept in dollar-denominated accounts 
by the elite help to enforce the maintenance of an unstable financial sector status quo, as does the 
availability of loans on easy terms that are frequently not paid back, arranged by political and 
client-based favouritism inside and outside the banks, and concealed by walls of opaque 
accountancy. On the numerous occasions when corrupt banking practices have broken banks, the 
elite involved in and profiting from these practices are protected from legal action, leaving the 
mass of ordinary account-holders and the taxpayers (the sections of society too poor and 
unimportant to have friends in government to arrange them tax exemptions) to carry the losses. 
Political control of the Superintendent of Banks, supposedly responsible for regulating and 
supervising the system, ensures that bank officials who enjoy sufficient political favour are not 
prosecuted, and banks similarly favoured are left unsupervised. 
It is into this scenario that the microfmance sector in Nicaragua is slowly making headway, 
having achieved coverage of perhaps 1.12% of the current population of about 5.2 million 
(Christen 2000). Since the first microfmance organisations began operations in Nicaragua, the 
industry has been operating under the hostility of the formal banking sector and its' close links 
with various powerful economic and political groups. The situation of many of these NGOs 
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involved in the sector was made more difficult by their failure to comply with the law governing 
financial institutions and commercial lending, particularly Ley 244 (Ley General de Bancos y 
Otras Instituciones). Many lending organisations continue to operate without effective regulation 
and using only the vaguest of accounting procedures, kept afloat by the generous availability of 
funding and technical assistance in the country. There is evidence to suggest, however, that 
notwithstanding any shortcomings many organisations have made progress not just with those 
people unable to access credit from the formal banking sector, but also many clients who have 
moved over from the formal sector to microfinance organisations. 
ASOMIF represents the largest and most successful informal sector lenders in Nicaragua, in an 
attempt to distinguish between effectively regulated organisations and the rest. It has been trying 
for some time to establish legal norms under which its' members should be regulated, and 
lobbying for perhaps the most vital change necessary for the further development of 
microfinance in Nicaragua, the legal right to accept savings. ASOMIF has also suggested that 
lending organisations be permitted expansion into other areas of finance such as offering life 
insurance, credit cards and housing loans, but progress on these legal projects has been 
obstructed by the banking sector interests represented in the national assembly. 
The hostility experienced by the microfmance sector has been exemplified by the passage of Ley 
374 discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 restricting informal sector interest levels to the average of 
those charged by the banks. Organisations accustomed to being able to charge interest at up to 
60% are thus restricted to far lower levels that will certainly restrain many organisations taking 
advantage of the lack of available credit. Whilst concessional funding is still widely available in 
Nicaragua there exists a cushion, but the new law must inevitably drive many organisations out 
of business. 
The slow rate of development of the microfmance sector has not been caused by external forces 
alone. In a country that is so impoverished that, according to UNDP estimates, as much as half of 
264 
the population are surviving on a dollar or less daily, the prejudice against using a proven and 
effective methodology such as solidarity group lending can only be described as perverse. There 
exist a number of reasons for this prejudice (amongst which has been suggested an aversion to 
encouraging `socialist' forms of behaviour in the post-revolutionary era), but making this form of 
loan procedure more widely available would greatly increase the potential and coverage of 
microfinance in Nicaragua. 
7.4.2 - Policy Considerations 
1. Nicaragua has more than enough law to regulate and maintain an effective financial 
system, but the process by which the government of Nicaragua is formed erases the 
political will to implement it. Every political party has its' own legal projects for 
regulation and supervision of the system, but all the laws that have been passed to date 
have been used to supervise enemies and help friends escape supervision. Thus, laws for 
the ethical behaviour of functionaries, anti-corruption laws and financial regulation laws 
are littered with obstructive amendments and loopholes, and where the law actually 
means what it says it is ignored. 
2. The continued insistence by the IFIs and external donors on financial liberalisation and 
privatisation in Nicaragua, rather than control and regulation and a proper appreciation of 
how services and utilities are best run in a very poor country, has made a bad situation 
worse. IFI pronunciations on the subject of participatory development and ownership of 
adjustment programmes are meaningless whilst all conditionality clauses are agreed by 
force majeure behind closed doors, and whilst the IFIs openly constitute such an example 
of anti-democratic behaviour, the political classes of Nicaragua understand that it is 
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alright for them to behave in the same way. Unpopular adjustment measures that do not 
work and in addition increase the misery of the majority continue to promote corruption 
as the price to be paid for implementation. 
3. The situation currently in Nicaragua is therefore that, in a country with a virtually 
unregulated and destructive financial system, the informal lending sector is trying to 
establish effective regulation for its members in the face of opposition and hostility. In 
the absence of the internal political will to foster further development, the sector will 
continue to grow at a slower rate and to attract hostility until it reaches some critical mass 
and influence. Attempting to continue growing outside a planned, holistic development 
environment would give microfmance organisations in Nicaragua no reason to change 
model, and thus continue to limit potential growth to the income bracket of the clients 
that currently constitute the largest percentage of the sector portfolio. 
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7.5.1 - Conclusion: Microfinance And ImDact Evaluation 
There currently exists a climate of impact assessment of microfmance in which a plethora of 
research is available and is being undertaken, using sophisticated statistical tools and regression 
analysis to attempt to demonstrate concrete returns to credit clients. As has been discussed by 
Hulme (1997), however, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to whether the evidence produced 
really is evidence of impact, and whether or not it will ever really be possible to measure it. Not 
only this, but as Mayoux (2001) outlines, the impact assessment that is being produced is 
frequently of relatively little use to the organisations to whom it is being provided. 
As Chapters 1,2 and 5 have discussed, however, a further mechanism by which take-up can be 
promoted and drop-outs reduced, is a continual search for innovative ways to lend and an 
organisational structure which is sufficiently flexible and adaptable to take advantage of new 
methods of lending. The methodology in this thesis moved deliberately away from ideas of 
impact analysis to look at a combined analysis methodology with the capacity to be responsive to 
as - many different socio-economic phenomena as possible. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the 
analysis that was undertaken was defined rather by the width of its focus and the interaction of 
the different methods employed, rather than by the individual methodological types used, as a 
form of triangulation. 
The analysis concluded with a field survey during the fifteen-month period between November 
1999 January 2001 which itself used a variety of instruments and underwent a continuous 
evolution. The process and body of the whole analysis also incorporated the theoretical critique 
of the role and structure of these IFIs that currently control the process of structural adjustment 
and the ideological underpinnings of adjustment practice. The validity of this analysis lies in 
locating microfmance praxis in the global political economy of the post-Cold War era, and 
discussing both the general practice of microfmance under the aegis of adjustment and the 
political economy, and Nicaragua under the same processes. The end result of this has been to 
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examine credit clients and non-clients in a Nicaraguan setting, locating them in the local and 
national political economy and examining their agency and processes in these spaces. 
An important contribution to this analysis was made by the sheer variety of sources of 
commentary, on the economic situation of Nicaragua, on gender, politics and the banking and 
microfmance sectors. The origins of these sources and commentaries were as varied as possible 
to provide a personalised account of theoretical, political and gendered expressions of experience 
in Nicaragua and especially, in interviewing credit users and non-users alike, the agency of 
individuals as opposed to the political and the academic. This approach was particularly useful, 
for example, in teasing out the real motives behind actions involving actors in the microfmance 
organisations and the government and regulatory authorities, where personal interviews filled in 
much information `hidden from/forbidden to' the literary sources. 
The use of all these sources and this methodology had as its' ultimate aim to open up and widen 
the range of how and what to measure in microfmance clients. Part of this was achieved by 
simply leaving the remit of the research as wide as possible, and by subsequently focussing in on 
problems/solutions actually suggested by the evidence gleaned. In the discussion above the rate 
of dropout of microfmance clients was mentioned, and the methodology used in the thesis 
widens the sources of background information to the circumstances under which dropout is more 
probable, and why. The analysis incorporated in the field survey is thus not just an attempt to 
examine new possibilities in terms of innovative credit tools, but an attempt to move towards a 
new way of seeing and examining such interventions. 
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7.5.2 - Policy Considerations 
1. Impact evaluation as currently practiced is a statistical sleight-of-hand driven by an 
entirely understandable need to `prove' development, as discussed above. Ultimately 
though, however much these exercises are employed, if the drop-out and default rate 
from an organisation is high, if the organisation has no information as to why drop-out 
and default are high and the impact evaluation can only suggest to the organisation that 
the clients are better off but not why, then the organisation will stagnate, decline and may 
fail. It seems probable (but not certain) that reasons for default and reasons for dropout 
are closely related, and there can be few more vital areas of information where research is 
needed, before more countries, regions and localities reach microfmance saturation point. 
2. Assessment exercises based on statistical returns from questionnaire exercises alone do 
not have the degree of sophistication necessary to instruct researchers and policy-makers. 
An approach with a different emphasis akin to the methodology of this thesis will begin 
to fill in the background information necessary to foster further development, but a pre- 
requisite for this is a structure of thinking about such surveys that looks beyond simplistic 
ideas of impact. As an instance of this, the results contained within Chapter 6 indicate 
that there is not gender-related disagreement amongst households interviewed in the 
reporting of total household income, whereas there is disagreement in the reporting of 
total female income79. A survey that treats these two variables as accurately reported, 
without undertaking the kind of cross-referenced analysis contained within the 
methodology of this thesis, is therefore likely to contain an avoidable degree of 
inaccuracy within its' results. 
79 It is likely (but by no means certain) that the total household income reported is accurate, but that neither gender 
allocates the correct total to itself or the other, with men in particular deliberately under-reporting female income. 
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7.6.1 - Conclusion: Survey Analysis And Nicaraguan Microfinance 
The survey of Masaya and its rural surrounds detected a number of processes and influences 
affecting local reality with implications for microfmance organisations. It also analysed socio- 
economic factors affecting the daily lives of clients of the two organisations, FAMA and ADIM, 
describing activities that directly impinged on commercial and reproductive aspects of their 
credit use. In the mapping exercise, Masaya was described in the light of general household 
activity analysis, and general patterns of productive, reproductive and social activities. Among 
the more vital information gleaned in this manner was the mass of peripatetic commercial 
activity taking place in the small villages and towns surrounding Masaya, the commercial links 
with Managua, and activities on a larger scale country-wide and as far as neighbouring countries. 
The mapping especially revealed a wide geographical spread of economic activities based on 
extended family households, where larger households were engaged in forms of employment 
which frequently compliment each other, such as families engaged in shoe-making where some 
members made shoes, others were responsible for the purchase of shoe-making materials and yet 
others travelled to markets in the north of Nicaragua to sell the finished product. Other extended 
families worked in bakeries, some members making bread, others transporting and selling it, or 
in carpentries making furniture in particular, some making furniture, others collecting wood, 
others selling the furniture and collecting payment. 
The analysis of statistically significant variables derived from the database of the pilot and main 
surveys complimented this spatial material. Here, assets, incomes, responsibilities and 
relationships were elicited which provided non-spatial data to do with the structure of the 
household, and relationships within the family. In other words the households were analysed as 
the socio-economic constructs they are, embedded in a network of obligatory and non-obligatory 
relationships related to work, religion, family and friends. 
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The production of gendered response patterns in the data adds texture to the analysis and, whilst 
rendering more difficult the correct interpretation of much of the data gleaned by the 
questionnaire, sheds light on an hitherto obscure but important aspect of sociological analysis. It 
is logical that in an impoverished, highly-politicized society where suspicion of authority and 
outsiders is rife, and with a social environment of which religion and machismo are two primary 
determinants, that the ways in which household heads respond to enquiries should be coloured 
by these influences, and this phenomena casts strong doubt on the gender-blind assumptions 
made by more usual forms of organisational and impact questionnaire analysis (See for example 
Mosley 1998). More generally the analysis makes a valuable contribution to the existing 
literature casting doubts on sample selection, limited recall, response bias and the use of control 
groups in microfmance impact analysis (Harper and Finnegan, 1998; Morduch, 1999, Karlan 
2001). A further step in this investigation would be to look at those areas where no gendered 
patterns exist, and to try and determine why that might be. 
As well as contributing to the body of knowledge concerning gendered knowledge in the 
household, the analysis would appear to provide support for non- or semi-co-operative model of 
the household (see e. g. Agarwal 1997, Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000, discussed in Chapterl). 
The evidence presented points at a need for further use of more sophisticated methods of 
combined survey and map-based analysis, where anomalies such as the gender-differentiated 
responses are fully mapped out, which the author would claim are vital if comprehensive 
economic analysis at the local level is to be undertaken in countries such as Nicaragua, or indeed 
in any country. There are in addition a variety of further reasons why purely question-based 
analysis may depict an inaccurate picture from respondents, among them the rate of illiteracy, the 
low rate of completion of primary education and the extremely low percentage of people with 
bank accounts and written financial records. These phenomena too need to be incorporated into 
socio-economic investigations 
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The area of the field survey, Masaya, constitutes one of the less poor and most densely inhabited 
areas of Nicaragua which is undergoing rapid urbanisation, and from the figures produced it 
appears that some 30% of the population appear to have access to credit of all kinds including 
mere credit at a pulperia. If the figures suggested in Chapter 5 for a potential microfmance 
clientele in Nicaragua of some 1.12% of the population is correct, then plainly Masaya is well- 
served in terms at least of coverage80. If globally (as has been stated by Richardson (2000)), 
however, there are many microfmance organisations that are experiencing drop-out rates of 
between 40-60%, although there are no figures for Nicaragua it seems likely that Nicaraguan 
microfmance organisations are experiencing similarly high drop-out rates. 
The use of this kind of analysis, therefore, makes a contribution to identifying "the needs and 
wants (expressed and latent) of the very poor" (Woller 2002, p. 21). The processes and issues 
discussed in these conclusions are processes and issues that are central to the continuity and 
improved economic circumstances of the vital informal, multiple employment lifestyle which a 
large majority of the population of Nicaragua are forced to endure, and if improvement (however 
measured) in those circumstances is to be made, there first needs to be a change in outlook and 
attitude of those involved in researching them. 
7.6.2 - Policy Considerations 
1. The desperate poverty in Nicaragua that fuels the high urban migration rate employs 
sophisticated, cyclical and seasonal rural/urban linkages, as well as informal sector 
80 From the personal experience of the author and anecdotal evidence from the interviewers, the outlets of the various 
microfinance organisations operating in Masaya such as FUNDE, ASODENI, Nitlapan, ADIM and FAMA are 
evident and well-known 
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networks, to ease the process of movement from rural to urban. Each successive crisis 
such as Hurricane Mitch in 1998 or the current (2001) crisis in coffee prices causes a 
surge in the rate of flow. In a country such as Nicaragua, which as stated in Chapter 4 is 
in permanent crisis, the surge may settle down for a while but never for too long. The 
attraction for the microfmance sector towards the activities involved in these linkages and 
networks is obvious, and yet by working with the current model of driving rapidly 
towards self-sustainability, Nicaraguan microfmance is limited by working with a small 
percentage of potential clients, and remaining wilfully ignorant of areas of the political 
economy that would increase both the coverage and beneficial effects of microfinance. 
2. The gendered influences and patterns that have been touched on in this thesis constitute a 
vital body of information towards an understanding of the dynamics of the household. 
These influences and patterns are not an interesting side issue to the spatially varied 
productive and reproductive activities measured and described, if not directly 
complementary to the productive and reproductive and explanatory of it. Research into 
both areas should be undertaken at the same time, or treated as though both were the 
same subject of investigation. 
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TEXT BOUND INTO 
THE SPINE 
APPENDIX A: COMPARATIVE HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURES 
Existence of Title 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Couple Disagreement 1 .5 .5 .5 
Yes 214 96.8 96.8 97.3 
No 4 1.8 1.8 99.1 
Don't Know 2 .9 .9 
100.0 
Total 221 100.0 100.0 
Existence of Title (non-creät) 
300 
200 
Frecw y 
100 
Cape Disagreement Yes No Don't Know 
Existence of Title 
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Existence of Title (Credit) 
Existence of Title 
300 
200 
i ncy 
1 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 218 94.4 94.4 94.4 
No 11 4.8 4.8 99.1 
3 1 .4 .4 
99.6 
Don't Know 1 .4 .4 
100.0 
Total 231 100.0 100.0 
Existence of Title (Credit) 
Vac Nn 3 Don't Knnw 
Existence of Title 
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Titleholder Gender (non-credit) 
Titleholder Sex 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male 78 35.3 37.9 37.9 
Female 102 46.2 49.5 87.4 
Both 5 2.3 2.4 89.8 
Various 20 9.0 9.7 99.5 
Couple Disagreement 1 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 206 93.2 100.0 
Missing No Title 15 6.8 
Total 221 100.0 
Titleholder Sex (non-credit) 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
Frequency 
20 
Male Both Couple Disagreement 
Female Various 
Titleholder Sex 
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Titleholder Gender (credit) 
Titleholder Sex 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male 80 34.6 37.4 37.4 
Female 115 49.8 53.7 91.1 
Both 7 3.0 3.3 94.4 
Various 12 5.2 5.6 100.0 
Total 214 92.6 100.0 
Missing No Title 13 5.6 
Couple Disagreement 2 .9 
Don't Know 2 .9 
Total 17 7.4 
Total 231 100.0 
Titleholder Sex (credit) 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
Frequency 
20 
Male Female Both Various 
Titleholder Sex 
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Why Moved (non-credit) 
Why Moved 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid To Marry 46 20.8 38.7 38.7 
Lack of Work 11 5.0 9.2 47.9 
Lack of Housing 55 24.9 46.2 94.1 
To Live With Family 5 2.3 4.2 98.3 
Better Educ. /Health 2 .9 
1.7 100.0 
Resource 
Total 119 53.8 100.0 
Missing 0 67 30.3 
Other 35 15.8 
Total 102 46.2 
Total 221 100.0 
Why Moved (non-credit) 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
Frequency 
10 
To Marry Lack of Housing L tter Educ. /Health 
Lack of Work To Live With Family 
Why Moved 
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Why Moved (credit) 
Why Moved 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid To Marry 43 18.6 31.2 31.2 
Lack of Work 5 2.2 3.6 34.8 
Lack of Housing 81 35.1 58.7 93.5 
To Live With Family 8 3.5 5.8 99.3 
Better Educ. /Health 
1 .4 .7 
100.0 
Resource 
Total 138 59.7 100.0 
Missing Lived whole life there 60 26.0 
Other 33 14.3 
Total 93 40.3 
Total 231 100.0 
wt-iy Mxed (crecit) 
100 
80 
60 
40 
IýecwLy 
20 
IA II; L. I i, I I"1 c ,iýj BEtter Ei. i At- h 
Lack d V1 xk To Li\e Mth Family 
VT/ Mxed 
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Migrants (non-credit) 
Migrants <5 Years 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 32 14.5 15.0 15.0 
No 182 82.4 85.0 100.0 
Total 214 96.8 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 7 3.2 
Total 221 100.0 
Migrants <5 Years (non-credit) 
200 
100 
Frequency 
Yes 
Migrants <5 Years 
No 
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Migrants (credit) 
Migrants <5 Years 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 37 16.0 16.4 16.4 
No 189 81.8 83.6 100.0 
Total 226 97.8 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 5 2.2 
Total 231 100.0 
Migrants <5 Years 
200 
100 
a U 
C 
d) 
0 
4) 
L 
Migrants <5 Years 
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Yes No 
No. s Working in H/H (non-credit) 
Numbers Working in H/H 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Person 63 28.5 32.6 32.6 
2 People 70 31.7 36.3 68.9 
3 People and over 60 27.1 31.1 100.0 
Total 193 87.3 100.0 
Missing System 28 12.7 
Total 221 100.0 
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Numbers Working in Household 
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Numbers Workint in Household (credit) 
Numbers in household working 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Person 53 22.9 25.0 25.0 
2 People 105 45.5 49.5 74.5 
3 People and over 54 23.4 25.5 100.0 
Total 212 91.8 100.0 
Missing System 19 8.2 
Total 231 100.0 
Numbers in household working 
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Numbers in household working 
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Other Property (non-credit) 
Own Other Property? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 43 19.5 20.0 20.0 
No 172 77.8 80.0 100.0 
Total 215 97.3 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 6 2.7 
Total 221 100.0 
Own Other Property? 
200 
100 
U 
U 
7 
Q 
a) 
U- 
Own Other Property? 
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Yes No 
Other Property (credit) 
Own Other Property? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 51 22.1 22.6 22.6 
No 175 75.8 77.4 100.0 
Total 226 97.8 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 5 2.2 
Total 231 100.0 
Own Other Property? (credit) 
200 
Frequency 
100 
yam; NO 
Own Other Property? 
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Income Shared (non-credit) 
Income Shared? 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 46 20.8 22.5 22.5 
No 158 71.5 77.5 100.0 
Total 204 92.3 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 16 7.2 
9 1 .5 
Total 17 7.7 
Total 221 100.0 
Income Shared? (non-credit) 
200 
Frequency 
100 
Yes No 
Income shared? 
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Income Shared (credit) 
Income Shared? 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 95 41.1 42.4 42.4 
No 129 55.8 57.6 100.0 
Total 224 97.0 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 7 3.0 
Total 231 100.0 
Income shared? (credit) 
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Yes No 
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Work Shared (non-credit) 
Work Shared 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 12 5.4 5.7 5.7 
No 200 90.5 94.3 100.0 
Total 212 95.9 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 8 3.6 
9 1 .5 
Total 9 4.1 
Total 221 100.0 
Work Shared (non-credit) 
300 
zoo 
RAY 
100 
Yes 
Work Shared 
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Work Shared (credit) 
Work Shared 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 23 10.0 10.3 10.3 
No 201 87.0 89.7 100.0 
Total 224 97.0 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 7 3.0 
Total 231 100.0 
Work Shared (credit) 
300 
200 
Frequency 
100 
Yes 
Work Shared 
No 
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Household Tasks (non-credit) 
Household Tasks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Couple Disagreement 20 9.0 9.0 9.0 
Male Head 4 1.8 1.8 10.9 
Female Head 75 33.9 33.9 44.8 
Both 17 7.7 7.7 52.5 
Daughter 12 5.4 5.4 57.9 
Son 2 .9 .9 
58.8 
Other Relatives 5 2.3 2.3 61.1 
Other Combination 86 38.9 38.9 100.0 
Total 221 100.0 100.0 
Household Tasks (non-credit) 
100 
80 
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Frequency 
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Couple Male Head Female Both Son Other Other 
Disagreement Head Helanves uomoination 
Household Tasks 
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Household Tasks (credit) 
Household Tasks 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Couple Disagreement 12 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Male Head 2 .9 .9 
6.1 
Female Head 58 25.1 25.1 31.2 
Both 23 10.0 10.0 41.1 
Daughter 19 8.2 8.2 49.4 
Son 2 .9 .9 
50.2 
Other Relatives 10 4.3 4.3 54.5 
Other Combination 105 45.5 45.5 100.0 
Total 231 100.0 100.0 
Household Tasks (credit) 
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Household Tasks 
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Disagreement Head Head Relatives 
Childcare Responsibility (non-credit) 
Childcare Responsibility 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Couple Disagreement 25 11.3 15.9 15.9 
Male Head 6 2.7 3.8 19.7 
Female Head 52 23.5 33.1 52.9 
Both 25 11.3 15.9 68.8 
Daughter 11 5.0 7.0 75.8 
Son 1 .5 .6 
76.4 
Other relatives 5 2.3 3.2 79.6 
Other Combination 32 14.5 20.4 100.0 
Total 157 71.0 100.0 
Missing No Children/Children 
of Age 
64 29.0 
Total 221 100.0 
Childcare Responsibility 
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Couple Male Head Female Head Both Daughter 
Disagreement 
Childcare Responsibility 
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Childcare Responsibility (credit) 
Childcare Responsibility 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Couple Disagreement 16 6.9 8.7 8.7 
Female Head 56 24.2 30.4 39.1 
Both 46 19.9 25.0 64.1 
Daughter 21 9.1 11.4 75.5 
Son 1 .4 .5 
76.1 
Other relatives 20 8.7 10.9 87.0 
Other Combination 24 10.4 13.0 100.0 
Total 184 79.7 100.0 
Missing No Children/Children 
47 20 3 
of Age . 
Total 231 100.0 
Childcare Responsibility 
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Couple Female Head 
Disagreement 
Childcare Responsibility 
Lk, u Daughter S°n Other relatives Other Combination 
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Patio Earnings (non-credit) 
Patio Earnings 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 14 6.3 6.5 6.5 
No 201 91.0 93.5 100.0 
Total 215 97.3 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 6 2.7 
Total 221 100.0 
Patio Earnings 
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Patio Earnings 
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Patio Earnings (credit) 
Patio Earnings 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 33 14.3 14.5 14.5 
No 194 84.0 85.5 100.0 
Total 227 98.3 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 4 1.7 
Total 231 100.0 
Patio Earnings 
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Patio Earnings 
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Yes No 
Who Profits (non-credit) 
Who Profits 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Female Head 12 5.4 85.7 85.7 
Other Male Relative 1 .5 
7.1 92.9 
Other Female Relative 1 .5 
7.1 100.0 
Total 14 6.3 100.0 
Missing 0 196 88.7 
Couple Disagreement 11 5.0 
Total 207 93.7 
Total 221 100.0 
Who Profits (non-credit) 
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12 
10 
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Frequency 
Fomala Roan Other Male Relative Other Female Relative 
Who Profits 
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Who Profits (credit) 
Who Profits 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male Head 8 3.5 30.8 30.8 
Female Head 16 6.9 61.5 92.3 
More than One Person 2 .9 
7.7 100.0 
Total 26 11.3 100.0 
Missing No sales 194 84.0 
Couple Disagreement 10 4.3 
Don't Know 1 .4 
Total 205 88.7 
Total 231 100.0 
Who Profits 
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Who Profits 
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Male Head Iý .a fit-0 More than One Person 
Own Transport (non-credit) 
Own Transport 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 132 59.7 61.7 61.7 
No 82 37.1 38.3 100.0 
Total 214 96.8 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreemen 7 3.2 
Total 221 100.0 
No 
345 
Own Transport (credit) 
Own Transport 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 148 64.1 64.6 64.6 
No 81 35.1 35.4 100.0 
Total 229 99.1 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 2 .9 
Total 231 100.0 
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Own Transport (credit) 
Education Costs (non-credit) 
Who Pays Educ. Costs 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male Head 32 14.5 14.5 14.5 
Female Head 31 14.0 14.0 28.5 
Both 39 17.6 17.6 46.2 
Son 5 2.3 2.3 48.4 
Daughter 4 1.8 1.8 50.2 
Other Male Rel. 3 1.4 1.4 51.6 
Other Female Rel. 6 2.7 2.7 54.3 
Other Combination 12 5.4 5.4 59.7 
Couple Disagreement 20 9.0 9.0 68.8 
No Children 69 31.2 31.2 100.0 
Total 221 100.0 100.0 
Who Pays Education Costs (non-credit) 
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Who Pays Education Costs 
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Education Costs (credit) 
Who Pays Educ. Costs 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male Head 36 15.6 15.6 15.6 
Female Head 43 18.6 18.6 34.2 
Both 85 36.8 36.8 71.0 
Daughter 7 3.0 3.0 74.0 
Other Male Rel. 1 .4 .4 
74.5 
Other Female Rel. 1 .4 .4 
74.9 
Other Combination 5 2.2 2.2 77.1 
Couple Disagreement 6 2.6 2.6 79.7 
No Children 47 20.3 20.3 100.0 
Total 231 100.0 100.0 
Who Pays Education Costs (credit) 
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No 
Children 
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Medical Bills (non-credit) 
Medical Bills 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Couple Disagreement 17 7.7 7.7 7.7 
Male Head 53 24.0 24.0 31.7 
Female Head 39 17.6 17.6 49.3 
Both 67 30.3 30.3 79.6 
Son 3 1.4 1.4 81.0 
Daughter 6 2.7 2.7 83.7 
Other Female Rel. 2 .9 .9 
84.6 
Combination 28 12.7 12.7 97.3 
Medical Insur. 2 .9 .9 98.2 
Don't Use 4 1.8 1.8 100.0 
Total 221 100.0 100.0 
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Medical Bills 
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Medical Bills (credit) 
Medical Bills 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Couple Disagreement 16 6.9 6.9 6.9 
Male Head 39 16.9 16.9 23.8 
Female Head 45 19.5 19.5 43.3 
Both 108 46.8 46.8 90.0 
Son 2 .9 .9 
90.9 
Daughter 2 .9 .9 
91.8 
Other Male Rel. 3 1.3 1.3 93.1 
Other Female Rel. 1 .4 .4 
93.5 
Combination 13 5.6 5.6 99.1 
Don't Use/Don't Pay 2 .9 .9 
100.0 
Total 231 100.0 100.0 
Medical Bills (credit) 
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hon Food (non-credit) 
Deals on Food 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 20 9.0 9.7 9.7 
No 187 84.6 90.3 100.0 
Total 207 93.7 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 11 5.0 
Don't Know 3 1.4 
Total 14 6.3 
Total 221 100.0 
Deals on Food (non-credit) 
200 
100 
ýreurcy 
Deals on Food 
No 
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Deals on Food (credit) 
Deals on Food 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 34 14.7 15.3 15.3 
No 188 81.4 84.7 100.0 
Total 222 96.1 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 9 3.9 
Total 231 100.0 
Deals on Food (credit) 
200 
100 
Frequency 
Deals on Food 
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Yes No 
Bank Accounts (non-credit) 
Bank Accounts Held 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 26 11.8 12.3 12.3 
No 185 83.7 87.7 100.0 
Total 211 95.5 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 9 4.1 
3 1 .5 
Total 10 4.5 
Total 221 100.0 
Bank Accounts Held (non-credit) 
200 
100 
Frequency 
Yes Nu 
Bank Accounts Held 
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Bank Accounts (credit) 
Bank Accounts Held 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 72 31.2 31.7 31.7 
No 155 67.1 68.3 100.0 
Total 227 98.3 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 4 1.7 
Total 231 100.0 
Bank Accounts Held (credit) 
200 
Frequency 
100 
Yes 
Bank Accounts Held 
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Male Accounts (non-credit) 
Male Accounts 
16 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
Bquency 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 15 6.8 60.0 60.0 
No 10 4.5 40.0 100.0 
Total 25 11.3 100.0 
Missing 0 185 83.7 
Couple Disagreement 9 4.1 
Don't Know 2 .9 
Total 196 88.7 
Total 221 100.0 
Male Accounts (non-credit) 
Yes 
Male Accounts 
No 
355 
Male Accounts (credit) 
Male Accounts 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 23 10.0 15.3 15.3 
No 127 55.0 84.7 100.0 
Total 150 64.9 100.0 
Missing 0 77 33.3 
Couple Disagreement 2 .9 
Don't Know 2 .9 
Total 81 35.1 
Total 231 100.0 
Male Accounts (credit) 
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Female ACCOunt% i nýýn crýdil i 
Female Accounts 
F re uenc. Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
V, ilit ", 16 72 593 59 3 
tJý 11 5.0 40 ' 1000 
f,,, rl 27 12.2 1000 
185 83.7 
ýýýt>le Dýý. ýgreernent 6 2.7 
O, )n't Knew 3 1.4 
194 878 
Tut, rl 221 1000 
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ti, 
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: ýcc()unlý Icr((iil 
Female Accounts 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yt"", 47 20 3 32.0 32 0 
No 100 43.3 68.0 100.0 
Total 147 63.6 100.0 
Missing 0 /7 33.3 
Couplef)irqrecnitnt 2.2 
Don't Kn,,,,, .9 
Tt, ýI ti"1 36.4 
Total ý>, ý 1 100.0 
Fernale Accounts (crecit) 
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Mortgage/Guarantee 
f , ý", ., ý r+ 
Percent 
Cumulat vice 
Valid Percent Percent 
V. riýý1 v+"ti r; 27 28 28 
'. .' 10 950 972 1000 
t t,, t 216 97.7 100.0 
upteD-i;....... ..,, ý 5 
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'1 1000 
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Mortgages (credit) 
Mortgage/Guarantee 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 22 9.5 9.7 9.7 
No 204 88.3 90.3 100.0 
Total 226 97.8 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 1 .4 
3 3 1.3 
Don't Know 1 .4 
Total 5 2.2 
Total 231 100.0 
NbrtgagefG. arantee (crecit) 
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NbrtgagdCx irar tee 
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Caia de Muerto (non-credit) 
Caja de Muerto 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 76 34.4 35.0 35.0 
No 141 63.8 65.0 100.0 
Total 217 98.2 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 2 .9 
Don't Know 2 .9 
Total 4 1.8 
Total 221 100.0 
Caja de Muerto (non-credit) 
160 
140 
120 
100 
80 
requency 60 
40 
20 
Yes 
Caja de Muerto 
NO 
361 
Caia de Muerto (credit) 
Caja de Muerto 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 62 26.8 27.0 27.0 
No 168 72.7 73.0 100.0 
Total 230 99.6 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 1 .4 
Total 231 100.0 
Caja de Muerto 
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Yes 
Caja de Muerto 
No 
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Remittances (non-credit) 
Remittances Received 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 64 29.0 30.8 30.8 
No 144 65.2 69.2 100.0 
Total 208 94.1 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 13 5.9 
Total 221 100.0 
Remittances Received 
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Remittances Received 
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Yes No 
Remittances (credit) 
Remittances Received 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 39 16.9 17.3 17.3 
No 186 80.5 82.7 100.0 
Total 225 97.4 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 6 2.6 
Total 231 100.0 
Remittances Received (credit) 
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Frequency 
100 
Yos 
Remittances Received 
IVu 
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Remittances from who (non-credit) 
Who From 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Partner (F) 1 .5 
1.3 1.3 
Son 9 4.1 11.7 13.0 
Daughter 9 4.1 11.7 24.7 
Other Rel. (M) 11 5.0 14.3 39.0 
Other Rel. (F) 2 .9 
2.6 41.6 
Different People 9 4.1 11.7 53.2 
Government 6 2.7 7.8 61.0 
NGO/Evangelicals 14 6.3 18.2 79.2 
Couple Disagreement 15 6.8 19.5 98.7 
99 1 .5 
1.3 100.0 
Total 77 34.8 100.0 
Missing 0 144 65.2 
Total 221 100.0 
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Who From (non-credit) 
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Remittances From Who (credit) 
Who From 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Partner (F) 3 1.3 6.7 6.7 
Son 9 3.9 20.0 26.7 
Daughter 1 .4 
2.2 28.9 
Other Rel. (M) 8 3.5 17.8 46.7 
Other Rel. (F) 8 3.5 17.8 64.4 
Different People 1 .4 
2.2 66.7 
Government 3 1.3 6.7 73.3 
NGO/Evangelicals 3 1.3 6.7 80.0 
Couple Disagreement 9 3.9 20.0 100.0 
Total 45 19.5 100.0 
Missing 0 186 80.5 
Total 231 100.0 
Who From (credit) 
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r (F) (M) Rel. (F) People ment Evang- Disagree 
elicals ment 
Who From 
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Remittances From Where (non-credit) 
Remittance from Where 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Costa Rica 8 3.6 10.4 10.4 
USA 30 13.6 39.0 49.4 
Inside Nicaragua 2 .9 
2.6 51.9 
Inside Masaya 21 9.5 27.3 79.2 
Couple Disagreement 15 6.8 19.5 98.7 
Other 1 .5 
1.3 100.0 
Total 77 34.8 100.0 
Missing 0 144 65.2 
Total 221 100.0 
Remittance from Where (non-credit) 
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Remittance from Where 
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Remittance From Where (credit) 
Remittance from Where 
Fre uenc Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Costa Rica 9 3.9 20.0 20.0 
USA 17 7.4 37.8 57.8 
Inside Nicaragua 2 .9 
4.4 62.2 
Inside Masaya 5 2.2 11.1 73.3 
Couple Disagreement 8 3.5 17.8 91.1 
Other 4 1.7 8.9 100.0 
Total 45 19.5 100.0 
Missing 0 186 80.5 
Total 231 100.0 
Remittance from Where (credit) 
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Remittance from Where 
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APPENDIX B: CRF, DIT Vs NON-CREDIT FREQUENCIES 
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Household Population (non-credit) 
Length of Residence (non-credit) 
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Iý 
Length of Residence 
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Household Monthly Income (non-credit) 
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Household Monthly Income (C$000s) 
Std. Dev = 4747.35 
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Household Monthly Income (C$000s) 
Std. Dev = 4180.59 
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Total Household Male Income (credit) 
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Total Household Female Income (non-credit) 
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Total Household Female Income (C$000s) 
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N= 165.00 
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Average Male Job Income (Credit) 
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Std. Dev = 3101.98 
Mean = 1886.6 
N= 155.00 
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Average Female Job Income (Credit) 
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1) Length of residence of household in current location 
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2) Comparative total income levels of credit/non-credit households 
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3) Comparison of income by gender for credit/non-credit households 
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4) Comparative expenditure on transport between credit and non-credit households 
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5) Comparison of possession of title for credit/non-credit households 
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6) Gender of titleholder 
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9) Responsibility within households for childcare 
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10) Comparison between credit/non-credit participation in `patio 
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11) Comparison of who profits from Patio Earnings? 
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12) Comparison of household ownership of transport 
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14) Comparison of funeral insurance group membership 
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APPENDIX 
ICI 
D- SIGNIFICANT CREDIT RELATIONSHIPS 
1) Relationship between possession of credit and length of residence 
Present Credit * Length of Residence Crosstabulation 
Length of Residence 
26 years 
0- 15 years 16 - 25 years upwards Total 
Present Yes Count 46 18 29 93 
Credit % within Present Credit 49.5% 19.4% 31.2% 100.0% 
No Count 66 46 101 213 
% within Present Credit 31.0% 21.6% 47.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 112 64 130 306 
% within Present Credit 36.6% 20.9% 42.5% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = . 006) 
2) Relationship between possession of credit and total household income 
Present Credit * Total Household Income Crosstabulation 
Total Household Income 
C$ C$ 2501 
C$ 0-1500 1501-2500 upwards Total 
Present Yes Count 13 26 25 64 
Credit % within Present Credit 20.3% 40.6% 39.1% 100.0% 
No Count 60 38 52 150 
% within Present Credit 40.0% 25.3% 34.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 73 64 77 214 
% within Present Credit 34.1% 29.9% 36.0% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.012) 
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3) Relationship between total income and loan total possessed 
Total Household Income * Total Credit Applied For Crosstabulation 
Total Credit A lied For 
C$1001 
C$ 0-1000 upwards Total 
Total Household C$ 0-1500 Count 67 6 73 
Income % within Total 
Household Income 91.8% 8.2% 100.0% 
C$ 1501-2500 Count 44 20 64- 
% within Total 
Household Income 68.8% 31.3% 100.0% 
C$ 2501 upwards Count 54 23 77 
% within Total 
Household Income 70.1% 29.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 165 49 214 
% within Total 
Household Income n"1 % 22.9% 100.0% 
(NB Figures for income are monthly totals) 
relationship between interviewer gender. respondent gender and reported total 
household income 
Cli. sex * Total Household Monthly Income * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Total Household Monthly 
Income 
C$ 2001 
Interviewer/Sex C$ 0 -2000 Upwards Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 8 16 24 
% within Cli. sex 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
Female Count 10 18 28 
% within Cli. sex 35.7% 64.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 18 34 52 
% within Cli. sex 34.6% 65.4% 100.0% 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 46 22 68 
% within Cli. sex 67.6% 32.4% 100.0% 
Female Count 48 46 94 
% within Cli. sex 51.1% 48.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 94 68 162 
% within Cli. sex 58.0% 42.0% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.857 for male interviewers, 0.035 for Female 
Interviewers) 
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5) Relationship between gender of respondent and reported household female income 
Cli. sex * Total Female Income Crosstabulation 
To tal Female Income 
C$ 1501 
C$ 0-750 C$ 751-1500 upwards Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 31 28 15 74 
% within Cli. sex 41.9% 37.8% 20.3% 100.0% 
Female Count 30 57 39 126 
% within Cli. sex 23.8% 45.2% 31.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 61 85 54 200 
% within Cli. sex 30.5% 42.5% 27.0% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.023) 
6) Relationship of reported female income in the household to gender of 
interviewer and respondent 
Cll. sex * Total Female Income' Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Total Female Income 
C$ 1501 
Interviewer/Sex C$ 0-750 C$ 751-1500 upwards Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 4 8 5 17 
%withinCli. sex 23.5% 47.1% 29.4% 100.0% 
Female Count 5 15 6 26 
% within Cli. sex 19.2% 57.7% 23.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 9 23 11 43 
% within Cli. sex 20.9% 53.5% 25.6% 100.0% 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 27 20 10 57 
% within Cli. sex 47.4% 35.1% 17.5% 100.0% 
Female Count 25 42 33 100 
% within Cli. sex 25.0% 42.0% 33.0% 100.0°/a 
Total Count 52 62 43 157 
% within Cll. sex 33.1% 39.5% 27.4% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.791 for male interviewers and 0.011 for female 
interviewers however NB Value for male interviewers just outside significance, 2 cells (33.3%) 
have expected count less than 5). 
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7 Relationship between possession of credit and expenditure on transport 
Present Credit * Transport Costs Crosstabulation 
Trans ort Costs 
C$ 61 
C$ 0- 20 C$ 21 - 60 upwards Total 
Present Yes Count 25 43 22 90 
Credit % within Present Credit 27.8% 47.8% 24.4% 100.0% 
No Count 82 63 39 184 
% within Present Credit 44.6% 34.2% 21.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 107 106 61 274 
% within Present Credit 39.1 % 38.7% 22.3% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.023) 
8) Relationship between present credit access and receipt of remittances 
Present Credit * Remittances Received Crosstabulation 
Remittances Received 
Yes No Total 
Present Yes Count 
Credit % within Present Credit 
16 
17.6% 
75 
82.4% 
91 
100.0% 
No Count 
% within Present Credit 
64 
30.8% 
144 
69.2% 
208 
100.0% 
Total Count 
% within Present Credit 
80 
26.8% 
219 
73.2% 
299 
100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.018) 
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9) Relationship between amount of remittances received and gender of recipient 
Cli. sex * How Much Remittance Crosstabulation 
How Much Remittance 
C$ 301 - 
C$ 0- 300 upwards Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 15 8 23 
% within Cli. sex 65.2% 34.8% 100.0% 
Female Count 10 32 42 
% within Cli. sex 23.8% 76.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 25 40 65 
% within Cli. sex 38.5% 61.5% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.001) 
10) Relationship between respondent gender and receipt of remittances (non-credit 
households) 
Cli. sex * How Much Remittance Crosstabulation 
How Much Remittance 
C$ 301 - 
C$ 0- 300 upwards Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 11 4 15 
% within Cli. sex 73.3% 26.7% 100.0% 
Female Count 8 28 36 
% within Cli. sex 22.2% 77.8% 100.0% 
Total Count 19 32 51 
% within Cli. sex 37.3% 62.7% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.001) 
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11) Relationship between present possession of credit and past use 
Present Credit * Past Credit Crosstabulation 
Past Credit 
Yes No Total 
Present Yes Count 
Credit % within Present Credit 
56 
65.9% 
29 
34.1% 
85 
100.0% 
No Count 
% within Present Credit 
63 
30.6% 
143 
69.4% 
206 
100.0% 
Total Count 
% within Present Credit 
119 
40.9% 
172 
59.1 % 
291 
100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
12) Past Credit Access And Possession Of Bank Accounts (Credit-Holding 
Households) 
Past Credit * Bank Accounts Held Crosstabulation 
Bank Accounts Held 
Yes No Total 
Past Credit Yes Count 
% within Past Credit 
63 
36.6% 
109 
63.4% 
172 
100.0% 
No Count 
% within Past Credit 
8 
18.6% 
35 
81.4% 
43 
100.0% 
Total Count 
% within Past Credit 
71 
33.0% 
144 
67.0% 
215 
100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.025) 
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13) Relationship between past credit access and possession of bank accounts (non- 
credit households) 
Past Credit * Bank Accounts Held Crosstabulation 
Bank Accounts Held 
Yes No Total 
Past Credit Yes Count 
% within Past Credit 
12 
20.7% 
46 
79.3% 
58 
100.0% 
No Count 
% within Past Credit 
13 
9.4% 
126 
90.6% 
139 
100.0% 
Total Count 
% within Past Credit 
25 
12.7% 
172 
87.3% 
197 
100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.029) 
14) Relationship between past use of credit and current amount of credit 
outstanding 
Past Credit * Total Credit Owed Crosstabulation 
Total Credit Owed 
C$ 2500 
C$ 0- 750 C$ 751 - 2500 upwards Total 
Past Credit Yes Count 19 43 68 130 
% within Past Credit 14.6% 33.1% 52.3% 100.0% 
No Count 15 16 5 36 
% within Past Credit 41.7% 44.4% 13.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 34 59 73 166 
% within Past Credit 20.5% 35.5% 44.0% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
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15) Relationship between educational expenditure and current use of credit 
Total credit applied for * Educational Costs Crosstabulation 
Educational Costs 
C$251 
C$ 0-250 upwards Total 
Total credit C $O - 2,500 Count 55 13 68 
applied for % within Total 
credit applied for 
80.9% 19.1 % 100.0% 
C$2,501 - 10,000 Count 45 22 67 
% within Total 
credit applied for 
67.2% 32.8% 100.0% 
C$10,000 upwards Count 18 20 38 
% within Total 
credit applied for 
47.4% 52.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 118 55' 173 
% within Total 
credit applied for 
68.2% 31.8% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.002) 
1 6) Relationship between medical expenditure and current use of credit 
Total credit applied for * Medical Costs Crosstabulation 
Medica l Costs 
C$ 101 
C$ 0-100 upwards Total 
Total credit C $O - 2,500 Count 32 36 68 
applied for % within Total 
credit applied for 
47.1% 52.9% 100.0% 
C$2,501 - 10,000 Count 23 35 58 
% within Total 7% 39 60.3% 100 0% 
credit applied for . . 
C$10,000 upwards Count 4 28 32 
% within Total 
credit applied for 
12.5% 87.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 59 99 158 
% within Total 
credit applied for 
37.3% 62.7% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.003) 
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17) Relationship between food expenditure and current use of credit 
Total credit applied for * Food Costs Crosstabulation 
Food Costs 
C$1,001 - C$1,501 
C$0 - 1,000 1,500 upwards Total 
Total credit C $O - 2,500 Count 43 30 19 92 
applied for % within Total 
credit applied for 
46.7% 32.6% 20.7% 100.0% 
C$2,501 - 10,000 Count 29 26 25 80 
% within Total 
credit applied for 
36.3% 32.5% 31.3% 100.0% 
C$10,000 upwards Count 6 13 28 47- 
% within Total 
credit applied for 
12.8% 27.7% 59.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 78 69 72 219 
% within Total 
credit applied for 
35.6% 31.5% 32.9% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
412 
APPENDIX E- GENDER-DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSE PATTERNS 
1) Relationship between gender and reported expenditure on water charges 
Cli. sex * Water Costs Crosstabulation 
Water Costs 
C$51 - C$101 
C$0 - 50 100 upwards Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 31 50 28 109 
within 28.4% 45.9% 25.7% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Female Count 26 49 59 134 
within 19.4% 36.6% 44.0% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Total Count 57 99 87 243 
% within 23.5% 40.7% 35.8% 100.0% Cli. sex 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.011) 
2) Relationship between respondent gender and electricity expenditure 
Cli. sex * Electricity Costs Crosstabulation 
Electricit Costs 
C$151- 
C$ 0- 150 upwards Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 69 19 88 
% within Cli. sex 78.4% 21.6% 100.0% 
Female Count 76 51 127 
% within Cli. sex 59.8% 40.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 145 70 215 
% within Cli. sex 67.4% 32.6% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.004) 
413 
3) Relationship between gender and reported food expenditure 
Cli. sex * Food Costs Crosstabulation 
Food Costs 
C$ 1251 - C$ 2001 - 
C$ 0- 750 C$ 751 - 1250 2000 upwards Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 38 35 33 15 121 
% within Cli. se 31.4% 28.9% 27.3% 12.4% 100.0% 
Female Count 31 64 58 26 179 
% within Cli. se 17.3% 35.8% 32.4% 14.5% 100.0% 
Total Count 69 99 91 41 300 
% within Cli. se 23.0% 33.0% 30.3% 13.7% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.044) 
4) Aggregated Database - Water Costs By Interviewer And Respondent Gender 
Cli. sex * Water Costs * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Water Costs 
C$51 - C$101 
Interviewer/Sex C$0 - 50 100 upwards Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 596 20 
% within 25.0% 45.0% 30.0% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Female Count 4 12 12 28 
% within 14.3% 42.9% 42.9% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Total Count 9 21 18 48 
% within 18.8% 43.8% 37.5% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 26 41 22 89 
within 29.2% 46.1 % 24.7% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Female Count 22 37 47 106 
% within 20.8% 34.9% 44.3% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Total Count 48 78 69 195 
within 24.6% 40.0% 35.4% 100.0% Cli. sex 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability for male interviewers = 0.538, for female interviewers = 
0.017, also NB result for male interviewers neither positive nor significant) 
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5) Relationship between gender of respondent and reported gender of credit-holder 
for aggregated database 
Cli. sex * Gender of Creditholder Crosstabulation 
Gender of Creditholder 
Couple 
Disagree 
Male Female Both ment Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 22 7 3 14 46 
% within Cli. sex 47.8% 15.2% 6.5% 30.4% 100.0% 
Female Count 16 23 4 8 51 
% within Cli. sex 31.4% 45.1% 7.8% 15.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 38 30 7 22 97 
% within Cli. sex 39.2% 30.9% 7.2% 22.7% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.012) 
6) Relationship between gender of respondent and reported gender of credit-holder 
for credit-holder database 
Cli. sex * Gender of Creditholder Crosstabulation 
Gender of Creditholder 
Male Female Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 
% within Cli. sex 
57 
86.4% 
9 
13.6% 
66- 
100.0% 
Female Count 
% within Cli. sex 
18 
13.5% 
115 
86.5% 
133 
100.0% 
Total Count 
% within Cli. sex 
75 
37.7% 
124 
62.3% 
199 
100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
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7) A gregated Database - Respondent Gender And Who Repays Credit 
Cli. sex * Repayment of Credit Crosstabulation 
Repayment of Credit 
Male Female Couple 
Head/Son Head/Daughter Disagreement Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 19 6 18 43 
within 44.2% 14.0% 41.9% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Female Count 14 23 9 46 
within 30.4% 50.0% 19.6% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Total Count 33 29 27 89 
within 37.1% 32.6% 30.3% 100.0% Cli. sex 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.001) 
8) Relationship between gender of respondent, gender of interviewer and reported 
responsibility for repayment of credit in aggregated database 
Cli. sex * Who Repays Credit * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Who Repays Credit 
Male Female 
Interviewer/Sex Head/Son Head/Daughter Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 82 10 
% within 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Cli. sex 
Female Count 268 
% within 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Clisex 
Total Count 10 8 18 
%, within 55.6% 44.4% 100.0% 
Cli. sex 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 12 4 16 
% 
Cli 
thin 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
. sex 
Female Count 12 17 29 
within 41.4% 58.6% 100.0% Clisex 
Total Count 24 21 45 
%a within 53.3% 46.7% 100.0% Cli. sex 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability for male interviewers = 0.020 however not positive 
although significant, Pearson Chi-Square Value for female interviewers = 0.030, both positive 
and significant). 
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9) Relationship between gender of respondent and reported gender of credit repaver in 
credit-holder database 
Cli. sex * Who repays credit Crosstabulation 
Who repays credit 
Female 
Male Head/Da Both/Other 
Head/Son u hter Combination Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 49 7 12 68 
% within Cli. sex 72.1% 10.3% 17.6% 100.0% 
Female Count 18 83 33 134 
% within Cli. sex 13.4% 61.9% 24.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 67 90 45 202 
% within Cli. sex 33.2% 44.6% 22.3% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
10) Relationship between gender of respondent. gender of interviewer and 
reported gender of credit reaayer for credit-holder database 
Cli. sex * Who repays credit " Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Who repays cr edit 
Female 
Male Head/Da Both/Other 
Interviewer/Sex Head/Son ughter Combination Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 27 3 4 34 
% within Cli. sex 79.4% 8.8% 11.8% 100.0% 
Female Count 2 23 2 27 
% within Cli. sex 7.4% 85.2% 7.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 29 26 6 61 
% within Cli. sex 47.5% 42.6% 9.8% 100.0% 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 22 4 8 34 
% within Cli. sex 64.7% 11.8% 23.5% 100.0°/a 
Female Count 16 60 31 107 
% within Cli. sex 15.0% 56.1% 29.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 38 64 39 141 
% within Cli. sex 27.0% 45.4% 27.7% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000 for both male and female interviewers, however 
again significant but not positive for the male) 
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in Relationship between creditholder gender and deals on food for the aggregated 
database 
Deals on Food * Creditholder Gender Crosstabulation 
Creditholder Gender 
Male Female 
Head/Son/Male Head/Daughter/Femal 
Relative e Relative Total 
Deals on Yes Count 39 12 
Food % within 
Deals on 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Food 
No Count 34 20 54 
% within 
Deals on 63.0% 37.0% 100.0% 
Food 
Total Count 37 29 66 
% within 
Deals on 56.1% 43.9% 100.0% 
Food 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.017) 
12) Relationship between deals on food and possession of credit for the aggregated database 
Deals on Food * Present Credit Crosstabulation 
Present Credit 
Yes No Total 
Deals on Yes Count 14 20 34 
Food % within 
Deals on 41.2% 58.8% 100.0% 
Food 
No Count 62 186 248 
% within 
Deals on 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Food 
Total Count 76 206 282 
% within 
Deals on 27.0% 73.0% 100.0% 
Food 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.046) 
418 
13) Relationshin between respondent gender and titleholder gender for the aggregated 
database 
Cli. sex * Titleholder Sex Crosstabulation 
Titleholder Sex 
male female both Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 58 43 12 113 
%within 51.3% 38.1% 10.6% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Female Count 53 95 26 174 
within 30.5% 54.6% 14.9% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Total Count 111 138 38 287 
within 38.7% 48.1% 13.2% 100.0% Cli. sex 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.002) 
14) Relationship between reported gender of titleholder and respondent sender for 
non-credit households 
Cli. sex * Titleholder Sex Crosstabulation 
Titleholder Sex 
male female Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 
% within Cli. sex 
41 
63.1% 
24 
36.9% 
65 
100.0% 
Female Count 
% within Cli. sex 
38 
34.2% 
73 
65.8% 
111 
100.0% 
Total Count 
% within Cli. sex 
79 
44.9% 
97 
55.1% 
176 
100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
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15) Relationship between reported gender of titleholder and respondent gender for credit- 
holdin2 households 
Cli. sex * Titleholder Sex Crosstabulation 
Titleholder Sex 
male female Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 
% within Cli. sex 
40 
58.0% 
29 
42.0% 
69, 
100.0% 
Female Count 
% within Cli. sex 
40 
31.7% 
86 
68.3% 
126 
100.0% 
Total Count 
% within Cli. sex 
80 
41.0% 
115 
59.0% 
195 
100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
16) Relationship between gender of respondent, gender of interviewer and 
reported gender of titleholder for aggregated database 
Cli. sex * Titleholder Sex * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Titleholder Sex 
Interviewer/Sex 1.00 2.00 3.00 Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 10 14 24 
% within 41.7% 58.3% 100.0% 
Cli. sex 
Female Count 6 20 2 28 
within 21.4% 71.4% 7.1% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Total Count 16 34 2 52 
% within 30.8% 65.4% 3.8% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 50 31 12 93 
% within 53.8% 33.3% 12.9% 100 0% Cli. sex . 
Female Count 46 77 24 147 
% within 31.3% 52.4% 16.3% 100 0% Cli. sex . 
Total Count 96 108 36 240 
% within 
Cli. sex 
40.0% 45.0% 15.0% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.152 for male interviewers, NB Value neither 
positive nor significant for male interviewers. Pearson Chi-Squared Value for female 
interviewers = 0.002, both positive and significant) 
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17) Relationship between respondent under. interviewer gender and reported 
titleholder gender for non-credit households 
Cli. sex * Titleholder Sex' Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Titleholder Sex 
Interviewer/Sex male female Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 6 5 11 
% within Cli. sex 54.5% 45.5% 100.0% 
Female Count 6 12 18 
% within Cli. sex 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 12 17 29 
% within Cli. sex 41.4% 58.6% 100.0% 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 35 19 54 
% within Cli. sex 64.8% 35.2% 100.0% 
Female Count 32 61 93 
% within Cli. sex 34.4% 65.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 67 80 147 
% within Cli. sex 45.6% 54.4% 100.0% 
(Pearson Ch-Squared probability for male interviewers = 0.260, NB value neither positive 
nor significant for male interviewers, Pearson Chi-Square Value for female interviewers = 0.000, 
value both positive and significant) 
18) Relationship between respondent gender. interviewer gender and reported titleholder 
gender for credit-holding households 
Cli. sex * Titleholder Sex * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Titleholder Sex 
Interviewer/Sex male female Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 17 14 31 
% within Cli. sex 54.8% 45.2% 100.0% 
Female Count 1 25 26 
% within Cli. sex 3.8% 96.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 18 39 57 
% within Cli. sex 31.6% 68.4% 100.0% 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 23 15 38 
% within Cli. sex 60.5% 39.5% 100.0% 
Female Count 39 61 100 
% within Cli. sex 39.0% 61.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 62 76 138 
% within Cli. sex 44.9% 55.1% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Sqaured probability for male interviewers = 0.000, for female interviewers = 
0.023, values positive and significant for both genders) 
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19) Relationship between past credit access and migrants into household in aast 
five years for the aggregated database 
Past Credit * Migrants <5 Years Crosstabulation 
Migrants <5 Years 
Yes No Total 
Past Yes Count 28 84 112 
Credit % within 
Past 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Credit 
No Count 16 153 169 
% within 
Past 9.5% 90.5% 100.0% 
Credit 
Total Count 44 237 281 
% within 
Past 15.7% 84.3% 100.0% 
Credit 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
20) Relationship between past credit access and ownership of other Property in the 
aggregated database 
Other Property * Past Credit Crosstabulation 
Past Credit 
Yes No Total 
Other yes Count 32 30 62 
Property % within 
Other 51.6% 48.4% 100.0% 
Property 
No Count 82 137 219 
% within 
Other 37.4% 62.6% 100.0% 
Property 
Total Count 114 167 281 
% within 
Other 40.6% 59.4% 100.0% 
Property 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.045) 
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21) Relationship between total credit applied for and possession of other properties 
Other Property * Total Credit Applied For Crosstabulation 
Total Credit Applied For 
C$0 - C$2,501 - C$10,000 
2,500 10,000 upwards Total 
Other yes Count 67 11 24 
Property % within 
Other 25.0% 29.2% 45.8% 100.0% 
Property 
No Count 34 25 8 67 
% within 
Other 50.7% 37.3% 11.9% 100.0% 
Property 
Total Count 40 32 19 91 
% within 
Other 44.0% 35.2% 20.9% 100.0% 
Property 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.002) 
22) Relationship between respondent gender, interviewer and reported 
responsibility for childcare 
Cii. sex * Childcare Responsibility * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Childcare Res on sibilit 
Female 
Male Head/Da Both/Other 
Interviewer/Sex Head/Son u hter Combination Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 6 13 19 
% within Cli. sex 31.6% 68.4% 100.0% 
Female Count 5 10 15 
% within Cti. sex 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 11 23 34 
% within Cli. sex 32.4% 67.6% 100.0% 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 3 24 34 61 
% within Cli. sex 4.9% 39.3% 55.7% 100.0% 
Female Count 5 64 36 105 
% within Cli. sex 4.8% 61.0% 34.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 8 8 8 70 166 
% within Cli. sex 4.8% 53.0% 42.2% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability for male interviewers = 0.914, NB value is neither 
positive nor significant, Value for female interviewers = 0.022, both significant and positive). 
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2 3) Relationship between gender of respondent and reported possession of 
transport by household 
Cli. sex * Own Transport Crosstabulation 
Own Transport 
Yes No Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 91 36 127 
within 71.7% 28.3% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Female Count 106 76 182 
% within 58.2% 41.8% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Total Count 197 112 309 
% within 63.8% 36.2% 100.0% Cli. sex 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.016) 
24) Relationship between gender of respondent and reported ownership of 
transport in non-credit households 
Cli. sex * Own Transport Crosstabulation 
Own Transport 
Yes No Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 
% within Cli. sex 
58 
71.6% 
23 
28.4% 
81 
100.0% 
Female Count 
% within Cli. sex 
74 
55.6% 
59 
44.4% 
133 
100.0% 
Total Count 
% within Cli. sex 
132 
61.7% 
82 
38.3% 
214 
100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.020) 
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25) Relationship between gender of respondent and reported ownership of 
transport in credit-owning households 
Cli. sex * Own Transport Crosstabulation 
Own Transport 
Yes No Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 
% within Cli. sex 
58 
68.2% 
27 
31.8% 
85 
100.0% 
Female Count 
% within Cli. sex 
90 
62.5% 
54 
37.5% 
144 
100.0% 
Total Count 
% within Cli. sex 
148 
64.6% 
81 
35.4% 
229 
100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.380, NB positive but not significant) 
26) Relationship between respondent gender. interviewer gender and reported 
possession of transport by household in non-credit households 
Cli. sex * Own Transport * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Own Transport 
Interviewer/Sex Yes No Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 11 2 13 
% within Cli. sex 84.6% 15.4% 100.0% 
Female Count 9 12 21 
% within Cli. sex 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 20 14 34 
% within Cli. sex 58.8% 41.2% 100.0% 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 47 21 68 
% within Cli. sex 69.1% 30.9% 100.0% 
Female Count 65 47 112 
% within Cli. sex 58.0% 42.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 112 68 180 
% within Cli. sex 62.2% 37.8% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability for male interviewers = 0.016, Value for female 
interviewers = 0.137, NB for female interviewers positive but not significant) 
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27) Incidence of responsibility for education costs for non-credit households 
Who Pays Educ. Costs 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male Head 32 14.5 14.5 14.5 
Female Head 31 14.0 14.0 28.5 
Both 39 17.6 17.6 46.2 
Son 5 2.3 2.3 48.4 
Daughter 4 1.8 1.8 50.2 
Other Male Rel. 3 1.4 1.4 51.6 
Other Female Rel. 6 2.7 2.7 54.3 
Other Combination 12 5.4 5.4 59.7 
Couple Disagreement 20 9.0 9.0 68.8 
No Children 69 31.2 31.2 100.0 
Total 221 100.0 100.0 
28) Incidence or responsibility for education costs for credit-holding households 
Who Pays Educ. Costs 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Male Head 36 15.6 15.6 15.6 
Female Head 43 18.6 18.6 34.2 
Both 85 36.8 36.8 71.0 
Daughter 7 3.0 3.0 74.0 
Other Male Rel. 1 .4 .4 
74.5 
Other Female Rel. 1 .4 .4 
74.9 
Other Combination 5 2.2 2.2 77.1 
Couple Disagreement 6 2.6 2.6 79.7 
No Children 47 20.3 20.3 100.0 
Total 231 100.0 100.0 
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29) Relationship between sender of respondent and reported gender of person responsible 
for education costs 
Cli. sex * Educational Responsibility Crosstabulation 
Educat ional Res onsibilit 
Female 
Male Head/Daug 
Head/Son/M hter/Female Both/Com 
ale Relative Relative bination Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 30 11 43 84 
% within Cli. sex 35.7% 13.1% 51.2% 100.0% 
Female Count 30 48 44 122 
% within Cli. sex 24.6% 39.3% 36.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 60 59 87 206 
% within Cli. sex 29.1% 28.6% 42.2% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
30) Relationship between gender of respondent and reported gender of person responsible 
for education costs in non-credit households 
Cli. sex * Educational Responsibility Crosstabulation 
Educat ional Res onsi bilit 
Female 
Male Head/Daug 
Head/Son/M hter/Female Both/Corn 
ale Relative Relative bination Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 16 7 27 50 
% within Cli. sex 32.0% 14.0% 54.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 24 34 24 82 
% within Cli. sex 29.3% 41.5% 29.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 40 41 51 132 
% within Cli. sex 30.3% 31.1% 38.6% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.002) 
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31) Relationship between gender of respondent and reported sender of person responsible 
for education costs in credit-holding households 
Cli. sex * Responsibility for Education Crosstabulation 
Responsibility for Education 
Female 
Male Head/Daug 
Head/Son/M hter/Female Both/Com 
ale Relative Relative bination Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 25 6 33 64 
% within Cli. sex 39.1% 9.4% 51.6% 100.0% 
Female Count 12 45 57 114 
% within Cli. sex 10.5% 39.5% 50.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 37 51 90 178 
% within Cli. sex 20.8% 28.7% 50.6% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
32 Relationship between respondent gender. interviewer gender and reported 
responsibility for education costs 
Cli. sex * Educational Responsibility * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Educat ional Res onsi bilit 
Female 
Male Head/Daug 
Head/Son/M hter/Female Both/Com 
Interviewer/Sex ale Relative Relative bination Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 5 2 10 17 
% within Cli. sex 29.4% 11.8% 58.8% 100.0% 
Female Count 3 4 9 16 
% within Cli. sex 18.8% 25.0% 56.3% 100.0% 
Total Count 8 6 19 33 
% within Cll. sex 24.2% 18.2% 57.6% 100.0% 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 25 9 33 67 
% within Cli. sex 37.3% 13.4% 49.3% 100.0% 
Female Count 27 44 35 106 
% within Cli. sex 25.5% 41.5% 33.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 52 53 68 173 
% within Cli. sex 30.1% 30.6% 39.3% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability for male interviewers is 0.552 and not significant or 
positive, Value for female interviewers = 0.000, significant and positive) 
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33) Relationship of respondent gender to reported responsibility for medical costs for the 
aggregated database 
Cli. sex * Medical Responsibility Crosstabulation 
Medical Responsibil ity 
Female 
Male Head/Daug 
Head/Son/M hter/Female Both/Com 
ale Relative Relative bination Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 38 5 65 108 
% within Cli. sex 35.2% 4.6% 60.2% 100.0% 
Female Count 37 54 75 166 
% within Cli. sex 22.3% 32.5% 45.2% 100.0% 
Total Count 75 59 140 274 
% within Cli. sex 27.4% 21.5% 51.1% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
34) Relationship between respondent gender and reported responsibility for 
medical costs in the credit-holding database 
Cli. sex * Responsibility for medical costs Crosstabulation 
Responsi bility for medical costs 
Female 
Male Head/Daug 
Head/Son/M hter/Female Both/Corn 
ale Relative Relative bination Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 28 46 74 
% within Cli. sex 37.8% 62.2% 100.0% 
Female Count 16 48 69 133 
% within Cli. sex 12.0% 36.1% 51.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 44 48 115 207 
% within Cli. sex 21.3% 23.2% 55.6% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
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35) Relationship between respondent gender and reported responsibility for 
medical costs in the non-credit database 
Cli. sex * Responsibility for medical costs Crosstabulation 
Responsi bility for medical costs 
Female 
Male Head/Daug 
Head/Son/M hter/Female Both/Com 
ale Relative Relative bination Total 
Cli. sex Male Count 28 46 74 
% within Cli. sex 37.8% 62.2% 100.0% 
Female Count 16 48 69 133 
% within Cli. sex 12.0% 36.1% 51.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 44 48 115 207 
% within Cli. sex 21.3% 23.2% 55.6% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000) 
36) Relationship between respondent gender. interviewer 2ender and responsibility for 
medical costs in the credit-holding database 
Cli. sex * Responsibility for medical costs * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Responsib ility for medical costs 
Female 
Male Head/Daug 
ead/Son/M ter/Female Both/Corn 
Interviewer/Se ale Relative Relative bination Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 12 23 35 
% within Cli. s 34.3% 65.7% 100.0% 
Female Count 1 12 12 25 
% within Cli. s 4.0% 48.0% 48.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 13 12 35 60 
% within Cli. s 21.7% 20.0% 58.3% 100.0% 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 16 23 39 
% within Cii. s 41.0% 59.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 15 36 57 108 
% within Cli. s 13.9% 33.3% 52.8% 100.0% 
Total Count 31 36 80 147 
% within Cli. s 21.1% 24.5% 54.4% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.000 for both male and female interviewers) 
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37) Relationship between length of residence in property and responsibility for 
educational costs 
Length of Residence * Educational Responsibility Crosstabulation 
Educational Res ons ibili 
Female 
Male Head/Daug 
Head/Son/M hter/Female Both/Com 
ale Relative Relative bination Total 
Length of 0- 15 years Count 32 11 36 79 
Residence % within Length 
of Residence 
40.5% 13.9% 45.6% 100.0% 
16 - 25 years Count 8 16 14 38 
% within Length 
of Residence 
21.1% 42.1% 36.8% 100.0% 
26 years upwards Count 17 30 36 83 
% within Length 
of Residence 
20.5% 36.1% 43.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 57 57 86 200 
% within Length 
of Residence 
28.5% 28.5% 43.0% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.002) 
38) Relationship between length of residence and responsibility for medical 
Length of Residence * Medical Responsibility Crosstabulation 
Medical Responsibility 
Male Female 
Head/Son/Male Head/Daughter/Femal 
Relative e Relative Total 
Length of 0-15 Count 32 12 44 
Residence years % within 
Length of 72.7% 27.3% 100.0% 
Residence 
16-25 Count 17 15 32 
years % within 
Length of 53.1% 46.9% 100.0% 
Residence 
26 years Count 30 34 64 
upwards % within 
Length of 46.9% 53.1% 100.0% 
Residence 
Total Count 79 61 140 
% within 
Length of 56.4% 43.6% 100.0% 
Residence 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability = 0.026) 
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39) Relationship between current use of credit and membership of funeral 
insurance groups in non-credit households 
(Non-Credit Households) 
Caja de Muerto 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 76 34.4 35.0 35.0 
No 141 63.8 65.0 100.0 
Total 217 98.2 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 2 .9 
Don't Know 2 .9 
Total 4 1.8 
Total 221 100.0 
(Credit-Holding Households) 
Caja de Muerto 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 62 26.8 27.0 27.0 
No 168 72.7 73.0 100.0 
Total 230 99.6 100.0 
Missing Couple Disagreement 1 .4 
Total 231 100.0 
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40) Relationship between respondent gender. interviewer gender and reported 
membership of funeral insurance groups for aggregated database 
Cli. sex * Caja de Muerto * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Interviewer/Sex 
Caja de Muerto 
Yes No Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 13 12 25 
°/a within 
Cli. sex 
52.0% 48.0% 100.0% 
Female Count 12 18 30 
% within 40 0% 60.0% 100 0% Cli. sex . . 
Total Count 25 30 55 
% within 45.5% 54.5% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 29 76 105 
% within 27.6% 72.4% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Female Count 61 93 154 
% within 39.6% 60.4% 100.0% Cli. sex 
Total Count 90 169 259 
% within 34.7% 65.3% 100.0% Cli. sex 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability for male interviewers = 0.373 and therefore not 
significant, Value for female interviewers = 0.047 and both significant and positive) 
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41) Relationship between respondent gender interviewer gender and reported 
membership of funeral insurance -groups for non-credit database 
Cli. sex * Caja de Muerto * Interviewer/Sex Crosstabulation 
Caia de Muerto 
Interviewer/Sex Yes No Total 
Male Cli. sex Male Count 5 8 13 
% within Cli. sex 38.5% 61.5% 100.0% 
Female Count 9 13 22 
% within Cli. sex 40.9% 59.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 14 21 35 
% within Cli. sex 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 
Female Cli. sex Male Count 16 54 70 
% within Cli. sex 22.9% 77.1% 100.0% 
Female Count 46 66 112 
% within Cii. sex 41.1% 58.9% 100.0% 
Total Count 62 120 182 
% within Cii. sex 34.1% 65.9% 100.0% 
(Pearson Chi-Squared probability for male interviewers = 0.886 and therefore not 
significant, Value for female interviewers = 0.012 and positive and significant) 
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ANNEX 1: SURVEY OUESTIONNAIRE 
Entrevistador Cödieo: 
Nombre del participante: 
1= Encargado (Pareja) 
3= Jefe(soltero) 
2= Encargada(Pareja) 
4= Jefa(Soltera) 
Antes de empezar, usted debe notar si se dirige la entrevista con el participante por si 
mismo o si hay otras personas presente, tambien si hay interrupciones. 
SECCION 1- CONSTRUCCION DE LA PROPIEDAD FAMILIAR 
2) I, Existe titulo para la propiedad aqui? 1) Si 2) no 3) no 
se 
(si no o no se, ve to a 6) 
3) i, De parte de quien? 1) hombre 2) mujer 3) No sd 
4) varios 
4) Es usted la dueno/a? 1) si 2) no 
5) Como adquirio este titulo? (99 = no se) 
6) LCuantas personas viven en esta propiedad? (99 = no se) 
7) LCuantas personas viven juntos como vuestro hogar, es a decir que comparten la 
comida e ingresos? 
(cifra) 
Despues de determinar quien es jefe, companera o jefa del hogar, la entrevista deberia 
ser dirigido con esta persona y, si el Jefe es hombre, con su esposa o cualquier mujer 
quien se juega el papel de mujer dirigente. 
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SECCION 2- JEFES/AS DE HOGAR Y SUS PAREJAS 
8) LCuänto tiempo tiene de vivir usted en esta propiedad? (cifra) 
9) LDÖnde vivia usted antes de venir aqui? 1) he vivido aqui toda mi vida 
2) dentro de Masaya 3) el campo cerca de Masaya 
4) mas lejos (especifique) (si 1, ve to at 11) 
10) 1Originalmente, por que vino at barrio? 
1= para casarme, 2= falta trabajo en ultimo lugar, 3= faltan vivienda en ultima lugar, 4= para 
vivir con parientes aqui, 5= ayudar con cuidar de ninos, 6= mejor educaciön/recursos de salud, 
099 = Otro razön 
11) 'Hay aiguien mas que ya vive aqui como parte de vuestro hogar que se vino aqui en los 
cincos anos pasados? 1) si 2) no (si no, ve to al q. 13) 
12) Los que vinieron aqui en los cincos anos pasados: 
De donde 
Quien: 1= encargado, 2= encargada, 3= hijo, 4= hija, 5= otro pariente(m), 6= otro pariente 
(f). De donde: 1= dentro de Masaya, 2= el campo cerca de Masaya, 3= mas lejos (especifique). 
Porque :1= falta trabajo en ultimo lugar, 2= falta vivienda en ultimo lugar, 3= para 
vivir con parientes aqui, 4= ayudar con cuidar de ninos, 5= mejor educaci6n/recursos de salud, 6 
= solo, y quieren vivir con amigos, 099 = Otro razon (especifique)) 
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13) LEn su hogar, Quienes tienen ingresos, y que tipos de trabajos hacen? Por favor 
mencionas especificamente si hay personas que hacen empleos diferentes a lo largo del 
ano, como por ejemplo la cosecha. 
Persona Tipo de trabajo Cuantos ganan 
mensualmente 
Donde el 
trabajo se hace 
Cuantos dias 
trabaja 
semanalmente 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Persona: 1= encargado, 2= encargada, 3= hijo, 4= hija, 5= otro pariente (m), 6= otro 
pariente (f). 
Trabajo: 1= taller de mecänicos, 2= carpinter a, 3= zapateria, 4= artesania, 5= construcciön, 
6= trabajo agricultura, 7= fontanero, 8= emplead@ domestic@, 9= trabajan en el mercado, 
10 = yenta de productos, 11 = pulperfa, 12 = ferreterfa, 13 = transporte, 14 = costura / bordadora, 
99 = otro (especifique) 
Cuantos ganan: (cifra) 099 = no se 
Donde: 1= En casa, 2= casa de otros, 3= en calle, 4= en tienda, 5= en mercado, 6= el 
campo, 7= sitio de construcciön, 099) otro (especifique). 
Cuantos dias: numero 
14) 
, 
Los ingresos de trabajo varian mucho durante el ano? 1) si 2) no 3) no se 
(si no o no se, ve to a 17). 
15) LEI trabajo de cual persona varia? 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 
16) LCuäntos varia cada semana? 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 
(cifra en C$, no se = 99) 
17) LHay alguien aqui que son dueflos de propiedad en otra parte? (por ejemplo una fmca) 
18) 1) si 2) no (si no, ve to a la 25) 
19) Desde hace cuanto tiempo? 
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20) Como lo adquirio esta propiedad? 
21) Emplean a otras personas, o comparten su otra propiedad con parientes o otras personas? 
22) LA donde esta? 1) dentro de Masaya 2) campo cerca de Masaya 
3) mas lejos (especifique) 4) Mas que una propiedad 
(especifique) 
23) LLa cosecha/producto de aquella propiedad se forma parte de los ingresos o alimentaciön 
del hogar? 1) Si 2) no 
24) Si comparten dinero del alquiler si hay? 1) si 2) no 99) no sabe 
25) Esta alquilada la propiedad? 1) si 2) no 99) no sabe 
26) LSon los ingresos del hogar o compartidos o prestados con parientes/amigos en otra parte? 
1) si 2) no (si no, ve to a la 27) 
27) Ingresos compartidos/prestados: 
Donde 
Quien: 1= parientes cercanos (m) (padre, hijo), 2= parientes cercanos (t) (madre, hija), 
3= otros parientes (m) (abuelo, tio, primo 4= otros parientes (fl (tia, abuela, 
prima) 5= amigos 6= amigas. 
Donde: 1= dentro de Masaya, 2= campo cerca de Masaya, 099 = Otro (Especifique)) 
28) LHay trabajo del hogar que ganan dinero compartido con parientes/amigos en otra pane? 
1) Si 2) no (si no, ve to a129) 
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29) Trabajo compartido: 
Donde 
Quien: 1= parientes cercanos (m) (padre, hijo), 2= parientes cercanos (f) (madre, hija), 
3= otros parientes (m) (abuelo, tio, primo), 4= otros parientes (f) (tfa, abuela, 
prima), 5= amigos, 6= amigas. 
Donde: 1= dentro de Masaya, 2= campo cerca de Masaya, 
099 = Otro (Especifique) 
SECCION 3- ACTIVIDADES DEL TRABAJO DEL HOGAR 
30) LQuienes hacen los quehaceres? 1) encargado 2) encargada 3) ambos 
4) hijas 5) hijos 6) otros parientes 7) otra 
combinaciön. 
31) Si la(s) persona(s) que hacen los quehaceres reciben algun ayuda economica, o en especie 
por eso? 
32) LQuienes tienen la responsabilidad para cuidar a los nifios? 1) encargado 2) 
encargada 3) ambos 4) hijas 5) hijos 
6) otros parientes 7) otra combinaciön 99) no hay ninos 
33) Si la(s) persona(s) que cuidan a los ninos reciben algun ayuda economica, o en especie? 
34) LHay alguien en el hogar que producen cosas a vender/trueque, Como por 
ejemplo gallinas, huevos, cerdos, frutas, canastas? 1) Si 2) no 
(si no, ve to a 36) 
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35) Productos del hogar: 
Quien Cuanto Ganan Que hacen Donde 
mensualmente 
Quien: 1= encargado, 2= encargada, 3= hijos, 4= hijas, 5= otros parientes. 
Cuanto Ganan: (cifra) 099 = no idea 
Que Hacen: 1= venden frutas, verduras, o otros productos, 2= venden frescos, comida 
caliente, otra comida, 3= venden canastas o otra artesania, 4= venden caramelos, chicle o algo 
similar. 
Donde: 1= en la calle, 2= en el mercado, 3= en casa 
36) LA quien le recibe el dinero/bienes por este trabajo? 1) encargado 2) encargada 
3) Hijos 4)Hijas 5) Otros parientes(m) 6)Otros parientes (f) 
37) LHay alguien en este hogar que tiene su rp opio transporte? (Como bueyes, bicicleta, 
caballo, moto, carro)? 1) Si 2) no (si no, ve to al 38) 
38) LCual tipo? 1) bueyes 2) bicicleta 3) caballo 4) moto 
5) carro 6) combinacion 
39) LNormalmente las personas aqui usan que otro tipo de transporte? 
1) No usamos otro transporte 2) Taxi 3) bus 4) 
carreta de bueyes 5) caballo 6) carretön de caballos 7) comparten 
camiones/etas 8) combinacion 
40) LCuänto se pagan semanalmente su hogar para el transporte? ( tarifas, mantenimiento de 
carros, gasolina, etc. ) (cifra en C$, 099 = no se) 
SECCION 4- GASTOS DEL HOGAR 
40) LNormalmente quien paga para la educaciön de los nifios? 1) encargado 2) encargada 
3) ambos 4) hijos 5) hijas 6) otros parientes(m) 7)Otros 
parientes (f) 8) otra combinaciön 099) No hay hijos/hijos de edad 
(si 099, ve to a 42) 
41) LCuantos se pagan mensualmente por esa? (cifra en C$, 099 = no se) 
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42) LNormalmente quien paga para los gastos de medicina? 1) encargado 2) 
encargada 3) ambos 4) hijo 5) hija 6) Otro 
pariente(m) 7) Otro pariente(f) 8) combinacion 
43) LCuantos se pagan mensualmente por esa? (cifra en C$, 099 = no se) 
44) LMensualmente cuanta se pagan el hogar para la comida? 
(cifra en C$, 099 = no se) 
45) LO hacen tratos o reciben precios especiales para la comprar de comida, de 
amigos/parientes? 
1) Si 2) no 
46) Si lo hicieron tratos en el pasado 1) si 2) no 99) no sabe 
47) Cuantos se pagan mensualmente por: 1) Agua? 
2) Electricidad? 
(cifras en C$, 099 = no se) 
SECCION 5- CREDITO DEL HOGAR 
48) LHay alguien aqui que va deben algo en credito o prestamo? 1) si 2) no 
(si no, ve to al 57) 
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49) LQuien fue que firmo para cada prestamo/credito? 
Quien firma Cuanto De donde Cuanto ue se debe Pro ösito 
Quien firma: 1= encargado, 2= encargada, 3= ambos, 4= hijos, 5= hijas, 7= otros 
parientes 
Cuanto: cifra en C$ 
De Donde: 1= banco privado, 2= organizaciön de desarrollo estatal, 3= Prestamista individual, 
4= ONG, 5= Banquito (Nitlapan, FAMA), 6= Cooperativo, 7= Tienda/Pulperia, 099 = otra 
Cuanto que se debe: (cifra en C$, 099 = no se) 
Propösito original del prestamo/credito: 1= comprar herramientas, 2= comprar maquinaria, 
3= comprar vehiculos, 4= construir/mejorar la casa, 5= comprar semillas, 
6= comprar materiales para la casa, 7= comprar materiales para negocios, 
8= investir en negocio, 099 = Otro (especifique)) 
50) Si la persona quien firmo es mujer, si utiliza el credito para hacer tratos de comida o de 
negocios en cualquier manera? 
51) LEs pagado el prestamo/credito en efectivo? No. 1) 1) si 
No. 2) 1) si 
No. 3) 1) si 
No. 4) 1) si 
(si 1, ve to al 53) 
2) no 
2) no 
2) no 
2) no 
52) LSi no, como pagado? 1) semillas 
4) construcciön de casa 
(especifique) 
53) LNormalmente quien paga el reembolso? 
3) ambos 4) hijos 
2) herramientas 
099) otra 
1) encargado 
5) hijas 
3) animales/gallinas 
2) encargada 
6) otros parientes 7) Todos pagan 
54) La persona que firmo, tiene el dinero? 1) si 2) no 3) no se 
55) Como ha sido, o esta siendo usado el dinero del credito/prestamo? 
56) Ha lido el dinero utilizado conforme al proposito original al banco/organisacion 
que presto el dinero? 1) si 2) no 099 = no se 
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57) LQue alguien en el hogar han recibido credito/prdstamo en el pasado? 1) Si 2) no 
(si no, ve to al Q. 60) 
58) Si recibieron credito en el pasado, le utilizaron para comprar propiedad? 1) si 2) no 
99) no sabe 
59) LSi le recibieron, puede usted contar me un poco mas de donde fue, y por cuanto dinero, y 
por que lo han usado? 
59) LUsted o la persona que va le recibe o le recibieron en el aasado aplicar an otra vez? 
1) Si 2) no 3) no sd 
61) LSi no, puede contar me por que? 
62) LUstedes han tenido problemas en el pasado con credito, o ya tienen? 1) Si 
2) no 
63) LSi han tenido, pueden contarme un poco mas? 
64) LSi nadie en el hogar no han recibido ni aplicado para un credito/prestamo, pueden 
contarme por que no les quieren? 
65) 'Hay alguien en el hogar que tienen una cuenta de ahorro/corriente con un I 
banco/cooperativo/cualquier organizaciön? 1) Si 2) no 3) no se (si la respuesta 
es no, ve to al 69) 
66) Desde hace cuanto tiempo tiene esta cuenta? 
67) Con cual banco/ organizaciön tiene esta cuenta? 
68) LQuien? 1) m (cifra, 99=no se) 2) f (cifra, 99=no se) 
69) 'Usted puede decirme los nombres de organizaciones de cuales podria posible 
recibir un prestamo/credito? (nombres) 
70) LLa propiedad tiene hipoteca o esta gravada por banco/otra instituciön? 
1) sf 2) no 3) no se 
71) 'Hay alguien aqui que son miembros de un grupo de cajas de muerto? 
1) si 2) no 3) no se 
72) LCuänto pagan mensualmente por eso? (cifra, 99=no se) 
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SECCION 6- REMESAS 
73) LHay alguien en el hogar que reciben remesas del extranjero o dentro de Nicaragua, o 
reciben pensiones del gobierno? 1) Si 2) no (si no, ve to a la 79). 
74) LQuien las recibe? 1) encargado 
4) hijo 5) Otro pariente (m) 
2) encargada 
6) Otro pariente (f) 
3) hija 
75) LCuänto reciben cada mes? (cifra en C$, 099 = no se) 
76) Como utilizan estas remesas? 
77) LDe parte de quien? 1) compafiera 2) companero 3) hijo 4) hija 
5) otro pariente(m) 6) otro pariente(f) 7) diferentes personas 
8) gobierno 
78) LDe donde los envian? 1) Costa Rica 2) Honduras 3) Guatemala 
4) El Salvador 5) Belice 6) Mexico 7) Estados Unidos 8) Dentro de 
Nicaragua fuera de Masaya 9) Dentro de Nicaragua dentro de Masaya 
099) Otro (especifique) 
SECCION 7- GENERAL 
79) LLa situacion de las mujeres en Nicaragua ha cambiado desde el 1996 (gobierno de 
Aleman)? 
1) Si 2) no 3) igual 4) no opinion 
80) i, Si ha cambiado, como ha cambiado, y por que? 
81) LLa situacion de los hombres en Nicaragua ha cambiado desde el 1996? 
1) si 2) no 3) igual 4) no opinion 
82) LSi ha cambiado, como ha cambiado, y por que? 
83) ß, E1 trabajo que hacen las mujeres aqui gana mäs dinero que hace 4 anos (Antes del 
gobierno de Alemän), o menos?? 1) Mas 2) Menos 
3) Igual 099) No se 
84) LEI trabajo que hacen los hombres aqui gana mäs dinero que hace 4 anos (Antes del 
gobierno de Alemän, o menos? )? 1) Mas 2) Menos 3) Igual 
099) No se 
MUCHAS GRACIAS POR VUESTRA PACIENCIA Y PARTICIPACION 
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ANNEX 2: MAP OF THE CITY OF MASAYA 
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ANNEX 3: MAP OF '1'11h; REGION BETWEEN MASAYA AND MANAGUA 
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ANNEX 4: MAP OF NICARAGUA 
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